December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

G48_bul
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CIAC has issued Bulletin G-48 on the denial-of-service attacks by TCP SYN flooding and IP spoofing. Two "underground magazines" for intruders have recently published code to conduct denial-of-service attacks by creating TCP "half open" connections. Any system connected to the Internet and providing TCP-based network services such as a Web server, FTP server, or mail server is potentially subject to this attack. Systems providing TCP-based services to the Internet community may be unable to provide those services while under attack and for some time after the attack ceases. See the bulletin below for information on how to protect your site from these attacks. ----- http://jya.com/g48bul.txt (15 kb) G48_bul

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Re: FCC's Hundt calls for univ service for Net, nixes iphone regs
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:04 AM 9/21/96, David M. Rose wrote: >On Fri, 20 Sep 1996, Declan McCullagh wrote: >>[Note that the 'we" paying for the shipping clerk's network is a >>private corporation spending its own money. But the second "we" is the >>government spending netizens' money. Guess the FCC can't tell the >>difference. --Declan] > >Correct. And if "we" fund universal service, then "we" don't want to see >anything on the Net about non-GAK crypto, the right to bear arms, freedom of >association, chemistry, non-clothed persons, taxes, etc. etc. "We" feel >that many if not "all American, but especially kids in classrooms" would be >injured by these thoughts. This is a terribly important point. If the "universal access" scheme is approved and deployed, it gets the government back into the regulation of the Net business. (I'm speaking of the "regulation of the Net" of the sort that existed some years back, when "appropriate use" (scientific, technical, educational, etc.) was the watchword, and casual chatter, GIFs, etc. were called "inappropriate" by some. The Constitutional issues of free speech would remain mostly unchanged even if "universal access" happens, but the government would definitely get more of a foot in the door than it has now. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Private Idaho 2.8b beta release
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The beta release of Private Idaho 2.8b is now available at http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/pi.html. (Previous beta testers can get an updated version of just the executable at http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/pi_list.html) Private Idaho is a freeware PGP, anonymous remailer, and nym server front-end for Windows (all versions). Some of the new features in the latest release include: ------------------ Automatic encrypt/decrypt of PIDAHO.INI, NYMS.TXT, PUBKEYS.OUT Automatic encrypt/decrypt of SECRING.PGP and PUBRING.PGP nym.alias.net support Generate key pair command Load passphrase at startup Submit key to MIT server command Get key from MIT server command (must have Net connection) Update remailer info command (must have Net connection) Get remailer keys command (must be have Net connection) Remailer newsgroup header command Delete nym command Attachment support Bug reports, comments, and questions, as always to: joelm(a)eskimo.com

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Re: Free RSA chip
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:04 PM 9/16/96 -0700, Lucky Green wrote: >I secured a 30 page data sheet for the new NTT (actually NLC, a subsidiary >of NTT) RSA accelerator chips. The NLC0048 LSI chip can handle keys up to >1024 bits. The secret key can be stored on-chip. If you want a copy of the >data sheet, email me your fax number. > >Furthermore, I have *one* sample chip that I am willing to loan to >somebody in the SF Bay Area with sufficient hardware knowledge to put the >chip to good use. If you think you qualify, let me know who you are and >why you think that you should get the chip. I apologize in advance to the >qualified candidates that do not get the chip. There is only one (that I >can loan out). I don't want the chip, but I'd like to know a few things. 1. How much of a secure telephone does it contain? a. voice A/D/A? b. modem A/D/A DSP? c. Keyboard multiplex? d. control microprocessor? e. Encryption section? 2. Is there any indication that NT+T has worked with any other manufacturers to design some sort of inter-telephone negotiation standard, one that would allow the kind of inter-compatibility that modems have today? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: IBM_gak
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:17 AM 9/16/96 -0700, Lucky Green wrote: >On Mon, 16 Sep 1996, John Young wrote: >> 9-15-96. PcWe: >> "IBM Boosts Encryption Initiative " >> >> IBM security initiatives next month will include a >> new way to build encryption into software and >> technology that could enable U.S. companies to export >> products with strong encryption algorithms. IBM also >> will introduce several "key-recovery" technologies >> that could enable businesses to satisfy the >> requirement imposed by the U.S. government that it be >> able to access encrypted data on demand. > >Aparently, Al Gore's recent phone calls to everybody who is anybody in the >industry have paid off. After HP, TIS, and other unnamed parties, now IBM >is supporting GAK. Folks, this battle is lost. Domestic GAK is coming to >a PKI near you. So, the "Little Tramp" and the "Great Dictator" turn out to be one and the same... Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Kiddie porn on the Internet
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:33 PM 9/16/96 -0400, hallam(a)ai.mit.edu wrote: > >>Yet another obligatory AP (Assassination Politics) reference: If a person >>is really interested in helping out "starving children" he may be able to do >>far more good by purchasing the death of the local tyrant(s), rather than >>(just) buying more food. > > >The problem is that assasination rarely leads to the installation of >a government that is any better. In most cases it gets worse. There is an enormous difference in significance between the following two scenarios: 1. Tyrant A, speaking outside, gets struck by a meteorite and is instantly killed. He is immediately replaced by his second-in-command. 2. Tyrant B is told that he has been threatened with a meteorite strike by an opponent in an hour if he goes on with his speech, he ignores the "unbelievable" warning, and dies on schedule, just as he was warned, struck by a meteorite. What should his vice-thug do in THIS case?!? Physically, the same thing happened: Big boom. But the implications are vastly different. Incident 1 looks like a freak of nature that's unlikely to be repeated. It leads to very few policy changes or changes in precautions. It was a fluke. Incident 2 looks like somebody has developed a new weapon of practically supernatural capabilities. This difference is why I scoff at your attempts to equate political assassination in the past with what will be accomplished in the future. (other people have made this mistake as well; it's a common misunderstanding.) In the past, assassinations have often led to worse replacements, but that is because there is no likely prospect that the assassination will be repeated, as many times as needed, until the job is done. Partly that's because assassinations were often seen to be the work of "lone nuts" (who don't come around all that often), or because they were done by the very people who take over. In either case, the prospects of a repeat are rather low. As anyone who really understands my AP theory recognizes, getting rid of an unwanted leader will become so easy and cheap (on a per-citizen basis) that nobody would dare take the job who angered more than a tiny fraction of the population. A "worse" government would simply never be formed, unless they were suicidal. >In the past the US excuse for supporting bloodthirsty murderers like >Pinochet, Saddam, Marcos and Noriega was that the alternative was >worse. The _truth_, however, is that the alternative was worse...for the US government. It's really very simple: Let me draw an analogy. Modern organophosphate pesticides were initially developed by German chemists in the 1930's. These materials are closely related to Sarin, the well-known nerve agent that killed people in the Tokyo subway attack over a year ago. It turns out that Sarin is a rather simple molecule. Why not use it to kill bugs? Well, it kills bugs just fine. The problem, of course, is that it kills farmers just as well. Since you presumably don't want to do that, you have to go to all the trouble to find compounds that kill bugs, but are as non-toxic as possible to farmers. And if you look at the description of the contents of modern organophosphate pesticides on the bottles, you see names that only a chemist could possibly pronounce, names so long (because their molecules were so complex) that you often have to take a breath in the middle to recite. These compounds were found by individually synthesizing thousands, or even tens of thousands of compounds, and testing each one. Individually. Eventually, they found compounds which were as toxic to bugs as Sarin is to humans, but were far less toxic to humans. They found the needle in the haystack. Likewise, as I've discovered through AP, it will be easy to get rid of tyrants. The exquisitely difficult task is to get rid of ONLY SOME of the tyrants, for example Saddam Hussein, Moammar Khadafi, etc, and leaving most of the rest behind. _THAT'S_ the tricky part. I have the easy task: describing a system to get rid of them all, with no exceptions. But that's the system that nobody in the leadership of any current country wants to see. That is why you won't see Clinton announcing that he's going to use my idea to get rid of Saddam Hussein, and instead will waste hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars in a failed bid to eject the thug. Doesn't that make you feel a lot safer? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Lexis-Nexis scare = opportunity
by Omegaman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been reading articles about the recent flap over Lexis-Nexis' P-TRAK database with interest. A recent Associated Press article said that the lines at Lexis-Nexis have been jammed with individuals requesting they be removed from the database. Lexis-Nexis is certainly not the only database of its kind, but it has certainly generated quit a bit of attention and panic In terms of cypherpunk goals, I think this is a positive development. It demonstrates ever-so-clearly that the average "Joe Schmoe" does not follow the government line that privacy and security are mutually exclusive concepts. Rather, there is an instinctive recognition that privacy and security are inextricably linked. Only when the government pulls on emotional (as opposed to logical) strings by pulling out the "if you only knew what we knew" & "if it saves just one life" arguments does the easily swayed public get pulled in the other direction. The flap over P-TRAK repudiates arguments by Freeh and others that American citizens want to give up their freedoms in the interest of security. If you are in a position to influence government policy (ie. Jim Ray with Judge Kozinski, EFF personages involved in the Bernstein case, PRO-CODE advocates, et al.), then keep these clippings handy. Here is a concrete example that our government and law-enforcement leaders are woefully out of touch with average citizens (not to mention reality!). The leap from P-TRAK to GAK is not that large in the so-called court of public opinion. Sometimes monkey-wrenching is as simple as pointing out the obvious. me _______________________________________________________________ Omegaman <mailto: omega(a)bigeasy.com> PGP Key fingerprint = 6D 31 C3 00 77 8C D1 C2 59 0A 01 E3 AF 81 94 63 Send e-mail with "get key" in the "Subject:" field to get a copy of my public key _______________________________________________________________

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Re: ANYONES CREDIT CARD # per your request.
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sat Sep 21 12:32:13 1996 > > > Note: Lexis-Nexis is only accepting written or fax requests. You > have the > > > option to fax your removal request to (513) 865-1930 state your full > name > > > and complete address. Or mail the request to: > > > Lexis-Nexis > > > Attn: P-Track > > > P.O. Box 933 > > > Dayton, Ohio > > > 45401-0933 According to the 800 number, you may also be removed from their database by sending a letter to p-trak(a)prod.lexis-nexis.com. You need to send your name and address, and probably your Citizen- Unit Social Insecurity Number. dave - ----- David E. Smith, P O Box 324, Cape Girardeau MO USA 63702 dsmith(a)prairienet.org http://www.prairienet.org/~dsmith send mail with subject of "send pgp-key" for my PGP public key "The world's at stake. Don't confuse me with details." -- Captain America, "Onslaught" ... famous last words -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMkQmnzVTwUKWHSsJAQEClgf/XsSOwYPANaQBXVg+vq/Oh5qgqEMZtyxZ CVy45RYlulXWKMixmWMn7OkebSug53xVfQoBR5SlZ3oCXN+KlQm0bLI1MKiiO0nv SlRz35x6O2lkXXQcyBF1brrk++1uXRQRsKIACh/ceTdMkkTyUk+u0imRschGslqp L84BVvhi/VVASrCgmY5HbwkeeqNlzDUpa5uD9ST10G9UvCMrf6IexEOzvGvfCzmt CFOELYK6e8iiVkP8sPQgj+yQaP08LyezlYuSRu+GcZhr3QljCuOjUghjCIe/aoJk 7RRSiGC/GXGtO/Ut5pOiTOkWmaTPiHUsxnb4cX2lijLyI+jXy5K5qA== =vyc3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The GAK Momentum is Building...
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:58 PM 9/20/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Wed, 18 Sep 1996, Dale Thorn wrote: >> My comment: Once the big Corp.'s get used to the new game, they'll put >> the non-critical stuff out there for Mr. Freeh, and for the really >> secret data, if the cops confiscate anything they can't read, the Corp. >> security will put it off on a fall-guy, even as high as the CEO if >> necessary. I just wanna see one case where a federal judge will try to >> bleed a big company for contempt for "refusing" to decode and hand over >> some ostensibly encrypted data. Matter of fact, there are probably cases >> similar to this that have already been through the appeals courts. > >Several. Most involve foreign banks refusing to turn over records to U.S. >courts. Most result in powerfully large fines imposed on banks, often on >a per diem basis. But as usual, you ignore the obvious solution to the problem. Let's suppose the amount of the fine is set at $1000 per day. Actuarially, this works out to be the interest (at 5% per year) on $7.3 million dollars in principle. In other words, if you can eliminate the fine for less than $7.3 million, you're better off doing it. Naturally, you won't even consider the possibility of going outside the system to solve a problem. The rest of us notice that there are probably thousands of terminally-ill people who would gladly act as a human kamikaze and get rid of any judge inclined to impose such a fine, for a payment of 1% of this principle amount to a family member or loved one, leaving 99% available for the few other judges foolish enough to basically commit suicide by taking up a futile gesture. This kind of operation is best arranged by what might be described as an "insurance company," which will divide the risk among client companies until everyone learns what the score really is. It wouldn't take long before no such fines are ever imposed. But nah, this is much too complex for you. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: WinSock Remailer Version ALPHA 1.3 Now Available
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Remo Pini (rp(a)rpini.com) wrote: : To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com : Date: Thu Sep 19 09:07:16 1996 : Has it already been exported by some sinister anonymous? If so, where? ftp.replay.com:/pub/replay/pub/remailer/wsa13.zip where else ...? -- Alex de Joode | Replay IP Service & Web DZign -- The Netherlands usura(a)replay.com | http://www.replay.com mailto:info@replay.com

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