December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Feinstein wants controls on forwards
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:11 PM 7/28/96 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote: Damn! Sorry! Forwarded it to the wrong alias in Eudora. (I knew I was going to fuck that up one of these days... Need more caffiene.) --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

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Re: your favorite poison recipes
by Vinnie Moscaritolo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous writes: >Please post your favorite poison recipes to this mlist. I'd have to say Federal Match in.308, Lead poisoning -- Long distance. martian Minow writes: > >Rare roast beef, baked potato with plenty of butter, red wine. > Martin; last time I checked you were a trickle down vegaterian too. Vinnie Moscaritolo ------------------ "friends come and friends go..but enemies accumulate." http://www.vmeng.com/vinnie/ Fingerprint: 4FA3298150E404F2782501876EA2146A

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Re: Feinstein wants controls on Internet, Books
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:45 PM 7/28/96 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >For instance, say you, hypothetically, wanted to blow up your government's >legislative building. You'd obviously want to pick a dark and stormy night, >say early in November, and you'd sneak into the basement with barrels >of gunpowder. You'd use a long, slow-burning fuse, so it would blow up >the next day when they're in session, but after lighting it you'd still >run away very fast just in case your fuse speeds up on you. The obvious >thing you'd need to do is to NOT GET CAUGHT LIKE THE LAST FOOL WHO TRIED IT. >However, if you do get caught, maybe you'll end up with your name in lights >and people will set off firecrackers in your honor every fall, >while if you don't get caught you won't be personally famous. Tough choice:-) > >Penny for the Guy? Fawke You! Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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H0W T0 MAK3 A P1P3 B0M8
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.infocom.net/~cbottaro/explosives.html

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Crypto and Sec Files
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Complete Internet Business Toolkit By Winn Schwartau and Chris Goggans Van Nostran Reinhold, New York, 1996 262 pp. Paper, with CD-ROM. $34.95 ISBN 0-442-02222-0 [Excerpt] The contents of this CD-ROM are copyrighted and protected by United States copyright laws. The individual programs included on the CD-ROM are copyrighted by the authors or owners of those programs. To use any program, you must follow the requirements as stated within any licensing agreement included with that program. ... You should also remember that some ofthe applications and information included on this CD-ROM is forbidden to export from the United States. Cryptographic algorithms and programs using such algorithms are classified as munitions by the United States government, and the penalties for taking them out of the country are very harsh. For this reason, DO NOT TAKE THE CD-ROM OUT OF THE UNITED STATES, OR YOU MAY WIND UP IN JAIL. [The Crypto and Secure directories of 22 directories]: \TOOLKIT\CRYPTO\ ABSOLUTE EXE 310,509 02-20-96 5:39p ANONMAIL ARJ 17,123 03-10-96 6:45p BLIND-SE DOC 9,276 03-10-96 6:45p BLOWFISH ZIP 18,981 03-19-93 3:53a BLOWFS58 ZIP 62,698 03-10-96 7:08p CHAIN ZIP 22,300 03-10-96 6:45p CPHANT ZIP 40,448 03-10-96 6:46p CRIPWIN2 ZIP 81,121 02-16-96 1:21p CRYPT20 ZIP 62,143 03-10-96 7:08p CRYPT201 ZIP 1,137,996 03-19-93 3:43a CRYPTE1 ZIP 28,521 03-10-96 7:09p CRYPTIC ZIP 486,830 02-13-96 7:17p CRYV120S ZIP 343,690 02-16-96 1:21p DES EXE 71,484 02-20-96 4:12p DES3 ZIP 195,642 02-14-96 5:52p DIGSIG ZIP 63,394 02-16-96 12:02p DOSBAT ZIP 5,455 03-10-96 6:45p EFW32U ZIP 525,722 02-16-96 1:27p ELIPT210 ZIP 61,786 03-10-96 7:00p ENCRYP ZIP 218,717 02-16-96 1:27p ENCRYPT ZIP 17,873 03-10-96 7:09p ENIGMA21 EXE 196,189 02-20-96 6:02p ENIGMA30 ZIP 449,132 02-20-96 6:03p ENIGWIN1 EXE 1,019,818 02-20-96 6:06p EXCRAK ZIP 278,946 02-12-96 7:05p HDSK41B ZIP 263,869 03-10-96 6:42p IDEA22A ZIP 14,592 03-10-96 7:00p IDEA3 ZIP 6,885 03-10-96 7:09p KRYPTO11 ZIP 15,972 03-10-96 7:09p MD5ASM32 ZIP 7,988 03-10-96 7:00p MESS11B ZIP 26,490 03-10-96 6:40p MRRCIP ZIP 148,569 02-20-96 6:18p NAUT090 ZIP 53,356 03-10-96 6:47p NAUT09OS ZIP 106,864 03-10-96 6:48p NCRYPT31 ZIP 21,481 03-10-96 7:09p NEWDES12 ZIP 30,295 03-10-96 7:09p OTP-10 ZIP 83,559 03-10-96 7:01p PASSGN50 ZIP 147,742 02-12-96 7:41p PGP262 ZIP 282,786 03-20-96 12:40a PGP262DC ZIP 167,102 03-20-96 12:41a PGP262S ZIP 658,945 03-20-96 12:44a PGPCLIP ZIP 52,020 02-13-96 7:14p PGPFRONT ZIP 62,885 03-10-96 7:10p PGPSHE33 ZIP 114,840 03-10-96 7:11p PKCRACK ZIP 25,374 03-10-96 6:56p PUBKEYS ZIP 7,118 03-10-96 6:45p QPCRAK ZIP 255,731 02-16-96 1:52p R4DCRYPT ZIP 15,895 03-19-93 3:54a RC4 ZIP 815 03-19-93 3:46a SCRYPT3 ZIP 27,169 03-10-96 7:11p SCYTAL13 ZIP 489,687 02-16-96 1:57p SECDR13A ZIP 87,769 03-10-96 6:49p SECDR13C ZIP 108,617 03-10-96 6:50p SFS10TEX ZIP 293,319 03-10-96 7:12p SFS110 ZIP 245,159 03-10-96 7:12p SPLOK18 ZIP 10,394 02-16-96 1:58p SPLOK95 ZIP 22,799 02-13-96 5:27p SPLOKNT ZIP 22,538 02-13-96 7:14p STEGODOS ZIP 21,958 03-10-96 6:42p TANGLE ZIP 34,472 03-10-96 7:13p TOMB100 ZIP 22,800 03-10-96 7:13p UECRYP01 ZIP 15,774 03-10-96 7:13p UNSSL C 11,646 03-10-96 6:56p VOUCH10 ZIP 89,257 03-10-96 7:13p WDCRAK ZIP 270,716 02-16-96 12:37p WINCRACK ZIP 141,025 03-10-96 6:57p WINPGP10 ZIP 23,739 02-16-96 2:10p WINPGP26 ZIP 245,421 09-21-92 11:24p WNS210 ZIP 84,102 03-10-96 6:42p WPCRACK1 ZIP 146,717 02-16-96 2:13p WPCRACKB ZIP 9,140 03-10-96 6:58p WPCRAK ZIP 181,848 02-16-96 12:31p ZIPCRACK ZIP 83,005 01-29-96 12:05p \TOOLKIT\SECURE\ BLANK20 ZIP 10,499 02-12-96 4:26p CALLER1A ZIP 1,180,957 02-12-96 2:06p CALLERID ZIP 1,278,664 02-16-96 1:19p CID125 ZIP 478,908 02-16-96 1:20p DMNPASS2 ZIP 41,742 02-16-96 1:21p KEYAPP EXE 135,168 02-19-96 10:58a LOCK ZIP 10,448 02-16-96 1:37p LOCKSET ZIP 12,138 02-12-96 4:27p LOCKTT23 ZIP 233,259 02-16-96 1:38p NOBLANK ZIP 23,673 02-12-96 4:39p PRGRD-22 ZIP 165,933 02-12-96 4:43p RESTEASY ZIP 63,911 02-16-96 1:54p S-TOOLS ZIP 134,707 02-16-96 12:14p SAFEPR ZIP 331,502 02-16-96 1:56p SECGP114 ZIP 31,548 02-16-96 1:57p SECLAU ZIP 42,057 02-16-96 1:58p SECURE ZIP 69,463 02-12-96 2:00p SECURE10 ZIP 49,753 02-16-96 1:58p SECWIZ ZIP 184,984 02-12-96 2:00p WINPAS11 ZIP 12,493 02-12-96 7:01p WINSEC10 ZIP 317,974 02-12-96 7:02p WINU202 ZIP 171,252 02-13-96 5:30p WLOCK16U ZIP 19,324 02-12-96 7:02p \TOOLKIT\SECURE\TEXT\ BIBLIO ZIP 18,912 01-29-96 12:08p CRC ZIP 29,038 01-29-96 12:08p FCVOL1 ZIP 155,958 01-29-96 12:09p FCVOL2 ZIP 166,764 01-29-96 12:11p GRNBOOK ZIP 275,675 01-29-96 12:12p IPEXT_PS ZIP 43,578 01-29-96 12:12p ITAR9307 ZIP 205,226 01-29-96 12:12p NCSCTG25 ZIP 20,682 01-29-96 12:12p ORNGBOOK ZIP 94,112 01-29-96 12:12p REDBOOK ZIP 19,891 01-29-96 12:13p SECURITY ZIP 51,123 01-29-96 12:13p SEC BIBL ZIP 16,861 01-29-96 12:13p SNR9501 ZIP 24,719 01-29-96 12:19p SNR9503 ZIP 22,168 01-29-96 12:19p SNR9504 ZIP 34,758 01-29-96 12:19p TEMPEST ZIP 6,868 01-29-96 12:13p TOUR PS ZIP 69,116 01-29-96 12:21p UEBER ZIP 4,100 01-29-96 12:13p UNIX SEC ZIP 8,179 01-29-96 12:21p WORM REP ZIP 111,782 01-29-96 12:21p ---------- In accord with Schwartau's and Goggans's copyright and export notifications, these files might be made available to those who may not have access to the volume's CD-ROM. Request a selection(s) by PGP msg and your thumbprint.

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Re: Schelling Points, Rights, and Game Theory--Part II
by tob＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) writes: > [Schelling Points, rights, etc.] This seems more a case of "the border is at the river" than Schelling Points. The river is the border because it hard to cross (harder than dry land), not because it is easy to see. Tom

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Re: Feinstein wants controls on Internet, Books
by Seth Oestreicher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>There's a diagram of a pipe bomb on the CNN web site, in the story about >the horrible things. In case you want to see, check it out at: http://www.cnn.com/US/9607/27/pipe.bomb.explain/index.html The picture that is on the page gives enough information for the average person to go to the hardware store and buy the parts..... Not only do they HAVE to point out that the information is available, but also provide it. *NOW* who is irresponsible? Seth

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Re: Publicly Verifiable Anonymous Voting System
by tob＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

JonWienk(a)ix.netcom.com writes: > That doesn't really do it. In fact, I'm not sure why you move in this direction at all. No offense. Seems to me that voter registration of some kind must be UNanonymous. I want to have confidence that my empowered political opponents aren't voting 10,000 times each. It also seems to me that if the entire system is the government's black-box, there is no anonymity. It is a trustworthy as the government itself. At worst, if they want to know how you voted, they can sum all votes, then sum all votes but yours, then subtract. Seems to me that the best thing would be a system where you the voter pick who is to handle your vote, in a sort of hierarchical tree. Each level has the same goal as a DC net, to make it difficult to tell who among many people communicated, and further levels confuse which group did, and which group-of-groups did, and so forth. Each group delivers its collected votes, publicly but unidentified, to a group-of-groups, and watches that groups' output. Obviously you would use multiple envelopes to prevent premature disclosure. At each level, you need to be able to identify your own vote and check that it is unaltered, but no-one else should be able to associate it to you. This assumes that there is no way for anyone to see you looking for your own ballot, which is a separate facet of the problem. Everyone needs to be able to see that the collected votes did not exceed the number of voters that group has. This is pretty simple and requires a fair bit of collaboration to defeat. But it can be partially defeated by partial collaboration and the rest guessed from parallel voting patterns. If your entire group is seen to vote the same way, your vote among them is obvious. Tom

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
by tob＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What the 20 Cypherpunk Bankrobbers do, aside from writing "Memo: Need better loot-division scheme. *URGENT*." Assume every player acts completely rationally, and unwaveringly trusts every other player to fully understand the situation and act solely to maximize their profit in this single situation. Also assume that each player announces an immutable, unconditional monetary distribution before anyone has voted, and the announced distribution constitutes the whole of the payoff (no way to make or enforce promises, no external loyalties, no side payments, etc.) Also assume no revolt against the rules is possible. Every proposer makes the most profitable deal for himself that will pass the vote, if they can predict it (As it happens, they always can with one exception, see below) Every player, when voting, compares what he is offered right now with what he will be offered between now and the first guaranteed successful proposal. He inspects the future possibilities and sees that the next offerer can make a successful proposal if they (the player) vote down the current proposal, and if his vote is needed this time, it will not be needed for the next offer to succeed. (You can check this assumption below). So he sees no reason to hope for a better result by voting against apparently favorable offers. ---- If we were to keep the condition that all other things being equal, players vote for the other players to live, the proposer always keeps the *entire* amount. If a player expects to be offered no money next time, it makes no sense to offer him anything this time, because you've got his vote for sure anyways (nice guys finish last). Working backwards, once a player will be shut out in the future, it never makes sense to cut him in. In fact, for each player it makes sense to some proposer to shut him out. The guy next in line will never vote for the proposer to live, so is always shut out. So nobody but the proposer expects any money and everybody but the guy next in line votes for the proposer to live. ---- So instead I'm going to assume that if a player does not do *better* than he will next time, he votes against the proposer. The result is that the first player not only lives, but makes out like a bandit, to the extent that the loot is subdividable. If there were 40 million and 1 guys in line, he'd be meat. Likewise, if the money was all in $2,500,000 notes he should start framing his last words. I'm going to write it in reverse order, where #0 is the last guy, #1 is second to last, etc. because it's easier to see the progression that way. 1 Player: #0: everything Voting for: #0 Trivially succeeds 1/1 2 players: #0: nothing #1: Everything Voting for: #1 Succeeds 1/2 3 players: #0: $.01 #1: nothing #2: Everything else. Voting for: #0 #2 Succeeds 2/3 4 players: #1: $.01 #0, #2: nothing #3: Everything else. Voting for: #1 #3 Succeeds 2/4 5 players: #1, #3: nothing #0, #2: $.01 #4: Everything else. Voting for: #0 #2 #4 Succeeds 3/5 6 players: #1, #3: $.01 #0, #2, #4: nothing #5: Everything else Voting for: #1 #3 #5 Succeeds 3/6 The other cases proceed similarly, grouping even/odd. In the end, the guy at the head of the list offers every other guy a penny and keeps the rest -- and then starts to sweat as he wonders whether our assumption of perfect rationality will hold up in real life. Paul Foley nearly got it, but it does matter who is offered money. If it didn't, then nobody could count on doing worse on the next proposal. -------- The case where the proposer does not get a vote is completely different: 1 Player: #0: everything Voting for: Vote is indeterminate 0/0 Player seals himself into a box with the money, Schroedinger's cat, and a vial of poison that has a 50% chance of being shattered. Everything that follows depends on how we resolve that case. If we assume some probability mixture of money & death, it is not given how to weight the player's negative payoff (death) vs positive payoff (money). Let's assume Schroedinger's player gets all the money and is not required to suicide. 2 players: #0: Everything #1: nothing Voting for: Fails 0/1 Remember the assumption that if a player does not do *better*, he votes against the proposer. This is a null move since the outcome is the same as above. 3 players: #0: nothing #1: $.01 (or nothing) #2: Everything else Voting for: #1 Succeeds 1/2 Note that we assumed that #1 requires strictly more money than he would otherwise be offered (His life means nothing to him). Otherwise he would be offered $0. (Yeah, I don't want to rewrite the analysis just for that). It would end up with the same pattern, though, just faster. 4 players: #0: $.01 #1: $.02 (or $.01) #2: nothing #3: Everything else Voting for: #0, #1 Succeeds 2/3 That fact that the proposer cannot vote means he needs to pick up an extra vote. He can't get it from the guy who would get almost everything, and a penny secures the vote of the player who would get nothing. So he has to offer the player who would get $.01 the next increment of money. If #1 valued his life, he'd be offered $.01 instead. 5 players: #0: $.02 #1: nothing (or group #0,#1 interchangeably) #2: $.01 #3: nothing #4: Everything else Voting for: #0, #2 Succeeds 2/4 ...leaving the next (previous) proposer a similar position. 6 players: #0: nothing #1: $.01 (or group #0,#1,#2 interchangeably) #2: $.02 #3: $.01 #4: nothing #5: Everything else Voting for: #1, #2, #3 Succeeds 3/5 7 players: #0: $.01 #1: ? #2: nothing #3: ? #4: $.01 #5: nothing #6: Everything else Voting for: #0, #4, ? Succeeds 3/6 For the first time here, one of the proposers has an arbitrary decision. He has #0 and #4 and he needs to pick up one more vote. He can't do it for $.01 and there are two ways to do it for $.02. We would have encountered this situation earlier if #1 valued his life. Here we have to add some notation to indicate a non-determinate distribution over a set: (set): (non-zero payoffs, all others are 0) average 7 players: #0: $.01 (#1,#3): ($.02) average $.01 #2: nothing #4: $.01 #5: nothing #6: Everything else Voting for: #0, #4, (#1 or #3) Succeeds 3/6 8 players: #0: ? (#1,#3): ? #2: $.01 #4: ? #5: $.01 #6: nothing #7: Everything else Voting for: #2, #5, ?, ? Succeeds 4/7 The proposer easily gets #2 and #5 and needs two more votes. #6 can't be reached. The rest all have an expected payoff of $.01, so he gives $.02 to any two of them. Our indeterminate-list seems to be growing. 8 players: (#0, #1,#3, #4): ( 2 x $.02) average $.01 #2: $.01 #5: $.01 #6: nothing #7: Everything else Voting for: #2, #5, 2 of (#0, #1,#3, #4) Succeeds 4/7 9 players: (#0, #1, #2, #3, #4, #5): ( 3 x $.02) average $.01 #6: $.01 #7: nothing #8: Everything else Voting for: #6, 3 of (#0, #1, #2, #3, #4, #5) Succeeds 4/8 The indeterminate-list has now swallowed up everything but the last 3 players and will continue to do so because the average payoff to the list is always more than $.01 and less than $.02. 10 players: (#0, #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #6): ( 4 x $.02) average $.08/7 #7: $.01 #8: nothing #9: Everything else Voting for: #7, 4 of (#0, #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #6) Succeeds 5/9 -------- Another set of assumptions is that the players do not trust each other to be rational or to see all outcomes. In this case, the guy at the head of the line says in a loud voice to the guy behind him: "Whoever would vote to kill me even though I offer them money would vote to kill you too even if you split the money with them, so if it gets to you you should cut out anyone who got my money but voted to kill me, but keep those who got my money and voted to keep me alive." He then allocates equal portions to half the group, including himself and not including the guy behind him. He probably lives. --------

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Re: Questions...
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12.12 PM 7/27/96 -0400, Alan Horowitz wrote: >> Hello, I would rather I not be too blunt, but despite my generous >interest in computer > hacking cracking, and other such related topics, I >have come to be confused by the > mailer, can I ask any questions that I >wish, or am I limited by some type of header > subject? > > > >Shaun, let me explain. There's a committee of seven people. Me, Tim May, >David Sternlight, some assination-politics guy, some guy named Vultis or >somesuch, and so on. > >Only if we're in unanimous agreement on the outcome of an issue, may you >start a thread on a new topic. which then continues till the first >posting which calls someone a Nazi. And if they *don't* like your suggestion, you get killed and they move on to the next guy's suggestion of how to split up the available issues so that each cypherpunk gets a fair share of ranting. =============================================================================== David Rosoff (nihongo ga sukoshi dekiru) ---------------> drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu PGP public key 0xD37692F9 -----> finger drosoff(a)acoma.arc.unm.edu or keyservers 0xD37692F9 Key fingerprint = 25 7D AA 01 85 41 43 89 50 5A 33 76 F1 F1 99 67 Do you know who's reading your email? ---> http://www.arc.unm.edu/~drosoff/pgp/ Is it a forgery? --- I have PGP signed all email and news posts since May 1996. =============================================================================== "Relax. It's not a real alarm. They can't crack _Pentagon_ codes. Can they?" :p -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMfqXpBguzHDTdpL5AQHkjQQAoLcf75f6TcKCGUaoq0c1JiL+seDFgw2l LQNHY+P/coI8KmQeEpeZgdAVEmts+BNbhGfHSaHTFtyAoUP24OfRDyVr7Mn4d0gF 1wuDp4aVNtGAEMCVkg9dXL6Klf38NeglU1EH2522loYo6g6/ANiTdPX729KrMNMO 3iPydVCu0aI= =NhSg -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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