December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: How I Would Ban Strong Crypto in the U.S.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:02 PM 7/15/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >At 7:03 AM -0700 7/15/96, Michael Froomkin wrote: >>On Sun, 14 Jul 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >> >>> So, who is in this "emerging consensus"? >>> >>Foreign governments? >>(Process of elimination, not inside info...) > >Perhaps. And the vast inside-the-Beltway policy community, "Policy"? I'm reminded of the fact that the whole concept of "policy" (as used in Washington DC) contains embedded within it its own set of biases. The concept of "national encryption policy" (a phrase I've seen before) implicitly assumes that there is (or must be) a _national_ policy, as opposed to a whole bunch of _individual_ policies. (Jim Bell's individual encryption policy is to get PGP and use it here and there, and try to keep up with newer developments, etc.) My opinion is that "nations" don't NEED "encryption policies" unless they intend to screw their citizens. "Policy", used in this way, is merely a smokescreen (or a shorthand) for a group of assumptions that toe the government's line. The people who make such assumptions rarely stick around to defend them. > most of whom are more like Dorothy Denning than Tim May. To the extent that they are POLICY (as in _government_ policy) people (with all the biases I've alluded to) that wouldn't be surprising. However, it is still extraordinarily dishonest for them to refer to an "emerging consensus" when they must well understand that the document they wrote was intended to be understood by ordinary people, not government-suck-ups. I'm reminded of an idiotic cover for a Classical Music CD directory book about 10 years ago, which grandly claimed that the book indexed "every CD published" but forgot to add the word "classical" adjective to that phrase. Without opening the book, you couldn't tell that the directory only listed classical CD's. A "policy" person who says there's an "emerging consensus" for key escrow has a similarly myopic point of view. >And the vast business community >that prefers automated escrow in standard systems. I feel certain that whatever portions of the business community that "prefers automated escrow" will get it, in forms which don't make the government particularly happy. > What I mean by that is >software or chips automatically escrowed to, say, Price Waterhouse. >Business is comfortable dealing with such firms in a trusted relationship, >and such firms will honor a valid court order to produce records or the >equivalent--a probable cause court-order for a wiretap. Most "chips" won't need to be escrowed, for reasons that have been adequated addressed so far. Data transfer encryption doesn't have to be escrowed, as Tim May pointed out. And, of course, an encryption chip needn't contain any sort of permanently-written key, thus obviating the need for "escrow" at all. >It really depends on how the issue is presented. If it is presented as >preserving law enforcement access, escrow follows. No, escrow DOESN'T follow! I think most people who are aware of the issues figures that the advent of encryption will provide dramatic net benefits for the public, even after potential negatives such as criminal use of encryption are factored in. > The problem is that like >the nose of the camel, each new piece of legislation establishes a new >status quo baseline of principle from which to argue, and though we all >kicked and screamed about it here, the new baseline is the Digital >Telephony Act. I concede NOTHING. That Act hasn't been funded, may not be, and with every passing month there are more people on the 'net who will understand how unacceptable it is. It's also going to be irrelevant as encrypted telephones appear, and 'net telephone access becomes more common. No new "baseline of principle" is produced. Only the thugs who are trying to foist it all on us would like to believe this. >As for the only counterargument to the above, that bad guys aren't going to >use escrowed systems, nothing is perfect, goes the argument, and the FBI >has caught plenty of bad guys who presumably should have known better, via >wiretaps. "the only counterargument"? What are you, a comedian? >If you look into it, you will find that most people with criminal minds >don't expect to get caught. > >Given the nature of this group it perhaps needs saying that the above is a >competitor analysis, not an argument nor my own position on mandatory >domestic key escrow. I'm agin it. Which is not adequate. To the extent I believe that the market will decide, if I model the market as a double-pan balance, which makes a decision as to which side is heavier, I don't want to see the heavy thumb of government pressing down on one of the pans. That's precisely what the US government tried to do with Clipper, and astonishingly it appears to have failed. To merely say that you're against "mandatory" escrow strongly implies that you would accept manipulation of the market in order to allow government to achieve its goals , as long as there is an illusion of a choice. I won't, and I think most people won't, either. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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UK privacy case: Munden
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

interesting story I hadn't heard before. this guy complained about a bad bank balance and went to jail for it. touches issues such as security of bank software, government oppression, crypto, judicial evidence legality, etc. ------- Forwarded Message Date: Thu, 11 Jul 1996 04:38:27 -0700 (PDT) From: Phil Agre <pagre(a)weber.ucsd.edu> To: rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu Subject: John Munden freed X-URL: http://communication.ucsd.edu/pagre/rre.html [This case is so outrageous that it wouldn't even work as a "Dilbert" strip. Fortunately the guy is now free, having had his life ruined for complaining about the theft of his bank deposits.] =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Wed, 10 Jul 1996 11:00:11 -0800 From: Jon Callas <jon(a)worldbenders.com> To: "The Eristocracy" <Eristocracy(a)mv.mv.com> Subject: Munden set free [Editor's note: I sent out an article about the Munden case when it was current -- in late '94. For those who don't remember, John Munden is a British policeman who was jailed for complaining about his bank balance being wrong. No, you didn't read that incorrectly. Read on for more details. I certainly hope that the next chapter will be some sort of restitution paid to Munden. -- jdcc] Date: Tue, 09 Jul 1996 12:13:28 +0100 From: Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> To: set-discuss(a)commerce.net Subject: Important UK court case +----------------------------------------------------+ Addressed to: set-discuss(a)commerce.net +----------------------------------------------------+ At a trial in England yesterday, a judge decided that if a bank was not prepared to let their computer systems be examined by a hostile expert witness, then they could not even present bank statements in evidence. At least SET has been done right - I believe it is the first significant banking protocol to have undergone an open design review. I hope that there will be implementations that have also undergone credible scrutiny. I append a note of the case that I posted to our supporters. Ross Anderson ********************************************************************* John Munden is acquitted at last! At twenty past two today, John Munden walked free from Bury Crown Court. This resolved a serious miscarriage of justice, and ended an ordeal for John and his family that has lasted almost four years. In a judgment loaded with significance for the evidential value of cryptography and secure systems generally, His Honour Justice John Turner, sitting with two assessors, said that when a case turns on computers or similar equipment then, as a matter of common justice, the defence must have access to test and see whether there is anything making the computers fallible. In the absence of such access, the court would not allow any evidence emanating from computers. As a result of this ruling, the prosecution was not in a position to proceed, and John Munden was acquitted. John was one of our local policemen, stationed at Bottisham in the Cambridge fenland, with nineteen years' service and a number of commendations. His ordeal started in September 1992 when he returned from holiday in Greece and found his account at the Halifax empty. He complained and was told that since the Halifax had comfidence in the security of its computer system, he must be mistaken or lying. When he persisted, the Halifax reported him to the police complaints authority for attempted fraud; and in a trial whose verdict caused great surprise, he was convicted at Mildenhall Magistrates' Court on the 12th February 1994. I told the story of this trial in a post to comp.risks (see number 15.54 or get ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/post.munden1). It turned out that almost none of the Halifax's `unresolved' transactions were investigated; they had no security manager or formal quality assurance programme; they had never heard of ITSEC; PIN encryption was done in software on their mainframe rather than using the industry-standard encryption hardware, and their technical manager persisted in claiming (despite being challenged) that their system programmers were unable to get at the keys. Having heard all this, I closed my own account at the Halifax forthwith and moved my money somewhere I hope is safer. But their worships saw fit to convict John. An appeal was lodged, but just before it was due to be heard - in December 1994 - the prosecution handed us a lengthy `expert' report by the Halifax's accountants claiming that their systems were secure. This was confused, even over basic cryptology, but it was a fat and glossy book written by a `big six' firm with complete access to the Halifax's systems - so it might have made an impression on the court. We therefore applied for, and got, an adjournment and an order giving me - as the defence expert witness - `access to the Halifax Building Society's computer systems, records and operational procedures'. We tried for nine months to enforce this but got nowhere. We complained, and the judge ordered that all prosecution computer evidence be barred from the appeal. The Crown Prosecution Service nonetheless refused to throw in the towel, and they tried to present output such as bank statements when the appeal was finally heard today. However, the judge would have none of it. For the computer security community, the moral is clear: if you are designing a system whose functions include providing evidence, it had better be able to withstand hostile review. Ross ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This message was sent by set-discuss(a)commerce.net. For a complete listing of available commands, please send mail to 'majordomo(a)commerce.net' with 'help' (no quotations) contained within the body of your message. - - --- end forwarded text - ------- End of Forwarded Message ------- End of Forwarded Message

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PARC Forum, 7-18-96, Gregory Schmid, "The Future of ConsumerElectronic
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Sender: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com Reply-To: mikkelsen(a)parc.xerox.com (Jim Mikkelsen) (by way of frantz(a)netcom.com (Bill Frantz)) Mime-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk Date: Mon, 15 Jul 1996 11:53:09 -0700 From: mikkelsen(a)parc.xerox.com (Jim Mikkelsen) (by way of frantz(a)netcom.com (Bill Frantz)) To: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com> Subject: PARC Forum, 7-18-96, Gregory Schmid, "The Future of Consumer Electronic Xerox PARC Forum Thursday, July 18, 1996, 4:00PM, PARC Auditorium The Future of Consumer Electronic Payments: The Impact on the Distribution Chain Gregory Schmid, Institute For The Future This talk explores the critical changes pushing consmers into the world of electronic transactions--improved technologies, better security, and consumers' growing experience with card-based and other electronic transaction technologies. These changes will not only affect customer behaviors, but will transform the distribution chain, bring in new players, force the current players to fundamentally transform the way they conduct business, and encourage policymakers to find the right balance of regulation and market forces. Combined, these impacts will change the basic relationship between businesses and their customers forever. Only the stakeholders who are prepared for such changes will carve out their place in the new world. Greg directs IFTF's long-term forecasting and strategic planning efforts in both the public and private sectors. He has been Director of IFTF's Corporate Associates Program (CAP) since its inception in 1976 and is also the overall editor of CAP's "Ten-Year Forecast." Greg has overseen projects for many Fortune 500 companies, including those in the financial services, high technology, consumer products, professional services, and healthcare industries. As an economist, historian, and policy analyst, Greg uses a variety of research and planning techniques to work with clients in exploring strategic choices. His most recent book is "Future Tense: The Business Realities of the Next Ten Years" (William Morrow, 1994) with Ian Morrison. Before joining IFTF Greg headed a research division of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. A graduate of Yale, Greg received his Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University. ------------------------------- This Forum is OPEN to the public. Host: Jim Mikkelsen 415-812-4401 Web site: http://www.parc.xerox.com/ops/projects/forum Requests for videotapes for "Xerox Employees Only" should be sent to Susie Mulhern (Mulhern(a)parc.xerox.com) Refreshments will be served from 3:45 - 4:00PM. The PARC Auditorium is located at 3333 Coyote Hill Road in Palo Alto. We are located in the Stanford Research Park, between Page Mill Road (west of Foothill Expressway) and Hillview Avenue. The easiest way to get here is to take Page Mill Road to Coyote Hill Road, and, as you drive up Coyote Hill between the horse pastures, PARC is the only building on the left after you crest the hill. Please park in the large (lower) lot to your right; enter the auditorium at the upper level of the building. (The auditorium entrance is located to the left of the main door and down the stairs.) ------------------------------- Next Week's Forum is Shirley Tessler, Stanford University, on "A Pilot Study of Software Product Management." --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Symantec's Your Eyes Only
by Clay Olbon II 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you read this weeks "Network Computing", there is a report on Symantec's Your Eyes Only encryption software for Windoze 95. The article can be found at: http://techweb.cmp.com:80/techweb/nc/711/711sneak2.html. Looks like a PGP competitor - uses RSA public key, DES, triple-DES, RC4, RC4 or blowfish secret key algorithms. It can also be used to encrypt directories on the hard-drive while retaining the ability to use them. This appears aimed at corporate users, and includes a "super-user" access to all encrypted files/messages. Also includes the capability to create an "unlock" disk that will decrypt everything should you lose your password. Now my $.02. I am concerned about the lack of a distinction between transient communications and stored data. This is apparent in the GAK proposals, but is also increasingly apparent in mainstream corporate products such as this one and ViaCrypt BE. It is apparent (to me anyway) that corporate access to stored data (data owned by the company, on machines owned by the company) is probably necessary. I do not see this same need for access to transient communications. Am I way off base on this one? Clay *************************************************************************** Clay Olbon II * Clay.Olbon(a)dynetics.com Systems Engineer * PGP262 public key on web page Dynetics, Inc. * http://www.msen.com/~olbon/olbon.html ***************************************************************** TANSTAAFL

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Re: Surf-filter lists
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Vlad: How can consumers make an informed decision as to which filter >they wish to purchase, if they are not told exactly what information >each product is filtering out? > >Meeks et al may be guilty of flamboyant, emotionalistic prose, but I >find the concept that the public is expected to buy various filters >without knowing what they filter...frankly, ridiculous. Flamboyant prose? Moi? Never! More to the point, as I wrote at the end of the original CWD, it's a bait-and-switch maneuver. Go after porn, they say, but the censor political information. And you don't know about it. -Declan

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Banning Anonymity As Well (was Re: How I Would Ban Strong Crypto
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 15 Jul 96 at 11:53, Bill Frantz wrote: [..] > I still think this whole GAK thing is going to fail on the, "Which > government?" question. I don't see either multi-nationals or their > governments wanting to share their secrets with each other, and I don't see > how to set up universal GAK to prevent that form of industrial espionage. > Also, the key which decodes the GAKed data is just too valuable and too > easy to steal. Assuming the info is encrypted with one GAK key, yes. There might be a series of keys, perhaps for each escrow agency, or an id-number that identifies the key. Note that such methods will not allow much anonymitiy, since each communication must be escrowed. The method used to id. the key can be used to trace a sender or receiver's id. Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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RE: Government: Home-Business
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Mike Rose >I'm getting more and more of this kind of crap sent to me. I have >a procmail script which greps a file of undesirable addresses I've >compiled, but that hasn't proven very useful as there aren't many >repeat offenders. (the procmail script is available at >http://www.universe.digex.net/~mbr/unix/junkmail.html) > >How are other people dealing with this? ............................................................. For this particular one, I faxed all 6 pages back to the phone number they gave ("send your check to.....), declining the offer. .. >Blanc

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Re: Chancellor Group (symbol = CHAG) (new data)
by David Lesher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The SEC already is aware of this ahem activity. They are looking into it. If you have further data, direct it to Al Lapins of "OIEA" at the SEC..... -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

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Cookie alternatives
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There has been quite a bit of discussion recently about the "cookies" used by Netscape Navigator and their effects on privacy of users. Here is some background and some thoughts on alternatives. I think the term "cookie" goes back to the 1960's. According to legend, there was a virus-like program called "cookie monster" which would occasionally pop up on people's terminals and say "gimme cookie". You then had to type the word "cookie" to satisfy the program, and it would go away. The program was hidden in the core memory of the large, multi-user computer systems which were common in those days. I first heard "cookie" used similarly to its current context in the 1970's. It referred to a data item which would be given by a service to a client of that service, and which would be used on later interactions. I think the usage comes from the cookie monster, where you imagine the client saying "gimme cookie" to the server. The cookie is an "opaque" data item, that is, its structure if any is not visible or documented for the client. It has meaning only to the service. There is a similar concept in cryptography, the "nonce". A nonce is a random value which is generated by one party in a cryptographic protocol and which is exchanged at later stages of the protocol. The purpose of the nonce is to prevent replay attacks and to maintain continuity during the (possibly) many exchanges of data which make up the protocol. When the client sends a request to a service it includes a nonce, and the return reply includes the same nonce. This way the client can make sure that this is a reply to its current request and not something which is replayed from an earlier interaction. Cookies seem a little more general than nonces, in that nonces are pretty clearly supposed to be just random numbers, while cookies are more general and could have internal structure which is known by one of the parties, although it is usually opaque to the other. However I think in current usage on the web cookies are most commonly used basically as nonces, random values whose purpose is to maintain continuity in a series of interactions. When a server gives a cookie to a web browser, that browser supplies the cookie on future interactions with the server. The cookie probably does not have any specific data about the user or the interaction, but is used only to link up the interactions which take place. It is most probably used as an index into a database maintained on the server itself. Its only requirements for this purpose are that it is unique and that it can easily be used as such an index. One typical usage would be to maintain a "shopping cart" while browsing at a store. If I am visiting an online clothing store, I may choose to buy some pants, a shirt, and a jacket as I browse around. Each time I click on the "buy" button, my browser includes the cookie I received when I first visited the site. This indexes into a database on the server which is keeping track of what I have bought. With each new item, the cookie allows the server to add it to the correct virtual shopping cart. Then when I "check out", again the cookie allows the server to display everything I bought. Given that cookies generally work this way it is clear that the notion of editing cookies doesn't make much sense. If cookies are opaque data structures, changing them is just going to make them invalid. You might as well just delete them. This also implies that you don't have much control over what kinds of information the server is maintaining in its database which is indexed by your cookie. In the shopping cart example, the cookie is sent on every transaction, not just when you click to make a purchase. This will allow the server to track your progress through the site, see which if any ads you have seen, and generally record many details about your interactions. More generally, cookies are used for this purpose even on sites which do not need them for shopping carts. As a user of the web, I would prefer to have more control over the kind of information which servers gather about my browsing habits. Of course, since web interactions are voluntary, a server is free to put whatever restrictions it wishes on clients in return for letting them access its information. It can require clients to accept cookies, to register with their names and addresses, or to FedEx their firstborn children to the store, for that matter. Nevertheless to the extent that I have bargaining clout in these interactions, I will prefer systems which do not infringe so much upon my privacy. It is interesting to consider how shopping carts might be done without cookies and similar technologies which allow servers to get more information about me than necessary. I would prefer a system where the list of things I have chosen to buy is saved on my own computer, in a format I can clearly see, and without linking my purchase decisions to other browsing I may have done on that site. Consider a system where when I click on "buy", a dialog box pops up in the corner of my screen which is my virtual shopping cart. It holds a list of the items I have selected for purchase, with each new item appended to the list. When I go to check out, the contents of this dialog box are uploaded (with my permission) to the site, where payment arrangements are made. Since I can see what is being put into the dialog box and what is being uploaded, I know that I am controlling exactly what information is being revealed about me. I don't have to trust the server to protect my privacy by not recording excessive information about my browsing. (Given the difficulties in creating new protocols for this kind of support, I think a step in the right direction would be to change the user interface so that cookies are only sent upon user request. Maybe you have to shift-click or use some other key modifier to send a cookie. Then shopping pages could ask you to shift-click the buy button to add the item to your shopping cart.) All this is in accord with the general principle that we support here, of protecting privacy by limiting the collection of infringing data, rather than trying to pass laws to restrict the dissemination and sharing of such information. We support ecash since it allows transactions without identification, rather than using credit cards but trying to put legal restrictions on what the CC companies can do with their transaction data. Cookies allow many kinds of privacy infringing data to be collected. I would prefer to see alternate mechanisms to allow for the kinds of transactions that cookies are needed for, which allow users to protect their own privacy. Are there other uses of cookies for which alternatives are needed? Hal

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Government: Home-Business
by Creative Financial Alternatives 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Let your computer start helping you make some money, instead of costing you money! The Refund Tracer Program is recognized as an extension of the services provided by HUD/FHA. This program is a gratifying way to earn extra money, especially since you are also helping someone else at the same time. The work you will be doing is simple, pleasant and absolutely anyone can do it! Without any formal training or education, Refund Tracers who have just started are earning $300 to $1,000 or more a week! It depends on your determination, and how much you want to make! If you have any additional questions for us feel free to call us at: 216-226-8799. Please don't delay. The only way you can lose is doing nothing, and that would be a shame. You owe it to yourself and your family. So act now. You'll be glad you did! We give you everything you need to get started right away, including a FREE state listing Nobody can even come close to matching this offer. Other people sell you the Manual then charge extra for the State Listing, not us. We give you the whole business for almost nothing. For a small amount, you can take a big step towards financial independence. We're looking forward to hearing from you! Plus, if you order the program we will personally assist you with any ideas or questions you may have while working the program, so your not alone in this. We'll be here to help you along you're way Below is an example of the State Listings. ---------------------------------------------- Name Address & City Case# & Zip Date & Money owed ------------------------------------------------------------- Smith, Joe 1626 Ansel Drive 441-024360 07/06/94 Dayton OH 45416 $1,800.00 Virgil Baker 804 10th Avenue 411-031524 03/01/95 Middletown OH 45042 $1,134.76 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- As you can see you are provided with quite a bit of information. This is what make the program so EASY to work!!! ********** 90 DAY MONEY BACK GUARANTEE ************** Here's how our policy works all you have to do is try the program for 90 days then if your not satisfied simply return it for a refund. So you have nothing to lose. If your looking for a real opportunity you found it. Respectfully yours, Creative Financial Alternatives The Program Only Costs $33.95 Send payment to: Creative Financial Alternatives Unclaimed Funds 18645 Detroit Ave. Suite 714 Lakewood, Ohio 44107 We accept Money Order or Check Made Payable to: Creative Financial Alternatives We are pleased to announce were able to accept checks by phone or fax to help you get started immediately. If you want to get started right away. The purpose of accepting checks by phone and fax is that it speeds up the process so you can get started immediately. Phone us at: 1-216-226-8799 Fax your check to: 1-216-226-3225 * Please note that if you do check by phone or fax you will need to keep that specific check for your own records. Please do not mail it to us or deposit it at your bank. Simply void it out and keep it for your own records. ************* QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ***************** You are bound to have some questions about the Government Refund Tracer Program. Below are some commonly asked questions and my straightforward answers. Also, if you have any questions that aren't answered below please call us at: 216-226-8799 We'll be glad to answer them for you. Q: Is the Government Refund Tracer Program legal? A: Yes, in 1986 Congress mandated that HUD make available to the general public lists of borrowers due refunds. Subsequently, HUD created the Tracer Program. Q: Can I do this from any state? A: Yes, you can live in one state and trace people in another state, you can do it from anywhere! Q: How much does the Tracer receive? A: We recommend 25%-30%, of the refund. Q: How do I obtain the names of the refund recipients? A: You can get them directly from HUD or us. Q: Why can't the person owed a refund get the money for themselves? A: They can, however the vast majority of people don't know anything about the Government refund process. They would need a case number and other specific information only you have. This lack of knowledge is what makes the tracer so valuable, because they can't do it without you. Q: Does this program require a large investment? A: No, expenses (such as lists of names, stamps,etc.) will depend on how large an area you intend to cover and since you will be self-employed these expenses will be tax-deductible. Most of your investment will be your time and effort. Q: What is the average refund amount? A: The average refund amounts range from $800-$1,000, but refunds of $4,000 are not unheard of. It all depends on the area or state you target. Q: If I did a refund for $1,130.94 how much would I get? A: Your fee is 30% so you would get $339.28 for that one claim!! Q: How do I find these people? A: You can go through the phone book directory or if you have a computer with a CD-ROM drive you can purchase a copy of "Home Phone" it's a directory of over 85 million residential phone numbers. The majority of these people are still at the current addresses on the form from HUD. Thank you very much and we look forward to talking with you in the near future. Creative Financial Alternatives 18645 Detroit Ave. Suite 714 `\|||/ Lakewood, Ohio 44107 (o o) Phone: 216-226-8799 Fax: 216-226-3225 ooO_(_)_Ooo________________________________________________ _____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____| _____|__ __|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____| _____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|

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