December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: Yeo, Pea-brained Imbecile
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:15 PM 3/18/96 +0000, "Michael Peponis" <peponmc(a)fe3.rust.net> wrote: >Here is my two cents on the whole subject of countries wanting to recieve the >technical and economic benifits of the internet, but reject groups they have >moral or ethical problems with. ... >Given the plethera of reports like this, I will start maintaining a list of >country that will not be given access to my site, no FTP, no HTTP, no nothing, >on top of that, I will hard code into all the new versions of my network aware > programs to check for a domain subfix, if it is on of the black > list, the software will not function. .... >They want isolation, let them enjoy the full benifits of that decision. I've got the opposite view - I think it's worth making access to widespread parts of the Internet _easier_ for people from countries whose governments don't want their subjects\\\\\\\\citizens to access them. Aside from any good that can be accomplished by building, say, a Singapore Banned Religion/Politics web index (since Singapore's recently announced policy is to censor Usenet access but not http access, so auto-indexing newsgroups would work), any technology that makes it easier to work around censorship will be useful for Yankees who want to access controversial groups after Buchanan's elected (:-) One part of the problem is building convenient mirrors in free countries; another is building packet/mail/http/etc. laundries that can be easily ported to make it difficult to block access to _them_. Some of the Andrew File System approaches for the Zundelsite project were interesting, since it's harder to block access to widely supported back channels, and since it provides people with non-subversive reasons to support a relay site, they're more likely to be widespread and supported at sites that censors don't want to totally block. Now, building a blacklist of censorious _government_ sites, like *.gov.sg (or whatever) and blocking them is more interesting. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 pager 408-787-1281 # "At year's end, however, new government limits on Internet access threatened # to halt the growth of Internet use. [...] Government control of news media # generally continues to depend on self-censorship to regulate political and # social content, but the authorities also consistently penalize those who # exceed the permissable." - US government statement on China...

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Re: A MODEST PROPOSAL
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed Mar 20 1996 Sandy Sandfort wrote: : Having said that, I am totally put off by the gradiose and : devisive ravings of this commentator. During the Second World : War the Nazis required Jews in the occupied countries to wear a : yellow star of David to identify themselves. In Denmark, the : king so identified himself, and soon so did most of his subjects. Ohh pleeez!!, give YOUR ravings a rest Next you'll be raving about soap and lampshades made out of Jews. The story about the Danish King and the Yellow star is a famous wartime lie by the US. When Germany invaded Denmark and Norway, the king of Norway fled to London to continue resistance. The king of Denmark surrendered. Many in the US thought the Danish king was a coward. During the war the story about the yellow star was made up to make the king look better. For more details try out IHRs web site on http://www.kaiwan.com/~ihrgreg. A recent article from a British on-line newspaper:- The Electronic Telegraph Tuesday 29 August 1995 Denmark's resistance to Nazis 'is a myth' By John Keegan, Defence Editor DANISH resistance to German occupation during the Second World War is largely a myth, according to a leading historian. The civilian population was not involved in resistance and the celebrated rescue of Denmark's Jews from Nazi deportation was facilitated by the German occupiers themselves. Those caught assisting the Jews' escape were either not punished or else given nominal prison sentences. These astonishing claims were made by Prof Henning Poulsen, of Aarhus University, at a conference on "The Second World War as Myth and History" held in the Swedish Houses of Parliament. The conference was opened by the Swedish foreign minister, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, and closed by the speaker of the Swedish parliament, Birgitta Dahl. Prof Poulsen insisted that his views were not controversial, a view supported by another Danish professor. The official story of the resistance was, he said, no longer accepted by most young Danes, who found it exaggerated and boring. He reminded his audience of fellow historians from Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Russia, Canada and Germany that Denmark capitulated on the day of the German invasion, May 9, 1940, and was not treated by Germany as a conquered nation. The elected government remained in office and German officials belonging to the administration in Copenhagen made visits to Danish ministers, not vice versa. Danish political parties were allowed to function normally and to maintain democratic debate. The only limitation on their activities was that criticism of Germany was not permitted. The occupation remained a benign one. Werner Best, the SS officer representing the German foreign office, did not wear his black uniform and was not allowed by Himmler to use his high SS rank title. The foreign office was the agency chosen by Hitler to represent German power in Denmark during the occupation. After August 1943, when there were riots in Copenhagen following misbehaviour by German troops, conditions worsened, said Prof Poulsen. The Germans dissolved the elected government and imposed direct administration. Nevertheless, he said, the occupation remained a benign one. Danish civilian rations were more generous than those in Germany and when German police were called on to put down demonstrations in Danish cities they did so under the regulations governing police response to civil disorder in Germany. In his most sensational revelation, he said that the only concentration camp set up by the Germans on Danish soil, at Froesley, never held more than 4,000 inmates, 2,000 fewer than it was designed to contain. Denmark "won a war in which it had not taken part" It was administered by the Danish prison service and was the only concentration camp in the Nazi system where the German guards asked for the same food as the prisoners. It was ironic, Prof Poulsen said, that Denmark was included among the victor nations in 1945 by Britain, America and the Soviet Union. It had thus "won a war in which it had not taken part". Prof Poulsen conceded that there had been resistance in Denmark, but of a military, not civilian, character. By that he appeared to mean that sabotage operations against the Germans were the acts of unrepresentative groups, working in co-operation with the British Special Operations Executive, and did not represent the attitude of the majority of the population. Prof Poulsen's paper is likely to provoke argument, particularly in Britain, America and Israel, where the Danish success in arranging the escape of 95 per cent of the country's 7,000 Jews to neutral Sweden in September, 1943, is hailed as an example of what might have been achieved elsewhere had domestic populations shown the same determination. He suggested that the escape succeeded because the Germans did not try to prevent it and because the worst penalty visited on those fishermen who were caught after smuggling Jews abroad was three months' imprisonment.

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Mailing Lists
by crisper 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could anyone direct me to some other mailing lists dealing with either computer security or current communication technology, routers,modems etc. Thank you ahead of time. Also could anyone direct me to some good beginner books on cryptography of computer security. When referring books could you make them recent so that they would be regularly available at Barnes&Noble or Borders. Thanks

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Internet Information
by crisper 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Iwas wondering if anyone could pint me to a DETAILED description of the internet routing system. Basically how a message gets from my computer to another lets say in Europe. No need for simplicity I would like a real description. Dont worry abpout protocols just where my message goes. Also does anyone have a list of where the net's routers are located and who runs them. Also their respective routing speeds at the current times. Thank You ahead of time! crisper

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RC2 speed
by Eric Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a quick RC2 update, since I have not seen anything about it's speed on this list. I have implemented RC2 from the posting from Message-ID: <4fk39f$f70(a)net.auckland.ac.nz> in sci.crypt (This is the 'text' description of the algorithm). The following times are from C code using gcc 2.7.0 on a sparc 20 and cc on 'some old slow alpha box' sparc 20 Alpha rc4 4521k/s 3835k/s des cbc 993k/s 833k/s des ede3 cbc 370k/s 476k/s idea cbc 862k/s 726k/s rc2 cbc 975k/s 1083k/s Documentation I had seen previously about RC2 made the claim it was about 3 times faster than DES is software. From my times it appears to be of a similar speed (depending on the box). It as has been speculated that RC2 was origionally written for effiecent implementation on 16bit hardware, this could well be true, but for modern 32bit processors, it appears to have no real speed advantage over DES or IDEA. I'm mostly interested in RC2 because it is in the SSLv2 and S-MIME specifications :-). Any comments? eric PS If RC2 was implemented in assember, it would obviously be faster due to direct use of machine rotate instructions. I don't quite know how much this would speed things up but obviously the other algorithms would also benifit from hand coding. -- Eric Young | Signature removed since it was generating AARNet: eay(a)mincom.oz.au | more followups than the message contents :-)

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Re:
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:18 PM 3/20/96 -0500, owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com wrote: >Since someone other than Jim Bell and THE LIST OF SHAME author thought I >was being serious, I thought it wise to respond. For the record, I couldn't tell whether you were serious or not. (most other people seem to have assumed that you were serious...) Nevertheless, I replied, because I was afraid there were other people who were anxious to not take good advice merely because they didn't like the source. If anything, I would say the other notes you received make it clear that my concern was justified. >The notion that a measure of criticism from a known enemy, Dorothy >Denning, corrects the many problems with Leahy's legislation is absurd. True. But it was apparently received without negative comment by a number of people who would also have "proudly" put their name on this nameless character's "list of shame." For one, I don't really appreciate the pillorying of some of the names on that list, either, but there are a number of facts which bother me about this whole Leahy bill incident: 1. The bill seems to be without fingerprints on it. Nobody (other than Leahy, of course) has claimed that he had input into it. Denning's recent comment at least implies that either she had no input, or was strongly dissatisfied at the eventual bill. (Despite this, there are plenty of "legitimate needs of law enforcement" clauses in that bill, and it is not conceivable that she wouldn't have been consulted if the author of the bill had any sympathy for the anti-encryption side.) Likewise, nobody on "our side" has made the fact of their input known, whether or not that input did any good. The question, therefore, is "Who knew what and when?" Who was consulted? What were their objections? What objections weren't satisfied? Since the bill at least superficially addresses some of our concerns, SOMEBODY must have told Leahy what we want. Who? 2. I haven't seen any analysis of this bill other than Peter Junger's, even and especially from some people and organizations that originally came out in favor of it. If anything, those people would be expected to be defending their positions, but they've not backed up that early support with anything close to a believable position. (Most are silent.) The implication is that they had no such early analysis done, and came out in favor of the bill anyway. Worse, they aren't correcting their position based on the more detailed study that has been done subsequently. 3. Because she's a negative barometer, Denning knows that a positive review by her would be as close as she could do to give the "kiss of death" to this bill. Her putative opposition is, therefore, far more interesting to us. If anything, it gives us a marvelous opportunity to ensure the death of a bad bill. I'm waiting for somebody to explain to me why we can't simply re-write the Leahy bill, take out all the bad parts and put a number of new protections in, and send it back to Leahy and condition our support on that edited bill. If Leahy really thinks he's doing a favor for the pro-encryption people, he'll support the corrected bill wholeheartedly. If, on the other hand, it's all just a fraud, there's no hope, and in that case it's better than no bill be passed than one that contains a few booby-traps that will explode shortly after the bill is passed. As far as I can see, time is on our side. Industry will continue to insist on free export of encryption, and there will be few in Congress to oppose it. We already have the 1st amendment which SHOULD defend encryption, unless that protection is implicitly weakened by allowing a precent for the control of encryption. In other words, we're going to win in a year or so regardless of this Leahy bill, so we can afford to be hard-nosed with our support or lack of it. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: IPG message
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[IPG legal nonsense deleted] > 1. The use of the word Ultima for the system, because it is > impossible to have a either a more secure system - it is > impossible to break the Ultima system, other equally difficult > to break systems may exist, or may be formulated in the future, > for example a true OTP, and in those cases, they may > "theoretically" be more difficult to break than the IPG Ultima > System, for example a true OTP. However, that would exist only in > theory, because in those eventiualities, none of the > systems would be breakable. I wonder what Lord British (of the famed Ultima computer game series) would have to say about the trademark of this name? (Not to mention the incredible run-on sentence...) The more I read their prose, the more I think that they must be experimenting with ergotic chemistry on the side. | Remember: Life is not always champagne. Sometimes it is REAL pain. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Dorothy Denning attacks Leahy's crypto bill
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I may have to adjust my position on Leahy's bill. Any legislation that Dorothy Denning attacks so virulently must be worth passing. -Declan ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 19 Mar 96 14:53:35 EST From: denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning) To: farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu March 14, 1996 The Honorable Patrick Leahy United States Senate Russell Building, Room 433 1st and C Streets, NE Washington, DC 20510 Dear Senator Leahy: As author, scholar, lecturer, researcher, and consultant to the government and industry in cryptography and information security, I am concerned that S.1587, the "Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1996," is not in balance with society's needs. By removing practically all export controls on encryption, the bill will make it far easier for criminals, terrorists, and foreign adversaries to obtain and use encryption that is impenetrable by our government. The likely effect will be to erode the ability of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to carry out their missions. This is not consistent with your own findings in the bill which recognize the need for a "national encryption policy that advances the development of the national and global information infrastructure, and preserves Americans' right to privacy and the Nation's public safety and national security." I am concerned that the proposed legislation responds only to a loud cry for assistance and is not the reasoned and practiced position of our multinational corporations. At the International Cryptography Institute, which I chaired in September 1994 and 1995, our discussions did not find that this unrestricted distribution of encryption technology was required to satisfy business objectives. Our corporations recognize the need to respect the legitimate interests of governments and the need for encryption methods that use "key escrow" or "trusted third parties" with data recovery capabilities to protect their own information assets. Businesses are moving in the direction of key escrow, and key escrow is becoming a standard feature of commercial products. I have recently summarized the features of thirty products and proposals for key escrow in a taxonomy which I developed with Dennis Branstad. Because of the need to address information security at an international level, the Organization for Economic Cooperation Development, through its Committee for Information, Computer, and Communications Policy, is bringing together the international business community and member governments to develop encryption policy guidelines that would respect the interests of businesses, individuals, and governments. In support of that objective, the INFOSEC Business Advisory Group (IBAG), an association of associations representing the information security interests of users, issued a statement of principles recognizing the needs of governments, industry, and individuals, and supporting approaches based on trusted third parties. A similar statement was issued by a quadripartite group consisting of EUROBIT (European Association of Manufacturers of Business Machines and Information Technology Industry), ITAC (Information Technology industry Association of Canada), ITI (Information Technology Industry Council, U.S.), and JEIDA (Japan Electronic Industry Development Association), which accounts for more than 90% of the worldwide revenue in information technology. X/Open is pursuing a public key infrastructure project aimed at creating specifications and possibly operating manuals that could be used in conformance testing and site accreditation of trusted parties. The European Commission has proposed a project to establish a European-wide network of trusted parties that would be accredited to offer services that support digital signatures, notarization, confidentiality, and data integrity. The trust centers, which would be under the control of member nations, would hold keys that would enable them to assist the owners of data with emergency decryption or supply keys to their national authorities on production of a legal warrant. Within the U.S., the Clinton Administration is developing federal standards for key escrow encryption (these are in addition to and more general than the original Clipper standard, FIPS 185), adopting escrowed encryption within the federal government, and liberalizing export controls on encryption products that include an acceptable system of key escrow. The Administration's policy has considerable flexibility, allowing for both hardware and software implementations, classified and unclassified algorithms, and government and private sector key holders. Some companies have submitted products for review under the liberalized export controls for key escrow encryption. Trusted Information Systems has already received approval for their Gauntlet firewall. Industry is also developing cryptographic application programming interfaces (CAPIs), which will facilitate the inclusion of cryptographic services in applications, networks, and operating systems. This approach, recently demonstrated by Microsoft, will allow U.S. software companies to develop exportable applications and systems that run with separate security modules. These modules can provide either domestic grade encryption or exportable encryption. The impact of export controls will thus be limited to those companies selling encryption modules, not the entire U.S. hardware and software industry. Even this impact can be made negligible by allowing companies to export security modules with strong encryption where the keys are held with escrow agents in the purchaser's country. Bilateral mutual assistance agreements could ensure that U.S. law enforcement agencies are able to obtain decryption assistance if the exported module is used in a crime against the U.S. CAPIs are providing the technological base for experiments under the International Cryptography Experiment (ICE), an informal international alliance of individuals and organizations working together to promote the international use of encryption within import and export regulations that respect law enforcement and national security interests. As these examples illustrate, businesses and governments are working hard to establish policies and technologies that respect the needs of users, industry, and governments in the furtherance of a secure global information infrastructure. Considerable progress has been made during the past year. The export provisions in S.1587 are likely to undermine those efforts by satisfying the immediate export demands of a few U.S. companies at the expense of other stakeholders and society at large. It will undermine the ability of governments worldwide to fight global organized crime and terrorism. Although some U.S. companies have lost sales because of export controls on encryption, the overall impact of these controls on the U.S. information technology industry as a whole is much less clear. In the most comprehensive study of export controls to date, the Department of Commerce and National Security Agency found that in all but three countries surveyed, sources indicated that U.S. market share (about 75% overall) was keeping pace with overall demand. Most of the impact was found to be on the sale of security-specific products, which account for only a small percentage of the total market, rather than general-purpose software products. Sales of security-specific products are generally few and mostly to customers within the country where the product originates. Visits to 50 computer and software stores in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, S. Korea, Thailand, and the U.K. found that all the general-purpose software products with encryption were from U.S. manufacturers. The study concluded that "the impact of U.S. export controls on the international market shares of general-purpose products is probably negligible" and that "the export licensing process itself is not a major obstacle to U.S. competitiveness." This is in stark contrast to the dire prediction of the Computer Systems Policy Project that U.S. industry stands to lose $30-60 billion in revenues by the year 2000 because of export controls. The Commerce/NSA study did acknowledge that the existence of foreign products claiming strong encryption could have a negative effect on U.S. competitiveness. However, by allowing encryption services to be sold separately from the applications software that uses them, CAPIs will make it extremely unlikely that general-purpose software will be substantially effected by export controls. Even security-specific products, which are a growing industry, can use CAPIs to separate out the encryption component from the main product (e.g., firewall). Moreover, if keys can be held in other countries under appropriate bilateral agreements as noted earlier, export controls need not substantially impact encryption products. Export controls are often blamed for the lack of security in our public infrastructure. The Commerce/NSA study found "little evidence that U.S. export controls have had a negative effect on the availability of products in the U.S. marketplace," although they "may have hindered incorporation of strong encryption algorithms in some domestic mass-market, general-purpose products." There are many factors which have played an even larger role in the general lack of security we find on the Internet: the high cost and low demand for security, the difficulty of designing systems that are secure, pressure to bring new products to market before their security implications are understood, the willingness of users to take risks in favor of acquiring new tools and services, and lack of a public key infrastructure to support encryption on a national and international basis. Many systems are so riddled with security holes that any would-be attacker can gain access to the system itself, and from there access to plaintext data and keys. Malicious code can be injected into a victim's system through electronic mail, documents, images, and web browsers; once there, it can transmit sensitive data back to its owner. Keyboard sniffers can capture a user's keystrokes before they are ever encrypted. Thus, while export controls have played a part in the slow integration of strong encryption into software and systems, they are not responsible for most of the security vulnerabilities we see today. Moreover, most of these vulnerabilities are remedied with non-cryptographic controls (e.g., process confinement, trusted systems engineering, biometrics, and location-based authentication) or with cryptographic techniques for authentication, data integrity, and non-repudiation, which are exempt from State Department export controls. I do not mean to suggest that encryption is not important. In fact, it is essential to protect against certain threats. However, it must be kept in perspective. The use of encryption for confidentiality protection is but one small, albeit important, piece of an information security program. The provisions is S.1587 regarding trusted key holders could have the benefit of increasing public trust in key holders. However, I have some concern that the current provisions may be overly restrictive. Thus far, we have practically no experience with the operation of third party key holders and the circumstances under which they will be called upon to provide keys or decryption assistance. It will be extremely important that the provisions allow enough flexibility to accommodate legitimate use of the data recovery services of key holders for criminal investigations, civil litigation, and intelligence operations. The liability risks to key holders should not be onerous. The definition of key holder and exact wording in the bill may also need some refinement in order to accommodate existing and proposed methods of trusted third party encryption. Encryption policy is a difficult and often emotional issue. It is important that Congress work closely with the Administration, industry, and other interested parties to develop the best legislative strategy for promoting information security on the national and global information infrastructure without diminishing the ability of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to protect the public safety and national security. Export liberalization should proceed cautiously, tied to key escrow or other methods that accommodate the needs of the government as well as those of users and industry. The Administration's plans to liberalize export controls on software key escrow is a good next step. As trust and confidence in key escrow grows, the export of virtually unlimited strength encryption systems may be possible. Because export controls are our only lever for controlling the spread of encryption, they should be used to their full advantage. Decisions to liberalize these controls must be fully informed by classified national security information as well as by economic analysis and market studies. Law enforcement agencies are encountering encryption with ever greater frequency. Within a few years, the successful execution of practically all court-ordered intercepts and searches and seizures is likely to depend on their ability to decrypt communications and stored information. If the encryption cannot be broken, it could be impossible to successfully investigate or prosecute those cases. Crimes of terrorism and white collar crime, including fraud, embezzlement, and money laundering, would be facilitated and perhaps impossible to solve. Even crimes of economic espionage, which often involve insiders with access to company secrets, are facilitated with encryption. It will be important for Congress to closely monitor the impact of encryption on law enforcement and use that information to guide any encryption legislation. In summary, our national policy can and must promote the legitimate use of strong encryption for information protection without unnecessarily hindering the ability of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to do their jobs. In so doing, the policy can accommodate reasonable liberalization of export controls and business objectives without undermining other national objectives. Such a policy is consistent with your own guiding principle for the bill: "Encryption is good for American business and good business for Americans." But it goes further in order to be equally guided by the principle that law and order and national security are essential for the American economy and the American people. It is not necessary to so radically lift export controls on encryption in order to accommodate both principles. I will be pleased to meet with you and the committee for comment and questioning, or to assist in any way I can with the development of a balanced approach to encryption legislation. Yours respectfully, Dr. Dorothy E. Denning Professor of Computer Sciences Georgetown University denning(a)cs.georgetown.edu http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/~denning

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unsubsrcribe
by thrdina＠ibm.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How can I unsubsribe from this mailing list? From: THOMAS HRDINA Manager - Networks Bank of Nova Scotia New York Agency E-mail: thrdina(a)ibm.net Date: 03/20/96 Time: 20:00:07

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Re: IPG cracked with known plaintext
by Ted Garrett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 05:32 PM 3/19/96 GMT, you wrote: >First let us describe the IPG system in more conventional C: [snip] >So this algorithm is easily broken with known plaintext. I seem to remember some sales named daemon stating that if anyone could break their system, the prize would be the company. I imagine that the continuing rants from IPG are a means of devaluing the company beyond it's already measly worth, thus making the company unworth claiming. It's obvious that the system has been trivially broken after a day and a half of being semi-published. Is there any other point to this? I could as easily generate an OTP pulling pages at random from the New England Journal Of Medicine or the Microsoft Visual C++ Programmer's Guide and XORing the text with my plaintext... But that still leaves me in the cipher.obscurity = cipher.security realm, doesn't it? Think we could sell it??? Of course, as long as it was someone else choosing the pages, I could trust it, right? (Damn, which smiley is it for sarcasm?) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMVCqic1+l8EKBK5FAQHLsgf/SnREwZgJa+mDGgeBi5GsMMyBxheWz0n2 Gl6CfPJ8KlSo80a4o+uQEXXVOw4di0T2zC4swXA8OJ0IvtOaIV0fYSYU0fpjZ4JG yxAfcg/NDkbP6G8WBUC/29JG4p29EyKsZHDVu68SNlyJp6BqWCzBa5WSRrtPd0b7 NLwAnMozdYpV67Q7/uldddm5esIESxHJduCumqlvmOWcP/n3T4IL/B4O9RhC6wXJ 2wa3QO7OMqugl/vJ7WwDLhCDqaHwVDF+wC4r8T25E0LrFuEEFO39otOIebVZF1y6 o16M+UoDZzxASmSTUcyNsT1GohF4ZgSS5FODYGgMYAc/CDzE6jQq1Q== =TVwd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ted Garrett <teddygee(a)visi.net> http://www.visi.net/~teddygee "Those who desire to give up Freedom in order to gain Security will not have, nor do they deserve, either one." Thomas Jefferson

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