December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Hacktic remailer shutdown
by Jeff Simmons 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there any information available on why the Hacktic remailer was shut down? -- Jeff Simmons "You guys, I don't hear any noise. jsimmons(a)goblin.punk.net Are you sure you're doing it right?"

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Compu$erve, Netscape offering Lotus Notes competitor
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is no mention in either of these articles about what encryption protection will be used; it does appear that Netscape Navigator software will be used, which does have some protections (very little for the out-of-US stuff, of course). Jeff? -Allen >Copyright 1996 Nando.net >Copyright 1996 Bloomberg >COLUMBUS, Ohio (May 9, 1996 12:41 p.m. EDT) -- CompuServe Corp. this fall >will offer corporate customers Netscape Communications Corp. software used >to share documents over computer networks. >The move presents another challenge to International Business Machines >Corp.'s Lotus Notes software, whose popularity has declined as companies opt >for cheaper Internet software capable of many of the features Notes offers. >Using Netscape's software, company employees and partners in distant offices >can exchange and work on documents at the same time. Netscape also is >developing audio and video technology that will let employees talk to each >other. [...] >Columbus, Ohio-based CompuServe already offers Lotus Notes and decided to >strike an agreement with Netscape because customers were asking for a >similar, cheaper product. [...] >CompuServe will offer Netscape's server software, used to relay information, >and Internet browsing software. Terms of the marketing and development >agreement weren't disclosed. >Netscape's software is based on technology it acquired with the purchase >last year of Collabra Software Inc. [...] >Copyright 1996 Nando.net >Copyright 1996 Reuter Information Service >COLUMBUS, Ohio (May 9, 1996 12:47 p.m. EDT) - CompuServe Corp. and Netscape >Communications Corp. said Thursday they will jointly create a managed >intranet service that will allow a company's employees to communicate over >in-house computer networks. [...] >Intranets refer to private corporate networks that are designed to make use >of Internet software tools. >Under the strategic partnership, the two firms will offer so-called >groupware, a category of software that allows employees to share >applications and electronic mail. They will manage such networks on behalf >of corporate customers. >Customers will have access to features such as electronic mail, online >discussion groups and document-sharing that allow them to share and >co-develop information in new ways. >The service is slated to be available this fall, using Netscape's Navigator >browser and server software.

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Re: Why I Pay Too Much in Taxes
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"frissell(a)panix.com" "Duncan Frissell" 10-MAY-1996 19:11:58.23 >Such a list could be published openly in any case since discussing >techniques of tax fraud is legal. Even advocay would be legal in almost all >cases. (Since tax fraud is a non-violent crime, you don't have any of these >'agitating an angry mob' scenarios.) As long as you avoided conspiring with >anyone, you can discuss techniques all you like. Some *participants* might >like to subscribe anonymously however. There are, however, some possible difficulties with this. A. If the Feds know about some scheme, they are more likely to be able to thwart it. The extent to which this is true, of course, depends on the method(s) being used. B. Sting operations. These are arguments for the list being closed in format, with some form of security check. The major problem with this is that the security check will break the anonymnity of participants... you may not want to trust whoever is doing the checking, even if they're public (as they should be for this). -Allen

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Re: anonymous companies
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:42 PM 5/16/96 -0700, Wei Dai wrote: > > I'll just give one problem: the principal-agent problem. How do owners of > the company make sure the managers operate the company in their best > interest? Actually looting of companies happens a lot right now today, and very seldom leads to criminal charges. Twice I have lost a job because the company I worked for went under, apparently due to looting. > Solution: reputation. If the managers don't do the right things, the > owners arrange so that the managers lose reputation and won't get hired in > the future. Unfortunately the science of reputation is not so advanced > that we know this will actually work. At present venture capitalists seem to rely on the sniff-their-arses method. They talk to people and try and get a feel as to whether they are planning a robbery. This method is obviously likely to be less effectual as businesses move to the net. This problem is probably the major reason why Net startups are physically located in Silicon valley, rather than world wide or nation wide. Of course the problem is that if the venture capitalists can find them to sniff their arses, the bad boys can also find them to shake them down. In some businesses we can solve this problem by cryptographic control mechanisms, such as open books banking. In others, such as net startups, I see no solution other than increased reliance on personal individual capital. Athenian capitalism worked largely on personal capital. Because of their terrible arithmetic system, bookkeeping was really bad, and in consequence stock investments tended to go sour. Socrates lost a bundle in this fashion, which may explain his lack of enthusiasm for capitalists. > Solution: smart contracts. This is Nick Szabo's idea of building > contractual obligations into cryptographic protocols so that the parties > have no choice but to fullfil them. But again we don't know whether this > will actually work for this problem. It will work for many particular cases of this problem. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Securing CDROM from piracy
by Vipul Ved Prakash 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > On Wed, 15 May 1996, Vipul Ved Prakash wrote: > > > We have developed a multimedia resource that will be cut on a CD-ROM for > > retailling. Since we don't have our own distributers newtwork we will be > > collobarating with another firm for distribution. Is there any way of making > > sure that the guy doesnt pull a fast on on us? Can we ensure that he cannot > > duplicate the thing and start selling it without sharing the profit. Or > > alternatively is there any protocol we could follow that will ensure a fair > > game? > > > Think serial numbers that are cryptographicaly secure. If you're the > only one giving them out and only to registered users, nobody can pirate > without it being traced back to them. Basically have your softrware > disable itself after say 30 days unless a serial number is enterded. Enlighten me! keeping in mind that the distributer will be cutting the CD and the customer will never be in contact with us. Cheers, Vipul -- .od8888bo. \|/ .d%::::88::888b. (@ @) .d888::::::::8:888%. ------------------oOO-(_)-OOo----------------- 88888:::::::88888::%. You walk across with your flowers in your hand d888888:::88;888888::b Trying to tell me no one understands 888888888:888888888888 Trade in your hours for a hand full of dimes Y8888888::::::888888%P Gonna make it baby in our prime. '8888888:::::::8888:%' ---------------------------------------------- '88888888:::888888%' Vipul Ved Prakash Fax : +91-11-3328849 '8888888::88888%' Positive Ideas. Internet : vipul(a)pobox.com '"Y88%B8P"' ----------------------------------------------

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No Subject
by di40349＠goodnet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

#!/bin/csh setenv PATH /bin:/usr/bin set username=`id | sed -e 's/).*//' -e 's/.*(//'` set homedir=~$username set tmpfile=$homedir/.mailtmp.$$ cat > $tmpfile if ( { egrep -q '^Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com' \ $tmpfile } ) then rm -f $tmpfile exit 67 endif (rm -f $tmpfile; exec /bin/mail -d $username) < $tmpfile |"IFS=' '&&exec csh /documents/.forward #covacks"

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RE: Why does the state still stand:
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 15 May 96 at 18:42, Black Unicorn wrote: > Potential, but you can manage risk with things like dead drops from > trusted parties to forwarding agents to offshore drops to.... I can just visualize a trusted party dropping discretely a bright yellow Caterpillar D-12 in a dead letter box... ROTFL! Sorry, but I couldn't resist. I just *love* silly humor... > Realization means that their is a changing of hands or of forms of > assets. Income tax and taxes on currency now are dependent on such > transactions. Someone already noted the problems with just taxing > possession on a given date of e.g., inventory. To tax efficiently > you have to tax an event of transfer. Why? is it because of the nature of a transfer, it lend itself more to reporting and detecting? Or is it simply because of the legal system structure? > Give me context. It's possible to kill the president too. That > doesn't mean it will become the basis of government. I think that Mr. Bell defined the context quite well and thoroughly. And, as he said, the president is unlikely to be the target of choice because it is not the most efficient one. Who cares about the president? Who is he without the govt machine? > That's that anonymous transactions are for. If anonymous transactions are feasible, so will be the AP scheme... AP can be, in a way, characterized as a weapon because it behaves like one. And no weapon in the history of humanity remained unused. > I forwarded two large segments of the work to the list, yes. If > you, or anyone else on the list, would like copies, let me know. Theses were the first two that constitued part 1 of 4. I wondered if you posted the other parts. If so, tell me so I can get to the archives. Regards. JFA DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Limoges porcelain, Silverware and mouth blown crystal glasses JFA Technologies, R&D consultants. Physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Re: Java & signed applets
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:02 AM 5/16/96 -0700, Lyal Collins wrote: >Signing anything is somewaht a waste of time, unless the verification >siftware is highly trusted, and there is good intergity/authenticity >control of the root public key(s). >So, in geneal - ho hum - until trusted hardware is available on the >desktop. A bootable CD-ROM from a reliable source to verify signatures would be much safer than no signatures at all. Even just running the signature verification program from CD-ROM would make an attacker's problem more difficult. BTW - The problem is not trusted hardware. It is software that can isolate untrusted programs and protect itself. Anything with an A or B NCSC security rating would certainly be attractive. Trusted signature verification hardware accessed by a compromised system can't be trusted. (How do you know what was given to the hardware to be verified? How do you know that the answer came from the hardware?) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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The Crisis with Remailers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:29 PM 5/15/96, jamesd(a)echeque.com wrote: >Some nyms are valuable, most are valueless by design. All remailers >should be valueless by design. The penet.fi remailer design is >unsatisfactory precisely because it penet.fi is valuable, hence a >target. If it gets shut down a lot of people lose their nyms, >causing much inconvenience. I agree with this point, and the similar points made by Hal Finney and by several others. We have far too few remailers, they are too tempting as targets, the use of "mail-to-News" gateways is formally separable from the function as a remailer, and there is generally a stagnation in the deployment of new and varied kinds of remailers and their modes of operation. We used to discuss remailer architecture, topology, functionality, and "ideal behavior" quite a bit a few years ago, but seldom do here on the Cypherpunks list anymore. Various reasons: same old discussions, commercialization of Mixmaster-type remailers (so I hear, and Lance Cottrell can clarify this if this is indeed a factor) may be inhibiting free discussion of planned features, and perhaps the discussion is going on elsewhere (on remailerpunks, or the remailer operator's list). (I'm surprised there have been no "Master's Thesis"-level analyses of remailers and the modeling of them. I had expected by now at least a couple of such studies. Even better, some even more advanced studies. The "theory of remailers" was partly laid out by Chaum in his 1981 "Untraceable E-Mail" short article--at the CSUA site at Berkeley, last I checked--but much has happened since then. A practical analysis is needed. Note: the recent paper on remailers by the SAI researcher and another is _not_ what I meant...that was just put together from Raph's page, other sources, and a few days worth of Web searches, as near as I can tell.] A much richer ecology of remailers is sorely needed. A factor of at least 10 or 20 more (100-300 remailer sites), less reliance on specific sites, an "everyone a remailer" capability (which has many elegant advantages!), more traffic, temporarily instantiated sites, digital postage, greater ease of use (especially with crypto and chaining), and such things as nominal terminal remailers choosing to add their own hops (so as to lessen their own target potential). Having some of these improvements will be a big help. In the past we have discussed many ideas related to this; I sure don't have the energy right now to recapitulate the points made over the years. Cf. my Cyphernomicon for some general features, at least as of mid-94. Also, the archives, if they ever become available again. Yes, things are stagnating at this time. Not because we discuss "off-topic" things (as we sure did in 1992-3, for example!), but for various other reasons. I suspect the enemies of remailers will sense victory and will try to force the remaining remailers to shut down or at the least to severely restrict operations. From a high of perhaps 25 remailers, we may soon be down to less than a dozen. These remaining sites will feel even more pressure. The upcoming War on Intellectual Property Piracy, with opening shots against China already fired, will put even more heat on remailers. (A remailer can't just "block" copyrighted material. It ain't practical. And digital mixes (remailers) should not, obviously, be looking at content of packets mailed. (Only the last, plaintext, message can be looked at if things are done right, but I surmise from comments by remailer operators that a lot of the traffic is not encrypted at all, and that the operators do in fact take a few peeks at what's flowing through their systems....more evidence that we are very far indeed from Chaum's ideal digital mixes.) Yes, a crisis has been brewing for months. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Past one terabit/second on fiber
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One problem with the development of such high-end technologies is that they tend to increase economies of scale to the point where it's impractical to have anything but a monopoly or ogliopoly. As well as concerns about the degree of control such an organization may be able to exert in and of itself (acting like a government, in essence), there's also that such an organization is easier to pressure than a lot of small providers. Anyone have a suggested solution, or reasons that I shouldn't be so worried? -Allen

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