December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

PKI_gak
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

9-21-96. MiPa: System and method for centralized session key distribution, privacy enhanced messaging and information distribution using a split private key public cryptosystem (Assignee -- Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc.) The method and system also provide for authorized wiretapping, video and data distribution and private enhanced messaging (PEM). ----- http://jya.com/pkigak.txt (4 kb) PKI_gak

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Re: Bernstein hearing: The Press Release
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:44 PM 9/22/96 -0700, John Gilmore wrote: [snip] >The wording there is taken directly from the controlling Supreme Court >case, which I believe is the Pentagon Papers case. I double-checked, and it is Potter Stewart from that case. Here's the whole paragraph: "But in the cases before us, we are asked neither to construe specific regulations nor to apply specific laws. We are asked, instead, to perform a function that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not the Judiciary. We are asked, quite simply, to prevent the publication by two newspapers of material that the Executive Branch insists should not, in the national interest, bepublished. I am convinced that the Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents involved. But I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people. That being so, there can under the First Amendment be but one judicial resolution of the issues before us. I join the judgments of the Court." Interestingly, Stewart says earlier: "I should suppose that moral, political, and practical considerations would dictate that a very first principle of that wisdom would be an insistence upon avoiding secrecy for its own sake. For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained." http://www.nfoweb.com/folio.pgi/ussc-1/query=[field+case+name!3A!22new+york+ times!22]/doc/{@461998}/hit_headings? >The example used >in that case was the departure date and route of a ship carrying US >troops to war. The government could sue people who threatened to >publish such information, prior to publication, and have some chance >of winning the case. It's not a guarantee, just a pre-qualification. >The idea is that if they CAN'T show such a danger, they have NO chance >of winning. This is the beauty of Patel's earlier ruling. The fact that we are possibly talking about speech places a much stronger burden on the gov to restrict it. [snip] >The Supreme Court would ignore the prior restraint line issue anyway, >because it isn't a factor in this case. The government isn't arguing >that they have the right to prior-restrain us because of direct, >immediate and irreperable damage. Instead they argue that the >publication itself is being controlled only for its function, not for >the content of the publication, and therefore in controlling the >function, they can "incidentally" control the publication. [snip] Anyone who was at the hearing on Friday heard some form of the word "function" repeated many times. This definitely seems to be the heart of the gov's argument. I think it's not gonna float, but IANAL, either :) Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon U.S. State Censorship Page at - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/state New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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TAG_ent
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

09-21-96, MiPa: Trusted agents for open electronic commerce (Assignee -- Citibank, N.A.) Abstract: A system for open electronic commerce having a customer trusted agent securely communicating with a first money module, and a merchant trusted agent securely communicating with a second money module. Both trusted agents are capable of establishing a first cryptographically secure session, and both money modules are capable of establishing a second cryptographically secure session. ----- http://jya.com/tagent.txt (3 kb) TAG_ent --------- Reuters, 9-19-96 -- It will be 50 to 70 years before the majority of people do their business electronically, Citicorp Chairman John Reed told a conference on electronic money and banking. Issues related to privacy and security must be resolved for electronic banking to take off. Citicorp currently considers the Internet off-limits as a place to offer banking products until the security issues are solved, he said. "The Internet is fundamentally flawed in that regard right now," Reed said. "At this moment in time at least, we at Citicorp would feel very uncomfortable accommodating any transactions on the Internet," he said.

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The periodic word of advice about Timmy C. Maypole, the pathological liar
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When Timmy C. Maypole's mother gave birth to him after fucking with a bunch of sailors, she didn't know who the father was but decided to tell him that he was a Russian as the Russian sailor was the one who satisfied her the most.

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SAK_net
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

9-23-96. WaJo: "SAIC Is Near Agreement to Buy Bellcore" Bellcore led a team that cracked RSA-129, a computer code once thought uncrackable, proving the vulnerability of such systems. It holds hundreds of patents governing numerous aspects of the U.S. infrastructure. SAIC specializes in systems integration, national security, transportation and health care. SAIC is expected to tap into Bellcore's considerable software talent as it continues to pursue new contracts. Bellcore boasts network expertise that is second to none. Bellcore also helps companies recover from network failures, and its experts are widely regarded as masters at foiling computer viruses and at the intricacies of technical standards. Those talents will no doubt add value to SAIC's considerable technical assets and expertise. ----- http://jya.com/saknet.txt (7 kb) SAK_net

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash ksub latent cut ek mix reord"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 23 Sep 96 6:46:13 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++++.+---++ 2:19:14 99.99% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ************ 16:28 99.98% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++--.+-++++- 1:07:11 99.98% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net +*+ -*-***** 29:26 99.86% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #****# #*+## 1:12 99.84% replay remailer(a)replay.com *********+** 4:14 99.55% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ------+++-+ 1:01:14 99.54% winsock winsock(a)c2.org --++.------- 3:29:10 99.49% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++-+ ++* 35:32 99.43% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com --.-.------ 8:25:42 98.99% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com - --- -- - 2:14:50 97.72% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com * * ******* 5:01 97.12% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ####### #--# 55:47 96.49% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ----.- ---- 4:41:47 94.33% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Public Schools
by DMiskell＠envirolink.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>An awful lot of accomplished persons grew up in isolated areas, on small >farms, and were educated in very small classrooms (or at home). I can speak of this from experience. I (currently) live in the near vacinity of a town we amiably named "cowtown", and used to go to a small ton high school. As it turns out, one of the graduates before me at that school went on to become an astronaut -- after living in almost-vacant "cowtown" all his life. Makes /me/ proud to be a citizen of such lightly populated areas. Besides that, it's quieter, safer, and if the government comes for me, I have a kill zone of at least 5 miles. Woohoo! Daniel. -- If in fact we are the only intelligent life on this planet, why the fuck are we in this goddamn mess? -- Find my public key on the World Wide Web -- point your browser at: http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html

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Re: More proposals for European censorship
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Asgaard writes: > On Thu, 19 Sep 1996, E. Allen Smith forwarded: > > >> STRASBOURG, France (Sep 19, 1996 11:24 a.m. EDT) - The European > >> Parliament pressed the European Union on Thursday to act to curb child > >> sex and trafficking rings, saying the fight against sexual abuse of > >> children must be an "absolute priority." > It's probably no coincidence that the recently busted, utter horrible > child-molesting ring, with obvious protection from various persons > in the establishment, was centered in Belgium - that's where the EU > bureaucrat nomenklatura play their power games and go to bordellos. > Asgaard What exactly are you suggesting when you say 'it's probably no coincidence?" I can't quite figure it out. [While I've not been following the case in detail, it involves a ring of criminals in Belgium who kidnapped children to use them in child pornography. At least two little girls were starved to death when they're usefullness was over.] Are you suggesting that someone specifically set up a ring of child pornographers/murders in Belgium, then let it get caught, in an attempt to influence the EU parliment? Or are you suggesting that this particular gang of sub-humans was exposed at this time in an attempt to influence policy, implying that the Belgian LEAs knew about, but did not stop the ring until they needed a publicity coup? I find such notions utterly beyond rationality. Do you expect we're going to see a statement from some Belgian police investigator to the effect of "Yes, I knew they were raping and killing children, but was told to do nothing, and I obeyed."? There is a tendency of many on this list to demonize those we disagree with. If a person or group takes the 'wrong' stance on cryptography, key "escrow", etc, many list members will act as if that person or group were capable of any atrocity, and is acting out of the very worst of motives and hidden agendas. Such an attitude is common, but not desirable in the modern world. It served some purpose when war involved the literal massacre of one's opponents - it's easier to commit genocide against the tribe over the ridge if you demonize them into not-quite-humans, but in the modern world this is not a rational option. While it's possible to regard many policies of governments, ill-informed, self-serving, populist, and wrong, to act as if there is no significant differences between real democracies and the worst authoritarian dictatorships is absurd. Peter Trei (not representing my employer) trei(a)process.com "Your enemy is never a villain in his own eyes. Keep this in mind; it may offer a way to make him your friend. If not, you can kill him without hate -- and quickly. " - Heinlein Reccomended for US readers: "Parliment of Whores" by PJ O'Rourke

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RE: USA_exe
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:27 AM 9/23/96 -0700, Brian D Williams wrote: > > >John (jya(a)pipeline.com) posts: > >>The Washington Post reports at length today on the Defense >>Department's disclosure yesterday of heretofore classified >>training manuals used in the School of the Americas to instruct >>Latino troops on killing a wide range of civilians for political >>purposes. > >This is not particularly new news, I have a copy at home of one of >these manuals, it was put out by a humans rights group that got >their hands on it during all the El Salvador business. > >It's as nasty as it sounds... I don't suppose we need ask the question about whether such manuals were classified to keep their contents away from the enemy...or the American people. Ooops, same thing I guess. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: More proposals for European censorship
by Asgaard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 23 Sep 1996, Peter Trei wrote: > > It's probably no coincidence that the recently busted, utter horrible > > child-molesting ring, with obvious protection from various persons > > in the establishment, was centered in Belgium - that's where the EU > > bureaucrat nomenklatura play their power games and go to bordellos. > What exactly are you suggesting when you say 'it's probably no > coincidence?" I can't quite figure it out. Obviously not only the arrested killer used the schoolgirls chained in underground cells. They were for hire. High officials used his 'services', then ordered the police to cover it up. Why else would some ten policemen be arrested? The EU bureaucrats are served by hordes of prostitutes. Surely there are pedophiles among the hordes. Probably some EU pedophiles have a connection to the gang. I don't know this of course, but speculation is cheap. Asgaard

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