December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

P.S. on chain letters
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A week or so ago I was ranting about chain letters and other memes - well, today I came across some well-research Web site hosted by Kenneth Han (Black Unicorn may know him) - check out http://www.gwu.edu/~khan if you care about more analysis of the Craig Sherhorn phenomenon. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Symantec's claim.
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:45 PM 11/25/96 +0200, cracker(a)icon.co.za wrote: > >In light of recent claims,i would like somebody to clear this up for me. >There seems to be a great deal of conjecture over wether or not the Deeyenda Virus exhists. >Symantec denies it's existence,although i hear differently?? >Greatly appreciate anyone who can shed some light on the subject,even though C-punks list doesnt usually deal with this topic of thought ;) >Anyone come across the pkz300 trojan,if you have it send it please. >A student,a paper,and a possible future career are at stake here,so please dig deep into your >pockets!!!!!! Asking a lot i know! Deeyenda is a hoax. (Very similar to "Good Times" and aimed towards the same audience.) Info on it can be found at: http://www.kumite.com/myths/myth027.htm --- | "Remember: You can't have BSDM without BSD." | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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A source of entropy?
by inssdl＠dstn21.dct.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last weekend I spent time formatting a little over 100 new floppies. When I was staring at the monitor between changes, I started looking at the volume serial number that was being thrown up for each disk. These *appeared* to be unpredictable from the previous serial number given. If the serial number is represented as xxxx-yyyy then sometimes yyyy would be one less than the previous yyyy but xxxx always seemed to be "random". The disks were all brand new, no errors (from a couple of boxes of 50 and some odd ones), formatted at the Win95 DOS prompt with 'format a: /u' no volume labels and pressing 'y' to format the next disk. Would anyone like to comment on the possible entropy from these serial numbers, even if it's only to say "Don't be daft, DOS derives the numbers like this..." I'll probably be doing a similar number next weekend. If any interest is generated from this post, I could always record the serial numbers given to the next batch to look for correlations. (Please don't reply with 'invest in a bulk-formatter' - I can't afford one right now.) ********************************************************************** David Lucas PGDip Software Engineering @@ BEng(Hons) Civil Engineering Postgraduate Software Engineer, University of Abertay Dundee, SCOTLAND @ E-mail: inssdl(a)dstn21.dct.ac.uk @ 2+2 = 5 for large values of two @ If you're not living on the edge, then you're taking up too much space Organisations can't have opinions, only people can and these are mine. Dave's Doorstep is back!!!! - http://river.tay.ac.uk/~i95dl/index.html **********************************************************************

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Fwd: Your Email Privacy Has Been Compromised
by EBDAVIS＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FYI --------------------- Forwarded message: From: securityadmn(a)netsecurity.yes Date: 96-11-18 05:31:58 EST This Message Contains Important Information About Violations of Your On-Line Privacy. *Email and Online Security Violations.* Please be advised that information contained in email is similar to a post card. It can easily be read in transit and does not go directly from your computer, to the computer of the recipient. Your message often passes through the hands of countless computer systems on its path to where you sent it. Because of this, it can easily be seen by many prying eyes on the way to its destination. If you are mailing personal, business or financial data it is unwise to use traditional email. There are many people on the net who profit by snooping in the open "post card" style email that most account holders utilize. Programs are readily available to make this task simple. Additionally, many people are purchasing mailing lists which contain your email address. If you do not wish to receive unsolicited email, there are a number of free and highly effective steps you can take to recapture your privacy. The personal exposure spoken of is not limited to email. If you make use of other internet services such as the World Wide Web, your privacy is at even greater risk. Unless secure, any information you enter on a form can be read in transit, just like email. Additionally, most of the information providers you contact on the web routinely collect information about you in high detail. This information goes right down to where you are located, and what kind of computer and operating system you use! To combat this problem, many countermeasures have been developed of which most account holders remain unaware. The on line criminals would like to keep it that way. Every net citizen needs to learn to stop sending "Post Cards" and stop allowing distant machines to accumulate large amounts of information about who they are and their interests. There are many simple things you should be doing right now to protect your privacy. Most of the best countermeasures available are FREE. This is because there is still a very strong vein of computer experts on the net who believe in an individual's right to privacy. There are excellent, completely free programs that you should be using right now to browse the web in an untraceable and private manner, and send email that only the recipient can read! You don't need to be a computer expert to use these tools. They often take little or no additional time and are designed to be very simple for the computer illiterate to use. The computer gurus that designed these programs know that it is extremely important that average net citizens make use of them. They have designed and continually revised them with that in mind. My name is Jeff Martin, my associates and I have spent a great deal of time researching this subject. It is my goal to provide you with access to the best resources available to keep your communications private. My information relates to both email and other aspects of the internet such as the World Wide Web. This information was put together because I don't feel that others are making it available in this form of wide distribution, and it needs to be done. The internet is just like a city in that you need some street smarts to keep yourself as safe as possible. That's the kind of information I wish would have been provided to me when I began to go on line, and it is what I have tried hard to put together to help you out. In my program you'll learn: *How to send email that cannot be traced. *How to send email to your friends and associates that cannot be read in transit. *How to post anonymously to Newsgroups. *How to browse the web and download files anonymously. *Why you should (almost) never send financial information over the net. *How to prevent your name from being gathered and sold for bulk email use. *And Much, Much, Much, More .... My package is a treasure trove of valuable information collected to guarantee your privacy! This is the first time I am making this information available. In a short while, the program will be retailing for $59.95. However, if you respond within the next 7 days of receiving this message you will receive the special price of $19.95. Because of the amazing expansion of the internet, I have decided to make this offer so that everyone can afford to learn how to protect themselves from the net's growing criminal element. After seven days you may still order the program at its retail price of $59.95. Additionally, if you order within the next 48 hours, I'll include a very special report about how you can get a free email address and account to use from just about anywhere in the U.S. I'll show you how, but you must order within the next 48 hours! HOW TO ORDER I strive very hard to protect your security. I do not accept unsecure credit card or check information by email, because it is too easily intercepted. While this could increase my orders, I feel that your security as a customer is more important. I am a small business person and keeping up with phoned and faxed in orders has proven to be too difficult for me. Therefore I now only accept orders via postal (snail) mail. Please be certain to give me your email address when ordering. I prefer to ship orders via email so that you can have my information as soon as possible. To order send a check, money order, or credit card information (Visa, MasterCard, Discover) to me at: Jeff Martin POB 72106 Newport, Kentucky 41072 Any credit card orders must use the attached form below. Thank you very much for your time. Best Wishes, Jeff Martin This information will always be held in the strictest confidence. Credit Card: Visa Mastercard Discover Card #:______________________________________ Expiration Date:__________________ Name on Card:________________________________ Please indicate amount $__________ ($19.95) or (59.95) SIGNATURE:x________________________ DATE:x__________________ Copyright 1996, Jeff Martin. All rights reserved.

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Symantec's claim.
by cracker＠icon.co.za 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In light of recent claims,i would like somebody to clear this up for me. There seems to be a great deal of conjecture over wether or not the Deeyenda Virus exhists. Symantec denies it's existence,although i hear differently?? Greatly appreciate anyone who can shed some light on the subject,even though C-punks list doesnt usually deal with this topic of thought ;) Anyone come across the pkz300 trojan,if you have it send it please. A student,a paper,and a possible future career are at stake here,so please dig deep into your pockets!!!!!! Asking a lot i know! J a m e s "Lead.Follow. Or get out of the way" ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 1024/9E318AA5 1996/09/24 Cracker <cracker(a)icon.co.za> -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3ia mQCNAzJHdKwAAAEEALl3A6auLG0JLdtgEzl6KfPNqbTTSDX4L4To2b7PLqGDVV5r BezC9dD/ITrCK9M64juiQ2p/DNjIihnXlEsJCy2btypStypQgU1fvAei3AnZ1cQ8 NiAnHNS+ImUAJgZjSHEQSevGE53IUovmWQ7YHUz9VpTTCtoJoUKxYuqeMYqlAAUR tBxDcmFja2VyIDxjcmFja2VyQGljb24uY28uemE+iQCVAwUQMkd0rkKxYuqeMYql AQEjagP/cYgGLAkWZJLeRcM4URwBX3J/0R54DadVnsvvoxDkzilv7U02IXZGZGnA CvXsu2sThS7qDBiHFop/OZs3WmlQbQ4BAZ/hiCs5tSU2e7fkk0EKxsGAD1pTbw/J rRU4WePLc++vv+6CBKw5NCSR5kMh8H3X4qtZZ9dYX9zsuzWKdpk= =YGH8 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Symantec's claim.
by cracker＠icon.co.za 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In light of recent claims,i would like somebody to clear this up for me. There seems to be a great deal of conjecture over wether or not the Deeyenda Virus exhists. Symantec denies it's existence,although i hear differently?? Greatly appreciate anyone who can shed some light on the subject,even though C-punks list doesnt usually deal with this topic of thought ;) Anyone come across the pkz300 trojan,if you have it send it please. A student,a paper,and a possible future career are at stake here,so please dig deep into your pockets!!!!!! Asking a lot i know! J a m e s "Lead.Follow. Or get out of the way" ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 1024/9E318AA5 1996/09/24 Cracker <cracker(a)icon.co.za> -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3ia mQCNAzJHdKwAAAEEALl3A6auLG0JLdtgEzl6KfPNqbTTSDX4L4To2b7PLqGDVV5r BezC9dD/ITrCK9M64juiQ2p/DNjIihnXlEsJCy2btypStypQgU1fvAei3AnZ1cQ8 NiAnHNS+ImUAJgZjSHEQSevGE53IUovmWQ7YHUz9VpTTCtoJoUKxYuqeMYqlAAUR tBxDcmFja2VyIDxjcmFja2VyQGljb24uY28uemE+iQCVAwUQMkd0rkKxYuqeMYql AQEjagP/cYgGLAkWZJLeRcM4URwBX3J/0R54DadVnsvvoxDkzilv7U02IXZGZGnA CvXsu2sThS7qDBiHFop/OZs3WmlQbQ4BAZ/hiCs5tSU2e7fkk0EKxsGAD1pTbw/J rRU4WePLc++vv+6CBKw5NCSR5kMh8H3X4qtZZ9dYX9zsuzWKdpk= =YGH8 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel remailer accepts PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 25 Nov 96 6:45:17 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de -++---++++++ 1:58:22 99.99% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ************ 14:14 99.98% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net **--#+**#**# 7:03 99.89% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ++**++***** 35:06 99.84% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ****** ***** 5:08 99.79% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++++++++ 38:35 99.62% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +++++-+*++++ 39:55 99.61% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---.------- 7:31:23 99.55% nym config(a)nym.alias.net *#**###*+## 1:05 99.51% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -++ ++++++ 2:02:00 98.98% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++++--+++-+ 1:16:28 98.92% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net +*--------- 2:30:43 98.78% replay remailer(a)replay.com ********** * 10:10 98.48% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com +------ -- 2:40:34 97.86% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com - .-+*+ ++ 3:09:24 95.37% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ######### 1:40:10 86.24% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: GELP/was:Word List
by wireinfo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>That should be a "what" is GELP. > >It's a type of sea weed. it's a dessert topping. <bong gurgle>, iMp ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "Call any vegetable, and the chances are good / That the vegetable will respond to you." Frank Zappa ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | any replies go here | no e-mail replies to usenet posts | ------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: John Gilmore is playing with himself
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

frantz(a)netcom.com (Bill Frantz) wrote: >At 6:15 AM 11/24/96 -0500, aga <aga(a)dhp.com> wrote: >>On Sun, 24 Nov 1996, John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: >actually the message was from lucifer(a)dhp.com: > >>> aga <aga(a)dhp.com> writes: >... messages suppressed You bet they want to suppress the truth about them being faggots! Faggot John Gilmore does NOT eat pussy. He only eats asshole if it's got a big dick up in front. Whoever calls Gilmore bisexual is a fucking liar. John likes to suck cocks at his San Fransicso bathhouse (the Toad Hole). >It looks like our juvenile "friend" is talking to himself. I am truely >sorry that he feels a need to harass ladies who have actually made ^ >something of their lives. Gilmore's friends try to drag every lady Gilmore knows into this shit. Gilmore is a fag. Gilmore does NOT eat pussy. Not Denning's, not Dyson's. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >Bill Frantz | The lottery is a tax on | Periwinkle -- Consulting >(408)356-8506 | those who can't do math. | 16345 Englewood Ave. >frantz(a)netcom.com | - Who 1st said this? | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA You can say that again, good buddy. diGriz

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DCSB: Money Laundering -- The Headless Horseman of the Infocalypse
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----BY SAFEMAIL----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents "Black Unicorn" "Money Laundering -- The Headless Horseman of the Infocalypse" Tuesday, December 3, 1996 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA S. L. vonBernhardt, <mailto:unicorn@schloss.li>, is an attorney, a member of the board of directors of two European financial institutions, author of "Practical and Legal Problems Confronting the Asset Concealer in Relation to Offshore Financial and Corporate Entities" and a former member of the intelligence community. He is currently working to develop and preserve institutions dedicated to traditional standards of financial privacy. One of the most disturbing products of the "war on drugs" has been the effective criminalization of many forms of formerly legal financial transactions. The resulting legislation places serious burdens on financial institutions in the form of "due diligence" requirements, as well as building what can be an inflexible barrier before those who would implement uncompromised digital commerce systems. Mr. vonBernhardt will address the legislative burdens imposed on financial institutions, the likely impact on future systems of digital commerce, potential solutions through regulatory arbitrage, and the practical problems facing jurisdictions seeking to enforce regulations in the face of advanced systems of digital commerce. No cameras, please. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, December 3, 1996 from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $27.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men, and "appropriate business attire" for women. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, November 30, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston". If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Planned speakers for DCSB are: January Rodney Thayer Applying PGP To Digital Commerce February David Kaufman 1996 in Review / Predictions for 1997 March TBA April Stewart Baker Encryption Policy and Digital Commerce We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, rah(a)shipwright.com . For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . Looking forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----BY SAFEMAIL----- Version: 1.0b4 e22 iQCVAwUBMpmydfgyLN8bw6ZVAQEvkQQAnmg8R3OF4IJpc+xVCRut8O0O9M4ZKOkG 5iD8b+XkdAZ7UTCqAQqqL8CTIlhEn9KLzRGIQbhx+V66qAbs/9nNRFMcFgmAjKy8 TuJlRNmjgF09jrr5tWgGpH9J5K1jmGqMDOc27Cr7TLMmgdTbzcQS9oUfpmoRpNns SFShKt2JHxA= =5/Zo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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