December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: MacGAK: Tim has a snit. Again.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:30 AM 10/4/96 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote: >It's interesting to note that the only person who is supposed to be in your >killfile is Perry Metzger, even though you respond to him anyway, >especially when he says something which offends your vanity. So, such a >killfiling claim is probably dubious. Since such luminaries as VZNuri, Dr. >Vulis, and Jim Bell are *not* in your killfile, evidenced by your >voluminous replies to them, Aw, C'mon Bob! I resent being placed in the same short list as Nuri and Vulis. While some people may consider my ideas to be similarly wacky, I try to not be NEARLY as rude as those other guys (singular?). Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: (Firewalls) Where is that Snake Oil FAQ again?
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: adam(a)homeport.org, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Oct 04 18:15:25 1996 This is the same company that made the claim earlier on this list to "break our code and own the company for $1". It definately generated a lot of comments then, I think about six months ago. They changed their name to IPG midway through the process. This should be in the archives. Sorry about the late response to this but I have been unavailable for the last four days working on a project and am just beginning to catch up on sleep and mail. Lou Zirko Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQEVAwUBMlWamctPRTNbb5z9AQGoAggAngPrYPYCOp+53BZ3Ns0XJtsI6O/PqUzQ sbxzpROa/blx9O3e1zIxbxPk1+aQcEwUXsnfFbDnciAjouaSnRzIfKG9XJ+cOy5y XRaLzBgZ3lQr3fIp7mHv5n+nsdtrj8mdgmUxYXpO9q+MwTuGL54n12Qw23rJ4KMq TSkBSgJWeqr7Mf1X2bI8ejaIbgImv9dCNFXIF+mUpKea2rarGej7lM1NOFd5FuyT umaFeOcH05pcmC8sYmaabe5i9kmDXztCiGaCD3O101a7JoIh8GOCNjg7blo7q/lZ rw77jyYpsI+3Ra67jWOMRK3p3WeBq9K8XqpP0b0Wo02R5nU1w5UnjQ== =eT3d -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Did HP get a sweetheart deal, too?
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ditto ... I expect Apple and the rest of the "gang" to announce something soon. Ern -------- From: San Jose Mercury (Breaking News) Hewlett-Packard wins $100 million NASA deals PALO ALTO, Calif. (Reuter) - Hewlett-Packard Co. said Friday that it won several contracts with a potential value of $100 million from the National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA). The contracts cover scientific and engineering workstation procurement contracts for mechanical computer-aided design and geographic information systems. The contracts cover a four year period. Hewlett-Packard will provide workstations, as well as peripherals, software, training and support services.

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Sun's GAK position
by Frank Stuart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I haven't been able to find a position statemnet from Sun Microsystems about the new GAK plan, but it looks like I did find a position. This is from "http://www.sun.com/corporateoverview/CorporateEmployment/LISTINGDIR/JobDeta…": >Created on Oct 01 1996 06:01. To return to: Employment Opportunities Home >Page. >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >Sun Employment Req#: AUF971004 > >SUMMARY > >Descriptive Title: System Engineer >Skills: Security & Cryptography Exp. >Functional Area: Engineering: Engineering >Location: Vienna, VA > >DESCRIPTION > >Extensive Security and Cryptography knowledge and skills, ability to >authoratatively present and advocatae security technologies at technical and >public policy levels, confidence and skill at writing and presenting >security documents and presentations. specific knowledge of government >security requirements. A US Government Top Secret SCI and potentially other >clearances will be necessary for this position. >The position of Principal Architect for Security and Networks requires an >individual with the following levels of education, experience and >specialized knowledge. A masters degree in a computer related field or a >bachelors degree in a computer technology and a masters degree in a business >oriented discipline is required. A minimum of twelve years of directly >related experience in computers, computer security and mission critical >systems design, and deployment is also required. Credit for four years >experience may be granted for a candidate with a masters degree in computer >science or computer security. Up to six years experience can be credited for >a PHD in somputer security. The condidate needs experience and >specializedknowledge in the areas of: >Government Security Requirementes, NSA MISSI and DoD DMS programs, Public >policy issues of cryptography and Key Escrow, Current workstation and server >hardware, Trends in network and systems security, Analysis of competing >security products and technologies. Hands-on experience with installing and >configuring computer hardward, Sun's product offerings in the security >arena, NCSC and Common Criteria evaluaations of trusted systems. Export >controls as they apply to encryption and security products. >To be successful in the position the candidatae must be able and willing to >write short analytical papers and long research documents. The position also >requires short notice or extemporaneous presentations on security, >technology and Sun specific subjects to groups of one to two hundred >customers or industry professionals. >A successful candidate must be capable of presenting themselves in an >authoritative fashion on many aspects of security in order to influence >product development in directions advantageous to Sun Federal. the candidate >must also be comfortable and confident when representing Sun and Sun Federal >in government and industry standards bodies and technology forums. >To be successful the candidate must be able to develop, define and >articulate a security vision and to develop support both within and external >to Sun for necessary technological and procedural changes necessary to >accomplish that vision. The condidate must either hold or be capable of >receiving US Government Security Clearances for Top Secret and Special >Compartmented Information. These clearances may require a CI Polygraph test. >This position will be locate in Vienna, VA and report to the Sun Federal >Director of Systems Engineering. >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >CONTACT: >Employment Agency resumes referred to this posting are considered >unsolicited; Sun does not accept unsolicted resumes. >To apply, please reference the requisition number of AUF971004 and email, >fax or mail your resume, attention Recruiter: Staffing45/OWSMI96, using: > > * Resume Submittal Form > * Email alias: Staffing45(a)bruin.corp.Sun.COM [ASCII ONLY, PLEASE] > * Fax number: 630-285-8177 > * Mail Address: > Sun Microsystems, Inc. > 2550 Garcia Avenue > Mountain View, CA 94043-1100 > Mail Stop: UITA01 > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >Employment Opportunities at Sun > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | (Douglas) Hofstadter's Law: | It always takes longer than you expect, even Frank Stuart | when you take into account Hofstadter's Law.

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Re: The Right to Keep and Bear Crypto
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Why is it "disturbing" that for administrative convenience a regulation >uses a shorthand term (in effect saying "treat crypto as if it was a >munition"), but that the courts say whatever convenient shorthand you use >for regulatory bookkeeping, it has no constitutional effect? > >What would be the advantage of having the government simply re-impose the >ITAR word for word identically for all materials that are not arms in the >constitutional sense? I guess this is the crux of the matter. I believe that most or all of ITAR's munitions should be constitutionally as arms. > >As for your argument that the 2nd Am should be read expansively, rather >than narrowly, personally I doubt strongly that the Framers would have >been unanimous on this. I doubt they were unanimous on most any issue. >Recall that the Articles of Confederation were >abandoned in part due to Shay's rebellion -- and the (majority) >Federalists (of whom the Jefferson you quote WAS NOT a part) managed to >push through a strong centralizing government. Yep, when they saw that some of the principles which help fuel the Revolution could be used to oppose a new order they adopted some of the same tactics and governmental view points of their former oppressors. The original calls for strong states rights and a weak central authority were swept away under Hamilton and early Supreme Court rulings. In some sense, the new government became just different clothing on the same old body. >Recall that the >constitution in its first draft didn't even have a bill of rights! I am >absolutely certain that the Framers recognized that things change over >time, and that they would have intended indeed did intend for us to >interpret the constitution with some degree -- but not too much -- >flexibility. As someone who believes in the importance of fidelity to >legal texts, I think we have a duty to make every word in the Constitution >count. I therefore place weight on the fact that the 2nd amendment is >*unique* in giving the policy reason for the limitation on government >power ("a well-regulated militia" being essential &tc.). This is ample >grounds to read the text as applying only in the context of an organized >militia -- not casual gun ownership -- **whether or not** this complies >with our best (and inevitably fallible) reconstruction of what certain >historical individuals may have thought the text meant, especially if the >historical evidence is mixed. [The Constitution preserves] the advantage of being armed which Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation [where] the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. --James Madison The Federalist No. 46, 1787 >[PS. Why do you privilege the authors of the bill of rights over the >people who voted for it?] Many of the framers, their mentors (e.g., Machiavelli) and even dyed-in-the-wool pacificists (e.g., Mahatma Gandhi) feared a central authority which, after making arms unavailable to general population would commence to tyranny. If I did I appologize. It was not intentional. > >I might add that I personally find all discussions of plots to kill >people, or to watch gleefully while others seek to do so, so morally >repulsive that I now killfile everyone who takes part in them. I hope that includes all comuniques from our government's Executive branch (although they almost never discuss these things publitically, with the possible exception of our raid on Kadaffi). How about the popular U.S. consensus that the government aught to have killed Saddam? Seems to me that some of the natural rights the people gave the government need to be taken back (such as the perogative for personal actions affecting those outside the U.S.) Though I doubt that the government would ever allow it. Why should the government call all the foreign policy shots and have all the fun? Especially when you see what a poor track record they have. Seems they should step aside for while and let some direct democracy go to work for a change. Thanks for your informative responses. I don't expect a reply as you've undoubtedly placed me in your kill file (as some other may have already). -- Steve

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[Books] Kahn's *The Code Breakers*
by stainles＠bga.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- My room-mate just brought me the latest catalog from Uncle Hugo's Science Fiction Bookstore & Uncle Edgar's Mystery Bookstore. The updated edition of Kahn's *The Code Breakers* is listed as being expected by mid-November, with a cover price of $65. (No publisher listed.) Hugo's can be reached at 612-824-6347, or unclehugo(a)aol.com. No connection except as a satisfied customer. ==Dwight -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6ui iQCVAgUBMlW+rYY4AzhdF11FAQEfzwP5AXP/63of9MPefzguLX5n9byRVUPcXOKT cYJNdTGe9ErVb6skDNN7e4PiwlZPSV03OFgntsp9CBFed+2AN/d+EFI3kNyFWQ5p fwEZ2u6VYINaQ0PhYaxneoMrxa+U8gnB5PZ8sa/Pwq4hhf6XxcOk7vUwKsLPQmeX 2KBLVLKeWj8= =f5D5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Fw: Re: ITAR satellite provision
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:09 PM 10/4/96 +0000, The Deviant wrote: >So.. if I were to take PGP, put it on a floppy disk, tape it to a model >rocket, and launch it across the mexican border, that's not exporting it >(although the FAA might complain)? As I read the regs, it's not an export at the moment it's launched, but it's almost certainly an export when it reaches Mexican airspace or when it touches Mexican soil. The "rocket exception" is not useful vis-a-vis crypto. Period. I'm very sorry I ever had anything to do with this thread and I'm not posting about it again. -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles(a)netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |

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Re: legality of wiretapping: a "key" distinction
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:10 PM 10/4/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >>It didn't have to be this way. The SC might simply have said that wiretap >>warrants must follow the same rules all other warrants followed, meaning >>that the target is informed of the tap when it is placed. Sure, the police >>would howl, complaining that they'll never hear anything "useful" if the >>target is informed, but then again, the Constitution cannot guarantee that >>any particular search would achieve its intended results. > >but then again, if "we the people" didn't challenge a usurpation of >our rights when it happened, something's wrong here. I've read references to polls which repeatedly show that well over 60% of the public is opposed to wiretaps, period. But no, I'm under no illusion that even a legal challenge would be respected. > hence my >opinion that wiretapping should be challenged in court. Well, I agree it should be challenged, but if anything my point is that the reason it wasn't challenged was the fact that wiretap targets are never given the opportunity. (Note for the clueless out there: An after-the-fact challenge doesn't count. Apparently, "non-incriminating" wiretaps are essentially never announced to the victim...er...target. And judges are sufficiently biased, gutless, and brainless that they almost never throw out the _incriminating_ results of a wiretap warrant. THis is for the same reason Judge Ito didn't throw out the evidence the four crooked detectives got in OJ's house, after jumping the fence without a warrant, claiming that they were afraid somebody was in danger inside. As I'm fond of saying, "Fuhrman pretended to tell the truth, and Ito pretended to believe him.") >>Are police entitled to use thumbscrews if simply asking a question won't get >>the "right" answer"? I don't think so. > >very poor analogy. a rhetorical loser imho characterisitic of >painting the issue in terms of extremism. wiretapping doesn't involve >any physical pain to the surveilled. also it is barely analogous >to "search and seizure" in that there is nothing physical being >seized. (just playing the devil's advocate here) No, not at all. The point is that acknowledged illegal tactics (remember, wiretaps were illegal before 1968, but they were done!) may be unquestionably "useful," but that doesn't mean that they are acceptable. If anything, the fact that cops would use illegal tactics proves that they aren't very good judges of what tactics are appropriate. Furthermore, the fact that telephone companies ALLOWED cops to do illegal wiretaps before 1968 (and even assisted them) proves that you can't depend on them to limit these tactics to reasonable limits. >>One thing that was very important to those who wrote the US Constitution was >>the sanctity of contracts. > >well, if the person entered in a contract with their phone company >to provide protected communications, maybe you'd have a case there. >in fact such a thing is not such a bad idea. Since up until now people have not had a choice, I think it's appropriate to assume that every telephone customer would have been entitled to insist on an anti-wiretap clause, and got it. >>As I understand it, there is a principle in law that all affected parties to >>a dispute must be included in a proceeding. (To ensure that each can protect >>his own rights.) Obviously, targets of wiretaps have not been informed, and >>thus can't possibly have been included. > >on the other hand, there are clear laws that say you can't withhold >evidence. That's misleading. If a cop wants in your house to collect evidence but he doesn't have a warrant, not letting him in is "withholding evidence." But that's obviously okay. So you need to qualify that claim. >>While I'm sure that I will be corrected if this is wrong, somehow I doubt >>whether there has EVER been a "before-the-fact", full challenge of a wiretap >>order _including_ representation for the target of the wiretap. Further, I >>also doubt whether there is frequently ANY SORT of challenge to a wiretap >>by a telephone company, even when the target was not informed. Quite >>simply, the telephone company does not consider itself to be in the business >>of protecting the rights of its customers! And without real challenges, >>there can be no presumed validity to such warrants. > >no, you have it backwards; without real challenges, there >is no validity to anyone trying to defeat the status quo. That depends on whose burden of proof you think it is. Since: 1. Wiretaps were done illegally before 1968, demonstrating that the people involved (cops, government officials) don't think they have to obey the law anyway. This should destroy any presumption on your part that wiretaps are constitutional, because those people are the main ones pushing wiretaps. 2. 60% of the public opposes wiretaps, period. (I think it's arguable that if most of the public decides that society should do without wiretaps, they are entitled to do this. Otherwise, "Who's country is it?") 3. Wiretaps do not resemble ordinary searches, because the target is not informed, and he's not given a chance to challenge them. 4. Wiretaps have "never" been adequately challenged, precisely because the only outside people who know about them have no motivation to do them. (Primarily telephone companies.) I'd say the bulk of the evidence is that the legal system accepts wiretaps simply as a convenience, without genuinely believing that they are constitutional. > >[bernstein, etc] >>Since it has always been legal to use encryption (in the US), they're really >>not "challenging the cryptographic status quo." > >no, ITAR has been around a long time and they are challenging it. you're >mixing up the issue. No, YOU'RE mixing it up. _DOMESTIC_ wiretaps are being compared with DOMESTIC use of encryption. ITAR says nothing about wiretaps. The government is pushing Clipper et al based primarily on domestic wiretap issues. >>I don't know about you, but somehow I'm past the idea that it's possible to >>reliably get unbiased justice in court. Know what I mean? > >ah yes, we revert to the basic cypherpunk nihilist position oft repeated >by lucky green, tcmay etc-- "essentially, we're screwed" Not really. It's just that when there's enough evidence of dishonesty already in the treatment of this issue in the courts, there is no reason to presume that the right decision will be reached in the future. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: DESCrack keyspace partitioning
by James A. Tunnicliffe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>geeman@best.com[SMTP:geeman@best.com] writes: >Another thinking step: most real-world DES keys are derived from hashes. >Not (P)RNGs. >The distributions are **not** uniform. Oh?? >I am talking about FAMILIES of predictable bit patterns in keys, not any >specific pattern. >I'm doing the stats. [...snip...] If you've discovered significant biases in MD5, or some other crypto-strength hash, that could be exploited to speed a keyspace search, that would be newsworthy indeed. I'm skeptical, but please share your results with us. [For context, Mike McNally wrote, in part] >[...] a good >32-bit CSPRNG has only a 1/2^32 chance of producing any particular >bit pattern. Of course, another way of saying that is that it's just >as likely to get an "obvious" bit pattern as it is to get any other >one. You can't just throw away part of the keyspace based on such >bogus reasoning. (There may be other reasons to throw away part of >the keyspace, of course.) Tunny ====================================================================== James A. Tunnicliffe | WWWeb: http://www.inference.com/~tunny Inference Corporation | PGP Fingerprint: CA 23 E2 F3 AC 2D 0C 77 tunny(a)Inference.com | 36 07 D9 33 3D 32 53 9C ======================================================================

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ironic, no?
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Dr." Vulis - KOTM whines: >What is the crypto-relevance of the above-quoted passage? what is the irony-factor in the above statement?

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