December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Violation or Protection? [OLYMPICS]
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:03 7/31/96, David Rosoff wrote: [...] >On the local news I saw footage of a couple schmoozing in the Olympic >(Centennial?) Park after its reopening. The voice-over said that all >bags are being searched, and the couple said that rather than be >alarmed or nervous, they "appreciated" it. > >I'm not quite sure what to think about this. I don't have enough >experience to form a well thought-out opinion. I'd like to hear some >of everyone's thoughts on this: Is this bag-searching a violation, >(which was my immediate reaction) or is it not, because you have to >already be going into the controlled area to get searched? You are confused because you wonder how it could be that the couple could appreciate having their bags searched, something you intuitively regard as a violation of their rights. The very simple answer is that, generally speaking, individuals enjoy to have their rights violated, provided that they are given a (often false) sense of security in return. Surveys from a few years ago showed that a majority of Americans would approve of warrantless house-to-house searches, including their own, to combat the use of narcotics. ObCrypto: The public will cheer the day that strong, non-escowed crypto is outlawed. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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Re: Smart cards "a giant leap backwards" - Canadian Privacy Commissioner
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:12 7/31/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >At 02:23 PM 7/30/96 -0400, Richard Martin wrote: >>Very little that might be new or enlightening to the world; attendees >>of CFP '96 will remember [fuzzily, in my case] the closest thing to >>Bruce's counterpart in the states admitting that the USA doesn't actually >>have much of a counterpart to the privacy commissioner. > >Most Central European countries have both privacy commissioners and legal >requirements that everyone register their addresses with the police. I'll >do without the former if I can also avoid the latter. I remember a time when Privacy Commissioners were a new thing. Their primary purpose seemed to be to sanction government access to (and keeping of) large databases on the activities of the population. Their secondary purpose was to prevent the private sector competition from doing the same. Eliminating access to such data by the individual in the process. Things may have changed for the better, but I doubt it. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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Re: fbi, crypto, and defc
by Cerridwyn Llewyellyn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Since they were speakers, could they be part of the Spot The Fed contest? They said that every other time their comrades had come to defcon, they had tried to come incognito, and got caught every time. This time, they wore FBI t-shirts, and the only response was "Hey! Where'd ya get the T-Shirt?!?". They said "We hacked 'em from the FBI" and that was it, noone suspected... =) //cerridwyn//

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NSA/ARPA/DISA joint research office Memo of Agreement
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I found this at the ARPA web site while looking up the programs there that are trying to deploy crypto in the Internet. You can read it as plain text, the HTML crud peters out after the first page. If you look at it on the web, they have reproduced the signatures from the signature page in a GIF file. -- John] <BASE HREF="http://www.ito.darpa.mil/ResearchAreas/Information_Survivability/MOA.html"> <HTML> <HEAD> <TITLE>MOA - Information Systems Security Research Joint Technology Office</TITLE> </HEAD> <BODY> <CENTER> <H3>Memorandum of Agreement<BR> Between<BR> The Advanced Research Projects Agency,<BR> The Defense Information Systems Agency, and<BR> The National Security Agency<BR>Concerning<BR> The Information Systems Security Reseach Joint Technology Office</H3> </CENTER> <H3>Purpose</H3> The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the National Security Agency (NSA) agree to the establishment of the Information System Security Research Joint Technology Office (ISSR-JTO) as a joint activity. The ISSR-JTO is being established to coordinate the information systems security research programs of ARPA and NSA. The ISSR-JTO will work to optimize use of the limited research funds available, and strengthen the responsiveness of the programs to DISA, expediting delivery of technologies that meet DISA's requirements to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and availability of data in Department of Defense information systems, provide a robust first line of defense for defensive information warfare, and permit electronic commerce between the Department of Defense and its contractors. <H3>Background</H3> In recent years, exponential growth in government and private sector use of networked systems to produce and communicate information has given rise to a shared interest by NSA and ARPA in focusing government R&D on information systems security technologies. NSA and its primary network security customer, DISA, have become increasingly reliant upon commercial information technologies and services to build the Defense Information Infrastructure, and the inherent security of these technologies and services has become a vital concern. From ARPA'S perspective, it has become increasingly apparent that security is critical to the success of key ARPA information technology initiatives. ARPA's role in fostering the development of advanced information technologies now requires close attention to the security of these technologies.<P> NSA's security technology plan envisions maximum use of commercial technology for sensitive but unclassified applications, and, to the extent possible, for classified applications as well. A key element of this plan is the transfer of highly reliable government-developed technology and techniques to industry for integration into commercial off-the-shelf products, making quality-tested security components available not only to DoD but to the full spectrum of government and private sector users as well. ARPA is working with its contractor community to fully integrate security into next generation computing technologies being developed in all its programs, and working with the the research community to develop strategic relationships with industry so that industry will develop modular security technologies with the capability of exchanging appropriate elements to meet various levels of required security.<P> NSA and ARPA now share a strong interest in promoting the development and integration of security technology for advanced information systems applications. The challenge at hand is to guide the efforts of the two agencies in a way that optimizes use of the limited research funds available and maximizes support to DISA in building the Defense Information Infrastructure.<P> NSA acts as the U.S. Government's focal point for cryptography, telecommunications security, and information systems security for national security systems. It conducts, approves, or endorses research and development of techniques and equipment to secure national security systems. NSA reviews and approves all standards, techniques, systems, and equipment related to the security of national security systems. NSA's primary focus is to provide information systems security products, services, and standards in the near term to help its customers protect classified and national security-related sensitive but unclassified information. It develops and assesses new security technology in the areas of cryptography, technical security, and authentication technology; endorses cryptographic systems protecting national security information; develops infrastructure support technologies; evaluates and rates trusted computer and network products; and provides information security standards for DoD. Much of the work in these areas is conducted in a classified environment, and the balancing of national security and law enforcement equities has been a significant constraint.<P> ARPA's mission is to perform research and development that helps the Department of Defense to maintain U.S. technological superiority over potential adversaries. At the core of the ARPA mission is the goal to develop and demonstrate revolutionary technologies that will fundamentally enhance the capability of the military. ARPA's role in fostering the development of advanced computing and communications technologies for use by the DoD requires that long term solutions to increasing the security of these systems be developed. ARPA is interested in commercial or dual-use technology, and usually technology that provides revolutionary rather than evolutionary enhancements to capabilities. ARPA is working with industry and academia to develop technologies that will enable industry to provide system design methodologies and secure computer, operating system, and networking technologies. NSA and ARPA research interests have been converging in these areas, particularly with regard to protocol development involving key, token, and certificate exchanges and processes.<P> One of the key differences between ARPA's work and NSA's is that ARPA's is performed in unclassified environments, often in university settings. This enables ARPA to access talent and pursue research strategies normally closed to NSA due to security considerations. Another difference is that while NSA's research is generally built around developing and using specific cryptographic algorithms, ARPA's approach is to pursue solutions that are independent of algorithm used and allow for modularly replaceable cryptography. ARPA will, to the greatest extent possible, allow its contractor community to use cryptography developed at NSA, and needs solutions from NSA on an expedited basis so as not to hold up its research program.<P> DISA functions as the Department of Defense's information utility. Its requirements for information systems security extend beyond confidentiality to include protection of data from tampering or destruction and assurance that data exchanges are originated and received by valid participants. DISA is the first line of defense for information warfare, and needs quality technology for detecting and responding to network penetrations. The growing vulnerability of the Defense information Infrastructure to unauthorized access and use, demonstrated in the penetration of hundreds of DoD computer systems during 1994, makes delivery of enabling security technologies to DISA a matter of urgency. <H3>The Information Systems Security Research Joint Technology Office</H3> This MOA authorizes the ISSR-JTO as a joint undertaking of ARPA, DISA, and NSA. It will perform those functions jointly agreed to by these agencies. Each agency shall delegate to the ISSO-JTO such authority and responsibility as is necessary to carry out its agreed functions. Participation in the joint program does not relieve ARPA, DISA, or NSA of their respective individual charter responsibilities, or diminish their respective authorities.<P> A Joint Management Plan will be developed to provide a detailed definition of the focus, objectives, operation, and costs of the Joint Technology Office. The ISSR-JTO will be jointly staffed by ARPA, DISA, and NSA, with respective staffing levels to be agreed upon by the three parties. Employees assigned to the JTO will remain on the billets of their respective agency. Personnel support for employees assigned to the JTO will be provided by their home organization. The ISSR-JTO will be housed within both ARPA and NSA, except as agreed otherwise by the three parties. To the greatest extent possible, it will function as a virtual office, using electronic connectivity to minimize the need for constant physical co-location. Physical security support will be provided by the party responsible for the specific facilities occupied. Assignment of the ISSR-JTO Director, Deputy Director, and management of other office elements will be made by mutual agreement among the Directors of ARPA, DISA, and NSA upon recommendation of their staffs.<P> <H3>Functions</H3> By mutual agreement of ARPA, DISA, and NSA, the ISSR-JTO will perform the following joint functions: <OL> <LI>Review and coordinate all Information System Security Research programs at ARPA and NSA to ensure that there is no unnecessary duplication, that the programs are technically sound, that they are focused on customer requirements where available, and that long term research is aimed at revolutionary increases in DoD security capabilities. <LI>Support ARPA and NSA in evaluating proposals and managing projects arising from their information systems security efforts, and maintain a channel for the exchange of technical expertise to support their information systems security research programs. <LI>Provide long range strategic planning for information systems security research. Provide concepts of future architectures which include security as an integral component and a road map for the products that need to be developed to fit the architectures, taking into account anticipated DoD information systems security research needs for command and control, intelligence, support functions, and electronic commerce. The long range security program will explore technologies which extend security research boundaries. <LI>Develop measures of the effectiveness of the information systems security research programs in reducing vulnerabilities. <LI>Work with DISA, other defense organizations, academic, and industrial organizations to take new information systems security research concepts and apply them to selected prototype systems and testbed projects. <LI>Encourage the U.S. industrial base to develop commercial products with built-in security to be used in DoD systems. Develop alliances with industry to raise the level of security in all U.S. systems. Bring together private sector leaders in information systems security research to advise the JTO and build consensus for the resulting programs. <LI>Identify areas for which standards need to be developed for information systems security. <LI>Facilitate the availability and use of NSA certified cryptography within information systems security research programs. <LI>Proactively provide a coherent, integrated joint vision of the program in internal and public communications. </OL> <H3>Program Oversight and Revisions</H3> The Director, ISSR-JTO, has a joint reporting responsibility to the Directors of ARPA, DISA, and NSA. The Director, ISSR-JTO, will conduct a formal Program Status Review for the Directors of ARPA, DISA, and NSA on an annual basis, and will submit mid-year progress reports between formal reviews. Specific reporting procedures and practices of the JTO to ARPA, DISA, and NSA will be detailed in the Joint Technology Management Plan. This MOA will be reviewed at least annually, and may be revised at any time, based on the mutual consent of ARPA, DISA, and NSA, to assure the effective execution of the joint initiative. Any of the parties may withdraw from participation in the MOA upon six months written notice. The MOA is effective 2 April, 1995.<P> <IMG SRC="http://www.ito.darpa.mil/ResearchAreas/Information_Survivability/sigs4.gif" ALT="Signatures of Dr. Gary L. Denman, Director ARPA; LtGen Albert J. Edmonds, Director, DISA; VADM John M. McConnell, Director, NSA; Dr. Anita K. Jones, Director, DDR&E; Emmett Paige, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence"><P> <P> <address> <HR> <A HREF="http://www.ito.darpa.mil/ResearchAreas/Information_Survivability.html">Return to Information Survivability Page</A> <BR> Direct comments concerning this WWW site to: <A HREF="mailto:Webmaster@ito.darpa.mil">Webmaster(a)ito.darpa.mil</A></address> </BODY> </HTML>

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Re: FPGAs and Heat (Re: Paranoid Musings)
by Scott Schryvers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 12:42 AM 7/31/96 -0700, David Wagner wrote: >>Those estimates assume that a single FPGA can break RC4 in hours. I think >>that is an extremely optimistic assumption, given the available public >>information. But perhaps NSA is orders of magnitude ahead of us in chip >>design (unlikely) or orders of magnitude ahead of us in RC4 cryptanalysis >>(and we're back to paranoid musings). > >>> If we assume a machine designed to break *every* message, NSA's response >>> makes more sense. > >I feel like I'm leaning over backwards to defend NSA's response, an >extremely uncomfortable position (and I could crack my skull when I fall) >:-). The most important issue is, what is NSA's state of the art. If we >accept their $1000/FPGA chip, then they are indeed at the bleeding edge, >and suffering from the associated low chip yields. If they are at the best >cost-performance point for 2-3 years ago or whenever they started approving >the export of RC4-40, then they are certainly subject to David Wagner's >performance limits. Sorry about mangling quotes. :( This was about a year and a half ago. I can't remember the name of it, but this chip fab industry mag was talking about how the NSA was obtaining out side help in fabricating what was at the time a type of ram that did processing off chip in parrallel. If the chip was basically routing the problem to different sectors and the same sectors of ram did their own processing on different parts of the same problem how many powers of processing time would this increase the same amount of acerage?* * NSA term for processing. Side note: Wired just recently talked about IRAM or Intelligent ram, and how it seems to be the future of high speed computation. PGP encrypted mail preferred. E-Mail me for my key. Scott J. Schryvers <schryver(a)radiks.net>

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Re: New Clinton Administration Ping Policy
by Scott Schryvers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:22 PM 7/31/96 -0700, you wrote: > >Press release: > >CLINTON ADMINISTRATION FACT SHEET: U.S. PING POLICY >(Industry, international cooperation urged) > The sad thing here is that I can't tell if this is a joke or not. :( PGP encrypted mail preferred. E-Mail me for my key. Scott J. Schryvers <schryver(a)radiks.net>

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Security of Web registration of Lview Pro
by Andrew Meredith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Sirs, I was happy to find that you have put up an SSL form through which one can register Lview Pro. I filled it in and pressed the button. My browser then warned me that although the form was sent to me securely, the data I was sending back was in the clear! I had a look at the page source for: https://commerce.mindspring.com/www.lview.com/iregform.htm and there is was: <FORM METHOD="POST" ACTION="http://www.std.com/Newbury/leonardo/cgi-bin/fp.exe"><P> ^^^^ Therefore the only thing protected by this "Secure Form" is the original text of the form, rather than the credit card details. I know that: "If using an SSL Web browser such as Netscape or Microsoft Explorer, please click here to access a secure document." doesn't actually *say* that your customers card details are secure, but at first glance it sounded like it to me. Whatever others may think about the rights and wrongs of it, my personal policy is not to commit credit card details to open networks, unless under strong encryption. I look forward to your comments. Andy Meredith

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Re: Cracking RC4/40 for massive wiretapps
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wait a minute: RC4 is an OFB cipher. The previous plaintext has no effect on the ciphertext. Hence, an attacker with shitloads of storage capacity can generate some initial output for each key and test each pre-stored key against ciphertext for possible hits. Using 'flaws' in the key schedule (esp. if the key is based on a password rather than a hash of a password) one could search for 'more likely keys' first. Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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crypto++ help
by wwoelbel＠midwest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I recently downloaded the crypto++ class library and am having a bit of trouble getting things to happen. I have read the text on the source-filter-sink concept and was able to create a DES file encryptor. What I would like to do is use either blowfish or IDEA to encrypt a variable length data stream. Does anybody have experience with this library? A short code snippet or similar help would be appreciated. Bill Woelbeling wwoelbel(a)midwest.net

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Micali's rights to lightweight certificates etc.
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 31 Jul 1996 17:28:56 -0400 From: Silvio Micali <silvio(a)sunspot.tiac.net> To: cme(a)cybercash.com, d.adams(a)xopen.co.uk, frantz(a)netcom.com, hallam(a)w3.org, rodney(a)sabletech.com, rsalz(a)osf.org, silvio(a)sunspot.tiac.net, spki(a)c2.org Subject: Micali's rights to lightweight certificates etc. Sender: owner-spki(a)c2.org Precedence: bulk Dear Carl: Last April I was forwarded by Ron (Rivest) the following e-message addressed to you: "[Re: Micali's lightweight certificates with hash chains] The mechanism maybe patented, but who owns the patent? I am aware of claims by two european groups who have payment schemes using a combined s/key and signed cert technique Pghill" As I do not know the context of your conversation, it is hard for me to guess which technology's rights the above question refers to. There are (at least) two possible technologies the question refers to. Let me thus answer it in either case. I would appreciate if you could pass this information to people you feel may be interested in it. (I am trying to CC all the people CCed in the original message, but I am not sure that this reaches all the right people.) RIGHTS INFORMATION My efficient certificate revocation technology is itself based on my off-line digital signature technology. The efficient certificate certificate revocation technology has been invented by me alone. I have filed for patent protection, and the patent is currently pending with the U.S. Patent Office. The underlying off-line signature technology has been invented by Shimon Even, Oded Goldreich and me. The technology is protected by U.S. Patent No. 5,016,274. The rights to this technology are only with me. (The latter technology, among other things, covers the process of separating the signing process into two stages: a OFF-LINE one --that can be performed before knowing what the message to be signed is--- and an ON-LINE one --which is typically performed when one knows exactly what he/she wishes to sign. In the preferred embodiment, in the off-line step, the signer uses the secret key SK of a first, conventional secret-public key pair (SK,PK) to digitally sign the publick key, pk, of a second, restricted but very fast, signature scheme. In the on-line step, the signer uses the second secret key --i.e., the one associated with pk-- in order to sign the desired message. In particular, the second public key, pk, can be obtained by evaluating k times a given one-way hash function on input sk. After doing so, one can sign in an off-line step pk together with a certificate serial number (and other information). Then, in an on-line step, one can sign that a certificate is being valid for at at least i days --where i is between 1 and k-- by releasing the ith inverse of pk; that is, by releasing a value that, hashed i times, yields pk. You can thus see the connection between the two technologies.) Both technologies are available for licensing. If you or someone in your discussion group is aware of a company using either technology, I would appreciate if you could facilitate a contact between me and such a company, so that we can discuss possible licensing arrangements. The Efficient Certificate Revocation Paper is presented in MIT Technical MIT/LCS/TM-542, dated November 95. A better version appears in a March 1996 manuscript. Either version could be obtained from me, if more convenient. Off-Line Digital Signatures also appear in the Proceedings of Crypto 89. A better version can be found in The Journal of Cryptography (1996) 9; pp. 35-67. Any version is also obtainable from me, if more convenient. Hope this helps answering the above ``rights'' question. Thank you also in advance for forwarding the above information to whomever you believe may be interested in it. All the best, Silvio --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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