December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Re: RSA breaking
by [0m [5m Toth 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> System of Russian dolls? What would you suggest? My idea(it is not me that found that) is that tou could have many public keys, when someone want to send you something, he just mail you his(or her) keys, and then you encrypt with the first key, then with the second, etc... This system is used by some anonymous remailers: Each one has a key, you encript your text with the key of the last remailer, then you put your text, the adress of the people tou want the letter to be sent, then encrypt it with the key of the before the last remailer, and put the adress to be sent of the last remailer, etc So your letter is decripted by the first remailer, then sent to the adress found, then the second remailer decrypts it, etc, like an onion. The fact is that you can obtain a very good privacy if you have some keymaker programm. Let suppose you want to send me a crypted text(don't, it's forbidden to crypt in france), you mail to my remailer, that choose 1000(arbitrary number) keys, that send it to you, crypted with your key, you crypt your text the necessary number of times. This way, the message will be maybe uncrypted by someone, but if the key change for each message, someone can't find your key, i insist on this danger, having one key is useless as soon as someone found it. >What kind of system do you think would be needed to crack RSA coded messages? As i said, it is impossible to break an RSA code with softwares, the best attempt was 25 days with ten Crays linked for a key of only 50 numbers. But this can be done as i said before with a simple eratosten crible "translated" into hardware. Sorry electronic is not my way, but for the exemples i saw in class, it is really to the ability of a basic electronician, and they were more complicated than what i am talking about. The best components you have, the faster you'll go, so a governement or a bog private lab can afford this kind of prices.

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WSJ on "IRS-bashing"
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to WSJ, Leslie B. Samuels, "Treasury's top tax-policy official" says that "IRS-bashing is 'counterproductive and harmful'" -- and that "destructive rhetoric ... hurts the tax system and society" [elisions are the WSJ's] What if a the CDA grew little by little by little until it covered statements deemed "destructive rhetoric" .... hmmm. I mean after all, if it harms society....! Let's see ... Treasury: BATF. Key Escrow. GAK, anyone? ;) keep up the good work.

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Re: Clipper III analysis
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:57 AM 5/30/96, jonathon wrote: .... > It is a specialty within the QDE Field, but there are a few > QDE's that are _currently_ doing that. << Printed hard copy, > not electronic copy, but that is the _only_ difference. >> > >> I would be very interested to hear how a "Questioned Document Examiner" can > > It is at the point where statistics, textual analysis, grammar > and lingustics converge. > >> possibly determine that a digital signature was not applied by a particular >> person. > > I don't remember the minimum number of characters that are needed > to establish that a document was written by a specific individual. > Roughly fifteen pages of text that both sides admit as being > authentic is required for the undisputed exemplars. Ah, but the issue of who _signs_ a document is fundamentally and importantly different from the issue of who _wrote_ the document. If I have allegedly _signed_ a contract, who cares if exhaustive analysis reveals it to have been _written_ with 77.93% probability by Irving J. Shlublutz, CPA for State Farm Insurance Compance? The issue with digital signatures is who _signed_ a document, not who _wrote_ a document. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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UNV_eil
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

21+C, Scanning the Future (UK), February, 1996: "Dataveillance." A global trend is emerging toward citizen surveillance. While authorities speak of the need for data regulation and people become digital shadows, watchdogs are doing some monitoring of their won. With interviews of Phil Agre, Roger Clarke and Simon Davies on invasive and privacy technology. These technologies face an uphill public relations battle. Digital cash has already been widely accused of providing money launderers, drug barons and other criminals with the perfect means of continuing their activities. It's the same argument that was used in the Clipper Chip debate, in which the US government proposed a central encryption software, and it will no doubt be directed towards pseudonymous techniques as they emerge. Simon Davies is familiar with this type of argument. He says there has been a change of political winds in recent years. Where once privacy was used to protect individual freedoms it is now officially deemed by governments and corporations to be an aid to criminals and a barrier to administrative efficiency. "In a generation, we now have privacy as almost like an ancient forgotten wisdom," he says. Then he adds: "The point that needs to be made very clear is that technology has been misused. It always did have the capacity, the capability to be a friend to people. Instead, it has become a potential tool of enslavement. And it has rendered society vulnerable on a scale that has never been seen before. It is technologists and politicians and financiers who have misused the technology and should be brought to account for it." UNV_eil

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Re: Clipper III analysis
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:54 AM 5/29/96, jonathon wrote: > A good Questioned Document Examiner will be able to demonstrate > that the signed document in question was not authored by Joe > Blow, even if it contains his digital signature. I was of course talking about digital signatures, not handwritten signatures. I would be very interested to hear how a "Questioned Document Examiner" can possibly determine that a digital signature was not applied by a particular person. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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TIC_hip
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

5-29-96. FiTi: Chips Galore [Editorial] Texas Instruments' claim to have developed a technology capable of inscribing 125m transistors, or computing elements, on a thumbnail-sized slice of silicon is remarkable chiefly because the technique is commonplace. ... The consequences for society of this continued rise in complexity are perhaps not fully grasped even in an age in which computers are taken for granted. The latest technology promises ubiquitous, tiny packages of electronic intelligence. Today's model is the smart card and the tiny videocamera. Tomorrow, tiny processors will be embedded in jewellery, spectacles, buildings and furniture. ... Widely distributed computer power will confer substantial advantages on society; but it will create new ethical problems for society, such as the individual's right to privacy, which may be at least as difficult to master as the technology. ----- FiTi reported yesterday and today on TI's new chip: TIC_hip

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Re: [Fwd: --> CRISIS on USENET -- SIGN THE PROTEST STATEMENT VIA E-MAIL]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:21 PM 5/28/96 -0700, you wrote: >At 11:52 AM 5/28/96 +0000, you wrote: >>This is a post from Jon Noring (noring(a)netcom.com) about the recent >>spamming of alt.religion.scientology. I thought he summed the >>situation up very well. > >Why don't we get together an organized spamming of the CoC's servers? >Let's give them a taste of their medicine! >I bet that we can make their servers crash before they know what him them! Please take that to alt.religion.scientology or some other relevant list. [ I recently found a Dianetics Personality Test on my car. I haven't put it in the toaster yet :-) ] # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Re: RSA breaking
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 14:21 1996-05-29 +0200, [0m [5m Toth wrote: >But, cause there is a but, it can be broken by an hardware system. Gimme the money, i'll break it, a simple algorithm can be "hardwarly programmed" and with very high-tech components, the speed it can have is enough to break an RSA key. How much money do you want for breaking a 2048 bit RSA key? How soon can you deliver the broken private key? Matts

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Re: Internet traffic is monitored.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:37 AM 5/29/96 +0200, Anonymous wrote: >Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 10:03:11 -0700 >X-Sender: bstout(a)osc.hidata.com >To: Firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM, Return requested <firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM> >From: Bill Stout <bill.stout(a)hidata.com> >Subject: Re: Encryption Technology >Sender: firewalls-owner(a)GreatCircle.COM > >Extrapolations of fact: > 1. Internet traffic is monitored. > 2. The ability to snoop for encrypted traffic is present > 3. The ability to identify encryption levels is present > (How else can they differentiate DES-1 from DES-3?) > 4. The ability to crack DES-1 in near real-time mode is present. > (See above). > 5. If above=true, then Feds dropping the Zimmerman PGP case probably > also points to it also being crackable in a similar manner. >Bill I think the Feds non-prosecution of Zimmermann had absolutely nothing to do with the crackability/non-crackability of PGP. They just had an extremely weak case: They probably had no way to demonstrate that any particular person exported PGP, which means that prosecuting Zimmermann would have looked like sour grapes. (or, in the alternative, if they had records to show that PGP was exported, they might not have wanted to reveal the extent of their Internet monitoring.) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Tempest Info
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:27 AM 5/29/96 -0400, SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N wrote: >> Water pipes are often form the earth line. If only 60hz (US) can get through >> the power cables then only 60 hz can get into the water pipes (I'll ignore >> re-radiating, because water pipes are the least of your problems there). > >The high-frequency harmonics from your computers are probably above the >cutoff frequency of the water-pipes when considered as circular waveguides. >The water filling will act as a dielectric, bringing F0 down. So, it >is conceivable that extremely high frequency radiation (>3 Ghz) could >propagate well in a water pipe. No, you misunderstood. The RF wouldn't be transmitted on the inside of the pipes (how could it get inside, anyway?) but on the outside. Since most information-containing appliances are well-grounded, there is at least a strong possibility that a ground connection would carry enough interesting RF to be useful to tap. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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