December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

holographic remailing & the scientologists
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

it seems that anonymous remailing has split into two basic areas, each with distinct requirements and demands and problems: 1. private mail, sent to another email address 2. posts to Usenet or other forums such as mailing lists. now, interestingly, apparently most of the extremely heavy political backlash has come against (2), causing Hal Finney for example to advocate or suggest that remailers not be designed for posting but be limited to emailing to individual users somehow. (he didn't mention how mailing lists would be handled, but one might screen out email addresses that are "known mailing list addresses" or something like that) regarding (2), with scientology, I was trying to imagine how one could accomplish the same feature of distributing information anonymously in a "public place", but without giving the scientologists the ability to track a particular origination of the email, even remailers. Chaum's DC net idea is a useful approach. here I'd like to suggest another. some time ago someone had the amusing idea of cutting up the PGP binary code, UUencoded, and putting all the zillions of pieces in peoples signatures. each person would send mail to the signature server to pick up one of the 1/n pieces, and they would put it in their messages. frankly, I think this was a great idea that we could explore some more. in a sense, it stores data "holographically" over all kinds of different people's messages. imagine a system in which the scientology documents are stored in people's signatures, and someone writes software to go and recombine the documents based on finding signatures "out there". this could be applied to one newsgroup by having remailers post only tiny pieces of the material, but with enough on the newsgroup at any time to recombine them all with the software, but far too many pieces for the scientologists to attack all the remailers they are sent through. (people could post them through their regular email addresses). furthermore anyone posting a piece has a sort of minor plausible deniability. ("I just copied the signature from so-and-so as a protest, I have no idea what it refers to") == this all suggests to me the following idea. suppose that some document has been created that someone wants censored. how could net citizens protest this censorship? one scheme would be for everyone to put a tiny piece of the document in their signatures. if you get enough people to do this, it may actually be the case that at any one time, just because of the randomness of all the pieces available, the news server has enough messages archived for a program to scan the message directories and reconstruct the documents from all the pieces that are found. these "pieces" could even be stored solely in the netnews header fields. another idea involves the concept behind "spread spectrum". in this system, little pieces of data are spit out in different places, or channels, and the source and the reciever are scanning the exact same channel at the same time based on exact synchronization. I guess an analogy to usenet would be tiny pieces of data showing up in seemingly random newsgroups, but which are followed or "caught" exactly by the "reconstruction software". some interesting ideas related to steganography that some people might like to play with. == for a model of the scientology problem, it appears that what we have is a set of email addresses (S) and a public forum that essentially reaches some large subset of these people (S2). a person wishes to send out a secret document to S2, but he can't do so by posting to the forum, because then the censors "see" him and shut him down. but what he *can* do is send lots of pieces to a group of people in S, and each of these people individually posts their piece. (the censors have no control over mail sent between individuals, only that posted collectively). possibly, then, there is no single target of "who posted the material" for the censors to clamp down on, and the information eventually can be reconstructed by all S2. == key ways what I am proposing is different than some of the other "cut up the anonymous messages and recombine" proposals out there: 1. the recombination is not done by a remailer. it is done by anyone who can run software on the newsserver (i.e. reading the directories). the scientologists or "censors" cannot tell who is doing this. 2. the messages are not completely comprised of the data to be sent. the data could be stored in headers or the signatures of otherwise "legitimate" messages. note that the same scheme could be applied to web pages. you could store a document "holographically" in which pieces are obtained at all kinds of different URLs. it would be laughable for the censors to try to get court orders against individual pieces. and furthermore, the entire document is not stored anywhere "out there" in particular but recombined by anyone. the scientologists don't know who. note that I am giving the scientologists a lot more credit for their enmity than they deserve. they have mostly lost their war already in many ways, and they aren't a very serious threat to cyberspace in general, imho. they have shown an amazingly unabated aggression & zeal against remailer operators, however, something that could possibly be derailed with a little ingenuity.

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nCognito is Dead..
by Ben Holiday 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well I have been given my notice to terminate the remailers running at this account. Make a note to remove ncognito from your type2.list, and those running pingers, please remove nCognito as soon as its convenient. Below i've quoted verbatim the request to shutdown that I received. PLEASE note that there is no mention of FBI, NSA, or Co$. :) The request is the result of some errors that mix generated while I was makeing changes, that resulted in the administration at gate.net noticing the remailer. Frankly, I cant blame them given the current legal climate. Although I would have liked to continute operating the remailers, I must admit that I'll sleep better at night now that its gone. BTW: Does anyone know of a few ISP's that accept cash and dont require verification of your identity? :) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From gli(a)gate.net Sat May 25 15:51:35 1996 Date: Sat, 25 May 1996 15:45:19 -0400 (EDT) From: gli(a)gate.net To: Ben Holiday <ncognito(a)gate.net> Subject: Re: Problems with your mail mix program Please note that CyberGate does not support remailer program so please stop running it on gate.net immediately. Repeated violation will cause your login privilege compromised. Your cooperation will be appreciated. Gary Li Systems Administrator CyberGate, Inc. --------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: [SCARE]: "If you only knew what we know..."
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:39 AM 5/25/96 -0400, Subir Grewal wrote: >I think an insight your analysis may benefit by is that certain >institutions/societal norms create incetives for "corrupt politicians". >Hayek argues against the "benevolent dictator" concept because he says no >gentle person would ever aspire to be a dictator. The system itself calls >for people who are ruthless to take the reins. A similar argument can be >made for the various functions of a modenr democracy (like the US). It is >rarely that we hear of a considerate IRS auditor, or a principled >politician. The structures themselves call for and promote those who (in >that an individual is more successful if they) are corrupt, power-hungry, >unprincipled and ruthless. Which means that attempting to clean up the system by half-measures is doomed to failure, wouldn't you say? >As for Assasination Politics, I can understand such proposals in jest. Ironically, I originally proposed it to myself in jest. However, I quickly realized that there was far more to it than a joke. I went through most of the objections that were later commonly raised against it, and then concluded that those objections were invalid. I also noted that most people recognized the flaws in those objections after they were explained to them. It has the prospect of enormously changing society. Too many pieces fell into place, like a jigsaw puzzle. This system is NOT an accident; it is fundamental. Admittedly, it is still a bit scary, because of the depth of its changes, but that does not make it wrong! > I too say things to appear controversial. AP was not publicized "to appear controversial." I think it's "controversial" simply because it is so different from the current system, and those in power in that system (and their sympathizers) realize how serious and enormous such a change would be. > As a serious political structure, however, it is reprehensible. Unfortunately, that's not a particularly specific claim. "reprehensible"? I'd call the current system reprehensible. Why should the government be able to put over a million people in prison, most for victimless drug crimes? Why should the government be able to start a war and send millions of people against their will, and thousands to die (as in Vietnam)? Why should their be repeated mass killings (Armenia, Russia, Germany, China, Uganda, Cambodia, Rwanda, etc)? If you could show that the current system had somehow been fixed to prevent these kinds of incident, you might have a point, but you cannot. Your claim is also biased: Everything you think about the term, "political," is based on the kind of systems you know and have known. For you, and most of us, politics is just about defined as that system by which a small number of people manipulate a larger number, ostensibly guided by the wishes of the larger number. > Murder cannot be condoned (as a pacifist, >the argument that politicians create wars and must be killed for that >reason does not hold much water for me) Then you need to learn to be more consistent. While you may, indeed, be a pacifist, most of the rest of us see nothing wrong with the concept of self-defense. You may argue as to what's really self-defense and what isn't, but the reality is that government engages in violence and the threat of violence regularly. Are you, by your statements, implicitly tolerating violence by government that you wouldn't tolerate from individuals? It is easy to fall into such a trap. >and the proponents of such systems >would do well to look more closely at the systemic ills rather than individuals. Why? Isn't it possible that it is not possible to reform a system because embedded within it is a fundamental flaw which makes real freedom impossible? The current system is heirarchically structured, and results in situations where millions die in the place of the very few. I'd say that's a serious, systemic flaw that needs fixing. > The argument that AP is an institutional dis-incentive for >"bad" representatives that offsets other incentives is problematic since I >do not believe the methods are just. I invite you to provide an alternative solution. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Where is PGP?
by Michael Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- WHERE TO GET THE PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY PROGRAM (PGP) FAQ Revised 24 May 1996 Disclaimer -- I haven't recently verified all of the information in this file, and much of it is probably out of date. For questions not covered here, please read the documentation that comes with PGP, get one of the books mentioned below, or search for other relevant FAQ documents at rtfm.mit.edu and on the alt.security.pgp news group. A NOTE FROM THE FAQ MAINTAINERS Peter Herngaard <pethern(a)datashopper.dk> is taking over the maintenance of this FAQ until further notice. Some of you sent me (Mike Johnson) corrections and suggestions for this FAQ, and I stored them away on my hard disk to edit from. Then, Windows 95 got indigestion (induced by a sound card) and destroyed all of the data in that partition. If you suggested changes and they aren't in this FAQ, please send them to Peter Herngaard <pethern(a)datashopper.dk>. WHAT IS THE LATEST VERSION OF PGP? Viacrypt PGP (commercial version): 2.7.1 (4.0 is due out Real Soon Now) MIT & Philip Zimmermann (freeware, USA-legal): 2.6.2 Staale Schumacher's International variant: 2.6.3i for non-USA (2.6.3ai source code only); 2.6.3 for USA WHERE CAN I GET VIACRYPT PGP? Just call 800-536-2664 and have your credit card handy. WHERE IS PGP ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB? U.S. only availability: PGP: http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp-form.html PGPfone: http://web.mit.edu/network/pgpfone International availability: PGP and PGPfone: http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/ WHERE CAN I FTP PGP IN NORTH AMERICA? If you are in the USA or Canada, you can get PGP by following the instructions in any of: ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/README ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ ftp://miyako.dorm.duke.edu/pub/GETTING_ACCESS ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/ ftp://ftp.gibbon.com/pub/pgp/README.PGP ftp://ftp.wimsey.bc.ca/pub/crypto/software/README WHERE IS PGP ON COMPUSERVE? GO NCSAFORUM. Follow the instructions there to gain access to Library 12: Export Controlled. AOL Go to the AOL software library and search "PGP" or ftp from ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp or another site listed above. It is possible to get PGP from ftp sites with hidden directories with the following trick: (1) View the README file with the hidden directory name in it, then quickly (2) Start a new ftp connection, specifiying the hidden directory name with the ftp site's address, like ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_xxxxxxx (where the xxxxxxx is replaced with the current character string). WHAT BULLETIN BOARD SYSTEMS CARRY PGP? MANY BBS carry PGP. The following carry recent versions of PGP and allow free downloads of PGP. US 303-343-4053 Hacker's Haven, Denver, CO 303-772-1062 Colorado Catacombs BBS, Longmont CO 8 data bits, 1 stop, no parity, up to 28,800 bps. Use ANSI terminal emulation. For free access: log in with your own name, answer the questions. 314-896-9309 The KATN BBS 317-887-9568 Computer Virus Research Center (CVRC) BBS, Indianapolis, IN Login First Name: PGP Last Name: USER Password: PGP 501-791-0124, 501-791-0125 The Ferret BBS, North Little Rock, AR Login name: PGP USER Password: PGP 506-457=0483 Data Intelligence Group Corporation BBS 508-668-4441 Emerald City, Walpole, MA 601-582-5748 CyberGold BBS 612-690-5556, !CyBERteCH SeCURitY BBS! Minneapolis MN 914-667-4567 Exec-Net, New York, NY 915-587-7888, Self-Governor Information Resource, El Paso, Texas GERMANY +49-781-38807 MAUS BBS, Offenburg - angeschlossen an das MausNet +49-521-68000 BIONIC-BBS Login: PGP WHERE CAN I FTP PGP CLOSE TO ME? IT ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP FI ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/pgp/ NL ftp://ftp.nl.net/pub/crypto/pgp ftp.nic.surfnet.nl/surfnet/net-security/encryption/pgp NO ftp://menja.ifi.uio.no/pub/pgp/ NZ ftp://ftphost.vuw.ac.nz SE ftp://leif.thep.lu.se TW ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/ UK ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp HOW CAN I GET PGP BY EMAIL? If you have access to email, but not to ftp, send a message saying "help" to ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com or mailserv(a)nic.funet.fi WHERE CAN I GET MORE PGP INFORMATION? http://www.csn.net/~mpj http://www.mit.edu:8001/people/warlord/pgp-faq.html http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Issues/Crypto/ITAR_export/cryptusa_paper.ps.gz ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-pgp-pgpformat-00.txt ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pem-mime-08.txt http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/mitp/recent-books/comp/pgp-source.html http://web.cnam.fr/Network/Crypto/(c'est en francais) http://web.cnam.fr/Network/Crypto/survey.html(en anglais) http://www2.hawaii.edu/~phinely/MacPGP-and-AppleScript-FAQ.html http://www.pgp.net/pgp http://www.sydney.sterling.com:8080/~ggr/pgpmoose.html http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/ http://inet.uni-c.dk/~pethern/privacy.html WHAT ARE SOME GOOD PGP BOOKS? Protect Your Privacy: A Guide for PGP Users by William Stallings Prentice Hall PTR ISBN 0-13-185596-4 US $19.95 PGP: Pretty Good Privacy by Simson Garfinkel O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. ISBN 1-56592-098-8 US $24.95 E-Mail Security: How to Keep Your Electronic Mail Private "Covers PGP/PEM" by Bruce Schneier Wiley Publishing The Computer Privacy Handbook: A Practical Guide to E-Mail Encryption, Data Protection, and PGP PRivacy Software by André Bacard Peachpit Press ISBN 1-56609-171-3 US $24.95 800-283-9444 or 510-548-4393 THE OFFICIAL PGP USER'S GUIDE by Philip R. Zimmerman MIT Press April 1995 - 216 pp. - paper - US $14.95 - ISBN 0-262-74017-6 ZIMPP Standard PGP documentation neatly typeset and bound. PGP SOURCE CODE AND INTERNALS by Philip R. Zimmerman April 1995 - 804 pp. - US $55.00 - 0-262-24039-4 ZIMPH How to Use PGP, 61 pages, (Pub #121) from the Superior Broadcasting Company, Box 1533-N, Oil City, PA 16301, phone: (814) 678-8801 (about US $10-$13). IS PGP LEGAL? Pretty Good Privacy is legal if you follow these rules: Don't export PGP from the USA except to Canada, or from Canada except to the USA, without a license. If you are in the USA, use either Viacrypt PGP (licensed for commercial use) or MIT PGP using RSAREF (limited to personal, noncommercial use). Outside of the USA, where RSA is not patented, you may prefer to use a version of PGP (2.6.3i) that doesn't use RSAREF to avoid the restrictions of that license. If you are in a country where the IDEA cipher patent holds in software (including the USA, Canada, and some countries in Europe), make sure you are licensed to use the IDEA cipher commercially before using PGP commercially. (No separate license is required to use the freeware PGP for personal, noncommercial use). For direct IDEA licensing, contact Ascom Systec: Erhard Widmer, Ascom Systec AG, Dep't. CMVV Phone +41 64 56 59 83 Peter Hartmann, Ascom Systec AG, Dep't. CMN Phone +41 64 56 59 45 Fax: +41 64 56 59 90 e-mail: IDEA(a)ascom.ch Mail address: Gewerbepark, CH-5506 Maegenwil (Switzerland) Viacrypt has an exclusive marketing agreement for commercial distribution of Philip Zimmermann's copyrighted code. (Selling shareware/freeware disks or connect time is OK). This restriction does not apply to PGP 3.0, since it is a complete rewrite by Colin Plumb. If you modify PGP (other than porting it to another platform, fixing a bug, or adapting it to another compiler), don't call it PGP (TM) or Pretty Good Privacy (TM) without Philip Zimmermann's permission. IMPORTANT: Please note that there is an official distribution site for MIT PGP and another for the International version: WorldWideWeb references: U.S/Canada non-commercial use: http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp-form.html Norway/International non-commercial use: http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/ U.S. commercial use: http://www.viacrypt.com WHAT IS PHILIP ZIMMERMANN'S LEGAL STATUS? Philip Zimmermann was under investigation for alleged violation of export regulations, with a grand jury hearing evidence for about 28 months, ending 11 January 1996. The Federal Government chose not to comment on why it decided to not prosecute, nor is it likely to. The Commerce Secretary stated that he would seek relaxed export controls for cryptographic products, since studies show that U. S. industry is being harmed by current regulations. Philip endured some serious threats to his livelihood and freedom, as well as some very real legal expenses, for the sake of your right to electronic privacy. The battle is won, but the war is not over. The regulations that caused him so much grief and which continue to dampen cryptographic development, harm U. S. industry, and do violence to the U. S. National Security by eroding the First Ammendment of the U. S. Constitution and encouraging migration of cryptographic industry outside of the U. S. A. are still on the books. If you are a U. S. Citizen, please write to your U. S. Senators, Congressional Representative, President, and Vice President pleading for a more sane and fair cryptographic policy. WHERE CAN I GET WINDOWS & DOS SHELLS FOR PGP? http://www.dayton.net/~cwgeib ftp://oak.oakland.edu/SimTel/msdos/security/apgp22b.zip http://alpha.netaccess.on.ca/~spowell/crypto/pwf31.zip ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/dc/dcosenza/pgpw40.zip ftp://ftp.firstnet.net/pub/windows/winpgp/pgpw40.zip http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm(Private Idaho) ftp://ftp.eskimo.com/~joelm http://www.xs4all.nl/~paulwag/security.htm http://www.LCS.com/winpgp.html http://netaccess.on.ca/~rbarclay/index.html http://netaccess.on.ca/~rbarclay/pgp.html ftp://ftp.leo.org/pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/gcppgp10.zip ftp://ftp.leo.org/pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pmpgp.zip http://iquest.com/~aegisrcs WHAT OTHER FILE ENCRYPTION (DOS, MAC) TOOLS ARE THERE? PGP can do conventional encryption only of a file (-c) option, but you might want to investigate some of the other alternatives if you do this a lot. Alternatives include Quicrypt and Atbash2 for DOS, DLOCK for DOS & UNIX, Curve Encrypt (for the Mac), HPACK (many platforms), and a few others. Quicrypt is interesting in that it comes in two flavors: shareware exportable and registered secure. Atbash2 is interesting in that it generates ciphertext that can be read over the telephone or sent by Morse code. DLOCK is a no-frills strong encryption program with complete source code. Curve Encrypt has certain user-friendliness advantages. HPACK is an archiver (like ZIP or ARC), but with strong encryption. A couple of starting points for your search are: U.S. only availability: ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/qcrypt11.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README ftp://ftp.miyako.dorm.duke.edu/pub/GETTING_ACCESS International availability: ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/virus/crypt/file/ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/crypt/code/ HOW DO I SECURELY DELETE FILES (DOS)? If you have the Norton Utilities, Norton WipeInfo is pretty good. I use DELETE.EXE in del110.zip, which is really good at deleting existing files, but doesn't wipe "unused" space. US ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/del120.zip NL ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/security/del120.zip UK ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/ibmpc/security/realdeal.zip WHAT DO I DO ABOUT THE PASS PHRASE IN MY WINDOWS SWAP FILE? The nature of Windows is that it can swap any memory to disk at any time, meaning that all kinds of interesting things could end up in your swap file. ftp://ftp.firstnet.net/pub/windows/winpgp/wswipe.zip WHERE DO I GET PGPfone(tm)? PGPfone is in beta test for Macintosh and Windows'9 users. The MIT has shut down their ftp distribution of PGPfone <tm> for Macintosh and Windows'95, so within the U.S/Canada you must obtain PGPfone <tm> using a WorldWideWeb browser. U.S. only availability: http://web.mit.edu/network/pgpfone International availability: DK ftp://ftp.datashopper.dk/pub/users/pethern/pgp/ NL ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/voice/ NO ftp://menja.ifi.uio.no/pub/pgp/mac/ ftp://menja.ifi.uio.no/pub/pgp/windows/ WHERE DO I GET NAUTILUS? Bill Dorsey, Pat Mullarky, and Paul Rubin have come out with a program called Nautilus that enables you to engage in secure voice conversations between people with multimedia PCs and modems capable of at least 7200 bps (but 14.4 kbps is better). See: U.S. only availability: ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/GETTING_ACCESS ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/other/nautilus-phone-0.9.2-source.tar.gz ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README ftp://miyako.dorm.duke.edu/pub/GETTING_ACCESS International availability: ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/misc ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/voice/ The official Nautilus homepage is at: http://www.lila.com/nautilus/ HOW DO I ENCRYPT MY DISK ON-THE-FLY? Secure File System (SFS) is a DOS device driver that encrypts an entire partition on the fly using SHA in feedback mode. Secure Drive also encrypts an entire DOS partition, using IDEA, which is patented. Secure Device is a DOS device driver that encrypts a virtual, file-hosted volume with IDEA. Cryptographic File System (CFS) is a Unix device driver that uses DES. CryptDisk is a ShareWare package for Macintosh that uses strong IDEA encryption like PGP. U.S. only availability: ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README ftp://miyako.dorm.duke.edu/mpj/crypto/disk/ International availability: http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut01/sfs.html ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/virus/crypt/disk/ ftp://ftp.nic.surfnet.nl/surfnet/net-security/encryption/disk/ ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/misc/ ftp://menja.ifi.uio.no/pub/pgp/mac/ ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/disk/ WHERE IS PGP'S COMPETITION? RIPEM is the second most popular freeware email encryption package. I like PGP better for lots of reasons, but if for some reason you want to check or generate a PEM signature, RIPEM is available at ripem.msu.edu. There is also an exportable RIPEM/SIG. U.S. only availability: ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/GETTING_ACCESS International availability: ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/crypt/code/ HOW DO I PUBLISH MY PGP PUBLIC KEY? Send mail to one of these addresses with the single word "help" in the subject line to find out how to use them. These servers sychronize keys with each other. There are other key servers, too. pgp-public-keys(a)keys.pgp.net pgp-public-keys(a)keys.de.pgp.net pgp-public-keys(a)keys.no.pgp.net pgp-public-keys(a)keys.uk.pgp.net pgp-public-keys(a)keys.us.pgp.net WWW interface to the key servers: http://www.pgp.net/pgp/www-key.html http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html For US $20/year or so, you can have your key officially certified and published in a "clean" key database that is much less susceptible to denial-of-service attacks than the other key servers. Send mail to info-pgp(a)Four11.com for information, or look at http://www.Four11.com/ Of course, you can always send your key directly to the parties you wish to correspond with by whatever means you wish. CAN I COPY AND REDISTRIBUTE THIS FAQ? Yes. Permission is granted to distribute unmodified copies of this FAQ. Please e-mail comments to Peter Herngaard <pethern(a)datashopper.dk> Look for the latest html version of this FAQ at http://inet.uni-c.dk/~pethern/getpgp.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7.1 iQEVAgUBMaftOm+Iqt/O4EnZAQHk8ggAwL5UcRF4Gv1F6eO7NaQcb45Xa+ST3l3S +6sPHN5vFn/LvUsNHO4o9gDBDJB3Bd8S3nDfRxoSolD1ijNtKGOvJzzXtAf2lXFI 95YXCuF+DyhBrghBfwNzFePjuiDZ/92aeXn90oAEpHc5gaUFoSo+o9Gu8sD0TMo7 p3houk0AdVRRQBTTljWDin2yoJcGLzbmY6ewRcdkYnEqmcv2oW9drSKky04bcg2A KGfOKk/5i1Mw3CPKJu/eHy1gi0P4hd5WbH23Jc3cHQVk2BvmR6lLL+ffl4TGjkxt o61fzYYunxuQzLOi4EeQWWhq31+WJwOO0CuW35nA1XzoQXALdBfF8A== =1NGG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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net-based key archival
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've put a revised version of my "Key Escrow without Escrow Agents" abstract in my ftp directory, in PostScript and Latex formats. ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/netescrow.ps ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/netescrow.tex -matt

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407 Arms Traffickers in first month of training
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the first month the Arms Trafficker Training Page has helped 407 people to become Arms Traffickers. Here are the stats: International Arms Traffickers 407 Public List of Known Arms Traffickers 147 Letters to the president 83 Number of times page was read 2498 So about one arms trafficker for every 6 times the page is read (some people read the page more than once so the real ratio is better). Kind of fun that a web page can turn 1 out of 6 people into criminals. Thanks for your support both as arms traffickers and for linking to this page. It is off to a good start. For anyone who had missed it, the URL is: http://online.offshore.com.ai/arms-trafficker/ -- Vince Cate

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e-mail gateways to usenet
by O. C. Winton WN1Z 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wonder if anyone would consider posting a list of currently functioning e-mail ways to post to usenet. Would be useful for people like me who often use libraries' access to internet, and the libraries don't give newsgroup access. orrin(a)redshift.com

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Re: nCognito is Dead..
by Censored Girls Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Long Live nCognito! Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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Re: "Key Escrow without Escrow Agents"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:56 PM 5/25/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > >I can see that you might create a code of law that determines >what procedures that these "distributed key juries" are supposed >to follow. but like our legal system, the interpretation and >application is ultimately left up to them. > >an interesting system, that is commendable for trying to >find a compromise between two seemingly irreconcilable polarities >(privacy and surveillance) but I doubt anyone in law enforcement >(with the mindset, "I can't be stopped from doing my job as I >see fit or criminals will get away") would go for it in the current form. But as long as key-escrow is claimed to be "voluntary," then the police should be happy if it is used at all. If they object that it is possible somebody won't agree that the person involved shouldn't have his data revealed, we can remind them that the jury system prevents conviction if not all of the jury agrees as to guilt. This is no worse than having, say, 12 key-escrow organizations and allowing any one to not reveal the correct key. Naturally, it will be necessary to ensure that they can refuse without anyone else knowing who opted out... Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: [SCARE]: "If you only knew what we know..."
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 26 May 96 at 12:23, Subir Grewal wrote: > the > struggle does not always have to be violent, and it hurts our cause > to instigate violence when none has been used directly against us. How would you qualify the seizing of 50+ % of our productive work? Since only the productive work permits an individual to live, could you say that they steal half of your life? Why not? Then, any tax man targeted by AP who is past 1/2 the life expectency is getting an "an eye for an eye" or better deal... Are you telling that giving your wallet to a mugger is not done under violence directed against you since he did not shoot you or beat you in the first place? Do you tell me that the fact that he did not use his gun means that there is no violence implied? Under every pile of red-tape lies a fully loaded gun. And *this* is what gives govt employees their attitude toward you. Just some thoughts. Ciao JFA ...and actually, I am not even on CP mailing list... PLEASE NOTE: THIS POST DOES NOT MEAN THAT I ENDORSE MR. BELL'S SYSTEM. MY RATIONNAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT IT'S INTERNAL MECHANICS AND IT'S INTRINSIC LOGICS DOES NOT MEAN THAT I LIKE NOR ENDORSE THE SYSTEM. I SIMPLY CONCLUDED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE SYSTEM FROM BEING IMPLEMENTED. IMO, IT IS UNAVOIDABLE. DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Limoges porcelain, Silverware and mouth blown crystal glasses JFA Technologies, R&D consultants. Physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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