December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

private message to anonymous recipient
by bryce＠digicash.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- C'Punks, I sincerely apologize for this breach of netiquette, but I can't figure out any other way to be sure of contacting my interlocutors. Please be patient with us, we'll have a better anon channel soon. Bryce - -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Auto-encrypted under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 hIwDulymyOnirHUBBACLxoU/DOrHiwd/4eedAqcMpeVBHJskv4mcFnG97Nxll6OV xRqNmVY7UT7HV6+8TgNsVPHtIz2gd76pT6gdscbZxFOnXNTOMR1c8kH/W0PZh8LY kE0WxxWyqghnw4j98jMCs1al+aMSKE9CzGVPM5v3iZjTO6taOguvOFaBzDSvwYRs A0jbHy8sKZitAQL+JDc20xS/fZPsIENngCyKcE7f8QsR85PhuQrBQeZuNsuOPU2v 5CbewkQR/+z3uzyJAfCcOUoXrPDecaMmyFYxrzjjYcjNhoxRDKEJa+X+SscvlcEp T06KDNUZrrXDUUevhIwDkJRPiBSKEeUBBACfB3dE6Izxr3V6qfnxgE3P09Tb1hNI 30ZcahXWwWMPnkIPXOESyNbSYquV+2Inw0sSumCk7A+uwSDQEdv7T+7NxnBBO6Cx EvUkOKIFa5ApyU38b/NjVeYK9XjOY5Zxz3smUwaRtCJwKSF/RfP/oRF465ZfiIaU 0bzo8Dx5o9H1bKYAAAHAl8upwh5wHWT+3xV89Vl0e+dsONfexbR28ON8o53gbLu1 UpgMhg3+ezSkPlaW5nXoDhME1Miwdi9/J9Rq3/CzF+jY4gus9pEobJ8MRZBLe2Lh O1cBCDzyzSJcQdt1kbItfMfKkm2PMKHYt+SyzR1l9hHq42UBqw6qGfbj0SiQ8hWf hwoAeL0xo2bfgwTYEX35QVc5FD5fEEAcsFOqgB/VzuxOfR9ydH1saOux8aXoF3N9 v/Y3pGMNxlAb+7NThv+Dt/GFK+3CnT9HbNE1h//SZL16THYByB1CzWqfUhrhW0XU BfPHkReKTnei5Tc9Hblu0JrGOctIKIjZiyRIJAZzPg2zq/lVwOdB5glZRtJ0LAID yvwODNXG71wLl2x8+jVFxCJTK5bAsQvluQXNwq8lPaDiJrBjsCWTYEbHXLnue4jO xvQQf+yGDLISXB1yVKUf0peuYSn6pmFw5pcftXbSE5hb5W1bkh7bUZs0nDt2AELa n/Ao8rnVWqiopUheIqIxEmxJZc4X99mTMQMUD4yr7ieR7+YtIkawOU4pGTyGZawM 3D5TFQdLphOUF512qGIxGbbg8NsZaPeIF133kHGOmw== =nVvT - -----END PGP MESSAGE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 iQB1AwUBMc51q0jbHy8sKZitAQELJwMAubh35EvdnyJnRMb7aPS7SRiLuR5nZaFz HNDM7YzwRJn+O9DFrrYiXSKGuGvQ4QPs3PRJ+UqbrbgNe6brXyMrMuHwRqELR+yI uI4a2b4XBLGMVxutlznqYs221w7P3DSi =/xkk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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http:--www.spyzone.com-
by reagle＠rpcp.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[IMAGE] THIS IS NOT A GAME. You are entering Communication Control System's Spy Zone. _________________________________________________________________ This is the real world of spy versus spy, corporate espionage, counter intelligence, surveillance, and ultra-high tech detection systems. The products, services and information contained in this site are designed to protect you, your business and anything that you consider valuable. _________________________________________________________________ THIS MONTH'S KEY FACT "72% of all businesses who experience a major loss of information systems/data and have not made preparations for that loss go out of business within 24 months...prepare for disasters..this is definitely the Decade of Disasters" ENTER SPYZONE TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES, OPPORTUNITIES, FACTS, ABOUT SPY ZONE Copyright CCS INTERNATIONAL, INC. 1995 Web Site Design By John Copen .

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AT&T bans anonymous messages
by WorldNet User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AT&T WorldNet service has banned the sending of anonymous email or posting anonymously. >From the "AT&T WorldNet Service Operating Policies": (i) Members may not post or transmit any message anonymously or under a false name. Members may not permit any other person (other than an agent acting on Member's behalf and subject to Member's supervision) to access the Service Member's account for any purpose. The no anon rule even beat the no indecency rule, which is second: (ii) Members may not post or transmit any message which is libelous, defamatory or which discloses private or personal matters concerning any person. Members may not post or transmit any message, data, image or program which is indecent, obscene or pornographic. http://www.worldnet.att.net/care/terms/#oppol

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(Kein 'Betreff')
by HHendler＠t-online.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsuscribe

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Re: Micropayments: myth?
by Paul Rarey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jun 23, 0:16, Bill Stewart wrote: > Subject: Re: Micropayments: myth? >>>don't people get this? with microcurrency, you don't say to a >>>seller, "bill me for this item". it would rarely work like that at >>>all. instead, it is, "here is my money, please give me the item". >> >>What is the authentication process for the "money" your are "giving" in this >>scenario? > >Varies with the micropayment system. Some proposals are to use Digicash, >either online or offline. Others are to use simpler systems, such as S/Key >variants or piles of tokens - you'd use some heavyweight payment system like >a credit card / ATM / digicash to buy 100 or 1000 microtokens, which you'd >use for the actual payments, and which would require less computation to >authenticate. These processes have a non-repudiation service? Cheers! [ psr ]

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Re: Bad Signatures
by geoff＠commtouch.co.il 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Jun 24 12:48:55 1996 Thanks to all list members who responded on this issue. The consensus is that bouncing bad signatures to the list is not a good idea. In the interest of reducing the number of bad signatures caused by munging which appear on the list, I will continue to bounce messages with bad signatures to the originator only. Thanks, Geoff Klein. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMc5WeELv5OMYFK1FAQEiAAP/fr0+Z1dmGfuRgiGqir9396+DSJ+eBquS 0JM9FxtMvZwyCsafsJSwZSHBPWtLanaAzFMgO5SigWSki6hP3sP/ywrH0qni480U 7d0CG9gz2g2N6pYAjE8nhFT26NUVFBvm/csPod+3W71/vvg/KP3vRas2fWRqRzQY wEV2g4aaTII= =rh71 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Arms Export Report
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Wash Post today reports on a new study of U.S. arms export policy, presented to the White House on Friday, and to be formally released next week. It primarily addresses killing-type arms and proposes greater U.S. restraint of export of advanced armaments rather than promotion to buttress the defense industry. One of its recommendations is to form all regulations governing arms exports and intelligence-gathering into "single, coherent framework." If anyone has seen this report, does it address crypto export? A copy by E-mail or fax (to 212-799-4003) would be appreciated. ---------- The Wash Post has a free (for now) Web site at: http://www.washingtonpost.com

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Re: info assembly line, "flits" (long)
by williams＠va.arca.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vladimir Z. Nuri,vznuri(a)netcom.com writes: > what the flit concept does is introduce a *context* to a bit. > a bit has no "context". where did a bit come from? the situation > with information is that it always has a *context* and is tied > with other information. (so in addition, I might like to suggest > that "flits" can be "tied together" with each other). To me, bits don't need context any more than atoms do. Their whole beauty (like atoms) is their simplicity. You can build incredibly complex structures (like jaguars) from the simplest of particles (or bits). Negroponte's analogy begs the question of the physics of cyberspace. They are clearly different from the physics of the real world. Imagine if you lived in a world where objects could be duplicated extremely quickly, cheaply, and perfectly. You could send things around at the speed of light. Nothing ever happens except by the action of a program. What would be valuable to you in this world (crypto-relevance)? Why would you care about "where" anything is? Why would you bother to "move" something? Putting aside the implementation problems with "flits", I don't think there is any need to make cyberspace behave like the real world. The best things about cyberspace are the differences with the real world. I agree we need to work on the interfaces between worlds, but that doesn't equate to making them the same. A major problem with your note is that it confuses the bit-atom level view of the world with the document-jaguar level. People don't have to interact with bits any more than they have to deal with atoms. The properties you are seeking are at a higher level than bits and are already in early development (OpenDoc and others). The "information assembly line" is at this higher level and does not require "flits". Thanks for a provocative note. --Jeff

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domain name zapping threat by Internic
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

surprising not to see any discussion on this here.. this is a very intersting development. all kinds of news reports are talking about the internic zapping 25,000 DNS addresses. I wonder how this will turn out. I saw in an article a claim, I think, that the internic now charges $100 "rent" per year for a domain. this is really amazing to me, because this has totally changed from a one-time only fee, if correct. is that correct? I wonder if people are going to try to find a way to "route around" this action by the internic... one wonders if this is just the first in a series of actions by the new spook owners. (SAIC) essentially, if someone wanted to implement a tax or a way to control the internet, the NIC would be an excellent place to start. I wonder if the NIC has legal authority to yank DNS address like they are doing. it seems one could take them to court and have a pretty good argument that people who run DNS servers are free to run them however they want, and that ultimately this is what determines how routing on the internet is supported, not some overseeing agency like the NIC. it seems to me that now would be a brilliant time for someone to introduce a "non NIC registration service" that sets up an alternate DNS that guarantees that members will never be charged money. of course that's what the DNS "sort of" started out as... sigh. Subject: Internic removing Domain names The news media is anouncing that the Internic will delete 25,000 domain names that have not paid their registration fees Monday. How will this work? If someone is using one of these Domains and has DNS entries to find them what can the Internic do to disable the Domain? Won't the existing DNS services keep them working? Glenn York

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 24 Jun 96 6:48:39 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ++++-+++++++ 59:15 100.00% replay remailer(a)replay.com ***+******** 4:33 99.98% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu **#+##*##### :58 99.98% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org --#+*#+####* 12:20 99.98% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com *#*+#**#**-# 37:05 99.96% c2 remail(a)c2.org +-+++-++++++ 54:42 99.96% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ##+###+#### :58 99.86% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++++++++ 40:58 99.82% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ***+*+-++*** 7:09 99.81% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net #*-*+-+*-+#+ 21:26 99.80% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com *+* ***** ** 8:10 99.57% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi .___ ____ 57:56:47 99.49% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++-+_.-__.- 18:28:27 99.47% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ---------- 3:37:36 98.99% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net +___-+.+++ 7:26:03 97.84% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---- --.- 7:35:07 95.20% ncognito ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ..._.--. 15:50:51 93.26% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org ++***** 35:02 87.27% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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