December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

CoS and anon remailers
by Jim Byrd 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's more details. For quite some time the Church of Scientology has been pestered by an anonymous poster "Scamizdat" who regularly has been spilling cult secrets onto the net. These include directions on how to harrass critics. Scamizdat (whoever he is or they are) appears to have been using anonymous chained remailers. Grady Ward, a critic of the cult, has been taunting the cult with "Have you stopped Scamizdat yet?" I believe that Grady is almost certainly NOT Scamizdat. The church appears to have concluded that Grady is Scamizdat, has sued him, applied for a writ of seizure to raid his house (denied), and asked for a deposition (granted). It appears that Scientology is interesting in getting into the records of American anon remailers. They are also interested in anon.penet.fi. Once before, they raided anon.penet.fi when some of their internal information leaked out onto the net, and that poster has never been heard from again. Someone asked if this wouldn't violate the ECPA. In the past the cult has seized whole computers, complete with email, and ignored court orders to return them. The whole story may be found on http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/scientology/home.html Here is a file I got from Ron Newman's web page: --------------- Article 78833 of alt.religion.scientology: Path: news.cybercom.net!dial2-30.cybercom.net!user From: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server,alt.religion.scientology,comp.org.eff.talk Subject: Warning - Scientology attacking remailers again! Date: Wed, 10 Apr 1996 11:15:40 -0500 Organization: Cyber Access Internet Services (617) 396-0491 Lines: 138 Distribution: inet Message-ID: <rnewman-1004961115400001(a)dial2-30.cybercom.net> NNTP-Posting-Host: dial2-30.cybercom.net Keywords: Scientology remailers anon penet anonymous Grady Ward Xref: news.cybercom.net alt.privacy.anon-server:3524 alt.religion.scientology:78833 comp.org.eff.talk:25569 The following are a series of messages from Grady Ward, which he has authorized me to distribute to the Net at large. Grady is being sued by the Church of Scientology for alleged copyright violation (they claim he is the mysterious "Scamizdat", which he denies.) For more details, see http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/scientology/grady/home.html http://www.northcoast.com/~grady/ According to Grady, the CoS has once again demanded access to anon.penet.fi, and may soon subpoena other remailers as well: ------- Date: Thu, 04 Apr 1996 08:52:38 -0800 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> I've just received e-mail from: kaj.malmberg(a)mallu.pp.fi (Kaj Malmberg) The Poilice CID in Helsinki who is being pushed by the criminal cult yet again to get a search warrant for Julf's anonymous remailer, claiming I have been violating my injunction to post cult crap. I told him that as usual the criminal cult is lying and that I gave him and Julf explicit permission to investigate any or all of my posts I have ever made through the remailer. The criminal cult is trying to use the fact of my injunction to further their own conspiracy theories. South Africa, Finland, where does it end? Grady ------------- Date: Fri, 05 Apr 1996 07:41:25 -0800 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: Kaj Malmberg, Finland At 10:11 AM 4/5/96 -0500, you wrote: >Why did you give them this permission? I think it sets a VERY bad >precedent. [deleted] was upset when I mentioned this >yesterday afternoon -- he thinks you're being >too nice, polite, and cooperative for your own good. I like to err on the side of openness. Each to their own I suppose. Basically I trust Kaj to sense who is the criminal perpetrator in this case. I also sent him the set of trial stipulations in the Snow White case that ought to give him very interesting background on the criminal cult. >In my opinion, Julf and the Finnish cop should Just Say No >to the CoS. He is still free to do as he wishes. ------------ Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 14:16:32 -0700 To: Ron Newman <rnewman(a)cybercom.net> From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: a few more questions At 04:56 PM 4/9/96 -0400, you wrote: >Was anyone with you (on YOUR side) at either day's deposition? > >How many hours total did you go each day? No one was with me. Total hours day one: 7.5 Total hours day two: 3.25 hours, as per order of Judge Infante. Also I believe all american anonymous remailers will be subpoenaed for their records as will all my ISPs, and contents of safety deposit box held as evidence. -------- Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 19:37:57 -0700 To: Ron Newman <rnewman(a)cybercom.net> From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: what is the latest regarding penet? I don't know what's up today, but Julf wrote yesterday to tell me that my id grady(a)northcoast.com had NOT been used to go through his remailer. No word on what the police are doing to subpoena his system, if they are. Grady -------------- Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 22:57:26 -0700 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: what is the latest regarding penet? At 01:52 AM 4/10/96 -0500, you wrote: >Was something else used to go through his remailer? > >Has he said anything in public about this? > >Should I post your message about it on my web site? That is all he told me: that he could verify to authorities that grady(a)northcoast.com had not used his remailer. He didn;t mention anyone else or how he was helping the CID with their inquiries. Yes, you can put this datum on the web. -------------- Date: Wed, 10 Apr 1996 07:17:01 -0700 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: what is the latest regarding penet? Ron, Yes do please distribute my messages as you deem necessary. Some people ought to be aware of what is coming down. My feeling is that they will be doing anything they can to attempt to produce "hard evidence" that I am part of the Grand Conspiracy. I would say it is virtually certain that U.S. anon remailers will be subpoenaed as well as any foreign ones in which they can handle the authorities. Grady Ward | | http://www.northcoast.com/~grady +1 707 826 7715 | | (voice/24hr FAX) | 34877c8566839cb7 | grady(a)northcoast.com | aeab8ec5e5ee97fe | -- Ron Newman rnewman(a)cybercom.net Web: http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/home.html

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Re: Anonymous Remailer threat: Scientologists may subpoena anonymous remailer records?
by Jim Byrd 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:01 AM 4/10/96 -0700, Jim Warren wrote: >My understanding is that the most famous remailer, anon.penet.fi, is of the >first flavor -- and was raided by reps of the Church of Scientology, >several years ago, with a Finnish search warrant, and that this produced >some [much?] of the evidence against their opponent who had allegedly been >splattering COS copyrighted "works" all over the net. (Interesting >application of private property rights -- protecting religious secrets.) The story is weirder than that. The first poster of church secrets (with lots of commentary) was Dennis Erlich, an ex-scientologist. Dennis was raided and sued, and is awaiting trial. His ISP, Tom Klemesrud, refused to cancel Dennis' account, and so was sued, and is awaiting trial. A lady met Klemesrud in a bar, identified herself as an IRS agent, and talked her way into Klemesrud's apartment. She proceeded to remove her clothes and spread blood all over the apartment. She there identified herself as a representative of the Church of Scientology. Klemesrud posted an account of this bizarre affair to alt.religion.scientology, and an anonymous poster "-AB-", using anon.penet.fi, posted a differing version of events. The Church went ballistic over this post, and raided anon.penet.fi to find the identity of -AB-. This turned out to be an alumni account at Cal Tech. The poster has never been heard from again. The raid on anon.penet.fi occurred in Feb. 1995. "Scamizdat" has never used anon.penet.fi, and his (their?) identity is still unknown.

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Re: PEP Announcement (fwd)
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:17 PM 4/10/96, you wrote: > Thanks for the good review, Bob. You're absolutely right about the > pgp/original message window problem. I wrestled with it through most of >the > development process, and it remains the interface element I'd like to > change most. I ended up choosing the PGP window because I didn't want the > user to be faced with the choice of saving it unencrypted or losing it > forever. I did think, however, that it automatically verified and added > keys on decryption. Are you sure it doesn't? Got me there. I didn't even check for it. Heh. Now I know better... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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Re: Message not deliverable
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Subj: Message not deliverable >Date: 96-04-10 11:51:09 EDT >From: Administrator_at_DCACINTS(a)dca.com (Administrator) >To: JonWienke(a)aol.com [body text deleted] Has anyone else been getting these when they post to cpunks? I get one every time I post. I emailed the administrator at dca.com, a few weeks ago, but nothing has changed. Anyone got suggestions? Jonathan Wienke

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Re: Protocols at the Point of a Gun
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:48 4/10/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: [...] >We know that governments would like to impose things like the Simple >Tax Transfer Protocol on the Net as well as Is A Person (and Is A Minor) >Protocols. There is one thing about the proposed minor flag addition to IP that I don't understand. [No, I am not surprised by this. Mandatory authorization to establish a connection and an "Internet Driver License", probably in the form or a smart card are coming]. If my computer creates the IP packet, what is there to prevent me from modifying the value of the "Minor/Adult" flag at my leisure? -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Tense visions of future imperfect
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:59 AM 4/9/96 -0800, frantz(a)netcom.com (Bill Frantz) wrote: >> Financial Times, April 9, 1996, p. 13. >> Garfinkel described it like this: "My name is Agent >> Jenkins. I'm an investigator with the secret service, >> working on a counterfeiting case. And it's tough. Last >> year, my office got a priority call from an economist at >> Stanford. The economist was looking at something called the >> money supply and velocity and both were increasing a little >> too fast. They just didn't add up. The economist finally >> figured an organisation was printing its own electronic >> money -- just like the US government does. Personally, I find the idea that the government could hope to track the economy so closely as to notice a $10M/year addition to the money supply to be disturbing (though it was done in a science fiction story about 20 years ago :-) With digital cash, it's also unrealistic - we finally have a technology for moving money around _without_ them being able to track it all, if we want to deploy it. >> "This counterfeit currency looked just like the real thing, >> except it was a fraud. She even found some of it -- a >> digital dollar that was signed and sealed by the US >> government's secret key, yet had a serial number that had >> never been issued. The money that was being made was on the >> Net. It was everywhere and nowhere. And it was encrypted, >> so that we wouldn't even know it if we found it. Last >> month, we estimate, the total fraud was up to $900,000 a >> month, and it is increasing still." > >I don't see how this third scam would work in a system such as DigiCash >which uses online clearing. Unissued serial numbers would be refused when >presented for clearing. In Chaum's DigiCash, the payer makes up the serial number, blinds it, and has the bank sign it blind, so the bank never knows the number until the payee deposits it. So this doesn't work. (The payee knows the number when he receives it from the payer, but in online operation he deposits it right away.) (There are alternative ways to structure transactions so the payee issues the serial number, or even so the bank does, but they're not needed.) What the bank _does_ know is whether the total number of digibucks with its signature on them that it's received is larger than the number it's signed - so if their private signature key has been stolen by counterfeiters, they'll know for sure once the counterfeiting level exceeds the amount of float of outstanding digibucks they've issued; they may suspect it earlier if the redemption level is high enough that the float statistics look real funny. On the other hand, with Chaum's system, what role would the US government have in issuing digibucks, rather than banks doing it? The one-big-bank approach doesn't scale well, though I suppose the Feds could pay member banks with digibucks instead of paperbucks or journal entries if they wanted to, and FedBucks might be more spendable in some markets than VisaBucks or TwainBucks or MeritaKroner or HKL$ or YakuzaYen or Chemical$ or CocaRubles. >If this kind of scam, particularly the counterfeiting scam, >occurs too often, public trust in the cash will disappear, and people will >refuse to buy it. In a multiple-bank scenario, that works fine. With a government-issued legal-tender digital currency, it's an offer you can't refuse... >Note that people trying to maintain anonymity are particularly vulnerable >since they have to hold cash for a period of time to defeat traffic >analysis attacks. Holding digital cash for a long time isn't difficult - it's easier than holding paper cash for a long time, since you can keep multiple encrypted copies (so stealing them isn't very useful to the thief and isn't as damaging to the victim), and you can stash floppies in smaller, less armored safe deposit boxes than you'd need for large quantities of cash. Of course, if you happen to become dead while you're storing it, the paper cash is far more useful to your heirs, so I assume we'll have a government-sponsored cash-escrow system announced soon to protect the government's interest in collection of inheritance taxes... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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Re: No matter where you go, there they are.
by rick hoselton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:04 AM 4/10/96 -0400, Peter Wayner wrote: > >Hmm. Here's an interesting question. Let's say that there are 3 >satellites in view broadcasting signals f1(t), f2(t) and f3(t). >...Okay, so why can't I just tape the signals I get from each of >the three satellites. >Or course, I could be completely missing some neat feature of >DGPS. ... Any thoughts? I have read that GPS uses encryption to place time-dependent, location-dependent inaccuracies into the signals. Innacuracies small enough so they are not a problem for civilian navigation, (mostly) but large enough to prevent GPS from being a useful method of military targeting for anyone who does not hold the keys. Perhaps Ms. Denning is suggesting that the US feral government could act as a "trusted server" (and she has repeatedly suggested such trust) and tell us whether a GPS that "thinks" it's at some location, right now, is REALLY at some known location.

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DCSB: Gold Denominated Burmese Opium Futures?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston (Formerly The Boston Society for Digital Commerce) Presents Perry E. Metzger "Possible Futures: The Impact of Ubiquitous High Speed Networking on Intermediation and Regulation" or "With Spring Street Brewing shares trading on the web, are gold denominated Burmese opium futures inevitable?" *Monday*, May 6, 1996 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Perry Metzger is the President of Piermont Information Systems Inc., a consulting firm specializing in communications and computer systems security. He has worked for, or consulted to, the New York financial community for most of the last decade. He has been strongly involved with the Internet Engineering Task Force's security area for some time, and is the author of several security related RFCs. He is also the co-chair of the IETF's Simple Public Key Infrastructure working group, which is developing public key cryptographic standards for the internet. Networking technology is racing far ahead of culture. Fiber optics offer the possibility of cheap truly ubiquitous internet service in the tens of gigabits per second within the decade, and cheap high speed mobile connectivity is also likely. We will likely live in a world where anyone can sit in a park with a cheap laptop and communicate over a multi-megabit per second channel to any other civilized location on the planet. This development may radically change our culture, and with it the nature of regulation and intermediation in the marketplace. Although opium futures trading might not be inevitable, the scope of the trends we are facing should not be underestimated. Mr. Metzger will discuss these and similar developments; he will also discuss the limits to our ability to predict or alter the course such changes will take. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on *Monday*, May 6, 1996 from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $27.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have a jacket and tie dress code. Please note that this meeting is on *Monday* this month, due to a scheduling problem at the Harvard Club. We go back to meeting on the first Tuesday of the month in June. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, March 30, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston". If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Planned speakers for the following few months are: June Dan Shutzer FSTC July Pete Loshin Author, "Electronic Commerce" August Duane Hewitt Idea Futures We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, rah(a)shipwright.com . For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . Looking forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMWv8/PgyLN8bw6ZVAQGu/gQAkdtTIsK6rbboD6NRVjpZD8WFMXgZGlOB 5MA4znnY/XC6qNvVseRRq0wcPukNsGoQdCE8LwwqS2oWdyMXlWdUO7RK+CgCvOGj 48HjCVcgItM4V3BW9W5CM897zBWAwfcCkfbzngwuhzinu0MHWgPK/MMSFX73/dtH 2kg/41CA6MM= =Tfdk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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Digital Cash Escrow
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:14 PM 4/10/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >Of course, if you happen to become dead while you're storing it, >the paper cash is far more useful to your heirs, so I assume we'll have >a government-sponsored cash-escrow system announced soon to protect >the government's interest in collection of inheritance taxes... Don't give them ideas, Bill! They are known to monitor our list for insights into what to regulate next, and I can see the 15-watt lightbulbs going on over their heads as they ponder the wonderful opportunities presented by "digital cash escrow." --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: No matter where you go, there they are.
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:41 AM 4/10/96 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Anonymous writes: > > Location-based System Delivers User > Authentication Breakthrough > > By Dorothy E. Denning and Peter F. MacDoran > Copyright(c), 1996 - Computer Security Institute - All Rights Reserved > Top - Help > When I first started reading the paper I said to myself, "Ah, they are going to have a box that provides digitally signed GPS locations." I still think they might try that as plan "B". Combined with a password or biometrics to prevent unauthorized use of the box, they might have a useful, if limited, system. A few other practical problems with the system they DID describe that haven't been mentioned: (1) GPS doesn't work well near the walls of canyons. The positions reported can be off by a considerable distance. This problem probably also applies in the steel and glass canyons of cities. (2) Consumer grade GPS receivers have problems acquiring satalites in forested areas. The same problem probably will also occur in skyscrapers. Using your portable in some client's office will involve shoving an antenna out the non-openable window. With these problems, I just can't see GPS authentication being popular for the masses. For some military and industrial uses it may solve a real problem. Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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