December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Intelligence Community Briefing
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My security clearence has long since expired. Anyone on the list plan to attend and report back :-) ------------------------------------ AFCEA The U.S. Intelligence Community: Who Does What, With What, For What? October 8, 9, 10, 1996 #### This course is Classified SECRET. ### Sponsored by The Community Management Staff. Location: AFCEA International Headquarters, Fairfax, Virginia The U.S. Intelligence Community continues to undergo substantial changes. This top-down course provides an up-to-date understanding of the structure and functions of the Intelligence Community and its components, the changing threats and challenges with which they must deal, as well as resources and processes used. The course addresses intelligence programs structure and provides insight into relations between intelligence producers and policy consumers, as well as useful information about the interaction between U.S. Intelligence and industry. WHO SHOULD ATTEND This course is suitable for industry managers, designers and producers of security and intelligence systems and products, including software and special purpose products. The up-to-date coverage of the changing intelligence community is equally suitable for intelligence officers and operatives proficient in their own services or specialties who have or expect to have responsibilities involving other agencies and services, overview functions or supervision of interfaces between various agency efforts. Past attendance has been divided about equally between persons from the government and from industry. COURSE OUTLINE: Intelligence, Practice and Issues Background of U.S. Intelligence Definitions of Intelligence Intelligence Process Relationships between Intelligence and Policy Systems Intelligence Issues Components and Coordination of the Intelligence Community Organization and Components of the U.S. Intelligence Community The Role of the DCI DCI Special Staffs and Multi-Agency Activity Centers The Community Management Executive Director and Staff The National Intelligence Council Intelligence Oversight and Management within the Executive Branch Civilian Intelligence Organizations Military Intelligence Components Coordination of Counterintelligence Intelligence Budget Structure NFIP TIARA JMIP The Central Intelligence Agency Structure and Functions of the Changing CIA Intelligence Collection, Analysis and Dissemination CIA Support to Military Intelligence Operations Military Intelligence OASDC3I Organization and Functions Structure and Functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency Support for OSD, JCS, and Operational Commands Military Services: Organization, Roles and Missions Impact and Trends Resulting from Changing World Situation and Operational Experiences Overhead Reconnaissance and Surveillance National Reconnaissance Office Defense Airborne Reconnaissance The National Security Agency and Central Security Service Role in the Community Specific Functions Services of Common Concern Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Organization and Functions Law Enforcement Intelligence Functions Counter-Intelligence Relationships with CIA and Other Components of the Intelligence Community Counternarcotics Intelligence and the Drug Enforcement Administration The Problem The Counternarcotics Community DCI Counternarcotics Center Operational Counternarcotics Intelligence Activities Imagery The Central Imagery Office Relationships with Other Parts of the Intelligence Community Support to Operational Commands Intelligence Support for Arms Control and Disarmament Arms Control Intelligence Staff Non-Proliferation Center On-Site Inspections Nuclear Intelligence and Role of Department of Energy Intelligence Community and the Congress Functions of the Oversight Committees Legislation Affecting the Intelligence Community Trends Intelligence and Industry Relationship Between Intelligence Components and the Private Sector Opportunities to Market Services and Products Control Mechanisms Business Strategies Intelligence Developments in Private Industry Internal Intelligence System Risk Analysis Course Coordinator COL John D. Sitterson, USA (Ret.), is now a consultant to AFCEA and industry. His military career included assignments in intelligence and international security affairs, as well as combat and commands with extensive C3I involvement. He headed the Department of National and International Security Studies at the Army War College. Colonel Sitterson served on a White House Task Force, in operations coordinating elements under NSA, on a Presidential-Congressional Commission, and as a military member of two blue ribbon study groups at the Council on Foreign Relations. As a civilian he served 20 years in defense-related government and industry positions, including 11 years with HRB-Singer (now HRB Systems). Lecturers: Mr. Peter C. Oleson has had extensive experience in intelligence related positions in the U.S. government and industry, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has been adjunct professor of Resource Management at the Defense Intelligence College. He now heads his own consulting firm. Other lecturers will be authoritative representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency; Community Management Staff; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I); Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Intelligence Services of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps; the National Reconnaissance Office; the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office; the Central Imagery Office; Department of State (INR); Department of Energy; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Drug Enforcement Administration; Arms Control Intelligence Staff; Non-Proliferation Center and the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Register by submitting the following information to: AFCEA 4400 Fair Lakes Court Fairfax, Virginia 22033-3899 Phone: (703) 631-6135 FAX (703) 631 4693 email = aafceapdc(a)aol.com until 1 October and then pdc(a)afcea.org Course Name or Number: Intelligence Course/ 203N Date Course Convenes: 8 October 1996 STUDENT: Rank/Honorific: Service: First Name: MI: Last Name: Title/Position: Company/Organization: Division: Mail Stop/ Suite/ Office Symbol: Street Address: City: State: ZIP: Country Telephone: (area code) Fax: (area code) Please indicate method of payment intended: Mastercard/Visa/AMEX/Diners Club/ DD1556/Voucher All registrations will be acknowledged. The acknowledgement letter will contain information on location of the course, housing and transportation details. Fees: Government Personnel $700 Industry $950 ### A Classified Visit Request must be submitted by mail or fax before the student is permitted to attend the course. This request should be received at AFCEA at least the week before the class convenes. ------------------------- PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Reputations
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Regulation - which is based on force and fear - undermines the moral base of business dealings. It becomes cheaper to bribe a building inspector than to meet his standards of construction. A fly-by-night securities operator can quickly meet all the S.E.C. requirements, gain the inference of respectability, and proceed to fleece the public. In an unregulated economy, the operator would have had to spend a number of years in reputable dealings before he could earn a position of trust sufficient to induce a number of investors to place funds with him. Protection of the consumer by regulation is thus illusory." -- Alan Greenspan TCM, seems like a reputable source to support your views. -- Steve PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Race Bit: C
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:47 AM 9/4/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 3:02 AM 9/4/96, James A. Donald wrote: >>At 10:33 PM 9/3/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: >>>>The Leahy crypto bill introduced early this year made (paraphrasing) "the >>>>use of encryption to thwart a law-enforcement investigation illegal." I >>>>immediately pointed out that while this wouldn't make _encrypted_ remailers >>>>illegal, per se, effectively it would because the moment an investigation >>>>(even a phony or trumped-up one) is started and is "thwarted" by the >>>>encryption used, the remailer operator became guilty of a crime. >... >>I believe that judges have a policy of interpreting deliberately >>ambiguous statutes in whatever way makes the most sense. The only >>sensible interpretation of Leahy's bill is that it criminalizes >>strong remailers, that it is intended to punish ANYONE, not just >>the criminals themselves, who obstructs investigations. > >As the recent discussion of knives, switchblades, and throwing stars >showed, such ambiguous laws are often used to keep the coloreds down. Perhaps the most ominous part of making "use of encryption to thwart an investigation" illegal is _not_ that remailer operators might be prosecuted, but that they might NOT be prosecuted in a deal where (in exchange for not being prosecuted) they continue to operate the remailer, "cracked" or sabotaged so that they share all the info with the cops. While even that won't make chained remailers totally useless, eventually suspicions of such a crack will surface, which will help sabotage the credibility of all remailers, not just the ones that have been "stung." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Browne and foreign tyrants
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: "George D. Phillies" <phillies(a)WPI.EDU> >Subject: Re: Browne & foreign tyrants >There is a section of the Geneva Protocols forbidding actions in occupied >territories directed against officers of political parties. Under that >section, the actions in Somalia against, e.g., the treasurer of General >Aidid's political party, were war crimes. No one seems to get very upset. > >> If there is such a treaty, the US has a long history of ignoring it. >> >> 0) Attempts to kill Hitler. >I don't think we ever tried this. And this was a real shame. Over 30 million people died in WWII, directly or indirectly. We knew that Hitler was going to be a problem well before 1936. Think how many could have been saved... If anything, WWII is excellent proof that AP is a good idea. Stauffenberg was the German who bombed Hitler's meeting in 1944 but failed to kill him. Stauffenberg knew as early as 1942 that Hitler needed to be killed, and a recent "60 Minutes" episode related how hundreds of people knew about this plot. The reason he failed was that while he was preparing the two bombs in a bathroom, he was interrupted. (The bomb's delay mechamism was acid dissolving a metal.) Rather than being caught, he left one of the briefcases in the bathroom and went to the meeting with only one bomb. Furthermore, he left the bomb at the meeting, but it was pushed behind the heavy table after he left, which shielded Hitler from much of the force of the explosion. If AP (or at least, some anonymous reward mechanism for Stauffenberg's family) had been available, he would have done "the honorable thing," and walked up to Hitler with the bomb and instantly detonated it right there, resulting in both Hitler's and Stauffenberg's certain death. At least hundreds of thousands or perhaps over a million people would have SURVIVED. As it happened, Stauffenberg's reticence caused not only his death after torture, but also the deaths of well over a hundred coup-plotters, but also the thousands that were yet to die in the last 6+ months of WWII. Question: Would you kill yourself to save a million lives? Even if you wouldn't, would you change your mind if your heirs would be anonymously paid an extra $10 million dollars or so? I'd say that's a pretty substantial motivation, wouldn't you? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: rc2 export limits..
by Surya Koneru 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RC2 uses a effective key size, so is it ok to use a key of 128 bits size with a 40 bits effective key size for export. Thanx --Surya >---------- >From: Simon Spero[SMTP:ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu] >Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 1996 8:33 PM >To: Surya Koneru >Cc: 'cypherpunks(a)toad.com' >Subject: Re: rc2 export limits.. > >It's the usual - if you want commercial jurisdiction, > 40 bits unescrowed > 64 bits (16 escrowed) > >Above that, you'll have to go through state on a per customer basis >(which I don't think is that easy to get if software is being shipped >outside the US, and is definitely going to be expensive.) > >Simon > > >--- >Cause maybe (maybe) | In my mind I'm going to Carolina >you're gonna be the one that saves me | - back in Chapel Hill May 16th. >And after all | Email address remains unchanged >You're my firewall - | ........First in Usenet......... >

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cypherpunks
by Chris Steinke 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

subscribe cypherpunks

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Secure remailers, was Race Bit: C
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 04 Sep 1996 15:21:54 -0800, jim bell wrote: >Perhaps the most ominous part of making "use of encryption to thwart an >investigation" illegal is _not_ that remailer operators might be prosecuted, >but that they might NOT be prosecuted in a deal where (in exchange for not >being prosecuted) they continue to operate the remailer, "cracked" or >sabotaged so that they share all the info with the cops. While even that >won't make chained remailers totally useless, eventually suspicions of such >a crack will surface, which will help sabotage the credibility of all >remailers, >not just the ones that have been "stung." > Yes, that is why there needs to be a move to place all 'critical' portions of remailers and other important servers inside trusted hardware which is highly resistant to compromise. All access to sensitive information (e.g., keys) inside these modules should require multiple parties in several countries (not just the operator of the server) to cooperate. Properly structured (such controls could effectively thwart law enforcement compromise. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Paladin Publishing suit dismissed
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thank you; my memory isn't the best in the world (obviously). -Allen

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Re: Letter to the Observer [re: Internet paedophile]
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 4 Sep 96 at 14:44, Declan McCullagh wrote: > Jean-Francois, your comments are inspired! > > As a member of "such media" in that I still publish articles on dead > trees -- I have articles in fall issues of Wired and Playboy, for > instance -- I rejoice in your reasoned suggestion that you deny me > and my ilk access to the Net. > > But wait! I connect through wired.com, eff.org, or *.edu accounts. > How do you plan to kick me off my "ISPs?" > > No, you're not out to lunch. Well, I did not expect nor want to bar all of the ink spreader community, only, by giving some individual or some rags some trouble, they might get the message. *I* don't plan to kick any net-smearer scumbag off his ISP, I suggest/-ask if- ISP themselves would have advantage to do that./? I simply don't pretend to know it all, so I ask questions... jfa Jean-Francois Avon DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants: physicists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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Re: Reputations
by gregburk＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) writes: > Briefly, think of "restaurants" when thinking about reputations. If one > arrives in a new city, most restaurants may have the same baseline > reputation, e.g. "none." A few may be known by name, for their > "reputation," either good ("You have to eat at Louie's--the laser chicken > is incredible") or bad ("Blecch!). Positive reputations and negative > reputations are self-explanatory. And the reputations of others may affect > the reputations of restaurants ("John Gilmore says he likes the Burma > Burger on Castro Street."). Bad recommendations may affect the "reputation > capital" of John, for example. (We speak of "reputation capital" because it > can in some sense be "spent.") That part of the "reputation capital" theory has always seemed suspicious to me. "reputation capital" doesn't behave linearly. There's too much incentive to bottom-feed and too little incentive to shoot for the heights. As an "asset", it is extremely non-liquid. It is hard to spend it in a controlled manner. Too much incentive to bottom-feed: For example, let's say there's someone well-known who frequently speaks nonsense on crypto issues. We'll call her "Norothy Nenning". She makes a recommendation on some particular crypto issue, say "The government's Nipper chip is a safe and effective form of crupto". Plenty of naive people will credit her to some degree. True, fewer people than if she had carefully husbanded her reputation, and to a lesser degree, but still a lot more than zero. Notice that that's a zero cost/benefit ratio. She never does anything to husband her reputation, she just spends it every chance she gets. And while no single expenditure rewards her as much as it would if she made the same expenditure with a good reputation, she spends so much more freely that it is a good strategy for her on the whole. "Reputation capital" is hard to spend down to absolute 0 because it is significant work to distinguish valid "reputation capital" from worthless counterfeit, and it is easy to counterfeit... just talk. I anticipate the answer "Well, the work pays off". But that misses the point. Frequently the work required to tell the good "reputation capital" from the worthless is as much as would be required to find the straight dope yourself. Too little incentive to shoot for the heights: Suppose you judge that you've accumulated twice as much "reputation capital" as Joe. How do you get twice as much payoff? It seems to me that above the threshhold of credibility, minor side issues make more difference than your two-fold "reputation capital" differential. As an "asset", it is extremely non-liquid: How exactly would you "convert" your reputation into other capital? Would you accept bribes and tell lies? Seems to me you would only get a one-shot "conversion" and it couldn't possibly hope to equal your investment. As soon as you leave the information-broker business, you discover that your "asset" cannot be converted, sold, auctioned off, or much of anything else of value to you. It is hard to spend it in a controlled manner: See above. The single bribe-and-lie will spend your "reputation capital" down to below the threshhold of credibility, no matter how much you started with. Human discourse often tends to be absolutist. It is often very difficult to make people understand and retain a message of partial support or qualified support. Particularly on hot issues. Restaurants, sure, you can give 1 to 5 stars, but in many subject areas there is no such system. And any system you yourself invent tends to be ignored. So I think the latter part of the analysis is wishful thinking, or at least restricted to a small subset of subject-matter. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQBVAwUBMi4omrMyVAabpHidAQGGPAIAizIOktCC4B5gtVYPblaTi9FL6ZtwTfkP sAFHT626mMLz1f/ZKa2SLq3pdag09ACCklJLJ1djFwSFP4bvoijMfw== =rFti -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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