December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Making Remailers Widespread [REMAILERS]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:37 AM 9/29/96 EDT, you wrote: >How about: maintain a list of trusted blocking-list sites (comparable to the >list of remailers used for chaining) and when it comes the time to update the >local copy of the blocking list, ask a random one on the list; if it's down, >ask another random one on the list. There may even be more than one list. :-) Getting more complex, but it might be workable. >> sender-blocking list ... >With most ISP's it's trivial to forge one's From: header in SMTP. >Switching to another dime-a-dozen throwaway account is also trivial. >Just admit that you can't block senders, and don't pretend that you >can - false pretenses destroy one's credibility. You obviously can't source-block a determined spammer, but you can slow down some spam attacks, especially if they're one individual using his/her regular account. It's no panacaea, but it helps. Also, if you source-block based on patterns anywhere in the header, you can catch less capable email forgers. >I think I see a way to accomplish this without too much trouble. >When an e-mail is directed at u@c4.c3.c2...c1, the code that checks >for blocking will search for the following records in the blocking list: >u@c4.c3.c2...c1 (exact match) >*@c4.c3.c2...c1 (replace user by *) >u@*.c3.c2...c1 (replace leftmost .-separated piece of domain by *) >*@*.c3.c2...c1 (both) >and repeat until there are only 2 components left in the domain name. That'd work. It's clunky, but there's no avoiding clunkiness for this sort of thing, and it does preserve privacy. >Now, the question is, who would be allowed to add records containing >'*' to the blocking list using the cookie protocol? I suggest that it be >one of the contacts listed in Internic's database. postmaster@domain is (ostensibly) guaranteed to exist. The Internic database is an interesting alternative, but for this I suspect postmaster is good enough. There's also the problem that for many domains, where smallcompany.com is virtual on an ISP, the Internic database will generally list someone at the ISP, who probably has no interest in the issue, rather than someone responsible for making decisions about smallcompany.com >Thus a blocking record for cypherpunks(a)toad.com could be added by >anyone listed in toad.com's Internic entry. There's no need for any >Remailer Cabal [tinc] to maintain blocking lists. For destination blocking, I agree that users should be able to block their own stuff as automagically as possible. For source blocking, most of the need is for spams and abusers that have been tracked down (or identify themselves in their postings), and that takes human thought. In particular, spammers are unlikely to block themselves from the remailers (:-), but forgers may try to block legitimate users. >One other suggestion: instead of storing one bit of information (the >address is on the list or not), why not have several flag bits. >E.g., the blocking list could contain records similar to: >hash - e.g. 160-bit SHA >flags - e.g. reserve 32 bits Interesting. I suspect the state of the art would be to collect the bits with a disclaimer that there isn't any code to interpret them :-), but it does let you build a blocking database that's usable as capabilities grow. Any suggestions for flags besides block/allow one-way, block/allow two-way, and max-size? I'm thinking of doing a remailer that instead of sending you a message, it sends you a retrieval cookie and lets you send it back to collect the message; blocking that would be another flag. The other kind of blocking that needs adding is blocking by words in message bodies - the spammer that caused me to shut down my remailer and not bring it back up was posting hate messages with somebody else's name and email signed at the bottom. It only took one or two to generate a flood of flames to the victim, and my current remailer couldn't block any followups. Also, since the spammer wasn't generating the flames himself, his spam slipped under the remailer's spam counter, just as hipcrime's did. This sort of blocking also lets you block things like the hipcrime spam and MAKE MONEY FAST. But it's a much more sensitive problem - anybody who can add things to the body-checking list can start doing real censorship, and it's probably best to leave that to individual operators to block, or at least to turn on by hand rather than default. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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the key of DES
by yjkim＠ssrnet.snu.ac.kr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, all ! With given a unknown DES system with 64 bits plaintext p, ciphertext c, can there be MORE THAN ONE keys ? If so, How is the probability (big or small)? Sincerely, - Yoonejong =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Yoonjeong Kim Email: yjkim(a)ssrnet.snu.ac.kr Department of Computer Engineering Phone: +82-2-875-7726 (office) Seoul National University +82-2-872-9801 (home) Seoul 151-742 Korea Fax: +82-2-875-7726 =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

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(Firewalls) Where is that Snake Oil FAQ again?
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may of course, just be a troll. ----- Forwarded message from Anonymous ----- >From firewalls-owner(a)GreatCircle.COM Sun Sep 29 21:27:09 1996 Date: Mon, 30 Sep 1996 02:37:26 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <199609300037.CAA20690(a)basement.replay.com> Subject: New Release - Software OTP Encryption. Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII To: firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Organization: Replay and Company UnLimited XComm: Replay may or may not approve of the content of this posting XComm: Report misuse of this automated service to <abuse(a)replay.com> Sender: firewalls-owner(a)GreatCircle.COM Precedence: bulk I apologize for this intrusion into your affairs. Please forgive but we do have important information that will be of interest to Internet users. Would you like to secure your hard disk files against compromise by Internet Interlopers? Would you like to communicate over Internet in absolute privacy? We can provide you with the tools necessary to do those two things in an absolute sense. Briefly, we have developed the first software sourced OTP, which is provably as good as any hardware sourced OTP that can possibly be be generated. Most experts thought that this could not be done, but we have done it, and can prove it. Our prices are: - $95.00 for a complete dual user system, the full package for two users, but your communications are limited to that single user - - $95.00 for a complete Elita unlimited usage system - that is you can protect your internal files, and communicate with anyone else that has an Elita system, or more comprehensive Ultima system below. - $195.00 for a complete Ultima Internet/intranets system, this allows user to protect their own files - communicate with anyone that has an Ultima, or an Elita, system - to form hierarchal work groups that provide the same protection - and to customize their system variables to achieve the maximum entropy. We are also going to open up the whole company for outside participation - it is going to a completely open Internet Distributive Company, we believe the first one of its kind. Anyone is welcome to participate in the venture. All marketing is to be done on an lucrative MLM basis, program development will be done on a royalty/commission on adjusted gross income basis. Everyone that participates will share in the rewards. System testing will also be handle in a similar manner, and system engineering will be handled on a fee for services and participation basis. If you can perform, you can win big, really big. If you just try to perform, you will still win. This is an important opportunity for you, take advantage of it at this most opportune time, To order, call us at 817-691- 1081, or write to us at 2629 Plaza Parkway, Suite B-20, Wichita Falls, Texas, or order through Internet or e-mail us at: ipgsales(a)netprivacy.com. For more details, visit our web site at: http://www.netprivacy.com Our apologies again, but we believe it to be important. Appreciatively, Don Wood, IPG "None can be so true to your secret as yourself." - Sa'Di ----- End of forwarded message from Anonymous ----- -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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An ITAR moment
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm currently sitting in a computer lab at the ICM in Warsaw, at a workshop on caching in the web. I wanted to log back home to check my email, so I asked if they had telnet or something. "Actually, we're disabling rlogin and telnet on our machines - can you use ssh?". Simon --- Cause maybe (maybe) | In my mind I'm going to Carolina you're gonna be the one that saves me | - back in Chapel Hill May 16th. And after all | Email address remains unchanged You're my firewall - | ........First in Usenet.........

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Re: The Petaflops Boondoggle Computer (was PET_ard)
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> On Sun, 29 Sep 1996 12:16:27 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > > >Symmetric multiprocessing is available, but it's often much less hassle to > >have a single CPU running at 200 MHz than to try games with multiple > >processors (which means more PCB real estate, more sockets, more of other > >things). > > As far as SMP goes, it's actually not all that expensive. People in the > linux-smp list have reported differences of as little as $50 for a > uniprocessor vs. dual pentium system. Of course, every so often we'll get a > message about a $30,000 system that can handle up to <drool>64 Pentium > Pros</drool>! Check out http://www.ssd.intel.com/tflop.html, where Intel is building a 9000 Pentium Pro (200 MHz) machine for Sandia. Yes, it runs Unix, and they've already delivered the first 64 processor node. When finished, it will have 600Gbyte RAM, 200Tbyte disk, and run at about 1.8 Tflops, and cover about 1600 square feet. Price? 46 M$, or about $5k/processor. Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Re: Utah as a Religious Police State
by Deana Holmes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 29 Sep 96 at 17:36, Ryan Russell/SYBASE wrote: > Hmm...never heard that one before. Care to produce > a reference? > > (Or am I supposed to be ignoring this guy when he > makes ridiculous claims?) > > Ryan I suspect that Dmitri is referring to the Mountain Meadows Massacre. It's not a pretty story and is one of the low points of Mormon history. The late historian Juanita Brooks wrote about the masscre, and about the leader, John D. Lee, in a couple of books. > ---------- Previous Message ---------- > To: cypherpunks > cc: > From: dlv @ bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) @ smtp > Date: 09/29/96 05:54:09 PM > Subject: Re: Utah as a Religious Police State > > Ryan Russell/SYBASE writes: > > I guess that depends on your definition of liberty. The Mormons > > originally moved there to have a place to practice their religion, > > and have freedom from persecution. I suppose one could extend that > > to wanting a place to have the freedom to have a set of rules consistant > > with their beliefs. Should that include freedom from interferance from > > folks such as yourself who want to change their rules, even though > > you're not presently effected? > > It's worth noting that one of Utah mormons favorite pastimes was to ambush > the settlers heading for California, kill them all, and take their property. > However the mormons were dealt with much less severely than the local Indians > who tried the same tricks. Pity. ===end vulis rant=== Deana Deana M. Holmes April 1996 poster child for clueless $cientology litigiousness alt.religion.scientology archivist since 2/95 mirele(a)xmission.com

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Re: Utah as a Religious Police State
by Deana Holmes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 30 Sep 96 at 0:55, Moroni wrote: > I never cease to be surprised by the interest that gentiles show in > working mormon communities while totally neglecting their own failing > areas. <rant on> I never cease to be surprised by Mormon apologists who refuse to look in the mirror at problems in so-called "working Mormon communities." I moved to Utah 2 years ago from Texas. Even though I am nominally Mormon (I haven't been to Church in years), it was still a huge culture shock to me. I think the thing that bugs me the most is the way the political system is dominated by a 500 lb. elephant known as the LDS Church. We Utahns sit in a room with this elephant that eats and s**ts and yet we don't talk about the fact that it's there. This is Utah for you...Utah where during the first legislative session I was here (1995) the legislature spent 42 out of 45 days talking about whether they were going to have tightened ethics laws. Where during the last legislative session (1996) the legislature spent 42 of 45 days discussing what to do about the fact that a few kids in one of the Salt Lake high schools wanted to have a gay/lesbian/straight club. NO MATTER that the schools are horribly overcrowded and that in some elementary grades 40-plus students per classroom is the norm. NO MATTER that teachers are horribly underpaid in a state with California-style costs. NO MATTER that despite a $100 million surplus the governor and the legislature can't see clear to get rid of the sales tax on *food*. NO MATTER that if anything terribly controversial (or even not so controversial) comes up, someone in the legislature feels like they have to sound out the Church to make sure that they don't cross Gordon B. Hinckley or Boyd K. Packer and endanger their Church membership. In the meantime, our legislators (with Church approval, these are Church "callings") run down to the prison at Point of the Mountain to "counsel" convicted child abusers and then pass laws to get rid of minimum mandatory sentencing. The roads are falling apart here, the schools are overcrowded. Gang violence is prevalent up and down the Wasatch Front. I heard about a gang-related murder in Layton last weekend. Up until a month ago, when the mayor of Salt Lake City closed the place and forced them out, there was a well-known open-air drug supermarket going on in Pioneer Park. Legislative leaders think that they're above the Open Meetings law. And liquor laws still are pretty backwards. (Gee, just last week places that sell beer actually got permission to put signs that say "BEER" instead of "BEE?" on their premises.) Thing is, Utah is generally a wonderful place to live. As I said, I used to live in Texas. It's great to live in a place where the economy is booming and there are jobs available. The crime rate is pretty low for an urban community (but there are sore spots, as I indicated above). The scenery is downright spectacular. And Salt Lake City proper is a pretty cool place. But I don't believe that Utah is immune to the problems that beset other cities. One thing that would help is for Utah opinion-makers to admit that not everyone who lives in this "pretty, great state" is a devout Mormon and/or a Republican. Not everyone shares the same values as the dominant religion, and they shouldn't have to. I apologise to the cypherpunks mailing list for this rant, but not everyone in Utah agrees with the view expressed by Moroni above. Deana Deana M. Holmes April 1996 poster child for clueless $cientology litigiousness alt.religion.scientology archivist since 2/95 mirele(a)xmission.com

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Re: What about making re-mailers automatically chain?
by Geoffrey C. Grabow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:30 09/29/96 -0800, you wrote: >At 4:14 AM -0500 9/29/96, David E. Smith wrote: > >>I dunno about that one. Even if the message itself is encrypted, >>every remailer has to have the address of the final recipient for >>your plan to work. And if you have cleartext for that message >... > >Actually, as I read the original proposal, it was to only _insert_ >additional links. Thus, imagine the following remailer chain, with Alice >sending to Zeke through a chain, represented in parentheses (like LISP): > That's what I was going for. The re-mailer would only add links if the recip that it sees is another mailer. If it doesn't recognize the destination as a remailer, it must assume that it's the last link and should send the mail. If that doesn't happen Dave's right. Multiple mailers would know the final dest. The question I was heading for on this is: Does this add anything useful? Removing knowledge of the path from the sender is a plus. This prevents anyone, even the sender, from being able to give up any useful info even if under court order. Adding "random" traffic is helpful 'cause many people (including myself) use pre-fab anon scripts and therefore use the same anon paths all the time (I should stop that). This opens those messages up to some analysis and the possibility of the sender being revealed. Granted, these are not major items. The real question is: Is this worth implementing? As gbroiles(a)netbox.com said: >All of this (adding remailer status tracking based on frequent updates of >digitally signed information from a trusted third party) can be done, but >it's a pain in the ass to code... G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | Great people talk about ideas. | | Oyster Bay, New York | Average people talk about things. | | gcg(a)pb.net | Small people talk about people. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | PGP 2.6.2 public key available at http://www.pb.net/~wizard | | and on a plethora of key servers around the world. | | Key ID = 0E818EC1 | | Fingerprint = A6 7B 67 D7 E9 96 37 7D E7 16 BD 5E F4 5A B2 E4 | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | That which does not kill us, makes us stranger. - Trevor Goodchild | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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ADJ_ust
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

9-30-96. NYP: "National Security Experts Plan for Wars Whose Targets and Weapons Are All Digital." Is the threat real, or is this just another way to win scarce funds? Military and intelligence officials believe that enemy nations, terrorists and criminal groups either already have the capability to mount information warfare strikes or soon will. Criminals are quickly progressing beyond the vandalism and petty theft associated with teen-aged hackers and into robbery and extortion schemes ranging up to millions of dollars, corporate executives and private investigators say. Others reply that the worst threats mentioned are mostly speculation. "Information warfare is a risk to our nation's economy and defense," said Martin Libicki, a senior fellow at the National Defense University. "But I believe we will find ways to cope with these attacks, adjust and shake them off, just as we do to natural disasters like hurricanes." ----- http://jya.com/adjust.txt (14 kb) ADJ_ust

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Re: [AP] Afghanistan
by Wayne H. Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:57 PM 9/29/96 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: >"Wayne H. Allen" <whallen(a)capitalnet.com> writes: > >> At 04:10 AM 9/29/96 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: >> >Afghanis publicly hanged their former president, Najibullah [no last name]. >> >Other countries should follow their example. >> > >> >> And this would accomplish???? And this has what to do with cryptography?? > >Nothing, of course - neither do Timmy May's stupid rants, lies, and personal >attacks. > >By the way, your abuse of your native language suggests that you're probably >a product of U.S. public education. > > And you would be far off base once again. Wayne H.Allen whallen(a)capitalnet.com Pgp key at www.capitalnet.com/~whallen

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