December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Logos -vs- Vulis
by logos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dale Thorn wrote: > Dimitri Vulis wrote: > > Lame losers who call themselves "cypher punks" and bend > > over for John Gilmore. > It is obvious that you, Dimitri Vulis, intend to be > disruptive to the operation of this list. I have politely > asked you several specific questions about your motives. Sorry for the noise, but could Logos be specific as to the fallacy in each item he/she is addressing? I thought that was the purpose of the Logos character. I indicated in my original post that I would be addressing both logic and decorum. With regard to the questions above, I was asking Dimitri Vulis to give a more detailed explanation of his thinking process. Once some of his assumptions are made explicit, it will be easier to make meaningful comments about the rigor of his reasoning process. It was never my intent to nit pick about every bit of sloppy reasoning by every poster to Cypherpunks. Rather, I am trying to elevate the general level of discourse via selective commentary and (hopefully) by example. If Dale Thorn, or anyone else, feels that a more rigourous attention to logic and/or decorum is called for, I heartily welcome your participation. Logos out

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Re: IP address
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 2 Dec 1996 04:38:46 -0600 (CST), Igor Chudov @ home wrote: >> >What is the risk of publishing your dynamic IP address to a web page while you are on line? How vulnerable is >> >someone just connected to the internet, w/o any server running? What attacks are feasable? --Internaut >> Well, if you are running Win95 (all) or 3.1 (w/certain TCP/IP stacks) your >> machine can be locked up or rebooted at *any* time using just PING! >Isn't is Unix that is actually vulnerable? Actually, it anything from Windows systems to Unix boxes to routers to printers to firewalls, etc can be vulnerable..! I know that linux got a patch out in 2 hours 35 minutes 10 seconds and that OS/2 hasn't been vulnerable since 1990 or so, but that's just because I use those systems. Check http://www.sophist.demon.co.uk/ping/ for details on your system. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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[CRYPTO] Forgery detection
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy `C' May uses an Adolf Hitler action figure as a dildo. >\\\|/< |_ ; (O) (o) -OOO--(_)--OOOo- Timmy `C' May

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RE: Counterproductive Dorothy Denning Flames
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Sir Galahad I agree. I hope that my own statements have influence in spite of my mouldy reputation. ........................................... Well, on the net nobody knows if you're mouldy, but only if your ideas are fresh. :>) You've presented some quite insightful explanations for why Ms. Denning's prestigious image would give one pause to consider her with reprehension, if not outright contempt. As they say, YMMV, depending on how educated you are on the subject of encryption, privacy, and crimes against humanity. .. Blanc

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SAIC buying Bellcore - Spooks have your number.
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The papers have been announcing recently that SAIC is buying Bellcore for ~$700M. SAIC is the spook-connected beltway bandit firm that recently bought the Network Solutions folks who run the Internet NIC. Bellcore is the Bell Labs spinoff that the RBOCs have jointly owned since the breakup of the Bell System a decade ago. One of the interesting things that Bellcore does is own and administer the North American Numbering Plan, which is the telephone numbering space for Country Code 1, including the US, Canada, and much of the Caribbean. (Mexico used to have a kluged subset of 1, but a few years ago decided to join with Latin America instead, gaining 5- prefixes.) So you want an Internet domain name? Ask SAIC. You want a phone number? Ask SAIC. It's nothing to get all paranoid about, probably, but it would be interesting to speculate what they can do with it, besides finding a post-Cold-War income stream. I wonder if the Ethernet address space or IPv4 or maybe IPv6 addresses are their next acquisition? # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk # (If this is posted to cypherpunks, I'm currently lurking from fcpunx, # so please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Laptops and TEMPEST
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Not to mention the point that an external attacker--say, the NSA van parked >across the street--will under no circumstances be able to measure "the" >spectrum: his antennas cannot possibly measure the signals (at the lower >bits) seen by the FM receiver, noise source local to the computer, whatever. Tim was talking about the Bad Guys setting your radio noise generator, but the other side of the coin is TEMPEST - making sure your computers don't emit enough radiation for Bad Guys to read it. CRTs are well known as emitters of easily decoded signal, but people have occasionally suggested on this list that laptop LCD screens are much quieter. I now have a data point on this one, and basically, it ain't so. Take a basic television with big rabbit-ear antennas. Tune to the football game on Channel 6. Take your AT&T Globalyst 250P (which is a gray NEC Versa with a Death Star), with the 16-million-color 640x480 screen in 65536-color mode, and pop up a DOS command window in white-on-black. Type a few lines of text, then look at the TV. The sync wasn't quite right, but there were about three copies of my DOS window. It may have been scrolling slowly vertically or horizontally, but it was relatively readable given the lack of resolution of the screen. A good receiver run by a Bad Guy ought to be able to set its scan rates correctly to pick up the screen at better resolution. There are obviously more variables to be explored, but other people who were present at the time considered the football game to be more important :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk # (If this is posted to cypherpunks, I'm currently lurking from fcpunx, # so please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Leaked Letter Reveals French Key-Escrow Scheme
by J. Thorel / Netpress 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

lambda 2.12 * * * * * For several months French authorities have quietly begun to build the world's first "key recovery" encryption scheme, scheduled to take effect early in 1997. But a leaked letter sent to the official security agency, the SCSSI, reveals that the so-called "trust" has some limitation in the draft project. The proposal, called a "decret d'application," is a prime ministerial decree scheduled to be issued after the Telecommunications Reform Act of July 27, 1996 (http://www.telecom.gouv.fr/francais/activ/telecom/lrt96.htm) In France, a law only takes effect after the government signs it as a decree. The decree will define the business conditions of future "trusted third party" (TTP) systems -- in French referred to as "tiers de confidentialite," or a "privacy third party" -- and stresses the difference between the two basic encryption applications: digital signature and privacy. These agents will have the role of electronic notaries, keeping crypto keys in custody for law enforcement or national intelligence purposes. Lambda Bulletin has also learned that French authorities won't impose the "key recovery" scheme as a "mandatory" one. Yet it seems clear that a company will not be able to do business-as-usual if its encryption systems aren't certified by TTPs. Is this good news for individual users? It's not certain: The law says that crypto is legal *only* if keys are kept in custody. It won't be mandatory -- however if you get caught using PGP, it could be considered as a criminal offense. The letter obtained by the press is signed by Jean-Claude Jouas, president of the computer security think tank CLUSIF, and addressed to General Jean-Louis Desvignes, head of the SCSSI. The CLUSIF represents security-related executives from large French companies (some of which are state-owned, such as Bull and Thomson) and also from private consultancies. The SCSSI decided, after intense lobbying, to meet the industry think tank -- which highly suggests that the CLUSIF saw the close-doors draft decree. * Point 1: The letter emphasizes the lack of resolving important questions such as "international exchanges." The letter says: "It shall be possible for [future TTPs] to search partners in foreign countries in order to make these international exchanges a reality, if these partners are ready to respect French national legislation...." The letter goes on to say: "section 5 [of the draft decree] presents a 'franco-francais' project," which could undermine the basic purposes of TTPs. This national approach could create a blow for the OECD initiatives to reach a worldwide consensus for encryption policies (as described in previous bulletins). Stephane Bortzmeyer, speaking for the French Internet Users Association, says: "We'll need more than these suggestions for allowing a reasonable use of crypto. For instance, the international exchanges case is simple: either PGP or SSH use are legal, or people [in France] won't be able to subscribe to CERT mailing lists." This is because CERT urges its participants to encrypt their communications (for integrity reasons). * Point 2: The so-called "certification" procedures. The CLUSIF says "concerning the users' point of view, the most critical point [is] the certification of encryption means and technologies which will be offered by the [TTP], especially concerning the trust level the users will have to afford. [Evaluation and certification] is the key point to establish a trusted relationship, and we consider it as fundamental to include [this point] in the decree". In terms of certification, people can understand that this will protect the user from possible illegal duplication of encryption private keys, thus helping to prevent illegal interception of communications. If these certification procedures are not scheduled in the draft, people could consider it as a reason for an additional lack of trust. * Point 3: The think tank severely notes that "there is nothing scheduled in the draft in the case of legal disputes ... between the user and the third party." The litigation could erupt if the TTP gives up a users' private keys to unauthorized parties (i.e., a competitor or a curious, wiretapping official...). Epilogue: The SCSSI says the final decree could be published by the end of this month. Lambda personal bet: It might be published on Friday, December 27th. (The previous crypto legislation, in 1990, was passed as law on December 29 -- and the decrees for it were officially signed in 1992, on December 28.) P.S.: The whole CLUSIF letter will be published in the French version of this bulletin (check the Web site: http://www.freenix.fr/netizen) * * * * * Short Notes * * * * * * OECD update: The OECD draft guidelines of the crypto expert group have been revealed in Austria. Check: ftp://ftp.netsphere.co.at/Public/OECD/oecd.doc This is the document that was amended during the September 26-27 meeting in Paris, thus there have been changes since then. * EPIC conference proceedings: It's a long after the event, but you can read the English version of a report on the crypto conference EPIC organized in Paris on Sept. 25, on the eve of the OECD meeting. Check the Planete Internet Web site (English translation by K. N. Cukier): http://194.51.213.12:80/interface/SendPage.exe?ID=389 * EF-Sverige: One Lambda subscriber advises people interesting in cyber-rights in Sweden to check EF Sverige, independent from the US-based organization (although, as for EF France and others, the EFF has given them the right to use the name EF-Sverige. Check their web page at: http://connectum.skurup.se/~annami/ EF-Sveridge was founded by two journalists: Anna-Mi Wendel <annami(a)connectum.skurup.se>, the chairman, and Peppe Arninge <journalist(a)peppe.pp.se>, a member of the board. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Jerome Thorel Planete Internet Journalist, Paris Editor / Redac chef thorel(a)netpress.fr 191 av A. Briand, 94230 Cachan Tel: 33 1 49085833 - fax-31 www.planete-internet.com

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Travelling With Laptops/PGP
by Evil se7en 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Problem: I will be spending a couple of months chilling out in Barcelona, Spain. I will have a local Internet account/dial-up in that city, and will use it to telnet into my various US-based accounts. This is how I plan to keep in touch with various people while I am gone. Questions: 1 - Is the importation of two laptops and it's various peripheral devices by a US citizen into Spain going to be a problem? I know it is in some European countries. 2 - Will having PGP 2.6.2, with 2048-bit keys, or any key length for this matter, installed on these two machines, cause a problem? 3 - What about having SSH and ESM installed on the laptops? Will this set off red flags as well? Now, I see a work around if this is a problem, but would like advice on this also: If I generate a temporary PGP key, and distribute it prior to my departure, and then store it on the US-based server (not a good idea, but it is a temporary key, and if it is not a problem in Spain, SSH and ESM would be in use) then bouncing out of Spain via telnet into US-based computers to process encryption/decryption, key management, etc, any encryption would never actually take place on servers outside of the US. Would this be a viable workaround? Or should I just say fuck it, and just disavow myself of any reason/need for PGP for the duration of my stay? If this is gonna be a problem, I'll just forego anything requiring encryption while I am in Spain. I have no interest in smuggling crypto in, or defying international law just to use PGP for personal use. If it's not allowed, I simply won't use it. But, I MUST be able to bring my laptops into the country. That HAS to happen. My Research: I tried to find these answers myself via conventioanl methods, and either there was no information available, or the embassy people I spoke to weren't sure. (Go figure!) So now I ask for your opinions. se7en

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Addendum
by Evil se7en 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For those who may bring this up, my questions are in relation to Spain's view of my problems, not the US view, as I can bring PGP out of the US legally. In February 1996, the ITAR rules were amended as regards personal use of cryptography. Temporary export of products for personal use is exempted from the need of a license, provided the exporter takes normal precautions to ensure the security of the product, including locking the product in a hotel room or safe. The product must not be intended for copying, demonstratrion, marketing, sale, re-export, or transfer of ownership or control. In transit, the product must remain with the exporter's accompanying baggage. The exporter must keep records of each export for five years. Export to certain "dangerous" countries (e.g., Cuba, Libya, Syria) is prohibited. See the text of the amendment. se7en

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Re: Travelling With Laptops/PGP
by Pyro Teknik 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Problem: > > I will be spending a couple of months chilling out in Barcelona, Spain. > I will have a local Internet account/dial-up in that city, and will use > it to telnet into my various US-based accounts. This is how I plan to > keep in touch with various people while I am gone. > > Questions: > > 1 - Is the importation of two laptops and it's various peripheral devices > by a US citizen into Spain going to be a problem? I know it is in some > European countries. > > 2 - Will having PGP 2.6.2, with 2048-bit keys, or any key length for this > matter, installed on these two machines, cause a problem? > > Would this be a viable workaround? Or should I just say fuck it, and just > disavow myself of any reason/need for PGP for the duration of my stay? If > this is gonna be a problem, I'll just forego anything requiring > encryption while I am in Spain. I walked straight through British, Dutch and Maltese Customs at the respective airports and they didn't even ask what was in the bag, let alone what software. I had PGP and a huge keyring stored on my hard drive and they were known the wiser. > I have no interest in smuggling crypto in, or defying international law > just to use PGP for personal use. If it's not allowed, I simply won't use > it. But, I MUST be able to bring my laptops into the country. That HAS to > happen. I'd suggest to lugging them through as hand luggage. If you are worred, zip up pgp and so on with a password - if customs do check, they aren't gonna waste breaking the zip password (even though it can be done quickly) Also, I think the law may different, as you are an American Citizen using your own equipment... [*]-------------------------------------------[*]----------------[*] [*] Pyro Teknik - <pyro-teknik(a)geocities.com> [*] Linux Guru [*] [*] www.geocities.com/SunsetStrip/Alley/7705/ [*] Phone Phreaker [*] [*]-------------------------------------------[*]----------------[*]

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