December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Vexatious Litigants (was: SurfWatch)
by Martin Janzen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Martin Diehl" <mdiehl(a)dttus.com> wrote: >Henry Huang <hwh6k(a)fulton.seas.virginia.edu> at INTERNET-USA wrote: >> The question I have is if these systems were widely implemented, could >> an Web page author or provider of content be sued for "mislabeling" >> their page? If so, under what circumstances? Could the RSAC attach >> legal requirements to the use of their system, and open up such a >> loophole (similar to how Sun attaches conditions to the use of its >> "Java" logo)? > > Seems to me that if the Web page author labels his page > conservatively, i. e. "materials may be unsuitable for non-adults; may > contain controversial material, may contain views different from your > own, etc.". How can the author be liable for mislabeling? I read Henry's question to refer to the case in which the Web page author rates a page "too low"; that is, in such a way that despite the use of RSAC/SurfWatch/etc. software, "undesirable" material gets through the filter. Suppose that an author provides a page which lists, say, clothing- optional beaches, complete with pictures. The author rates it as "suitable for family viewing" -- either naively, believing that no one will be offended; or deliberately, to make the point that the content is harmless and _should_ be considered suitable for family viewing; or simply in order to widen the potential audience. Henry's question (as I interpret it) is this: If prudish parents now catch their kid looking at a page with pictures of barenaked people, figure out why the page wasn't filtered out, and file suit against the author, what is likely to happen? ObCrypto, sort of: What if the page were retrieved through an HTTP proxy which, unbeknownst to the author (and the filtering service/SW), deliberately removes or alters the PICS-Label or other rating information? The author did, after all, _provide_ the "undesirable" material.... To what extent does the author's intent matter? Must Web authors now add a digital signature to each page (including its rating info), to prevent tampering? -- Martin Janzen janzen(a)idacom.hp.com ObRant: Or, before it comes to that, will people learn to take just the tiniest shred of [Exon]ing responsibility for themselves and their [Exon]ing kids?

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Re: [ Death of MOSS? ]
by Housley, Russ 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim: >> And if you look at what I've said previously, it is my firm belief >>that if we are to succeed in giving users a truly interoperable secure >>email standard, then said standard must be fully and completely >>integrated into MIME and do everything it does in the proper MIME way, >>as opposed to just being security grafted on. > >Allow me to make a contentious statement: > > MOSS is the only secure email protocol integrated with MIME. > >You see, integrated to me means that the base is security aware. MIME is >only security aware when the security multiparts are used. In all other >cases, MIME is not security aware. > >The use of the application content-type with experimentally defined >subtypes gives the appearance of MIME being security aware, but it >provides nothing more than a mechanism for carrying a protected object. >In addition, the fact that the security service itself must do a callback >in order to support recursive services, unlike MOSS which uses the >security multiparts framework and thus lets MIME do all the work it was >designed to do, further supports my position. Jim, in what way does the end user distinguish between the MOSS-like integration and the S/MIME-and-MSP-like integration? It seems to me that a good user agent implementation provides the same services to the user. Russ

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Re: Switchboard
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:27 AM 3/7/96, Bill Frantz wrote: > I checked them out and the couldn't find my record. Since I have a listed > telephone number, I can only assume that their records do not include GTE > local service records or some other equally huge gap. I was messing around with this a year and a half ago (woulda shoulda coulda), and my guess is they're using Reuben Donnelly's database. They're the largest phonebook printer, and they even go so far as to OCR a lot, but apparently not all, of their competition. They say 90 million names, and that seems to be the number I was quoted... Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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re: FCC & Internet phones
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>"Long-Distance Dueling. Free Dialing Via Internet Faces a Challenge From >Small Phone Firms." You seem to forget that the Internet is just about the *only* electronic communications media not controlled/licensed by the FCC in the US. The FCC also prohibits use of cryptography by those with amateur licenses. Warmly, Padgett

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Re: Assassination Politics(tm) was V-chips, CC, and Motorcycle Helmets
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:42 PM 3/8/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: >Since my name keeps getting dragged into this discussion, I will share with >youall the conclusions I reached after my last set of exchanges with Jim >Bell. > >(1) Assassination Politics (AP) will be most useful to a fired-up group of >people who want to silence a single person. Madeline Murray O'Hare comes >to mind. (She was a Texas atheist who challenged school prayer and won.) I think that's a misleading conclusion. While it may, arguably, be "most useful" useful to one kind of person or another, that doesn't mean that it won't be, cumulatively, vastly more useful to the rest of the population. To carry the gun analogy a bit further, somebody might argue that "a handfun will be most useful to a criminal in the commission of a robbery." Aside from gloriously ignoring the self-defense issue, this interpretation falsely implies that the fact that SOME bad person might benefit from it justifies banning them. >(2) Jim Bell and I disagree strongly on the market price for assassinations. Is this relevant? And I don't recall where the "disagreement" you describe exists: I think there will be some people killed for $1000, some won't be killed for less than $100,000. >(3) Jim Bell and I disagree on the number of deaths needed to deter someone >who believes in what they do. In our discussion, this question comes down >to: are IRS employees more like corporate consultants or like soldiers. It's far easier to "believe in what they do" when nobody is out there planning to kill them for doing it. >(4) I think that if someone can be traced as profiting from a AP death, >e.g. through winning a gamble on the date/time of death, that person's >whereabouts at the time of death will be carefully investigated. By whom will it be investigated? And it's merely a matter of ensuring that the payments can be made anonymously; I would consider anyone who tried to do such traces to be an enemy, and I'm sure anyone who believed in the underlying idea would as well. >(5) While killing someone whose name and residence are known is easy, and >the killer is likely to get away with it, does that mean that killing >someone who has been marked as having a price on her head is as easy? I >assume her friends and neighbors will protect her. Question: Let's suppose your neighbor had a $20,000 price on his head. Even if, arguably, you didn't want to see him die, you also wouldn't want somebody to drive a car through his front wall, filled with 1000 pounds of ANFO, and blow his house up, along with doing tens of thousands of dollars of damage to your house as well. I would say you would have somewhat of a motivation to ensure that when the killing eventually occurred, it occurred in a way that wouldn't negatively affect you. > The TV cameras will be >running 24 hours a day. This will, at a minimum raise the price of >assassinations. That won't mean much if the "minimum price" went to $20,000. This could easily be raised for many government employees. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Artist self censorship (Was Chinese net-censorship) Noise
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:22 PM 3/9/96, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: > guilt. The judge then sentenced her to 30 days at MCI Framingham. We ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > are currently trying to raise money to pay for her appeal. Man, making someone work for one of the Phone Companies...that's a pretty harsh sentence! Maybe that's how that cute "MCI girl" we see on television got assigned to MCI? (Or is this MCI an example of AOL, Acronym OverLoading?) --Klaus!

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Re: Bootable disks
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My understanding was that the parallel-port version of the Syquest drive would also be bootable. That is, you would boot the driver off a floppy and then the rest of the boot sequence would be handled by whatever was on the Syquest drive. THis, I thought, would let you install something like linux and the various other software to give you a very portable anon server, neatly containing a separate OS and all the "incriminating evidence" while the regular hard disk held nothing other than Windows and Doom. Is this not the case? --tallpaul On Mar 06, 1996 14:55:44, 'JonWienke(a)aol.com' wrote: >I recently installed an IDE version of the Syquest EZ 135 hard drive for a >client. Since it is a fully functional hard drive, it is bootable, unlike >the parallel port model. The biggest advantage to this type of drive is that >the cartridge (and any potentially incriminating data) can be quickly removed >and destroyed (burn it, smash it with a large heavy object, insert it into a >bulk eraser) or taken to a secure location for storage. Also, this type of >drive provides an excellent place to put swap files, which have an annoying >tendency to pick up sensitive data. That is less of a problem if you can >remove the cartridge and store it in a secure location when not processing >sensitive data. > >Jonathan Wienke >

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Re: FCC & Internet phones
by Mutant Rob 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security wrote: > You seem to forget that the Internet is just about the *only* electronic > communications media not controlled/licensed by the FCC in the US. The > FCC also prohibits use of cryptography by those with amateur licenses. Yes... but the Internet is not like HAM radio. The FCC has no jurisdiction outside the US, and it would cause various problems for them to try to regulate the use of IPhone or how ISPs operate. On another note, I wonder how the Leahy bill would affect use of crypto by HAMs.... - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMUHENyoZzwIn1bdtAQE1XwF9EP/jLWWk2gd41oNnkNF88lhTpa7PvGEU iEBdP8oalQfanQz/WcBjYQ9ilXEXxOqo =+FDh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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EXR_ciz
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-5-96. TWP: "Untangling the Spy Network's Webs." Chairman Combest of the House intelligence committee yesterday proposed making the CIA's DO into a separate service and splitting the NRO into two giant technical agencies to handle satellites. The CIA would control most long-range intelligence work, some of which is now handled by the CIO and some by the NSA. The biggest change in terms of size would put the NSA, which has more than 25,000 analysts, in a new Technical Collection Agency that would also take in the managerial functions of NRO and parts of imagery analysis from CIO. 3-5-96. NYT: "Proposal Would Reorganize U.S. Intelligence Agencies." The intelligence services are held in low regard by the public and some leaders -- State complains about the quality of analytical papers; Defense bad-mouths the quantity of intelligence; and Congress gripes about too many secrets and not enough accountability. Rep. Goss, a former member of the CIA's DO, said the proposal aimed to rebuild the credibility of the agency's spies: "The whole exercise we're going through is meant to restore that." EXR_ciz

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Re: (INFO) Leahy/Goodlatte introduce crypto bill
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12:17 PM 3/5/96 -0500, Voters Telecommunications Watch wrote: Dear Mr. Sadfar, By now I'm sure you've read a few items that I posted not only to you, but also to the cypherpunks mailing list, as well as the NWLIBERTARIANS(a)teleport.com list. I believe you have made a grievous error in your position apparently supporting the Leahy bill. As you presumably understand by now, based on your description of the bill it contains an extraordinarily serious flaw, in that it makes a new crime concerning the USE of encryption. Ostensibly, this is "reasonable," but I've already presented a scenario on Cypherpunks (also posted to you; as I write this it may not yet have appeared there, but I copied you) in which the government uses this provision maliciously to go after anonymous remailers. While that was merely a specific example, almost any service that protects the identity of its customers and allows them network access is potentially at a serious risk, because the US government has been known to fabricate a crime (for example, the "Amateur Action" BBS case from a few years ago) in order to make criminals out of non-criminals. As you have quoted it, Leahy's bill allows the government to, in effect, "stalk" a service provider (anonymous encrypted remailer, anonymous digital cash bank, Internet access provider, etc) and create a crime that involves the provider well beyond the standards described in this bill. The government can CREATE a crime, "to order" as it were, and snare the service provider in the net, despite the fact he has done nothing wrong. (In fact, he could be "guilty" even if there was no way, short of going out of business, to avoid the "crime.") This, I hope you agree, is totally unacceptable, but despite this, you said: >This provision only applies to you if you are using encryption to >specifically foil a law enforcement investigation AND the communication >relates to a felony AND you are using the communication to commit the >felony. VTW feels this is a fairly narrowly drawn statute that is not >likely to be easily abused. Frankly, you made an error, and "it was a doozy!" But what I fear is that you will "dig your heels in" and hesitate to admit it, and continue on calling this "a good bill." You _would_ be right about that, except for the specific portion that is referred to above. (In addition, as Padgett Petersen noticed on Cypherpunks, that portion of the bill seemingly contains an error of phrasing, although we can't tell and we are depending on your quoting of that bill. Please verify that the quotation you made was accurate, and please carefully read that portion to see if you can identify the problem both Mr. Petersen and I observed. Since it just about reverses the entire meaning of the paragraph, it is vital to know what the actual bill said and meant.) I strongly recommend that you _DRAMATICALLY_ change the tone of your support: Please make it clear that your support for this bill is ENTIRELY conditional on removing the offending section. (I see little or no problem with your description of the rest of the bill, except for a few items I mention below.) I certainly invite any challenge you'd care to make to my reasoning and logic: If you feel I'm wrong in my estimation of what the government could do with that portion of the bill, say so and back up your analysis. If, on the other hand, you recognize that I'm right, or at least on the right track, I think you have a certain moral responsibility to ensure that this "wolf in sheep's clothing" doesn't get by the shepherd. Remember, in your press release you said: >VTW believes this legislation is an excellent initiative. It would be far more accurate to say, "This legislation COULD BE an excellent initiative, if a short section were removed." >We predict that the White House will do everything in their power to >prevent Senator Leahy from liberating PGP. He will need your help to >push forward. If this is REALLY true, then he will have to listen to our suggestions, right? People listen WHEN THEY HAVE TO CONVINCE YOU OF SOMETHING. Failing to make Leahy aware of what we consider terribly wrong with that bill would be irresponsible. If Leahy REALLY wants the bill passed, and "all" the potential supporters insist on the removal of the offending section, he will have no choice but to do so, since it has already been widely predicted that the administration will oppose it. If, indeed, they will oppose it, they will oppose it REGARDLESS of whether it contains that bad spot or not. >Over the next few months, VTW will be coordinating a coalition of >names, many of which are already familiar to you. This coalition will >ask you to call and write to Congress, expressing your opinion, and >threatening to back it up with the ultimate legitimate weapon of >democracy, your vote in this election year. While I do indeed intend to vote in this election year, as you may be aware I believe there are other weapons the public will eventually be able to use against recalcitrant politicians and government employees of all types. The government is presumably well aware of my position, and it would certainly not be unexpected if they were desperately trying to avoid what I consider to be an inevitable conclusion. This particular bad section, in what is probably an otherwise-good bill, seems tailor-made to fight against developments that I think this society and "our" government can't avoid, and shouldn't avoid. I'm not asking you to endorse, or for that matter even acknowledge, my theories. However, you should at least take notice of the fact that Congress' motivations are clearly to maintain its power over the citizenry, and they will presumably act in predictable fashion to achieve this goal. We've already got them on the run; they can't pass Clipper and they knew they couldn't prosecute Zimmermann, and their position on ITAR is resoundingly criticized by individuals and industry alike. Most people agree that these rules have to change; it would be a tragedy if we "gave away the store" just to get a few trinkets. The fact is, this bill didn't have to contain the offending section, and it doesn't have to keep it. If we make our absolute opposition to that portion clear, who will stand up and support it? Only those people within government who secretly want this bill to pass, that's who! ____________________________________________________________ >A FEW QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS > >Q: Wasn't Goodlatte one of the bad guys on the Communications Decency Act? > Why is he sponsoring this bill, and can we trust him? >A: Goodlatte did indeed introduce the fatal amendment that made the House > version of the Telecomm Bill unsupportable. Nevertheless, VTW has found > that a Congressperson's vote on one sort of bill is little indication of > his or her stand on others. VTW wil closely examine any change in the > language of the bill throughout its Congressional life. Well, frankly, it looks like SOMEBODY managed to sneak in a pit into the cherry pie. (or a worm into the apple!) I wonder who could have done this? What do you want to bet that there aren't any fingerprints on it?!? >Q: Does this create a new obligations for key holders to disclose keys that > they wouldn't have to comply with before? >A: No. In fact, this bill makes it harder for a law enforcement official to > retrieve a key from a key holder, by requiring a wiretap request instead > of a simple search warrant. In my opinion, key escrow agents should be required to inform THEIR CLIENT, the actual user of the key, BEFORE giving the key to the cops. They should also be obligated to fight any such request if the key holder requests it. (Remember, if key-escrow is really voluntary, then it is a contract between the encryption-user and the key escrow agent, and the encryption user should be able to put whatever conditions he wishes on that relationship. Presumably, he would not have entered into that relationship unless he was able to control the disposition of the key.) Furthermore, the cops should not be allowed to do any decryption of any material wiretapped before they possess the key itself. In summary, I think you really need to revisit your support for this bill. It is only a short distance away from being a good bill, but that is a trip we must make if we are to protect and even expand our freedom. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMT5aHPqHVDBboB2dAQEACwP/eDky+Gi0kebbAWPYO9dX9HCQTzac3m3v YVyW4iEtGrQE78/Hmi4M2m9l4sDA3qOaFZtFhImRc4JVVWNy1Yp8JzTPbjESiB4M Q3ppLV7S9sQmYQnHIHbpJu9YVQ/j+cMIwp9tOI0FNLbXIKWhZz4t+6bfiqJWUgZK awsbDpXjYaU= =3HJl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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