December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Schlafly on crypto
by Jim Legg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Subject: Clinton Is Trying to be Big Brother -- Phyllis Schlafly Column 8/8/96 > [snip!] Beware when politicos speak! Phyllis Schlafly would think nothing of trying to ban speech on the internet when it is something that she doesn't agree with. -jim-

4 3

Stopped Clock. Was: Schlafly on Crypto
by Marc J. Wohler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:59 AM 8/14/96 -0400, you wrote: >Subject: Clinton Is Trying to be Big Brother -- Phyllis Schlafly Column 8/8/96 It makes me ill to agree with Schlafly on any issue, but 'Even a stopped clock....... Unrepentant Liberial

1 0

Citation for NSA Type III & IV Crypto products
by Mark O. Aldrich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C'punks: Most who are familiar with the Fed's crypto products are aware that the NSA categorizes crypto products by "type." Type I is specified as being for classified protections (and relying upon classified key) and Type II being for SBU/other (with unclassified-only key). I recall, however, that there were also categories called Type III and Type IV. I think that Type III had to do with industry use, with Government-generated key. Type IV I can't recall at all. Now, I can't find the citation where these things were described. The EPL cites only Type I & II, Dockmaster has proven of no use, and the search engines can't find anything on the Net. Does anyone recall where a discussion of these types can be found? TIA. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Just as the strength of the Internet is |Mark Aldrich | |chaos, so the strength of our liberty |GRCI INFOSEC Engineering | |depends upon the chaos and cacophony of |maldrich(a)grci.com | |the unfettered speech the First Amendment|MAldrich(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil | |protects - District Judge Stewart Dalzell| | |_______________________________________________________________________| |The author is PGP Empowered. Public key at: finger maldrich(a)grci.com | | The opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the author | | and my employer gets no credit for them whatsoever. | -------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Re: [SIGNAL] Microsoft's Internet Explorer
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:22 8/14/96, Jüri Kaljundi wrote: > Wed, 14 Aug 1996, Frank Stuart kirjutas: > >> According to C-Net Radio (http://www.cnet.com/) Microsoft will be including >> 128-bit SSL encryption in their Internet Explorer 3.0 for Win 95 and NT 4.0. > >As M$IE 3.0 is now available for download from www.microsoft.com, I did >notice there is also a 128-bit version there, which requires you to first >fill in data about you. Unfortunately microsoft.com is so slow right now, >that I did not have a chance to try to download 128-bit version by filling >in my favourite US politicians name. I don't see the 128 bit version. URL? -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

2 1

Imprisoned Capital
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:12 PM 8/14/96 +-200, Bart Croughs wrote: >If investors use their capital to invest abroad, this capital cannot at the same > time be used to invest at home. Only after the investors decide not to invest > abroad any more, they can invest it at home. But I was not talking about > investors who decide to stop investing abroad and start investing at home. I > was talking about investors who decide to invest abroad instead of at home, > and the effect of such a decision on the wages in the US. There is no straightforward link between amount of capital invested and productivity or wages. If there were, some steel plants in the Soviet Union would have had the best paid and most productive workers on earth. Additionally, countries which prevent capital outflows don't receive capital inflows and thus become poorer. DCF

1 0

Thursday, 15 August: Join Matthew Gaylor in Club Wired's Electronic Frontiers Chat
by freematt＠coil.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thursday, 15 August 6 p.m. PDT Matthew Gaylor, in Electronic Frontiers Join Gaylor and host Jon Lebkowsky on Thursday, 15 August at 6 p.m. PDT (Friday 01:00 GMT) in Electronic Frontiers. http://www.hotwired.com/eff/ [Note from Matthew Gaylor: I'll be online at ClubWired discussing cyberlibertarianism and other pro-individual rights issues. I'm sure you'll want to join the discussion. I hope to see you there.] **************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor,1933 E. Dublin-Granville Rd.,#176, Columbus, OH 43229 ****************************************************************************

1 0

Re: key escrow idea from David Satelin of MIT Lincoln Labs
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:48 AM 8/14/96 -0400, Matt Blaze wrote: >>Remember, since the phoneco has had no competition, they've never been at >>risk from being shunned by customers who object to this secret cooperation. >>A more "realistic" position, I think, would be to conclude that if there was >>true competition, customers would be able to negotiate varying levels of >>non-cooperation in order to win customers. I suspect that post-Ruby >>Ridge/post-Waco, there would be a substantial fraction of the public who >>would conclude that it cannot trust its own government. >> > >Well, I don't know what went on before 1968, but these days phone companies >don't keep wiretap orders secret because they are being nice to the police, >they keep them secret because the court order for the weretap also orders >them to. Perhaps you aren't aware of this, but when a third party is >ordered to turn over records or access to something, the order often >includes a provision that prohibits them from revealing the order to the >subject. This is not unique to phone records; orders for bank records >frequently have secrecy provisions as well. Well, that's just the problem. These are clear violations of the 1st amendment. The law may authorize a search, but the Constitution is supposed to limits them to "reasonable" ones. And it says nothing about _secret_ ones, either. The effectiveness of the search itself can't possibly be compromised by releasing the fact of the search AFTER it occurs, which means that the inclusion of such a secrecy order can't even conceivably be supported under the US Constitution. Think of this as a two-pan balance: On the one side is the 1st amendment, a very important issue. One the other side is...nothing. Or, perhaps more accurately, no _constitutional_ issues. Remember, the Constitution does not guarantee the effectiveness of the entire investigative process; it merely addresses one portion of it, the search. (and even there, it doesn't guarantee a successful search!) If the government claims that the process is crippled by releasing the fact of the search, then I'm afraid that this is not an adequate reason to violate free-speech rights. (When the famous Miranda warning decision was made by the Supreme Court, cops said that it would cripple their investigations.) You may say, of course, "that's not how they currently interpet it," but my response is simple: Any talk of tolerating any sort of key-escrow (GAK) system must presume that the people running it are no more honest than they are today. If the cops (and the government in general) so generously misinterprets the government's "rights" with regard to wiretapping, there is simply no reason to believe that any restrictions they claim to be willing to respect now will actually be followed once such a plan is approved. Don't try to get out of this: You can't ignore past abuses. And if they were willing to do illegal taps before 1968, this tells you how inclined they are to obey the law. We've been handed an opportunity: The government wants to change its wiretap powers, and unlike previous times the public is actually aware of what's happening and can object. I think we must take this opportunity to entirely re-think the search-warrant/wiretap process. Rather than blindly accept the opinions of crooked judges who got where they are by demonstrating their willingness to "get along by going along," we should strip away all the decades of scheming, and delete the entire process. My opinion is that wiretaps are, inherently, unreasonable searches within the meaning of the Bill of Rights. Interestingly, support for this interpretation was shown when the media stated that Japan's Constitution prohibited wiretapping. This was portrayed as being somewhat of an oddity. But in reality, that Constitution was forced on Japan after WWII, by the US. Curiouser and curiouser, that happened during a time frame (pre 1968) in which wiretapping was illegal in the US, and probably believed to be unconstitutional as well. Since the US Constitution hasn't changed since then, at least with respect to searches, the only realistic conclusion is that the thing that's changed is the interpretation of the US Constitution, and not for any sound reasons either. (That Japanese Constitution, apparently not subject to such convenient re-interpretation, stands as it was when adopted, at least on this one issue.) In fact, the timing for this change is suspicious: 1968 was certainly a rather tumultuous year, what with anti-Vietnam war protests, assassinations and such. Not only in the US, but even more so in France, with the student riots. The motivation to adopt an unconstitutional wiretapping law must have been substantial. And given the fact that public polls on the concept of wiretaps repeatedly show it to be opposed by a majority of the population, I think the burden of proof is on the Denning-types to show that they're appropriate. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

2 1

DCSB: The Transnationality of Digital Cash
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----BY SAFEMAIL 1.0----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents Tatsuo Tanaka Center on Japanese Economy & Business Columbia University "The Transnationality of Digital Cash" Tuesday, September 3, 1996 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Tatsuo Tanaka is from the Center for Global Communications at the International University of Japan. He is currently a Visiting Research Fellow at Columbia University's Center on Japanese Economy & Business. Government analysts like to stress the anonymity and security concerns of digital cash, particularly money laundering and tax evasion. However, probably the most important economic consequence of digital cash to nation-states is its transnationality. Theoretically speaking, any bank can issue digital cash any country's currency, even on a fractional reserve basis, without permission from that nation-state's central bank, and everybody in the world can use it as if that cash were issued by the country itself. This unprecedented transnationality could make a country's financial system unstable in terms of money supplies or exchange rates. Tanaka goes through a possible scenario in which nation-states and cyberspace conflict over the authority to issue digital cash, including a possible resolution of the problem. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, September 3, 1996 from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $27.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men, and "appropriate business attire" for women. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, August 31, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston". If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Planned speakers for DCSB are: October Philippe LeRoux Stock Exchanges and the Web November Philip S. Corwin Regulatory Barriers to Internet Commerce We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, rah(a)shipwright.com . For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . Looking forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----BY SAFEMAIL 1.0----- Version: 2.6.i iQCVAwUBMhHz1/gyLN8bw6ZVAQGJlQQApgYjtBSEW+g3cF9qsO3SVF3dFn5ObPa6 WoP7nhldO2XbLgFQOsBqXWv+pUHu9aAxo2TaHFtqegCrr5eEbVutjKhFGdOCZqRT QoFElygD3hKE7sITW6VM9hQaq37eylRapNuvMLo6Q49/BwuDYcWQSkCVQsBlKkP7 lp7JBVIHkMY= =WlRo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

1 0

re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:33 13/08/96 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: > > the fact that an engineer who is subject to the power of the Indian > > government is not worth very much, as is demonstrated by the fact > > that companies with Indian engineering teams often spend a lot of money > > to get their employees out of India. > > > > Demand for Indian programmers is less than supply not because capital > > has somehow failed to flow to India, but because an engineer in India > > is not free to produce the value that engineers elsewhere are free > > to produce. At 07:00 PM 8/14/96 +0600, Arun Mehta wrote: > Whoa! In economies that are highly de-coupled, incomes and prices > can easily find quite different equilibria. So? What does this have to do with the price of fish? Are Informix campuses "highly decoupled economies". The fact is a company like Informix has a campus in India, and it has campuses in the US that are largely staffed by Indian teams, and it will pay big bucks to get its people out of India, even though it has to pay them more than ten times as much in the US. An Indian programmer doing the same job for the same company is more than ten times as valuable to that company if he is not subject to the power of the Indian government, as proven by that companies actions. Plainly Informix does not like the power of the Indian government, which is no surprise as a few years ago just about every company on earth utterly detested the power of the Indian government and would not touch the place with a ten foot pole. > India has its faults, > but it still is a relatively democratic and free country. Under democracy, people get the government they deserve and get it good and hard. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

3 2

Toronto Signing Party (fwd)
by M. Plumb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 14 Aug 1996 04:10:26 -0400 From: Richard Outerbridge <outer(a)interlog.com> Newgroups: alt.security.pgp Subject: Toronto Signing Party -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 1996/08/14 04:01:55 EDT Marc Plumb and I are trying to organize a "signing party" for anyone within range of downtown Toronto. The tentative date is the afternoon of Saturday September 7th. Location will depend on the size of the crowd: so RSVP to Marc or myself (<mp(a)the-wire.com> or <outer(a)interlog.com>) and one of us will get back to you during the first week of September with the precise details. Be patient! Richard Outerbridge -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMhGJcNNcQg4O6q8hAQE0LwP/WvmqDyLqqY28H0peWO/HJyhCInRITx7N aCCfDYdQxjym8/AAFBHy6Luye1DpRpok0RM9OFIMVMWOFzf7Ma7hYwD2KK56IJcy E9XDbak+DkbS/AKthxS5UXPN4Vy1VRUExxMGvXrcCIK2RvoxhT8ZbUp3pQAo/fn4 IYIHo/oTJ0Q= =qQOf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "Just an eccentric soul with a curiosity for the bizarre." PGPpubkey 1024/0EEAAF21 1994/07/23 <outer(a)interlog.com> Fingerprint = 6A89 D49F D3DA 12E4 040A 273B F383 0127

1 0