December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: The Joy of Java
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:57 PM 4/26/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >I think the interesting target date to plan for is a year from now. I said a few months ago that I thought Java would be ready for prime time in a couple of years. I think we are in complete agreement here. >>(1) There are not many sources of high-quality entropy available to Java >>applets. Keystroke timings and scribble windows are probably the best >>sources, but may represent an inconvenience for users. > >Shouldn't be any worse or any better than with the status quo, right? I'm >not sure I see the Java issue. (I've been looking at SoundClip and >AudioClip, but only cursorily.) I think it is a bit worse since an applet doesn't get access to a lot of stuff a C program, or even better an OS gets. A C program has a lot of environmental queries that might produce some entropy, although they would also be available to an attacker on the same system. The OS has access to interrupt times, mouse movements, and keyboard timings for ALL the applications that have run since boot. >By the way, Hal Finney is working on a bignum package. I know. I have an (old) version on my disk. AFAIK, Hal is the most active person developing crypto and crypto related Java code. He deserves thanks from all of us. Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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code vs cypher
by hochiminh＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> writes: pm> tm> Timothy C. May writes: pm> tm> Well, I was not invited to join the elite and secret pm> tm> coderpunks list, pm> It is neither elite nor secret. It is fairly high signal to noise. pm> I think only about one in every fifty or so cypherpunks pm> messages has any content at all worth mentioning. Agreed! I wasn't "invited". I simply requested access and was quickly welcomed to the list. pm> tm> but I still have some thoughts on coding and, pm> tm> especially, on the opportunities offered by Java. pm> tm> Sorry if this interferes with discussions of Rabbi pm> tm> Heir and Morris Dees. pm> You have no right to grumble about the situation here. pm> It is exactly what you wanted. Here you were, a person pm> of some personal gravitas and moral authority, and you pm> put your stamp on the "post whatever you like; don't let pm> the grumbling censors stop you". Well, as you sow, so pm> shall you reap. Its your fault, more than anyone else's. TC May was not the first person to substantialy digress from chartered topics but he certainly "ran with the ball" when he got his chance to expose his ignorance and intolerance of other races and religions ( the cypher-relevance or "charter topicality of which always escaped me). I was discouraged by the encouragement given to the murder advocating moron, Jim Bell to post his insance littany. pm> If Cypherpunks has become a cesspit, well, its YOUR cesspit, pm> Tim. Its the list you always strove to create, but it appears pm> that you now don't like the smell of your own wallow. Well, pm> sorry. Deal with it. Well put, Perry!

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Reminder: PDX Physical Cypherpunks Meeting Saturday
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A reminder for those who are intending to show up.... If you are intending on being involved with the key signing, please send me your public key(s) so that they can be included. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- There will be another physical meeting on the Cypherpunks in Portland, OR. The particulars: Location: Powell's Technical Bookstore 33 NW Park Portland, OR 97209 (Just north of Burnside off of the Park blocks.) Date: April 27th, 1996 Time: 5:23pm Discussions will cover: ** A Portland Remailer ** Various Coding Projects ** Events in the News ** Other Projects related to Crypto (Web sites and Documentation) ** Possible PGP Keysigning (Depends on the response) ** General Discussion Devolving into Chaos If you have any other topics for discussion, bring them up at the meeting or you can e-mail me in advance. Powell's Technical Book has a good selection of crypto books, so you might want to be prepared. (Do not bring money you cannot afford to spend. Powell's has an evil force that seduces people into buying books.) A PGP keysigning will be held if there are enough interested people. If you are interested in participating, please send me your public key via e-mail. Any comments, suggestions, ideas, and/or complains can be sent to me at alano(a)teleport.com. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMXMZZeQCP3v30CeZAQG0/Af/To2q0fuLk8Q6KquP+6LX1/1EOqGGoxBZ jWfCJoz40Wk1EHMJMis+XpiPgcXg2nAZNeQXubS4Q9se8uGG57UbzpX8rv5GnzdV HWimufNeL/bfxSn+OYswTEQExSwG2V/TSWZNwfFf5Xl/6V0zy1Xa5qY8CEtXn1fr 3/vXicYexd3NwSvToN5udYYtUe2kH14O3RIoXAnaJwMZLvS+oiDzw8LWXI7UMdsf akUbhisfgf/lu3wiMVQkN2hdP15rioIlAhryA0skvl1fxh3OkFC8/GDJpRBRWD+K RjO5VgRRXYrQUG4PKAK8Y1/PSINzandOkaMc2duaSshslZYyI3YRmg== =zD1a -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

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re: Joy of Java
by dp＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Scott Brickner <sjb(a)universe.digex.net> wrote: > >And later: > > The Java bytecode is where the security properties must ultimately > be verified . . . . Unfortunately, it is rather difficult to verify > the bytecode. . . . The present type verifier cannot be proven > correct, because there is not a formal description of the type > system. Object-oriented type systems are a current research topic; > it seems unwise for the system's security to rely on such a > mechanism without a strong theoretical foundation. It is not > certain that an informally specified system as large and complicated > as Java bytecode is consistent. > >And in the conclusions: > > We conclude that the Java system in its current form cannot easily > be made secure. Significant redesign of the language, the bytecode > format, and the runtime system appear to be necessary steps toward > building a higher-assurance system. . . . Execution of remotely- > loaded code is a relatively new phenomenon, and more work is > required to make it safe. > >I do think that the ideas embodied in Java are very important, and will >significantly shape the future of computing, but Java itself may be just >a stepping stone on the way. Given the crowd here, this is likely stating the obvious, but it has never failed to provoke spluttering from the Sun employees I have tried it on. The thing not mentioned in this excerpt is that at best, the verification will have been done for the Sun implementation of the byte code engine. There have been announcements of competing implementations of the the engine, and any assumptions of safety are out the window in that case. Sun doesn't have any control over Java the byte code engine, anyone who wants can build one. (and at 40kb total size, it is a tractable thing for an undergrad that didn't manage to find a summer job). Sun does control Java the logo, and can deny a license to use it. That is likely to become a meaningless distinction -- If somone will install a disk recieved unsolicited in the mail, or handed to them at a trade show (how hard can it be to re-seal AOL packaging, such that a casual recipient won't notice), they aren't bright enough to insist on genuine Sun brand Java. If it becomes an expected thing, that all browsers/os's/toaster-ovens have a java byte code engine in them, there will be a sizable number sold without "benifit" of trademark (at the low end if nothing else, Sun does expect to be paid to use the steaming cup). Not all of them will have sufficient rigor applied to their development. Once common, then things get interesting. The press will (for lack of anything else to do, as all the engines are supposed to act identically) start to benchmark the competing implementations. At that point, under pressure to "get good numbers", some of the more "expensive" operations will be "tuned". Other restrictions might be sacrificed in order to have something ready for Comdex... Can't happen you say? I still remember when some of the PC video makers got caught special casing the strings in one of the big magazines benchmarks. Unfortunately, Sun has designed a fine example of a "Square Peg". As OAK, it was a moderately good fit for the intended use. With zillions of set top boxes, and a limited number of sources of product (national/regional controlled entry broadcaster model), you had to have remote execution, nobody could build a big enough set of servers. Since it was coming from a broadcaster, you could get away with trusting signed code -- not just any bozo can get video broadcast nationally (unless it is violent, and even then they time base correct it), the same would be true of set top code. Since it meant selling hardware (engine in rom), there would be a limited number of sources of system code -- the above mentioned undergrad would find it difficult to find enough capital to get a mass market hardware product to market. And when you get down to it, with only a few meg of ram, and no disk, there really wasn't a huge amount of data to compromise. Now lets examine what they are trying to do with it. It is a software only item currently, thus it has very low entry barriers. Code can be put up by any bozo with $10/month to pay a local web provider -- even if the code is signed, you may not be able to get at the author of an applet, either because of national boundries, or anonymity. And you get to run the stuff on a machine with a lot of state (all the dells and gateways sold today had at least a gig of state spinning there to browse), and a live net connection (back to the source if nothing else) to transmit interesting things back with. Looks like a bad fit to me. But the PR department does have a big hammer, and they are beating on it, and the hole is starting to give a bit -- they have it forced about halfway now... To get a round peg, they have to build a system at the A2 trust level. That means a verified design, and an implementation checked against that design. Sun hasn't done the design side of the game, if the comments made about the design by the Princeton group are accurate. Lacking a verifiable design, even Sun's implementation must be doubted. But it doesn't end there, the browser that surrounds the byte code engine can compromise even a good implementation (as netscape has demonstrated), and last, Sun has no way to ensure that everything that executes the byte codes is a "good" implementation. We don't even have to assume malicious intent on the engine builder, accidents have already supplied us with enough examples of how it can go wrong. (tho it is easier if you put the hole there -- you don't have to be skilled enough to find a hole to exploit, just good enough to add a hole to an existing implementation) <dp>

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Re: US law - World Law - Secret Banking
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:55 PM 4/26/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: >First of all, and as one of the only western powers to do so, the United >States taxes its citizens on _worldwide income_. While this in itself, >with a proper foreign tax credit system, is not offensive, when the Unites >States adds to this a very wide scope of extraterratorial jurisdiction and >compelled process, it becomes more than tax. Further, the United States >implements policy it cannot directly legislate constiutionally through >taxation. Just to make it perfectly clear... The US (and the Philippines) are the only countries in the *civilized world* that tax non-resident citizens. This means, par example, that if you are born in the US and leave at the age of 2 days, never return, never get any services from any US government, you are subject to full US federal taxation. If you happen to reside in a country with no tax treaty with the US, you will owe local country taxes *plus* US federal taxes simply because of citizenship. In any of the European countries, you can eliminate your tax liability for foreign (out-of-country) source income simply by moving overseas. They tax all residents but only non-resident citizens who have domestic source income. The US grabs everything even if you've had virtually no US contacts. This is why some rich Americans have renounced their citizenship to avoid taxes on their non-US income, rich Brits don't have to renounce they can keep their citizenship and just move. >It is partly the arrogance of many U.S. citizens, and the view that their >government knows the one single way to conduct economic and foreign >affairs, that empowers the United States to impose her tax and >economic policy on unconnected sovereigns thousands of miles away. Note the other areas this has applied as well. Roosevelt's outlawry of private posession of gold by Americans made it a crime for Americans to own gold anywhere on earth. And the proposed regs on licensing of space launches prohibited Americans from committing unlicensed space launches anywhere on earth. DCF "Note that no woman has ever conquered Europe but several men have. No point, I just thought it was interesting."

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Re: WWW proxies?
by David Wagner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <Pine.SUN.3.93.960426191223.12146D-100000(a)polaris.mindport.net> you write: > > Has anyone developed such a beast yet? > > Will we have as extensive a WWW proxy network as remailer network? > Here's what I know of. You could get an anonymous www.c2.org account and websurf from it. You can also publish web pages anonymously from c2. See http://www.c2.org/anon.phtml It looks like there's an experimental anonymizing proxy up in France (if you can tolerate the link delay): http://hplyot.obspm.fr:6661/ http://hplyot.obspm.fr:80/~dl/anonproxy.txt I haven't tested it myself, though. CMU has a web anonymizer at http://anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu:8080/ Unfortunately, it's not useable by the public yet. (They promise to release it in early 1996.) Decense is a early prototype of a double-blind penet-style "re-webserver": http://www.clark.net/pub/rjc/decense.html Wei Dai has talked about PipeNet, a network of "re-routers" for general Internet traffic. Unfortunately, at this point, it's only a pipe dream on the whiteboard (as far as I know-- correct me if I'm wrong!). If I left any out, let me know. I hope to get a chance to play with these things (and possibly install one on my machine) during the summer, when I'll have some more free time. Whee!

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Re: RSAREF dos not give you access to RSA
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:48 PM 4/26/96 -0400, David Mazieres <dm(a)amsterdam.lcs.mit.edu> wrote: >> 5) the price of RSA is fairly low, once free RSAREF came out >RSAREF does not give you RSA. Do not think that you can write and >distribute free software that uses RSA encryption in the US just >because of the existence of RSAREF. If you don't believe me, let me >tell you a little story. [ really atrocious story of RSA's non-responsiveness, deleted] >The RSAREF license strictly requires that you only use the documented >RSAREF interface, which does not include direct access to the RSA functions. Yeah, that's a good point, and it'd slipped my mind since the PGP permission was eventually granted. For some applications of RSA, you can use RSAREF to do them; you may have to not mind an extra DES layer thrown in where you really don't need it, and the resulting ugliness. (But at least encrypting a random session key with a random DES key doesn't provide much hook for a DES-cracker.) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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www.WhosWhere.com selling access to my employer's passwd file
by rich＠c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- If you are involved with the affairs of a large organization, I urge you to check www.whoswhere.com to see if they have a bunch of user email addresses that they shouldn't. Of course there is little that one can do about this kind of invasion of privacy. But they don't have to be so fucking blatant and stupid about it. They have the email addresses of DAEMONS from our password files in their database. There is no need for mailbombing, or anything like that. Our lawyers are simply going to nuke them from orbit. Please check them out before they go offline, so that you will have a shot at whatever is left. - -rich -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMYHku43DXUbM57SdAQGQpwP/U9TzWE2vEjHYZo4eniVctFe3pVe0KIQe FvdNOWTykqfgEyhagKuifmRwUgjjIcIZONzRDw1Hi7UrJbOghH3j9sW5wxsphbxU 3U0hHuKumAczUHn03IVkkF4JpobawEgHqqP1Y++PhNopAvqnVSu+hnf5aIS1R390 MlUiwpoo0OE= =+Mm2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The Joy of Java
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From my perspective, the biggest win of Java isn't the security, though that's certainly important. It's that it's a reasonably powerful virtual machine that doesn't need to run on Microsoft operating systems, though it can (except Win3.1, of course.) That means that decent small application software can be written that doesn't have to be locked into the far less secure/reliable DOS/Windows/95 architectures, and can run on Macs and Linux and Unix, a bit slowly, but with a lot less baggage. (Maybe 16-bit code is gone from NT 4.0, but it's not going to run on 386s!?!) Yes, you may want to be careful with code that autoloads from web pages, but you don't have to be quite as paranoid with Java from ftp sites as you did with MS binaries, and you can be more comfortable with applets like word processors and data-crunchers knowing they won't be doing all the "helpful" things MSOffice likes to help you with. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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Re: trusting the processor chip
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> By NSA standards, it is simple. NSA has probably had its own >> semiconductor fabs for 30+ years. >Yep. Regardless of whether the fabs are government property or not, >it's a sure thing that some contractors have appropriately SCIFfed >fabs and appropriately cleared staffs. There's an interesting Moore's Law wrinkle to this. Not only does processor speed double every 18 months, but the cost of the chip fab plant for each generation of technology also doubles. Intel's building some $2B plants now, and who knows what the x886 CPU and 256MB memory fab plants will cost. While the costs are somewhat lower for a low-volume plant than a high-volume one, at some point it will be much harder (as a percentage of their total budget) for the NSA to stay ahead of the power curve, and they'll have to switch over to designs like highly-custom applications on commercial FPGAs and such. And "appropriately cleared staffs" are also harder to find as the chip business internationalizes. Back when I was a tool of the military-industrial complex, I was working on an RFP that had a heavy-duty "buy American" policy, not only for economic protectionism but to make sure that UnAmerican Foreigners didn't subvert the designs for critical components to add security leaks. For instance, the controller chips for disk drives, and raw EPROM. We eventually got them to let us use imported commercial products as long as any design and construction that was actually specific to the customer was done in the US, on the assumption that the Singaporean Espionage Service wasn't going to put back-doors in all the disk drives their city exported, and the Korean CIA wasn't going to put extra pins in their EPROMS that would replace the contents with hacked versions designed to steal US Secrets :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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