December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Book: The President's Eyes Only
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:08 AM 4/28/96 -0700, rick hoselton wrote: >I just finished reading "For the President's Eyes Only", >a book by Christopher Andrew. [stuff deleted] >I suppose I tended to look upon ITAR restrictions on cryptography >as a sign of a power-hungry, self-agrandizing, government that has >lost track of the fact that its legitimacy depends on protecting >the blessings of liberty for its citizens. That's partly true, >but there's more to it than that. > >After reading "For the President's Eyes Only", I can understand that >many in government believe that they are protecting the public by >outlawing cryptography. After careful reconsideration, I still >believe in strong free crypto, but it made me think very hard. >I think that some on this list and in sci.crypt should be ashamed of >their ad hominem attacks in an area where reasonable people disagree. > >The crypto-game is being played "for keeps". Someday, all crypto >may be too strong to break, but for right now, many "bad guys" >(and whatever your philosophy, I bet you can find some) use weak >crypto, and this allows the US Govt. to know more about what goes >on in the world. Here's one reason why I object to this. While "reasonable people" occasionally disagree about things, in the political arena my experience has been that the main reason they disagree is their differing VALUES, not the interpretation of those values. For example, if a person simply disliked the concept of freedom (for others, anyway) or wanted to maintain the power of an existing government against future reductions based on technological developments, he'd object to the deployment of good crypto by ordinary citizens. One could argue that his position is "reasonable" given his value system, but in reality his would be a particularly hostile position with regards to my rights. Yes, "bad guys" exist, but for most if not all of us the vast majority of those bad guys would have no use for crypto, and probably wouldn't be able to figure out how to install and run PGP. Only a very tiny fraction of "bad guys" would benefit from crypto, yet that's all the government is talking about. The reason is simple: The government's "bad guys" are NOT OUR "bad guys", not at all. The government is almost entirely uninterested in the common criminals who do most of the damage; it is focussing on the few people who are the biggest threat to _it_, not a threat to the public. It is this self-interest that makes the positions of the government-apologists unreasonable, and worthy of our scorn. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com As long as Uncle Sam keeps his finger on a nuclear >trigger, I can see a strong case that knowing what he's doing and >not getting too surprised are (mostly) good things. > >There will be a price to pay when everyone uses strong crypto. >There will be great benefits derived, as well. It will be very >expensive, but worth it. If we want to make it happen sooner, >we should understand (and respect) our opponents in this debate. > > >Rick F. Hoselton (who doesn't claim to present opinions for others) > > >

1 0

NOISE - AARMs
by Dave Emery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From MAILER-DAEMON Sun Apr 28 19:24:26 1996 Received: by pig.die.com (5.65/1.35) id AA01144; Sun, 28 Apr 96 19:24:26 -0400 Date: Sun, 28 Apr 96 19:24:26 -0400 From: MAILER-DAEMON (Mail Delivery Subsystem) Subject: Returned mail: User unknown Message-Id: <9604282324.AA01144(a)pig.die.com> To: die Status: RO ----- Transcript of session follows ----- 550 cypherpunks.com... User unknown ----- Unsent message follows ----- Received: by pig.die.com (5.65/1.35) id AA01142; Sun, 28 Apr 96 19:24:26 -0400 Message-Id: <9604282324.AA01142(a)pig.die.com> Subject: Re: Cell Kill 2 To: asgaard(a)sos.sll.se (Asgaard) Date: Sun, 28 Apr 1996 19:24:26 -0400 (EDT) From: "Dave Emery" <die(a)pig.die.com> Cc: cypherpunks.com Reply-To: die(a)die.com In-Reply-To: <Pine.HPP.3.91.960428210130.10419A-100000(a)cor.sos.sll.se> from "Asgaard" at Apr 28, 96 11:44:03 pm X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL24alpha3] Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Length: 1237 Asgaard writes > > enough for this application of force. It makes more sense if > he was using a direct (mobile) phone-satellite device, assuming > such devices are emitting a stronger signal that could easily > be targeted by AWAC type technology, or even satellites (that > they are communicating with in the first place). > Much the most likely satellite phone is the widely used INMARSAT A or C types which radiate continuous narrow band (nbfm or QPSK) uplinks in L band (around 1636 mhz) at considerable power (multiple tens of watts) via antennas with large sidelobes (the fact that the antennas are small and portable on most satellite terminals mean that they radiate lots of energy in various directions other than the satellite because of the limitations of the physical optics involved at such a long wavelength). This would be a sitting duck for an anti-radiation missle. The US has had such missle's since the Vietnam era for knocking out radar sites, one can presume the USSR developed such weapons as well. Why the Russians did not use this technology earlier remains puzzling ... and why Dudeyev used a satellite phone which made him a sitting duck is even less clear. Dave Emery die(a)die.com

2 1

Nando.net on expatriate tax issue
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Of course, the mainstream media is failing to question why such taxes should be in existence at all. -Allen >Billionaires' tax loophole could complicate passage of health reform >--------------------------------------------------------------------------- >Copyright 1996 Nando.net >Copyright 1996 The Associated Press >WASHINGTON (Apr 28, 1996 1:47 p.m. EDT) -- A once white-hot, but still >smoldering, partisan dispute over taxation of expatriate billionaires could >further complicate enactment of a popular measure making health insurance >portable from job to job. [...] >But an effort to plug a loophole that's allowed a handful of wealthy people >to avoid taxes by renouncing their citizenship could put another hurdle >before a health bill all sides say they want. >Competing expatriate billionaire provisions are tucked into separate health >bills that cleared the Senate last week and the House in March. >In an approach recommended by the Clinton administration, the Senate would >impose an immediate capital gains tax on the assets of wealthy people when >they renounce their citizenship. >However, the House bill, crafted by Ways and Means Chairman Bill Archer, >R-Texas, takes an entirely different approach that Democrats and the >administration say leaves the loophole wide open. >House and Senate lawmakers haven't met yet to work out the differences >between the two health bills. But if past negotiations on the expatriation >issue are any indication, the House version will emerge victorious. [...] >Instead of imposing a large and immediate tax on wealthy citizenship >renouncers, the House version tightens current law. It requires expatriates >with a net worth of $500,000 or more to pay taxes on capital gains and >other income from U.S.-based assets for 10 years after they renounce their >citizenship. >But critics say it will accomplish little more than forcing accountants and >lawyers to find more creative ways around the rules on behalf of >billionaire citizenship renouncers such as Campbell soup fortune heir John >Dorrance III and Dart Container Corp. President Kenneth Dart. >The House version would be extremely difficult to enforce and would allow >patient expatriates to avoid the tax by holding their assets for 10 years >before selling, they say. In the interim, they could raise cash by >borrowing against the assets. [...] >However, Archer says his committee's version is actually tougher. The >administration's proposal would create an incentive for people who had >recently inherited their wealth to expatriate before their newly acquired >assets started to appreciate, he said. >"The reality is their proposal is weaker than ours," Archer said. "Some of >the most egregious cases are where there have been heirs that have been >recipients of estates who can under their proposal leave and never pay >anything."

2 1

Re: arbiter/escrow agent for hire
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"unicorn(a)schloss.li" "Black Unicorn" 28-APR-1996 20:43:07.41 >My key is available on the keyservers, as far as I know. >Sandy Sandfort, for one, has spoken with me extensively and his signature >is on my key. If you like, I suggest you ask him as to his view of my >credibility/continuity. My information would appear to be out of date; I was getting it from one of the web-of-trust studies which stated that your new key was not signed by anything except itself. Sorry. >Note, this hardly assures you that I'm not several people working >together, merely that this nym is connected to at least one person who >posts on cypherpunks regularly and has had a presence here since just >after the lists foundation. It would admittedly help if your messages were signed also; this would provide somewhat of an additional confirmation. However, I very well understand that this is not always possible/practical; note that I don't have a key yet. -Allen

1 0

API for the next release of NOISE.SYS available...
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you're interested in seeing the preliminary API for the next NOISE.SYS release, send a message with the subject "send noise-api" and my mail filter will respond in kind. Thoughful comments and criticisms or suggestions would be most welcome. If you're seriously interested in taking a look at the source code before the next version is released (that is, if you intend to comb it for bugs, optimizations, security flaws, etc. etc.) drop me a line. Rob. --- Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" to <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> for a copy of my PGP key.

1 0

Re: PGP and pseudonyms
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:08 PM 4/28/96 -0700, Steve Reid wrote: >Suppose someone were using a pseudonym, and had a seperate PGP key for >this pseudonym. If this person's secret keyring were stolen, could >person=pseudonym be revealed, based on the key ID? Or would it require >knowing the passphrase? Yes, the person=personna would be revealed. No, a passphrase would not be needed. To demonstrate try "pgp -kv secring.pgp" and see what you get. I hope this gets fixed in PGP 3.0. --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

4 4

Attorney-Client / Nyms
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sun, 28 Apr 1996, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > From: IN%"unicorn(a)schloss.li" "Black Unicorn" 27-APR-1996 23:07:10.42 > > >Well, using attorney client confidentality to shield things otherwise > >discoverable just doesn't work. > > Given discussions as to attorneys holding passphrases, et al, perhaps > a tutorial from the lawyers on the list (yourself and others, since > disagreements among J.D.'s have been known to happen) on what attorney-client > confidentiality does cover? Proposed FRE 503 probably has the best codification of the prevailing common law on the subject. I reproduce it in part below. Typos are mine. (a) Definitions. As used in this rule: (1) A "client" is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults with a lawyer with a view to obtaining progessional legal services from him. [...] (b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purposes of facilitiating the rendition of professional legal services to the client, [between the attorney and the client directly or indirectly]. (c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client [or his agents or assigns etc.] The person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client. His authoriety to do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. (d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule: (1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud; or (2) Claimants through the same deceased client. As to communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the samed deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction; or (3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer; or (4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or (5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to matter of common interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action between any of the clients. (end) Generally speaking the particulars of attorney-client relationships are regulated by state statute, though some states define the provisions through common law. Note the confidentiality requirement. A client is estopped from claiming privilege if he discloses the content of the communication to a third party not connected to the attorney-client relationship. The identity of the client and the existance of the attorney client relationship are not confidential. There are some exceptions. Physical evidence is generally not protected by attorney client privilege unless it is a manifestation of communications between attorney and client (letters, documents etc.) Communications regarding future crimes or frauds are not protected. What I think you will be most interested in, however are the exception for stolen property and destruction of evidence. Stolen property may be held by an attorney for a reasonable time for inspection purposes, but must be returned to the rightful owner or the attorney will be a receiver of stolen goods and participating in an ongoing crime. Privilege will thus not apply. In re Ryder, 263 F.Supp. 360 (E.D.Va 1967). (Some courts will permit the attorney to refuse to disclose the source from which he obtained the property, however). Consider this in the context of trade secrets. All states have laws against destroying or concealing evidence. The attorney who advises his client to destroy evidence is a co-consiprator. Privilege does not apply. Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d 339 (Crim. App Tex. 1953). (Interesting to wonder if advising a client to encrypt evidence is 'concealing' it). > > >There are many mail forwarding services that don't use attornies. An > >attorney is going to charge you by the hour for this service. I don't > >think you really want to pay for it. > > Most of them aren't anonymous, either... although that does give me > the thought of going to one outside the US and its reporting requirements. > They'd know who I was (or at least the address it was going to), but at least > nobody else would know. Any suggestions, since you've been writing of the joys > of nymdom recently? I suggest you use a forwarding service, sign up with your nym name, and provide the address of a P.O. box for them to forward to, also in the name of your nym. > -Allen -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMYQU6S1onm9OaF05AQHN7ggAstl9Is4Yyt0ZSPiOJYBJvFqPoj8kNtQL 6TuIubS4Ybu+5tWEqI6O/llmwE0NGw9q8ow4zK4yAm7PnbtvcFsRvjLy+KlPbU6/ rVTd1EI9Qz6rGTiK99j3bBxdYsQv4p4AwiC/+sdR/ZJyq6+ZR5PX/RzqPO/Tfxc6 nlM/G0S4PcA45W4v+lDRbj8GTcRaTlziPAl8/8xJGPuapZBrt8Icl92dLrCAFu7e vGe0u0yrRw/ljq2hQ1FjpQzEv4pbQ4XPxylqmoh7lTjkFw2KsT/pNb/36YUNisPv 4n4EiAcRCviVBSmaOF8DzgwANirTR5WEYj9ayIBwN5UmlwZnKWf/Bw== =N2Wa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information Opp. Counsel: For all your expert testimony needs: jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Re: Java security weaknesses
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To add to the list of Java security weaknesses from the Princeton paper I posted the other day, I saw a new one on comp.lang.java this afternoon. It is another bug in the bytecode verifier, different from the one discovered by the Princeton group, that allows you to bypass the security mechanisms completely. Details are not yet available. Apparently the earlier bytecode verifier bug still does not have a fix available. However the nature of the bug itself was kept secret until last week. Now that it is out I hope Sun and Netscape will push to get the fix available ASAP. The bug appears to require considerable sophistication to exploit (understanding the details of the class resolution mechanism). Still with the talent which is out there on the net I imagine it will only be another week or two at most before a demonstration exploit appears. I hope the extended delay in making the fix available means that an intensive review of the code is being conducted, so that for example this other bug will have been fixed as well in the new release. I certainly hope that it won't be another month before a fix comes out for this new bug. Hal

1 0

Re: code vs cypher
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:01 PM 4/28/96 -0700, Rich Graves wrote: > I do not recall defending any statist policies. I did not defend the > [SMC call to silence Nazis], and indeed to defend the > [SMC ] would not have been > egregious statism, or indeed any kind of statism at all, I do not recall anyone accusing you of statism on the SMC call to cut Nazi net access -- probably because I deleted all that tedious crap, not because nobody accused you. I and others accused you of statism on various other matters, such as your claim that those who fail to pay taxes steal from society, and I just accused you of always changing the subject to Nazism whenever somebody accuses you of statism. And I also accused you of talking about Nazism much too much. And what happened: You immediately changed the subject to Nazism. Cut the nazism, please. Statism is sometimes on topic. Nazism will not be on topic until the next serious threat to Nazi's net access. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

3 2

Freedom and security
by angels＠wavenet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>No. "Those who sacrifice security for freedom, will have neither" is >not consistent with Franklin's statement, nor is it true. Security and >freedom are antithetical, and worse than that, security is always an >illusion. But you can have your illusion, as long as you keep it out of >my life. Censor yourself if you wish, but don't censor anything I might >want to look up. > The relationship / balance between security and freedom is always a defining factor in a society. My point is that a society with no laws and no codes of conduct is not a free society. This is not the same thing as saying that all societies need government. Small communities can and do operate without major legislation, using what sociologists refer to as "informal social controls", e.g. peer pressure. But even those small communities require and enforce boundaries on the conduct of their members. There is no society that tolerates the murder of its innocent members. The Internet may once have been one of those small close knit communities, small enough not to require law enforcement - although even then it had rules that had to be followed. But that Internet is gone, and it will never return, because now its the biggest city in the world, and the history of the change from pastoral communities to urban life, to the development of nation states and power blocs is also the history of crime. And as the Internet grows, so will its security problems. My position is to seek a balance between the freedom of the individual and the security of the community. My argument is that when the security of the community is threatened by the freedom of the individual, the community will always prioritise its safety. Good government of course means maintaining individual freedoms *and* maintaining community security. I actually disagree that they are antithetical. On the contrary they are a balance that any society has to find. Where individual freedom takes over you have the urban jungle where predators consume prey. Where security takes over you have the totalitarian state. Neither is necessary nor inevitable. We are simply concentrating on the problem from two different angles. My concern is to maximise community safety while protecting individual freedom. Your angle is to maximise individual freedom while protecting community safety. There is IMHO very little difference between the two. ********************************************************* Colin Gabriel Hatcher - CyberAngels Director angels(a)wavenet.com "Two people may disagree, but that does not mean that one of them is evil" *********************************************************

2 1