December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: NRC Cryptography Report:
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some dumb questions from a citizen. Note: Recommendation summaries are from "Fight-Censorship Dispatch #11: Landmark Crypto Study Released", posted by Declan McCullagh <declan(a)eff.org>. Thanks Declan. >Recommendation 4: Export controls on cryptography should be >progressively relaxed but not eliminated. > > 4.1 -- Products providing confidentiality at a level that > meets most general commercial requirements should be easily > exportable. Today, products with encryption capabilities that > incorporate 56-bit DES provide this level of confidentiality > and should be easily exportable. How do you reconcile this recommendation with the recommendation of the Cryptography experts group that data which needs to be kept secret for 20 years should be protected by at least 90 bit keys? The current export restrictions inhibit using strong crypto domestically. How do this recomendation free domestic crypto for commercial development? Another way of asking is, how can strong crypto be distributed in the US so as to preclude prosecution for exporting it? How do future export controls affect software posted to FTP/web sites? > > 5.3 -- To better understand how escrowed encryption might > operate, the U.S. government should explore escrowed > encryption for its own uses. To address the critical > international dimensions of escrowed communications, the U.S. > government should work with other nations on this topic. How do government experiments with key recovery systems help us learn about their vulnerablities to human level attacks, e.g. bribery? How much negotiable value will these government systems carry? How will GAKed systems protect US business from spying by foreign governments? France is rumored to be particularly active in commercial spying, and will want access to all keys used in France. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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(Fwd) Re: [crypto] crypto-protocols for trading card games
by David F. Ogren 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Gary Howland asked me to forward his response to the mailing-list: - ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Thu, 30 May 1996 12:12:48 +0200 From: Gary Howland <gary(a)systemics.com> Organization: Systemics Ltd. To: ogren(a)cris.com Subject: Re: [crypto] crypto-protocols for trading card games David F. Ogren wrote: > Cards are not transferrable. In order to make cards transferrable > the game company must be able to invalidate cards which have been > traded to others. In other words if Alice wants to give a cards to > Bob she must: > > 1. Contact the game company and tell them she wants to give the card > to Bob. 2. The game company must issue a new card to Bob with a new > serial number and with Bob's public key rather than Alice's. 3. The > game company must invalidate Alice's old card. Since there is no > way that the game company can make sure all copies of the card have > been destroyed it must create a "invalid serial number list" and > have the players dial into that list everytime the game is played. This is the double spending problem. > Since step 3 is so costly to implement, I think it is unlikely that > a cryptography-based trading card game will have tradable cards. Given that untraceability of cards is less of an issue than with e-cash, why not have a central registry of the owners of the cards (which would consist of the card hashes paired with the public key fingerprint)? Admittedly this means the players must be on line, but then we all know how difficult off line detection of double spenders is. For anyone who is _serious_ about starting work on such a game system, I have a few pieces of Perl and Java code that would really get you on your way - let me know if you are interested. Gary - -- pub 1024/C001D00D 1996/01/22 Gary Howland <gary(a)systemics.com> Key fingerprint = 0C FB 60 61 4D 3B 24 7D 1C 89 1D BE 1F EE 09 06 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMa6YXPBB6nnGJuMRAQG0tgP8DSnhI+SgoaR63AuOpOi7qPgC6Ei3bFJV TdZUB6lfYg3FnE4AaBkxdYkGPfzoyJx1u3Nu/s2BJs5i3Zd2eOfYohj3CJoXJVo1 04zXamo9cCvgemNTplT331sFc+nX/iOIRUvAWbJdfhaOapnm6KVSrNkFqhiRhQ5S 0SYvgcISnZA= =VdtP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- David F. Ogren ogren(a)concentric.net (alternate address: dfogren(a)msn.com) PGP Key ID: 0xC626E311 PGP Key Fingerprint: 24 23 CD 15 BF 8D D1 DE 81 71 84 C8 2C E0 4B 01 (public key available via server or by sending a message to ogren(a)concentric.net with a subject of GETPGPKEY)

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someone to "educate"
by clouds＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This was, well, interesting. As a result of the recent loss of many remailers, I started looking for a local (to me) ISP that would offer me an anonymous account, and/or a shell account. Nobody would offer me a shell account except for these people, and here's what they had to say about an anonymous account... Received: by alpha.c2.org for clouds(a)alpha.c2.org From gjung(a)igateway.net Thu May 30 06:33:10 1996 The policy is set and I am not going to argue with you about it. I explained that we do not feel that anyone needs to be doing things that they do not want their name attached to on the Internet, and for that reason do not offer anonymous accounts. You have offered no reason to change the policy. I regret that we are unable to offer service to you. ---------- From: The Dreamer[SMTP:clouds@alpha.c2.org] Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 1996 5:32 PM To: gjung(a)igateway.net Subject: anonymity/corporate policy > Corporate policy dictates that we do not offer anonymous > accounts. It is corporate belief that there should be no > reason anyone needs anonymity on the net That's an, er, interesting policy. Although there are a great number of arguments for anonymity - and privacy - I won't try to persuade an obviously uninterested audience. (That's you.) I'd like to see the relevant corporate policies; are they available at www.igateway.net or elsewhere? Also, is there a more precise rationale behind the decision? I'd very much like to do business with you, but if you don't want my money, that's cool. d.

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Re: Quickremail v1.0b
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:36 PM 5/28/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"matts(a)pi.se" "Matts Kallioniemi" 28-MAY-1996 06:08:28.40 > >>Why would anyone set up a remailer at Lance's (or Sameer's) machine? >>They have remailers running already. If the thugs break root and obtain >>one remailer key from a machine, they probably get all the keys on that >>machine, compromising all the remailers in one single attack. Or am I >>missing something? Is there any benefit of multiple remailers on a machine >>where root is running his own remailer? > > Well, the advantages are: A. I get Lance's help more quickly in setting >up this one, so I can later go to other machines (preferably out of the >country) and set things up the same way there (getting Mixmaster from an >out-of-US source, of course); and B. supporting the efforts of Sameer, Lance, >et al by paying them some money. While multiple ISPs are certainly >preferable (to avoid one rubber-hose (e.g., law enforcement) breaking from >getting everything), your argument assumes that all the machines at a given >ISP are linked together such that if one is broken, the rest are - which >isn't very good from a security standpoint, so I'd hope it _isn't_ the case. > > Thanks, > -Allen In addition, it is more remailers which need to be shut down to bring the remailer system down. At this point I think we need to think of robustness against shutdowns in our threat models, in addition to the usual considerations of traffic analysis. With all the shutdowns, the most immediate need is for more remailers. -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: opinions on book "The Truth Machine"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It sounds like a "make.money.fast.by.promoting.this.book" scam to me. At 3:32 AM 5/31/96, A.Back(a)exeter.ac.uk wrote: >Anyone read this book? Available on line: > > http://www.truthmachine.com/ > >The book is a possible future world scenario exploring the social >implications of another new potential technology, a 100% reliable >truth test. What would society do with such a device? > >The book explores the direction in which it is no longer possible to >speak untruthfully without detection. A different approach to AP to >ensuring honesty in politicians. .... Adam, I find it hard to believe you're caught up in this "Amway novel" nonsense. (I saw the ads for it in many newsgroups a few weeks ago.) A "machine which makes lying impossible"? Give me a break. (Sounds like a great scheme for factoring large numbers...you just pick a pair of factors at random and the "truth machine" says whether you're lying or not....Other problems with this "truth machine" are left as an exercise.) In any case, I decided to waste a few minutes skimming the opening parts of this "online media event novel" and discovered at the URL you cited: "Complete this brief survey and receive the first two and a half chapters of the book free! Upon submission, you will be given access to these chapters of The Truth Machine......" Utter bullshit. If the book was any good it would have a real publisher, not an opinion survey. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: [crypto] crypto-protocols for trading card games
by David F. Ogren 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In my earlier message I said: > > Cards are not transferrable. In order to make cards transferrable > > the game company must be able to invalidate cards which have been > > traded to others. In other words if Alice wants to give a cards > > to Bob she must: <snip> Gary Howland said: > This is the double spending problem. > Me again: > > Since step 3 is so costly to implement, I think it is unlikely > > that a cryptography-based trading card game will have tradable > > cards. > Mr. Howland again: > Given that untraceability of cards is less of an issue than with > e-cash, why not have a central registry of the owners of the cards > (which would consist of the card hashes paired with the public key > fingerprint)? Admittedly this means the players must be on line, > but then we all know how difficult off line detection of double > spenders is. > And herein lies the problem with an implementation of trading card games. In order to detect "double spenders", the system must be on-line. However, I believe going on-line will drive the costs of running such a game out of the range of commercial feasibility. First of all, it requires that all players have Internet access. This reduces marketability. Secondly, it requires that both players make an Internet connection with the game company everytime they want to play a game. This will incur costs to the game company that it invariably will want to pass on to the players. Players, however, will be very resistant to a game that requires a subscription fee as well as costs for purchasing "cards". Especially, if becomes known that the only reason for the game requiring on-line access is to prevent "cheaters". It also raises the question of whether the game program could be "hacked" to avoid checking for authenticity of cards. I think that a more realistic solution to the "double spending" problem is to not allow the transfer of cards between players. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMa6cjPBB6nnGJuMRAQGr3wP+K+DXJVM0rX0F6FSqwfTE/YCJbfiJXC7g dAlwBA1URYA96h4su6xRThD2SbL0vJSLhvi3djQiTeshdqgmD8MTzlDsqTDLPp+f Sw0GN7OjHWlt8VO5UOK9686L7u2Ev49EdGqkaR2NOy5qNdj079v0JydRCg3qhvmT 7LqcXhRbH7g= =h3Eq -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- David F. Ogren ogren(a)concentric.net (alternate address: dfogren(a)msn.com) PGP Key ID: 0xC626E311 PGP Key Fingerprint: 24 23 CD 15 BF 8D D1 DE 81 71 84 C8 2C E0 4B 01 (public key available via server or by sending a message to ogren(a)concentric.net with a subject of GETPGPKEY)

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opinions on book "The Truth Machine"
by A.Back＠exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone read this book? Available on line: http://www.truthmachine.com/ The book is a possible future world scenario exploring the social implications of another new potential technology, a 100% reliable truth test. What would society do with such a device? The book explores the direction in which it is no longer possible to speak untruthfully without detection. A different approach to AP to ensuring honesty in politicians. The political climate has moved to a situation were the population accepts a world government and loss of privacy for the payback of near zero crime rate. Is this utopia or has free will been removed? Certainly many of the premises in the book are contrary to cypherpunk goals in that privacy is erroded (you can not lie, and truth tests with the question as to wether you have committed a crime at routine points, for example when you need to renew a driving license, etc). Government regulation of many aspects of life have been increased. Position escrow or some near-relative is in there too, for the purpose of allowing one to prove what was said, the video stream is sent and encrypted in real time. Also cryogenics, and nano-tech. Interesting technology for cypherpunks to think about the implications, likelihood, desirability etc. Adam

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Re: Where does your data want to go today?
by David F. Ogren 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > What problems does compression before encryption have? It at least > > >seems to work for PGP. > > > > > Most compression schemes put a header/index on the front of the > > compressed data. > > This makes recognizing the correct decryption very simple. > > > > Call it a limited "known plaintext" situation. > Using a random IV also limits the effectiveness of using known headers for "known plaintext" attacks. Also note that a good block cipher isn't that vulnerable even to "known plaintext" attacks. -- David F. Ogren ogren(a)concentric.net (alternate address: dfogren(a)msn.com) PGP Key ID: 0xC626E311 PGP Key Fingerprint: 24 23 CD 15 BF 8D D1 DE 81 71 84 C8 2C E0 4B 01 (public key available via server or by sending a message to ogren(a)concentric.net with a subject of GETPGPKEY)

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Re: remailers, mail technology
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>>Why would anyone set up a remailer at Lance's (or Sameer's) machine? >>>They have remailers running already. If the thugs break root and obtain >>>one remailer key from a machine, they probably get all the keys on that >>>machine, compromising all the remailers in one single attack. Or am I >>>missing something? Is there any benefit of multiple remailers on a machine >>>where root is running his own remailer? There are multiple threats that remailers have to face; multiple remailers on one machine are jointly vulnerable to some of them, but separately vulnerable to others. If there are keys stored in plaintext on a machine, then root-breakers can steal them (unless it's running a multi-level secure operating system that can prevent that, if physical security is maintained.) Thugs confiscating the hardware or trashing the OS obviously break all the remailers at once, though that's only denial of service and not compromise. Offline remailers using POP, UUCP, or other mail forwarding also don't risk compromise (if they only accept encrypted messages), because they don't keep keys or perform encryption on the ISP's server. For all of these cases, the remailer-positive ISP provides a certain amount of flak catching, but can also avoid much of it because _he_ isn't running the remailer - his customers are, and if the remailer gets abused, maybe they'll have to become ex-customers. That's especially effective for ISPs that support customers with their own DNS names - foobar.com is owned by someone other than Sameer, and if Sameer has to squash them, maybe they start getting hosted by Lance instead, or by AOL, or by YAISP.SF.CA.US. Telnet-only shell account providers probably get a little less deniability than dial-only IP+POP providers or especially dial-only IP-only providers. (On the other hand, the fact that Sameer's systems are telnet-only means that users can be spread around to other dial-IP providers, including all those 10-hour AOLers he just has to keep squashing :-), while if he had dial-up users the thugs might go for telephone records. ==== What kind of technical infrastructure would help run remailers in environments like this? I can think of three things - Encrypted IP sessions (either IPv6, if it ever gets deployed, or swIPe) - Encrypted POP and SMTP client/server interactions. - User-based encrypted communications (SSH? SSL?) relaying POP/SMTP. If we're going to get convenient wide deployment before the millenium brings IPv6, the approach will either need to run on shell(-like) accounts only, or else will need to piggyback on SSL. Either way, rather than get everyone to replace POP3 with CryptoPOP (they haven't even done IMAP), it'll probably take some kind of relay that sits on your desktop machine, speaking POP3-server on one side and CryptoPOP on the other. And you'd have to handle firewalls. Is there any way to get Netscape to implement something like pop3: and smtp: services for the client software (or do them as plug-ins)? Adding them to a server (i.e.. Apache-SSL) would allow SSL to do the crypto, and would mean you could use https: proxies to handle firewalls, since everybody's got to deal with them anyway. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Optimism re NRC Cryptography Report
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:04 PM 5/30/96, Hal wrote: >I read the overview of this, and while it is good that the report calls >for maintaining the legality of domestic encryption and some slight >loosening of the export rules, overall I was diappointed. Reading it at the Web site (http://www2.nas.edu/cstbweb/) and looking at some of the comments here, I'm not as disappointed as I expected to be. Sure, there is a lot of language about meeting law enforcement needs (including the disturbing proposal to apply NSA SIGINT capabilities domestically to help the FBI and law enforcement solve the "growing gap" problem in telecommunications intercepts), and the language about "56 bit" systems seems to leave open the door for severe restrictions on stronger systems (as Hal, Bill Frantz, and others note in their posts). But, on balance, I think this NRC report comes down strongly enough in favor of cryptography use for business and individuals that it will effectively *derail* and *stall* current Administration proposals, give support to the Burns Bill, and delay key escrow systems for at least several years. This should be enough to ensure our victory. (Not that I think that even fairly repressive legislation would've been enough to defeat us, but a new breathing spell can only help.) Unless laws are passed very quickly to outlaw the things we are involved with, including such things as superencryption, steganography, anonymous remailers, and digital money, I think we will "win the race to the fork in the road." The "fork in the road" being the point at which the changes are unstoppable. (And I couldn't see much about these technologies....though I haven't read every line of the Web summary, and have certainly not seen the full report.) So, at first reading, I am cautiously optimistic that this NRC report will carry enough weight to delay crypto legislation long enough to ensure our ultimate victory. The "degrees of freedom" will soon be too large as to ever control. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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