December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

PGPCrack
by Mark M. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[ I tried sending this a couple days ago, but apparently no mail I sent that day ever got delivered. My apologies if any one has already received this. -- Mark ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have written a UNIX program that will brute-force crack a PGP conventionally encrypted file using a dictionary of passphrases. I am working on making it possible to break secret keys also. If you have any suggestions or bug reports, feel free to e-mail them to me. The URL is: http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/pgpcrack5b.tar.gz The MD5 hash of this file is 46aa9e37020ac2efce73d870fe1acbdc. - -- Mark =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= markm(a)voicenet.com | finger -l for PGP key 0xf9b22ba5 http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/ | bd24d08e3cbb53472054fa56002258d5 "The concept of normalcy is just a conspiracy of the majority" -me -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMW6j0LZc+sv5siulAQETGAQAnKr1n/OnWS6CpQqTQSRAJhTTCkq1zP8N l0QZYKrvO9i3EE0uXYF88EIXludrXq2mzEZCOeh4vjF0Ym8KEc82gUdRwAfxPxTU YxHylDI56PdvgLwRBAoBiGTaUZwajM+sEtvJaH1fYshPR7neTF+Aw3YL+cMQ/iQt PMFKXEM9GWQ= =fgA8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: X.25 [NOISE]
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:45 PM 4/14/96 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >And, yes, it's [X.25] a lousy environment to do full-duplex character >echo over. I implemented and have been supporting a system with full-duplex character echo over X.25. I can only agree with Bill Stewart's assessment, but you hold your nose and do it. I have learned that an X.25 "standard" network is about as standard as a K&R C compiler. Sure you can talk to the network, but each network is different in what you have to do to get it to send you the ASCII characters so you can echo them. Many times you have to use non-standard, network specific extensions. I am also responsible for getting Zmodem style data transfers to work. To make it work means the network must be fully 8-bit transparent, AND send the last chunk of data eventually (within a few seconds) to complete the transfer. Don't even ask about getting Zmodem transfers working thru X.25 to various "Unix" systems. Now you know why I claimed the title, "Wizard of Trailing Edge Technology" in Dogbert's New World Order. Regards - Bill [To be complete, I also do work in electronic commerce, Java and other things you see on this list.] ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: key bit lengths
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:21 PM 4/14/96, Mark M. wrote: >I doubt it. This calculation is based on the minimum amount of energy >needed to invert a bit. The amount of energy is a function of the temperature, >so a brute force attack might take much less energy several billion years >hence, since the universe will cooled off more. There only way for there to >be any way around this, is if a way was found to lower the termperature to >near absolute zero consuming a very little amount of energy, or if some way >was found to invert a bit using less energy than is currently believed (very >doubtfull). Of course, if P=NP, then brute-force attacks will be pointless. A late April Fool's joke, methinks? Arguing that in "several billion years" the "temperature" of the universe will have anything to do with computation....well, your physics is all wrong. The approximate figure, kT, for the minimum energy in a conventional bit flip, can be reduced by simple cooling. Not a problem. And what the so-called "average temperature" of the Universe may be in, say, 10 billion years, will not affect computation. Fusion will still occur, stars will still burn, sunshine will still produce heat. And so on. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Heat death of the universe
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 14 Apr 1996 21:19:27 -0700 > X-Sender: tcmay(a)mail.got.net > Subject: Re: key bit lengths > > A late April Fool's joke, methinks? Arguing that in "several billion years" > the "temperature" of the universe will have anything to do with > computation....well, your physics is all wrong. > > The approximate figure, kT, for the minimum energy in a conventional bit > flip, can be reduced by simple cooling. Not a problem. And what the > so-called "average temperature" of the Universe may be in, say, 10 billion > years, will not affect computation. Fusion will still occur, stars will > still burn, sunshine will still produce heat. And so on. > True, but there will be considerably fewer of them doing it. Jim Choate

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Re: instructions for anon.penet.fi? please
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 14:48 4/14/96, O.C.Winton WN1Z wrote: >Wonder if someone here could pls tell me how to go about finding >out how to use the anonymous remail services @ anon.penet.fi. >On the list please. Thank you. Send email, any subject, any message body, to help(a)anon.penet.fi -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: RC4 licensening
by Tim Dierks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:08 PM 4/14/96, Jack Mott wrote: > Anyone know how much it costs to license RC4 or how RSA has been >handling the whole situation? If, for whatever reason, you decide to license RC4 from RSA, you have two options: you can license BSAFE from RSA, or you can license RSAREF from Consensus Development, which will soon be available with an RC4/RC2 implementation. Costs vary. It's my understanding that RSA has threatened legal action against anyone shipping RC4 without a license, but I don't know of any lawsuits that have been filed. - Tim Dierks Disclaimer: I am an employee of Consensus Development. Tim Dierks -- timd(a)consensus.com -- www.consensus.com Head of Thing-u-ma-jig Engineering, Consensus Development

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Re: [Political Rant] Was: examples of mandatory content rating?
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:52 4/14/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >I'm not sure if the major use for ratings may not be searching for >material that the raters don't like. I'd be interested in many things the >fundys don't like, for instance. One could even do this via one of the >"services" that mails out listings of places to be locked from kids - just >sign up one of your anonymous employees, and get the data and put it on your >anonymous web access site. Doing so - if you don't admit you've done it - may >be cheaper than doing the research yourself. Of course, you'll need to check >out each such site to make sure that it isn't a decoy that they've inserted. When you do the checking, make sure it is from an IPN that does not point back at you (or at least only points to a Server Supplied not a Dedicated IPN). You might also want to watch out for "Canary Trap" Decoys (where each list has an unique set of Decoys [or at least one unique Decoy] so they can tell which copy was compromised). I'm assuming that the Decoy is a "valid" [possibly virtual] domain address which is being logged.

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Trojan Horse Loose On The Internet
by wolv＠infosys.utm.my 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to several reliable sources there is a deadly virus on the Internet. This is NOT a hoax! CAN ANYBODY CHECK THIS OUT, PLEASE.. Note: The reliability of all information below is UNKNOWN. WHAT: Virus Alert: PKZIP 3.0 Trojan Loose on the Internet BACKGROUND: A trojan (virus) program, PKZIP 3.0, which is advertised as an updated version of the popular compression utility PKZIP, is currently being distributed on the Internet. Please note that this trojan is REAL and DESTRUCTIVE. Once executed, this program will destroy data on your hard drive; there's no stopping it. According to PKWARE, makers of PKZIP, the only released versions of PKZIP are: 1.10, 1.93, 2.04c, 2.04e and 2.04g. All other versions currently circulating on the Internet are suspect and should not be used. ACTION REQUIRED: Please do not download or execute any files that are named PKZ300B.EXE, PKZ300B.ZIP, PKZIP300.ZIP, PKZIP300.EXE, etc. from the Internet or other external source. Anybody with any information on this..?? ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Best Regards, _\|/_ Q(@ @)Q |-------------------oOO-(_)-OOo--------------------| | If I can, it doesn't mean that I will. | |--------------------------------------------------| | Ramli Bin Jaafar | |Faculty Of Computer Science And Information System| | University Technology Of Malaysia, | | 80990 Johor Baharu, | | Johor Darul Takzim, | | Malaysia. | | Tel: (607)-5576160 ext: 3593 | |--------------------------------------------------| | E-mail: wolv(a)infosys.utm.my | | ramli(a)raptor.utm.my | | wolv(a)cyberspace.org | |--------------------------------------------------|

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RSA-130 Falls to NFS - Lenstra Posting to sci.crypt.research
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: alenstra(a)fwi.uva.nl (A. Lenstra) Newsgroups: sci.crypt.research Subject: new factorization record Date: 14 Apr 1996 10:35:20 GMT Organization: FWI, University of Amsterdam, Bellcore Lines: 189 Message-ID: <4kqkd8$g37(a)net.auckland.ac.nz> Summary: factorization of RSA-130 using the Number Field Sieve Keywords: factoring, Number Field Sieve, RSA On April 10, 1996, we found that RSA-130 = 18070820886874048059516561644059055662781025167694013491701270214\ 50056662540244048387341127590812303371781887966563182013214880557 has the following factorization RSA-130 = 39685999459597454290161126162883786067576449112810064832555157243 * 45534498646735972188403686897274408864356301263205069600999044599 This factorization was found using the Number Field Sieve (NFS) factoring algorithm, and beats the 129-digit record that was set on April 2, 1994, by the Quadratic Sieve (QS) factoring algorithm (cf. [AGLL]). The amount of computer time spent on this new 130-digit NFS-record is only a fraction of what was spent on the old 129-digit QS-record (see below for details). For information about NFS, see [LL]. For additional information, implementations and previous large NFS factorizations, see [BLZ, DL, E, GLM]. We used the polynomial 5748,30224,87384,05200 X^5 + 9882,26191,74822,86102 X^4 - 13392,49938,91281,76685 X^3 + 16875,25245,88776,84989 X^2 + 3759,90017,48552,08738 X - 46769,93055,39319,05995 and its root 125,74411,16841,80059,80468 modulo RSA-130. This polynomial was selected from a list of 14 candidates provided by Scott Huddleston, after extensive sieving experiments carried out by Joerg Zayer at the University of Saarland. Sieving was done on a great variety of workstations at many different locations: 28.37% by Bruce Dodson (Lehigh University) 27.77% by Marije Elkenbracht-Huizing (CWI, Amsterdam) 19.11% by Arjen K. Lenstra (Bellcore) 17.17% by contributors to the www-factoring project (organized by Jim Cowie, Wojtek Furmanski, and Arjen Lenstra, among others) 4.36% by Matt Fante (IDA) 1.66% by Paul Leyland (Oxford University) 1.56% by Damian Weber (University of Saarland) Except for a relatively small part of the contribution of the CWI and the entire contribution by the University of Saarland, all contributors used the NFS sieving program that was developed at Bellcore. This program uses `lattice sieving with sieving by vectors' as introduced by Pollard in [P], and is based on the implementation described in [GLM]. The main difference is the more liberal use of `special q-primes' that define the lattices (see also [E]). Unlike [GLM], these special q's do not necessarily belong to the factor base (as is the case in [P]); this idea can also be found in [B]. Another difference is the more liberal interpretation of the factor base sizes, which results in a much more flexible memory usage. These changes allowed us to run the sieving program in parallel on almost any number of processors, as long as they have at least about 6 megabytes of memory. This was exploited in the Web-based sieving effort, which used a collection of CGI scripts ("FAFNER", from Cooperating Systems Corporation) to automate and coordinate the flow of tasks and relations within the globally distributed network of anonymous sieving clients. As a consequence almost any user of the Web can contribute to future, larger factoring efforts, simply by a few appropriate mouse clicks. The changes also made it hard to estimate how much time was spent on the sieving stage, because the performance of the siever strongly depends on the amount of memory it gets. We can say, however, that we would have spent about 500 mips years (i.e., 10% of the computing time spent on the 129-digit QS-record) if we had done all the sieving on average workstations with at least 24 megabytes of memory. Sieving started in September 1995, initially on a very limited number of workstations. The Web-based sieving started relatively late, in December 1995. Relations were collected and merged and duplicates were removed at Bellcore. On Jan 14, 1996, we had 56,515,672 unique relations. In uncompressed ASCII format, with only the primes >2000000 listed per factorization, storage of the relations required more than 3.5 gigabytes. With a rational factor base of 250,001 elements (the primes <= 3,497,867) and an algebraic factor base of 750,001 elements (ideals of norm <= 11,380,951), the breakdown of full and partial relations is as follows. \ number of prime ideals of norm > 11,380,951: \________ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 number of \ rational \_____________________________________________________________ primes > | 3,497,867 | | 0 | 48400 479737 1701253 1995537 6836 403 9 1 | 272793 2728107 9617073 11313254 39755 2212 44 2 | 336850 3328437 11520120 13030845 56146 3214 71 3 | 1056 9022 24455 0 0 0 0 4 | 3 9 31 0 0 0 0 The first successful dependency used 4143834 relations, of which 3506 were free relations. The breakdown of large prime ideals amongst the other contributing relations is as follows. 0 | 24242 154099 330738 255742 1054 52 1 1 | 75789 443647 885136 648148 2734 164 2 2 | 56326 300369 565605 389046 1923 131 4 3 | 182 776 1105 0 0 0 0 4 | 2 4 7 0 0 0 0 Once every week during the collection the cycles were counted at Bellcore. The final collection of 56,467,272 relations with one or more large primes generated 2,844,859 cycles. In these cycles 18,830,237 (33.3%) of the partial relations occurred (i.e., were useful). As in our previous NFS factorizations, we witnessed an explosion in the number of cycles, with first a sharp increase in the number of useful relations, followed by a sudden growth of the number of cycles: # partials # usefuls # cycles 41,319,347 47,660 16,914 45,431,262 8,214,349 224,865 53,282,421 11,960,120 972,121 56,467,272 18,830,237 2,844,859 Using the approach sketched in [DL], these data resulted in a 3,504,823 x 3,516,502 matrix of total weight 138,690,744 (on average 39.4 entries per column). Using Peter Montgomery's Cray implementation of his blocked Lanczos algorithm (cf. [M95]), it took 67.5 CPU-hours and 700 Mbyte central memory on the Cray-C90 at the SARA Computer Center in Amsterdam to do the linear algebra. This resulted in 18 useful dependencies. These were processed on 1 processor of an SGI Challenge (150 MHz R4400SC processors) using Peter Montgomery's square root program (cf. [M93]), which took 49.5 hours per dependency (with initial numerator and denominator of approximately 9.7 million decimal digits). The factorization was found by the third dependency. It is likely that slightly more sieving (and therefore more partials) would have led to substantially smaller (and easier) matrix and square root problems. Arjen K. Lenstra, Bellcore, April 11, 1996 with Jim Cowie Marije Elkenbracht-Huizing Wojtek Furmanski Peter L. Montgomery Damian Weber Joerg Zayer Acknowledgements are due to the contributors, and to the Dutch National Computing Facilities Foundation (NCF) for the use of the Cray-C90 supercomputer. [AGLL] D. Atkins, M. Graff, A.K. Lenstra, P.C. Leyland, THE MAGIC WORDS ARE SQUEAMISH OSSIFRAGE, Proceedings Asiacrypt'94, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 917, (1995) 263-277. [B] D.J. Bernstein, The multiple-lattice number field sieve, Chapter 3 of Ph.D. thesis, ftp://koobera.math.uic.edu/pub/papers/mlnfs.dvi. [BLZ] J. Buchmann, J. Loho, J. Zayer, An implementation of the general number field sieve, Proceedings Crypto'93, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 773, (1994) 159-165. [DL] B. Dodson, A.K. Lenstra, NFS with four large primes: an explosive experiment, Proceedings Crypto 95, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 963, (1995) 372-385. [E] R.M. Elkenbracht-Huizing, An implementation of the number field sieve, Technical Report NM-R9511, Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica, Amsterdam, 1995. To appear in Experimental Mathematics [GLM] R. Golliver, A.K. Lenstra, K.S. McCurley, Lattice sieving and trial division, Algorithmic number theory symposium, proceedings, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 877, (1994) 18-27. [LL] A.K. Lenstra, H.W. Lenstra, Jr., The development of the number field sieve, Lecture Notes in Math. 1554, Springer- Verlag, Berlin, 1993 [M93] Peter L. Montgomery, Square roots of products of algebraic numbers, in Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics, Mathematics of Computation 1943-1993, Vancouver, 1993, Walter Gautschi, ed. [M95] Peter L. Montgomery, A block Lanczos algorithm for finding dependencies over GF(2), Proceedings Eurocrypt 1995, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 921, (1995) 106-120. [P] J.M. Pollard, The lattice sieve, pages 43-49 in [LL]. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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pgpcrack review [failed]
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I complied pgpcrack (which was on the list a few days ago) on a SPARCstation-10 running SunOS 4.1.4. Running pgpcrack on a -c encrypted file (duress.pgp) encrypted with the passphrase "lover" (which is in my dictionary file) results in the following output after under 1 second. (The dictionary file I was using is about 250k): PGPCrack passphrase: cruddy Using the same plaintext encrypted with "pain" the following output after 3 seconds or so: PGPCrack passphrase: promulgate A third time, same plaintest -c'd with "avoid" results in: PGPCrack passphrase: cerebral Seems to work just fine on linux. --- My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information Opp. Counsel: For all your expert testimony needs: jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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