December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Internet File System?
by Scottauge＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is actually a good idea. There is something in the UNIX world called NFS (network file system). It is based on TCP/IP sockets. I do not know if you know anything about UNIX, but the file system used does not have logical drives (like a: or b: etc), just one huge tree that can span across many harddrives on many computers, thus making them all look like one. NFS helps to connect the other computer's file systems to the network tree. I think it is pretty cool... There is an RFC for it, though I do not remember the number. I read it once cuz I was planning a windows 95 version so I can hook my laptop up to my UNIX computers, but I found software to do it with and was like, why should I kill time on it when I could be using it to make money! It is very complete and designed to be implemented in C. Since Java is so close to C, a port could probably be made fairly easily (provided ya know something about writing file systems/operating systems ;) )

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LD
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr. Dimitri Vulius, you made this remark to someone: ...You really should get to know L.D. better before you repeat the lies Timmy May spreads about him. ......................................................................................... May I recommend that you read the content within these urls: http://www.csn.net/~ldetweil/ and especially: ftp://crvax.sri.com/risks/15/risks-15.27 (and 28) These contain a history which will clarify for you some of the comments made about L.D.'s relationship to the list, Tim May, etc. .. Blanc

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Transforming variable-length to fixed keys
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I posted this to sci.crypt recently but the response to it was rather underwhelming, so I thought I'd repost it here to see if anyone has any comments on it. What it is is a scheme for transforming arbitrary user keys (typically a long passphrase) into a fixed-length key for a particular algorithm. This has the following properties: 1. The user key 'userKey' is transformed into an algorithm-specific key 'key' using a number of 'iterations' of a hash algorithm 'hash()'. 2. The transformation is strongly serialized so that any form of attack involving parallelization or precomputation isn't possible. 3. The transformation is non-reversible, so that recovering the transformed key won't recover the original key. 4. The result of the transformation is algorithm-dependant, so that if an attacker recovers a transformed key for one algorithm they can't recover the transformed key (from the same user key) for another algorithm. 5. The transformation can be iterated as often as required to make password-guessing attacks difficult. 6. The transformation process is algorithm-independant and can use any type of hash algorithm and original and transformed key size. The transformation algorithm (which was designed with the help of John Kelsey) is as follows: key[] = { 0 }; state = hash( algorithm, mode, parameters, userKey ); for count = 1 to iterations for length = 1 to keyLength (in hash_output_size blocks) state = hash( state ); key[ length ] = hash( state, userKey ); The state acts as an RNG which ensures that the key hashing is serialized. The initial state depends on all encryption parameters, not just the user key. If we hashed the user key directly and then used it for a number of algorithms then someone who could recover the transformed key for one algorithm could compromise it if used for other algorithms (for example recovering a DES key would also recover half an IDEA key). Hashing all algorithm-related parameters means that a successful attack one an algorithm, mode, or configuration won't allow the key for any other algorithm, mode, or configuration to be recovered. The code which implements the iterated hashing is: /* Hash the variable-length input to a fixed-length output */ memset( key, 0, keyLength ); for( count = 0; count < iterations; count++ ) { for( keyIndex = 0; keyIndex < keyLength; keyIndex += hashOutputSize ) { /* state = hash( state ); key[ n ] = hash( state, userKey ) */ hash( state, state, hashOutputSize, HASH_ALL ); hash( NULL, state, hashOutputSize, HASH_START ); hash( temp, userKey, userKeyLength, HASH_END ); | | | output input input size /* Copy as much of the hashed data as required to the output */ length = ( keyLength - keyIndex ) % hashOutputSize; for( i = 0; i < length; i++ ) key[ i ] ^= temp[ i ]; } } Peter.

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RE: Where to write crypto?
by Will rodger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sat, 21 Sep 1996, Dan McGuirk wrote: >>| > If I want to go to a country outside the United States to write >>| > cryptographic code that will be freely distributable, what's the best >>| > place to go? >>| >>| Or, on the other hand, is there no way that a U.S. citizen can legally do >>| this? >> To which Adam Shostack replied: >> Thats not clear. The ITARs seem, on their face, to create a >>prior restraint on speech based on its content, and forbid Americans >>the right to leave the country to pursue their livlihoods. The odds >>of geting persecuted seem pretty low. Could be. But prominent crypto atty. Ken Bass told me he thought such actions would be vigorously prosecuted - quicker than you could say "global proliferation." Thing to notice here: no prominent cryptographer in the US has come forth and said "yes, I helped write strong crypto abroad." Which isn't to say most of them aren't traveling abroad frequently these days - take, e.g. the presence of M. Blaze, W. Diffie et al. at the OECD in Paris this week. >> As to the (predictable) comment that I'm not doing this, I'd >>be happy to entertain offers of crypto work that are not in the US, >>possibly leading to me being a test case. >> Call before you do, Adam; I'd kill to have that story first... Will Rodger Washington Bureau Chief Inter@ctive Week -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.9 iQEVAgUBMkXvQ0cByjT5n+LZAQGLyQf8Ctlf2JVeYI8Ws47YovJ0fhF3nzf9ihLd nHzZNqGpEVGVcOXYw2u84jV68y9Y7M3vdo/BDZCA3G0T8zZopmpiNZHgblh15ndP jPdYRkz4+7NnEn/Tz/1LQS6SVp/LA1G/qoCCNqGuYneSVkZxxsoeoEp9ZdCMhDE9 iq7IEI+pyY44vnSWvo65YNQZXt4thf94E94pspoNWC+DNwRDj8BkK28MpM3vduqD i/cViVUcKOLVg/b31HTVrq0rwWClfD0+J4a4F8AcGcf4SwedGCVaUAdSWRw0FQTJ 6AioCSd5Cs/g9k+xxaqRMzExJcBphwnlCZvA+qpgjY+KdagaEqJwGA== =vyTv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Bernstein hearing: The Press Release
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:15 PM 9/22/96 -0700, Rich Burroughs wrote: >At 04:39 PM 9/21/96 -0800, Jim Bell wrote: >>At 02:03 PM 9/18/96 -0700, John Gilmore wrote: > >[snip] >>>* Any legal framework that allows a government bureaucrat to >>>censor speech before it happens is an unconstitutional prior restraint. >>>The government is not allowed to set up such a drastic scheme >>>unless they can prove that publication of such information will >>>"surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our >>>Nation or its people" and that the regulation at issue is necessary >>>to prevent this damage. >> >>At the risk of being a devil's advocate, let me suggest that you are >>conceding too much even with the preceding paragraph. The 1st amendment >>says nothing about preventing speech which (even admittedly) would result >>in "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our nation or its people." >[snip] > >Jim, that's a quote of Potter Stewart from the Pentagon Papers case, if I'm >not mistaken. It's not written in the Constitution, but Supreme Court >precedent is the next best thing as far as con law goes. Under the circumstances, I think it would be wise to actually EXPAND our protections. A lot has happened in the last 25 years. If a reasonably extensive list were made of situations and circumstances where the wool was pulled over the eyes of Americans by government...and how subsequent developments showed that these things were best revealed THEN and not later...it could be reasonably argued that there is no or almost no area where the "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage" exception is likely to realistically exist. You should point out that the Pentagon Papers case was decided notwithstanding an extraordinarily generous set of assumptions common in Cold-War America about the power and authority of government, many if not most of which would be no longer considered valid. Put the opposition on the spot: Insist that they provide a substantial number of examples where speech was expected, was attempted to be restricted by gov't under such an exception, where that speech actually occurred (either by refusal of the court to intervene or by refusal of a party to the case to restrict his speech), and show how this actually caused any "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage." In the absense of such examples, it is reasonable to presume that, generally, they don't exist or are so rare as to be ignorable. (For example, in the Progressive case from the middle 70's, the gov't dropped its case. What harm occurred?) >The government can restrict speech in time, place or manner, according to >the courts. Restricting content is more difficult, and places a much >heavier burden on the gov. > >To expect people writing about and arguing the case to completely ignore >the existing case law is foolish, IMHO. I am _not_ suggesting that case law be "ignored." Rather, point out that the case law, even though it goes in your favor, was still decided in a thoroughly biased atmosphere and therefore further reductions in government authority are appropriate. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Paradox db passwords/encryption
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Sep 23 12:52:32 1996 Sorry to disturb everyone, but I've got a questions that is (gasp!) immediately related to crypto: Does anyone have any info on the encryption used in the Paradox (4.5 for Win) database? I've got someone that has an encrypted (well, password-protected :-) Paradox database that needs some maintenance, and the person that knew the password is now - shall we say - 'no longer with them'. Right now, doesn't matter if it's something clever, or a brute-force hack; they just need to get into the tables and such. Dave Merriman - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- PGP Email welcome, encouraged, and PREFERRED. Visit my web site at http://www.shellback.com/p/merriman for my PGP key and fingerprint "What is the sound of one hand clapping in a forest with no one there to hear it?" I use Pronto Secure (tm) PGP-fluent Email software for Windows -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMkYXlcVrTvyYOzAZAQGcxgQAleY6gXoM1n0AbYSUogW9Zo4brlHgsEHW vs3aAh+DQEaWJKc9ltXlDK94su9uJbAo3gb4cvG0EnBDifpqlS/bya7fG9KlcM6H k6REe2Ui6xBLtbjJTa5fmAjmeLYPSKnF5z6Eql8VpdZPoS0hqKZKgdyogMrai4Dx esOt90XBqVk= =hibj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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A daily word of caution in reference Tim C[unt] May
by Dustbin Freedom Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C[unt] May is not only as queer as a three dollar bill, but he is also into having sex with children.

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Re: Snake-Oil FAQ
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:41 AM 9/23/96, steven ryan wrote: >At 05:27 AM 9/22/96 -0700, you wrote: >>My view is that people interested in buying and using crypto are either >>bright enough to learn, or are not. A "Snake Oil FAQ" is largely >>unnecessary, for either category. For the first, because they're bright. >>For the second, because they're not. > >My view is that there is a large third group of people who are bright >enough to learn, but don't have the time or inclination to read books or do >extensive research on the subject. There are a lot of people using PGP for >the wrong reason, not because they read the books or did the research. Nor >do they even understand how it works as opposed to how it is used. They are >using it because they cruised the net and read good things about it or >heard it was cool. Well, there are a bunch of books out on PGP, which they can read. And there are already some good FAQs out on the basics of cryptography--surely concise enough and yet detailed enough to warn folks away from some basically flawed programs. But just how far can one go? Some people just won't be taught, despite the several very-accessible books on PGP and crypto. So? And I don't really think there's a problem. Just how many of these "Snake Oil" crypto programs are people really _buying_? And does it matter if they buy a reasonably-competent program (*) like "DiskLock" instead of using 3DES or one of the good disk encryption programs? (* By "reasonably competent" I mean not "snake oil," and roughly able to do the job for which it was intended. Many people just want casual-grade crypto, to stop casual attempts to look at what they've written. We may disagree with them, but, hey, it's their choice. I maintain that these people are unlikely to read something called "The Snake Oil FAQ.") To coin a phrase, you can lead a person to strong crypto, but you can't make him drink. >A Snake Oil Faq could help prevent these people from choosing wrong >products. It would also be very helpful to have all the arguments in one >place in one concise faq. Before I joined this list and read Applied At some point this become YACB (Yet Another Crypto Book). If you and others want to donate time to help educate the (small, I think) class of users who won't read the PGP books, or the PGP articles in the magazines, and yet who you think are smart enough...blah blah...well, go ahead and write such a thing. (BTW, Schneier has a book out on "Security for the Macintosh," a kind of watered-down intro to crypto and security....he makes the points a "Snake Oil FAQ" might make...again, I think this is an overcrowded market.) >Cryptography I was in a discussion in a previous job about securing one of >our products. The programmer wanted to protect the key with a convoluted >series of transpositions. I knew it was dumb but couldn't successfully >argue the point why. A faq would have been helpful. Wouldn't arguments out of the standard textbooks have been just as effective, and perhaps even more "credentialled" than words from a FAQ? I hope you are not expecting that a FAQ would have the precise magic words dealing with your programmer friend's situation? At best, it would contain seom reworded arguments out of the well-known textbooks. I just don't see the point. But if it keeps folks busy, and happy, I guess it's harmless. (:-}) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RE: Where to write crypto?
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Sep 23 08:31:11 1996 > > > On Sat, 21 Sep 1996, Dan McGuirk wrote: > > If I want to go to a country outside the United States to write > cryptographic code that will be freely distributable, what's the > best place to go? Switzerland has NO crypto laws (yet)... - ------< fate favors the prepared mind >------ Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/crypto/crypto.html - ----< words are what reality is made of >---- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMkYusBFhy5sz+bTpAQHziQf/eGRk90lC1/0NNMj9Qco54BHZhElwPCnK CsH8UJr90Ue68K5GA5VSBcWrBw/7j/AxaM5RiwnNzeuyw1GwYWlSKyfKzczqU6Z/ 2DuCGz/cRkDuUYjK5PrWbh59Pr6PH8flqnFEap9cWU1Fl8BjdCBX+6IYTjVh1Ph4 Z6M7kYB3rDlTYECB8CtZhAELq89+nD4Rk1SI/lIckGNOS/tSESBQ+5L/t+JDFmUd e6w07eRchN22+XDkVxBJ6UNPGR+3IiaNduOMXDyAgsHetXkfN51TaGOSpTlJltOz Wd7K0vjhGPDNhSgAa9dQ5J3B8ckHGsELHloXvjYfzfzW/tDOtbdjmg== =Whww -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Public Schools
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:31 AM 9/23/96, Lucky Green wrote: >On Sun, 22 Sep 1996, snow wrote: >> I would agree that parents can do as good or better at _most_ subjects >> thru about the 3rd or 4th grade, and I do agree that most of todays schools >> are shit, however there is one area--social skills--that homeschooling >> simply can't compete. Children need to learn how to interact with one another >> in groups larger than a family unit. I don't think that homeschooling can >> accomplish this nearly as well as the public (or private) schools could. > >I understand that many parents that homeschool belong to organizations >that provide for meetings twice a week in which the children so educated >in a certain area get together. Homeschooling does not have to stand in >the way of a normal socialization process. Also--and I mean this point completely seriously!--many parents are not altogether convinced that the "public school socialization" is all that beneficial. Do kids really _need_ to learn to wear gang colors, smoke to be cool, get pregnant at age 14, and so on? An awful lot of accomplished persons grew up in isolated areas, on small farms, and were educated in very small classrooms (or at home). I think the "social skills" Snow talks about above are actually the _worst_ part of public schools in fin-de-Siecle America. If I had a kid, I wouldn't want him or her in the local public schools. (And my area is more remote than over in San Jose--San Francisco, which is even worse. And LA is even worse.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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