December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Reputations
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:11 AM 9/5/96, Greg Burk wrote: >That part of the "reputation capital" theory has always seemed >suspicious to me. "reputation capital" doesn't behave linearly. There's >too much incentive to bottom-feed and too little incentive to shoot for >the heights. As an "asset", it is extremely non-liquid. It is hard to >spend it in a controlled manner. Sure, it isn't fungible, it isn't transitive, it isn't neat and clean. But it's the best thing we've got, imperfect as it is (and must be, I believe). >Too much incentive to bottom-feed: > >For example, let's say there's someone well-known who frequently speaks >nonsense on crypto issues. We'll call her "Norothy Nenning". She makes a >recommendation on some particular crypto issue, say "The government's >Nipper chip is a safe and effective form of crupto". Plenty of naive >people will credit her to some degree. True, fewer people than if she >had carefully husbanded her reputation, and to a lesser degree, but >still a lot more than zero. > >Notice that that's a zero cost/benefit ratio. She never does anything to >husband her reputation, she just spends it every chance she gets. And >while no single expenditure rewards her as much as it would if she made >the same expenditure with a good reputation, she spends so much more >freely that it is a good strategy for her on the whole. To stick with my restaurant example, consider _advertising_. MacDonald's and Burger King spend hundreds of millions of dollars every year claiming their "restaurants" are great. Many millions of people obviously are swayed. So? Others choose not to trust the advice of the MacDonald's hucksters. Maybe only a tiny fraction choose Chez Panisse over MacDonald's. This is the way of the world. It's still the give and take of reputations. It ain't perfect (in that it doesn't produce results I believe are empirically valid and optimum :-}). But it's all we have. It's the market. The agora. >"Reputation capital" is hard to spend down to absolute 0 because it is >significant work to distinguish valid "reputation capital" from >worthless counterfeit, and it is easy to counterfeit... just talk. I strongly disagree. It's quite possible for Person A to quickly convert his reputation to Person B to a _negative_ value. Real quick, in fact. Perhaps my short article did not fully explain a few things. Reputations are a _tensor_ or _matrix_ quantity. Person A has a reputation R(A,B) to Person B, a reputation R(A,C) to Person C, and so on. (And the matrix may be further broken down into reputations for advice on various subjects, in various fields, etc.) We may lump a lot of folks together and say, for example, that MacDonald's has a reputation of R (MacDonald's, lots of people) = 0.7531. And perhaps R (Chez Panisse, lots of people) = 0.0013 (i.e., they don't know what it is, and so value the rep of Chez Panisse at near zero). And so on. Lots of examples could be given. Now suppose that J. Anonymous Gourmand announces that MacDonald's is shit. How much will anonymous claim hurt MacDonald's? Obviously, not much. But what if the American Heart Association publishes a detailed study on the fat levels of MacDonald's products and declares it to "Dangerous." The effect will probably be greater, as R (AHA, many people) = high, and by the kind of Dempster-Shafer belief calculus I discussed a few months ago, the rep of the AHA propagates semi-transitively to the rep of MacDonald's. (This all happened recently, with the famous studies of fat levels of movie theater food...sales dropped almost overnight, and now the fat levels of popcorn, etc., have been changed for the better.) This is a real example of how reputations matter, how negative and positive reps matter, etc. Note especially that the "identity" (in the Dyson sense of providing True Name accountability) of an opinion-giver is not what it is important...it is not the essence of why people believe or don't believe the opinions of others. (Some years ago on the CBS station in San Francisco, there was an "anonymous gourmet" who visited restaurants and gave reviews. His reviews were taken quite seriously, and his anonymity did not matter, provided his personna was _persistent_. That is, provided that people thought it was "the guy they had come to trust," and not, say, a guy the station recruited off the street each day and sent out as the "anonymous gourmet." In the case of this guy, his face was cloaked in shadows, but his voice was distinctive. (His voice on the show was probably different from his food-ordering voice, so restaurants would not know who was ordering and alter the food or service.) Much could be written abou the role of anonymity in such reviews, in tests of service, etc.) >I anticipate the answer "Well, the work pays off". But that misses the >point. Frequently the work required to tell the good "reputation >capital" from the worthless is as much as would be required to find the >straight dope yourself. Reputations work OK for me in the real world. Given the limits on a lot of ontological facts, hard to see how it could be better. I've already spent too much time writing this, so I can't address the remainder of your points. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Using Compromised Remailers to Get the Goods
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:21 PM 9/4/96, jim bell wrote: >Perhaps the most ominous part of making "use of encryption to thwart an >investigation" illegal is _not_ that remailer operators might be prosecuted, >but that they might NOT be prosecuted in a deal where (in exchange for not >being prosecuted) they continue to operate the remailer, "cracked" or >sabotaged so that they share all the info with the cops. While even that >won't make chained remailers totally useless, eventually suspicions of such >a crack will surface, which will help sabotage the credibility of all >remailers, >not just the ones that have been "stung." A very valid concern. As Jim must be tired of hearing by now, this was brought up a couple of years ago in discussions about the pressure that could be brought to bear on remailers. One suggestion was a duress signal, effectively saying "I have been compromised." (Also known as a "wave off" in criminal circles.) The issue of whether a remailer can be trusted to wave off others, via covert channels, is of course another issue. One can hope that additional channels will be acquired to produce the necessary information. (For example, full sender untraceablility means that sources within police departments can go home, log on with the own PCs, and sell information about pending investigations, modulo their concerns about pointing to themselves with information provided (see "canary traps"). What an exciting world we are entering.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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ZD Net Registration
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://community.zdnet.com/register/register.cgi Check this out! Harvesting Mother's Maiden Name. I wonder how many they get each hour....

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ALERT: Join thousands of net users in their fight against the White House! (9/4/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| NET LUMINARIES JOIN THOUSANDS IN SIGNING PRO-ENCRYPTION PETITION http://www.crypto.com/petition/ CRYPTO ACTION WEEK ENDS WITH JUDICIARY HEARING ON HR 3011 (9/11/96) Date: September 4, 1996 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com If you redistribute this, please do so in its entirety, with the banner intact. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents Introduction Join Phil Zimmermann, Bruce Schneier, and other cyber luminaries! How to receive crypto-news Press contacts ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INTRODUCTION This week is a hard week for many working on the encryption issue. The House pro-encryption bill, SAFE (HR 3011), will have a hearing in the Judiciary committee on September 11. Between now and then, individuals and industry representatives will be calling on their legislators to support HR 3011. On the other side of the issue, the White House is expected to release their "solution" to the encryption debate no earlier than September 8th. It will surprise no one if it is designed to be in the best interests of law enforcement with concerns for privacy placed dead last. Be a part of this assault on the White House by signing the pro-encryption petition at http://www.crypto.com/petition/ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- JOIN PHIL ZIMMERMANN, BRUCE SCHNEIER, AND OTHER CYBER LUMINARIES! The following petition can be signed onto at http://www.crypto.com/petition/ The Information Revolution is being held hostage by an outdated, Cold War-era U.S. encryption policy. Current U.S. export controls and other initiatives are slowing the widespread availability of strong encryption products, endangering the privacy and security of electronic communications, harming the competitiveness of U.S. businesses, and threatening the future of electronic commerce and the growth of the Global Information Infrastructure (GII). We the undersigned Internet users and concerned citizens strongly support Congressional efforts to address this critical issue. Bills are currently pending in both Houses of Congress which would: -Relax export controls on encryption technology; -Prohibit the government from imposing "Key Escrow" solutions domestically; and -Recognize the importance of privacy and security for the future of electronic commerce, individual liberty, and the success of the Internet. We urge Congress to act NOW to enact a U.S. encryption policy that promotes electronic privacy and security. Join Phil Zimmerman, author of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), Bruce Schneier, author of "Applied Cryptography", Dr. Matt Blaze of Tessera card fame, Phil Karn and Vince Cate as they pressure the White House to change their wrong-headed encryption policies. Add your name to theirs at http://www.crypto.com/petition/ ! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO RECEIVE CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo(a)panix.com with "unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir(a)vtw.org Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger(a)cdt.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- End crypto-news =============================================================================

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Voluntary Disclosure of True Names
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a rare moment of lucidity Vladimir Z. Dettweiler wrote: >I think cpunks should hold the view that communication is a matter >of mutual consent between sender and receiver. if a receiver says, >"I don't want any anonymous messages", then should be able to block them. But this is precisely what nearly all of us have been arguing. Namely, that the issue of anonymity vs. providing of True Names, is a matter of _contract_ between parties, not something the government is justified in sticking its nose into. Those who wish to not deal with the entities they cannot reliably verify the True Name of are free to filter them out. All we are asking is that those of us happy to deal with S. Boxx, Black Unicorn, PrOduct Cypher, Pablo Escobar, and other pseudospoofing tentacles, not be told by a government that, for our own good, such communications are felonies. >the above is almost exactly what Dyson was saying, and I have been No, Dyson said "Therefore I would favor allowing anonymity -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." This implies a role for government, and concomitant restrictions on related anonymity technologies, to provide traceability. So much for mutual agreement between sender and recipient. (I have nothing against senders and recipients agreeing to use the services of some third party in providing ultimate traceability. I'm not wild about the U.S. Government being this third party, paid for by tax money, but so long as it is not required, it's a minor concern to me. I surmise, though, that use of the U.S. Government as a third party would not be optional, in the schemes of Dyson, Denning, and others of that ilk.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Steganography -- Tell Tale Signs?
by makof＠alias.cyberpass.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi there! I'd appreciate some help from you experts in steganography. 1) If I hide some PGP encrypted data in a gif, jpg or wav file will there be any tell tale signs to the naked eye of an expert? If yes, what are they? 2) Would it better to hide the data in a jpg with black and white image rather than a color one? 3) Are there any tools at the moment to expose (not crack) the hidden encrypted data? If none. are there tools in development? If this is off-topic please accept my apologies. and if necessary, please email replies to me directly. Thank you. Makofi

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Re: Voluntary Disclosure of True Names
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Or About: 4 Sep 96 at 21:48, Timothy C. May wrote: > In a rare moment of lucidity Vladimir Z. Dettweiler wrote: > > >I think cpunks should hold the view that communication is a matter > >of mutual consent between sender and receiver. if a receiver says, > >"I don't want any anonymous messages", then should be able to block them. > > But this is precisely what nearly all of us have been arguing. Namely, that > the issue of anonymity vs. providing of True Names, is a matter of > _contract_ between parties, not something the government is justified in > sticking its nose into. I always use my true name and am happy to spread it far and wide, but I have been doing some work for a GroupWare manufacturer. They have seen that even in a corporate environment where information sharing is practised and embraced, sometimes people want to make a comment and not take the heat for making that comment. This can provide some constructive input, so they have a anonymous comment feature built in. So you could say that it is absolutely necessary for the web to have that feature as well. > of some third party in providing ultimate traceability. I'm not wild about > the U.S. Government being this third party NO WAY, These guys are in my life enough already, and you can't trust them anyway!!!! Ross =========== Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: 415-206-9906

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Re: ZD Net Registration
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:45 AM 9/5/96, Carl Ellison wrote: >http://community.zdnet.com/register/register.cgi > >Check this out! Harvesting Mother's Maiden Name. >I wonder how many they get each hour.... "Think of it as evolution in action." I tried to register as "foobar," but the name was taken. So I added a few bits. I used "fuckyou" as my mother's maiden name (no pun intended). So now I'm an full-fledged member of ZD Net, fuck you very much. The more things change... --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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WinSock Remailer Available Overseas
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Winsock remailer announced by Joey Grasty available at Obscura, an access-contolled site on August 21, became available August 26 at at least five overseas sites, one of which is ftp://ftp.replay.com/pub/replay/pub/remailer/wsa12.zip OK, let's get some more non-USA remailers running!!

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Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:13 PM 9/4/96 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: >On Wed, 4 Sep 1996, jim bell wrote: >> Why WOULDN'T the police want to shut down anonymous remailers? The Leahy >> bill clearly didn't distinguish between remailer operators and users, so it >> is no leap to conclude that they would be treated similarly. > >Why *wouldn't* the police want to shut 'em down? Because the police >respect the Constitution and our civil liberties, of course, and realize >and respect the value of anonymous political speech. "Hey, man, whatever you'se been smoking, could'ja give me a joint or two?" Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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