December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

What can the judge do to me?
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An unnamed cypherpunk asked: > I was just wondering how/if [International Union] fit[s] in with frequent >claim 'the judge can throw away the key' if he wants...... c'punks - I've been involved in a private discussion with a list reader about the extent to which courts can impose contempt fines and sanctions. I thought I would post the results to the list as many have expressed interest in the ways that courts might try to compel production of crypto keys or compel offshore e-cash institutions. The bulk of my answer follows. The key to limiting the ability of a court to summarily enter contempt sanctions has always been the classification of the sanctions. "Criminal" sanctions, may entitle the witness to a trial by jury. "For 'serious' criminal contempts involving imprisonment of more than six months, these [procedural] protections include the right to jury trial. " International Union, United Mine Workers of America, et al. v. Bagwell et al., 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1993)(hereinafter, International Union)(citing Bloom, 391 U.S., at 199; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495, 41 L. Ed. 2d 897, 94 S. Ct. 2697 (1974)). "Civil" sanctions do not require such protections and can be imposed on the spot and without review. "...civil contempt sanctions, or those penalties designed to compel future compliance with a court order, are considered to be coercive and avoidable through obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard. Neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required." International Union, supra. The court in International Union also makes a distinction between "direct" and "indirect" contempts. "Direct contempts that occur in the court's presence may be immediately adjudged and sanctioned summarily." International Union, supra. These would certainly include refusing to reveal non-privileged information on the stand, and may include the refusal to reveal the passphrase to a crypto key while on the stand. The court also recognizes that the indefinite confinement option is available to judges. Specifically, "[t]he paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction, as set forth in Gompers, involves confining a contemnor _indefinitely_ until he complies with an affirmative command such as an order "to pay alimony, or to surrender property ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to make a conveyance." International Union, supra (emphasis added)(citing Gompers, 221 U.S., at 442). See also, McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64, 83 L. Ed. 1108, 59 S. Ct. 685 (1939) (failure to testify). Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370, n. 6, 16 L. Ed. 2d 622, 86 S. Ct. 1531 (1966) (upholding as civil "a determinate 24 month sentence which includes a purge clause"). My favorite language from the court defining such sanctions is this: "In these circumstances, the contemnor is able to purge the contempt and obtain his release by committing an affirmative act, and thus "carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket." International Union, supra (citing Gompers, 221 U.S., at 442, quoting In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 451 (1902)). The court goes on: "A contempt fine accordingly is considered civil and remedial if it either 'coerces the defendant into compliance with the court's order, [or] . . . compensates the complainant for losses sustained.'" International Union, supra (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-304). And, "Where a fine is not compensatory, it is civil only if the contemnor is afforded an opportunity to purge." International Union, supra, (citing Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590, 91 L. Ed. 1117, 67 S. Ct. 918 (1947)). And on per diem fines, "Like civil imprisonment, such fines exert a constant coercive pressure, and once the jural command is obeyed, the future, indefinite, daily fines are purged." International Union, supra. The court makes a point to justify severe sanctions where testimony is sought, or the proceedings are threatened. "The necessity justification for the contempt authority is at its pinnacle, of course, where contumacious conduct threatens a court's immediate ability to conduct its proceedings, such as where a witness refuses to testify, or a party disrupts the court... [t]hus, petty, direct contempts in the presence of the court traditionally have been subject to summary adjudication, 'to maintain order in the courtroom and the integrity of the trial process in the face of an 'actual obstruction of justice.'" International Union, supra (quoting Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S., at 513 and citing numerous other sources). Most interesting to the crypto crowd: "Contempts such as failure to comply with document discovery, for example, while occurring outside the court's presence, impede the court's ability to adjudicate the proceedings before it and thus touch upon the core justification for the contempt power.... Similarly, indirect contempts involving discrete, readily ascertainable acts, _such as turning over a key_ or payment of a judgment, properly may be adjudicated through civil proceedings since the need for extensive, impartial fact-finding is less pressing." International Union, supra (emphasis added). Hence, International Union preserves very broad contempt sanctions which can be imposed without much review provided they fall into a rather wide "civil" categorization, rather than a "criminal" one. I think it's clear, the court literally spells this out, that holding a witness indefinitely until he complies with court orders is within the discretion of a judge. Compelling through sanctions the production of a "key" (though I'm not sure a crypto key is directly contemplated) is likewise clearly permitted. --- My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information

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Calvin and Hobbes
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:14 AM 4/12/96, Adam Shostack wrote: > Snow Crash is a book about a future in which governments are >ineffective. Companies run things, and have complete local control. >The world has gone to hell, and as a result, life is nasty, poor, >brutish and short. Many people do not look forward to this world. Reminds me of a good joke I heard about the comic strip "Calvin and Hobbes" (Calvin is a little boy, Hobbes is his stuffed toy tiger, who only Calvin can see is alive). Why is Calvin so much like Hobbes? He's nasty, brutish, and short. (I heard this from Chip Morningstar...I don't know where he heard it, or if perchance he invented it.) --Tim Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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PGPCrack
by Mark M. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have written a UNIX program that will brute-force crack a PGP conventionally encrypted file using a dictionary of passphrases. I am working on making it possible to break secret keys also. If you have any suggestions or bug reports, feel free to e-mail them to me. The URL is: http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/pgpcrack5b.tar.gz The MD5 hash of this file is 46aa9e37020ac2efce73d870fe1acbdc. - -- Mark =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= markm(a)voicenet.com | finger -l for PGP key 0xf9b22ba5 http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/ | bd24d08e3cbb53472054fa56002258d5 "The concept of normalcy is just a conspiracy of the majority" -me -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMW6j0LZc+sv5siulAQETGAQAnKr1n/OnWS6CpQqTQSRAJhTTCkq1zP8N l0QZYKrvO9i3EE0uXYF88EIXludrXq2mzEZCOeh4vjF0Ym8KEc82gUdRwAfxPxTU YxHylDI56PdvgLwRBAoBiGTaUZwajM+sEtvJaH1fYshPR7neTF+Aw3YL+cMQ/iQt PMFKXEM9GWQ= =fgA8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Protocols at the Point of a Gun
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:48 4/11/96, Timothy C. May wrote: >As required by the CDA (Competency Disclosure Act) my Ignorance bit is set >to "1" for this speculation. > >At 11:03 PM 4/10/96, Lucky Green wrote: > >>If my computer creates the IP packet, what is there to prevent me from >>modifying the value of the "Minor/Adult" flag at my leisure? > >Are the "minor/adult" settings (and Christian/Atheist, Southern >Baptist/Reformed Baptist, Creationist/Evolutionist, etc. bits) even be >proposed to be set at the IP packet level? Yup. Sen. Exon and this staff demand that IP be redesigned to include such a flag. No doubt, we'll soon hear about demands to include a male/female flag, a cast flag (there go another two bits), a flag for meat eater/vegetarian, a flag indicating your HIV status, one they get going, the sky is the limit. >I'd've thought it would be at the message level, such as this message or a >posting to Usenet. (Granted, many messages are presumably the same as IP >messages. But I'd assume that the setting would be within the message, so >that any forwarder of the packet would not be likely to tamper with >internal message settings....) Sure. Access control belongs into the application layer, or somewhere nearby. The problem is that those in power wouldn't know a modem if it bit them in the ass. Expect legislation that mandates routers to support the various flags in the near future. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: No matter where you go, there they are.
by Paul_Koning/US/3Com%3COM＠smtp1.isd.3com.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>While we may disagree with Ms. Denning on a number of political matters, >she's quite intelligent; I suspect the paper is well-founded. Yes, that was my initial reaction too, but the content just don't support that. I suspect this is a case of a person well-qualified in one area (crypto) working in very different area (GPS) where she is not qualified and does not understand what is going on. >GPS receivers are line-of-sight only; only a small portion of the earth can >see the same satellites. Well, sort of. The satellites are up at 11,000 miles, which makes for a large footprint. You'd certainly see most of the same satellites from several states away. >It might be possible to seperately record the signals from several >different satellites, delay them each just the right amount of time, and >then recombine them to simulate being at another nearby location (within >several hundred miles). Right, that's what several of us have been saying. >However, this might not be possible. Examine the >following quote from Denning's paper: > >:The location signature is virtually impossible to forge at the >:required accuracy. This is because the GPS observations at any given time >:are essentially unpredictable to high precision due to subtle satellite >:orbit perturbations, which are unknowable in real-time, and intentional >:signal instabilities (dithering) imposed by the U.S. Department of Defense >:selective availability (SA) security policy. Sure, but that is nonsense. Here's why. The time delay you need to introduce a 200 mile shift is 1 ms. The effects Denning et al. are talking about are LOW FREQUENCY effects. This is obvious for orbital perturbations, since we're talking about small motions of large heavy objects here, and it is also true for the S/A dither. Indeed it has to be that way, since any high frequency jitter would prevent the receiver from locking on the spread spectrum code that's at the core of how GPS works. In other words, at the millisecond level, none of those effects exist. Re Hal's comments: >Note however that Denning did not mention the Internet in her spiel. > >I believe her method would be workable across lower latency networks, if such >exist or eventually exist. Perhaps direct connections or leased lines would >provide low enough latency; I don't know. In any case networks are likely >to become faster in the future and her method might eventually work. >Actually the issue is not just latency but whether the latency can be >lied about, and for some kinds of networks that would be harder. What a checking system actually observes is: at time T2 it receives a message that claims to have been generated at time T1 by a system at location X. It would accept the authentication as valid if the elapsed time T2-T1 is small enough to be believable. How small this is depends on (a) the transmission latency, (b) the processing delay in X and in the checker. There are two flavors of attack on this: 1. Attacker Y uses the real-time signals from the satellites, delayed as needed. It sends those after processing, just as X would have done (except that X doesn't insert the processing delay). The elapsed time seen by the checker differs from the case of X by the sum of the processing delay and the incremental transmission latency (since Y is at a different place than X, so its connection to the checker may have either less or more latency). This fools the checker if the incremental latency is within its tolerance. Suppose that I'm using a LAN -- in that case a transmit delay on the order of 1 ms is plausible. X and Y would be about the same (of course it has hard for Y to get on the LAN unobserved...). If X is less than 20 miles away, the processing delay is under 100 microseconds, which is "in the noise". If I'm in a WAN, then the latency is likely to be greater, but even if is is 1 ms, I can be many miles away before it becomes obvious. The above of course assumes that the signal processing is done in hardware (or fast DSP) so it can indeed be done in well under 1 ms. Not a big deal... That seems to be one Denning mistake, the thinking only of replay in the sense of long delayed spoofing messages. 2. Attacker Y synchronizes to the satellites but constructs a signal locally that effectively "anticipates" what the satellite is about to send. This allows it to get the effect of a negative delay (thus avoiding the "node in the ground" problem). Since the signal is entirely predictable at the few-ms level, this is not difficult, though it requires a bit more effort than the simple delay approach. This way Y can construct a signal acceptable to the checker, even if its transmit latency to the checker is greater than it is for X. It simply anticipates by the difference plus whatever it needs to fake the position. Finally... As Hal also pointed out, if the system allows users to have partial sky view, then the attacker can avoid the need for negative delays entirely by selecting satellites closer to him than to the legitimate user. For anyone interested in an intro to GPS, Trimble (one of the leading companies in the industry) puts out some skinny paperbacks with nice clear explanations. They sometimes are a bit at the "see Spot run" level, but they do have the correct story. paul !----------------------------------------------------------------------- ! Paul Koning, NI1D, C-24183 ! 3Com Corporation, 1-3A, 118 Turnpike Road, Southborough MA 01772 USA ! phone: +1 508 229 1695, fax: +1 508 490 5873 ! email: paul_koning(a)isd.3com.com or paul_koning(a)3mail.3com.com ! Pgp: 27 81 A9 73 A6 0B B3 BE 18 A3 BF DD 1A 59 51 75 !----------------------------------------------------------------------- ! "Be wary of strong drink. It can make you shoot at tax collectors ! -- and miss!" ! -- Robert A. Heinlein, "The Notebooks of Lazarus Long" ! in "Time Enough for Love"

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Re: Scientologists may subpoena
by me＠muddcs.cs.hmc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Scott Binkley writes: > What if we set up a chaining remailing system in as many countries as > possible, all working in double blind > mode. You could have it randomly pick 20 or so remailers before actually > sending the message to its destination. > > That isn't a very clean method, but would sure slow down the process of > obtaining court orders in each respective country. This is true. We definitely could use more remailers outside the US. Especially since we all know that if you have enough money, you can get away with murd^H^H^H^Hanything in this country,possibly even getting access to remailer records. > I have this other idea, but it would be difficult to set up. Again, with > many many remailers, you could set it up, so that > any message you send is sent to a random FTP site of the day. Each of > the remailers randomly picks messages out > of the pool at the FTP site, and sends it on its way (all is encrypted of > course). At the end of the day, the FTP site is > erased, and a new one is set up somewhere else (all remailers would then > scan there). > > The beauty is that when a remailer pulls a message out of the FTP site, > it has no idea where the message came from, nor which > remailer (country) sent it there (providing the pooled messages have had > the return addresses removed). This would make it > very difficult to track down to the source. > > The disadvantage is that it requires cooperation between remailers, and > that a message cannot be replied to. Some of the cypherpunk remailers already sort of do this. However, the only thing it really does is make it a little harder to do traffic analysis. The main problem with your scheme is that all of the remailers would have access to the final destination of the message. The best method is still to use a randomly selected group of remailers for each anonymous message, and change your reply block on your nym often. me -- Michael Elkins <me(a)cs.hmc.edu> http://www.cs.hmc.edu/~me PGP key fingerprint = EB B1 68 32 3F B5 54 F9 6C AF 4E 94 5A EB 90 EC

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Re: Protocols at the Point of a Gun
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Should this nonsense of adding "Adult bit" to IP headers actually be implemented, I will sponser a contest: A free emailed "Thanks" to the first person who (truefully) reports that an Adult Internet access username and password has been posted (or scrawled on the bathroom wall) at a US high school. Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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CDA Court Challenge: Update #6
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CDA Challenge, Update #6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- By Declan McCullagh / declan(a)well.com / Redistribute freely ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- In this update: BYU/CMU's Dan Olsen's net-censorship boondoggle ACLU's 4/9 motion to suppress obscene images -- DENIED The new "I am a child" Internet protocol Who cares about kids: Who are the adults? Olsen as an expert witness -- on what? April 11, 1996 PITTSBURGH, PA -- The U.S. Department of Justice wants to split the worldwide Internet into "adult" and "minor" sections. That's their plan, assuming they can find someone to testify that this audacious boondoggle is even remotely feasible under current technology. If the DoJ gets this testimony in the record, then their attorneys will argue that the Communications Decency Act is constitutional and should be upheld. Well, they found their man. The Justice Department stoolie who's testifying tomorrow is none other than Dan R. Olsen, Jr., the incoming director of the Human Computer Interaction Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, now the head of the computer science department at Brigham Young University. Olsen concocted this scheme that he calls L18, for "Less than 18." Under it, every net-user must label every USENET post, email message, FTP site file, web page, chat room, IRC channel -- any collection of public bits spewed on the Net -- if the content is "inappropriate for minors." If you think you're clever 'cuz you labeled some "indecent" materials as suitable for kids, guess again, pal. Try that trick and the Feds'll throw your ass in jail for two years and send you a bill for $250,000. (Owners of anonymous remailers might be for in some surprise visits from the Feds if their systems are used to post "indecent" stuff that's labeled L18.) The censorhappy geeks at Brigham Young University put together a demo to prove that this scheme works. First Olsen stuck L18 tags on half his web pages. Then they set up a "Netscape proxy server" so it denied access to pages with L18 tags unless the user was verified as an adult. The experiment was a success -- and a hit with the DoJ! By now cybersavvy readers are wondering: "But how will a server know how old a user is?" The DoJ has a couple ideas that they're going to throw at the three-judge panel in Philadelphia tomorrow. The government's idea seems to be that if the judges accept even one of them, they'll uphold the CDA. The DoJ's proposals are: 1. Servers with "indecent material" will register users as adults or minors. 2. Every ISP will tag accounts as adults or minors. 3. A custom router will only allow users to access "indecent" sites if an adult types in the password first. Olsen's Grand Design for the Net incorporates Proposal #1. He's pushing the idea that web servers or proxy servers with "indecent" material will give out "adult verification passwords" before you can access their web page. This means: * A lengthy pre-registration process before you can access the site. * The server has to keep a database with the identities of all the adult users, complete with the credit card numbers that presumably will be used for verification. * If you want to access hundreds of web sites with "indecent" material, you've got to get hundreds of different passwords. If you run a web site with material that a Federal prosecutor anywhere in the U.S. may find "indecent" or "patently offensive," under Olsen's plan you have to verify that your users are adults. Somehow, I don't expect overseas sites will go for this. What, doesn't the DoJ realize that we're not just talking about the U.S. here? +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ ACLU'S MOTION TO SUPRESS OBSCENE IMAGES -- DENIED! +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ It's not about cybercensorship. It's about cybersex. At least that's what the DoJ wants everyone to believe. Justice Department attorneys have been flooding the court with printouts of hundreds of pages of dirty pictures, a lot of them pretty damn raunchy. Some of them might even be "obscene" -- that is, they fall into a legal class of images that flunk a three-part test that includes only images without "serious literary, artistic, social, political, or scientific value." Pretty hardcore stuff. GIFs like coeds fraternizing with german shepherds -- with the help of 25' of rubber tubing and a Tibetan yak. On April 9, the ACLU/EFF plaintiffs filed a motion to close the floodgates on the DoJ's deluge of porn, asking that the government be barred from introducing exhibits "unless they believe in good faith the material could not be prosecuted under existing obscenity or child pornography laws." The idea behind this motion was to educate the court and remind them that the CDA outlaws "indecency," not "obscenity." EFF attorney Mike Godwin explains the difference in his forthcoming book _Cyber Rights_: The term "indecency," although never defined by Congress or the courts, is a far broader concept than "obscenity" (examples of "indecency" include George Carlin's famous "Seven Dirty Words" monologues, at least some portions of Howard Stern's radio broadcasts, and, according to one court, the text of Allen Ginsberg's "Howl"). Not one of our plaintiffs has "obscene" or even titillating pictures on our web sites, but all of us are subject to a $250,000 fine and two years in prison if a minor stumbles across our URL. Yesterday the court denied our motion, saying that it understood that we weren't challenging obscenity laws and that, unlike the situation that might occur if there were a jury, the judges would not be prejudiced by any pictures introduced. The court ruled *they* were capable of understanding the difference, so there was no need to separate the materials. They did admit that we had raised an important issue, and the court understood the reason for the motion. I guess we have to trust them. +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ THE NEW "I AM A CHILD" INTERNET PROTOCOL +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ There's a second way to answer the question of: "How do you know who the children are?" Another option the DoJ appears to be pushing -- we'll know details tomorrow -- is this idea of reprogramming every computer on the worldwide Internet to run software that tags users as adults or minors, so a server will know whether it can send out "indecent" material. This shifts the burden of establishing age-identity from the content provider to the business or school giving out the Internet account. It also would allow any unscrupulous net.lurker to troll for "I am a child" tags and follow them back to the originating site -- not exactly the best way to protect the children! I should have realized this DoJ strategy earlier. Last week when I was arguing with Bruce Taylor, an architect of the CDA, we went 'round and 'round on the issue of children on the Net. He maintained that every Internet user has to have an account somewhere, so the provider of that account can tag the user as a minor or adult. I asked Taylor how his proposal was possible with the TCP/IP protocol -- the nerve system the carries all the data flowing through the Net. He replied that technical problems can be solved by technical people, and wasn't there a new protocol being developed, anyway? Basically, his position was: "Your side comes across to the court as saying that it can be done but we won't do it. You're a bunch of geeks who want to protect their porn and the court isn't going to buy it." The "new protocol" being developed is IP Version 6, which the DoJ zoomed in on in cross-examination of one of our witnesses, Scott Bradner from the Internet Engineering Task Force: 13 Q Would it be fair to say, to summarize what you've just 14 said, that the IP Next Generation group is working on a new 15 generation of the IP Protocol itself? 16 A That is correct. 17 Q Does it have -- does the IP Next Generation group have 18 recommendations regarding a specific architecture of the 19 packet traffic on the Internet, including the format of the 20 packet? The DoJ is going to argue that IPv6 can include such an adult/minor tag in each datagram. Chris Hansen, the head of the ACLU's legal team, says: Olsen is going to push this tagging idea that the government has, that you can imbed in your tag -- in your address -- an adult or minor tag. They're going to suggest that the market will come into existence that will make that tagging relevant. It's more like the *judicial penalties* will evolve to make the tagging not just relevant, but mandatory! On the cypherpunks list, Bill Frantz, a computer consultant, outlines one problem: One of the migration paths suggested for IPV4 to IPV6 migration is to tunnel IPV4 packets within IPV6 packets. IPV4 packets do not provide for an adult/minor tag, so until the transition to IPV6 is fairly well along, this approach will be ineffective. If the people who are worried about minor's accessing smut want something this century, they should go with PICS. A member of the IETF replies: Neither, for that matter, do IPv6 packets -- there is no provision for them. Furthermore, were anyone to create an end to end header of that sort, it would be eight bytes of wasted space in every packet in the net, especially since the implementation of such a tag is a technical impossibility as there is no way to force the originating system to tell the truth. The "high-touch" argument against this is important as the high-tech one. I just received the following mail from someone who would be unable to continue his work if the DoJ's IPv6 scheme is implemented: We provide free anonymous access to the net to sexual abuse survivors. We don't even know who they are, nor do we care - a lot of them are hiding out from their perps, and to try and identify them would be a tremendous breach of trust, as they are depending on us for their anonymity, much as a reporter would protect their anonymous source. I also have been told by these folks themselves that some of them are under the age of 18 - hell, I've had a few that tell me that they are 13 or 14 years old, and that they are still at home, still being raped by their perps. We provide an outlet for their frustrations, emptional support, a community for them, people to talk to, and support for them if they choose to report their abuse. None of this would be possible if Taylor and friends had their way. Sure, we could trace each and every one of them back to their providers, and find out who they are, but I'm not going to do it, and I'm perfectly willing to go to jail to protect their identities. My integrity is worth a whole hell of a lot more than any government law. +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ WHO CARES ABOUT KIDS: WHO ARE THE ADULTS? +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ The third way to answer the now-tiresome who-are-the-kiddies question is to turn it on its head and ask: "Who are the adults?" Hardware to answer that question already exists. The March 25 issue of Interactive Week reports that Livingston Enterprises, Inc. has colluded with Senator Exon's staff to design an "Exon box" -- a router that lets ISPs cut off unrated or "indecent" or unrated sites. To get around the block, an "adult" enters a secret password that tells the router to open a session and let the packets flow. Exon's staff is heralding this as an example of how easy it is to comply with the CDA. The only problem is that, like many such hamfisted censorship "solutions," it sucks, and it ain't going to work. One of the original architects of the Internet, David P. Reed, wrote: I do work to protect my children from inappropriate material, but pressure from Senators to mandate technically flawed solutions, and opportunistic, poorly thought-through technologies from companies like Livingston are not helpful. +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ OLSEN AS AN EXPERT WITNESS -- ON WHAT? +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ As I was writing this, I started wondering why Olsen got picked as the DoJ's expert witness for tomorrow's hearing, especially when his research is *not* in distributed computing environments and protocol design. It's in human computer interaction and user interfaces. One of Olsen's former students at Brigham Young University contacted me last week, saying he had initially hoped that Olsen was "lending a neutral opinion" on technical issues "but that hope proved false." I asked if his former faculty member has "done any work relating to distributed computing environments like the Internet?" His reply: "The closest thing I'm aware of is a paper on interactive bookmarks." Network engineering that ain't. On April 7th I sent Olsen email, asking him: "What kind of research have you done related to distributed computing environments like the Internet?" As of April 11, still no response -- even though he had replied to my earlier messages almost immediately. (I wouldn't put it past the DoJ's tame attack ferret, Jason Baron, to try and muzzle Olsen as well.) Vanderbilt Professor Donna Hoffman writes about Olsen: A colleague at CMU told me that Dan Olsen is largely an administrator at BYU and will assume administrative duties at CMU as the temporary head of the HCII... I've seen his vita and talked to some colleagues in CS and related fields about his work and it doesn't seem that he has done much, if any, research related to the distributed computing environments like the Internet. His vita is difficult to parse because he has numerous items I can't identify - for example, are they book chapters, working papers, proceedings? Where were they published? And so on. He is the Editor of a new journal published by CACM which started a few months ago, related to human-computer interaction. His main research interest seems to be in user interface issues, but he hasn't published much in scholarly journals so I would conclude that his work has had little impact on the field. (I should point out here that a member of the HCII at CMU sent me mail saying that conference proceedings are the main form of publication in the field.) Still, I wonder why the DoJ couldn't get a real net-expert to defend the CDA and the network protocol schemes they're proposing? Grey Flannel Suit (aka Air Force Special Agent Howard A. Schmidt) is going to take the stand tomorrow and do a live demonstration of how he can find cybersleze on the Net. I can hardly wait! Grey Flannel has been involved in a half-dozen porn prosecutions in the past: two dealing with civilian porn sites and and four dealing with military ones. From the deposition he gave in Washington, DC earlier this week, the extent of his testimony seems to be: "I went onto the Net and found dirty pictures." The following clue as to Grey Flannel's history of porn-prosecutions flowed into my mailbox the other day: It would be interesting to find out if Schmidt was involved in _US v. Maxwell_, 42 M.J. 568 (USAF Ct Crim App 1995), a military justice case concerning a USAF colonel who used AOL to communicate "indecent language" to another servicemember and to traffic in pornographic matter. USAFOSI was clearly involved in the investigation, but no agents are named in the opinion. Flannel will be followed by our last witness, MIT's Albert Vezza, and then Dan Olsen. Stay tuned for more reports. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- We're back in court on 4/12, possibly 4/15 as a last day of witness testimony, 4/26 for rebuttal if necessary, and 6/3 for closing arguments. Mentioned in this CDA update: Michael Froomkin: "The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage" <http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/arbitr.htm> Wired: "How Anarchy Works -- Inside the Internet Engineering Task Force" <http://www.hotwired.com/wired/3.10/departments/electrosphere/ietf.html> Net-Guru David Reed's article: "CDA may pervert Internet architecture" <http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/fight-censorship/dl?num=2093> Michael Froomkin's LONG article on anonymous remailers: <http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/ocean1-7.htm> Dan Olsen at BYU <http://www.cs.byu.edu/info/drolsen.html> BYU's censorship policy <http://advance.byu.edu/pc/releases/guidelines.html> Internet Eng Task Force <http://www.ietf.org/> Rimm ethics critique <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~declan/rimm/> Int'l Net-Censorship <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~declan/zambia/> CMU net-censorship <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~kcf/censor> University censorship <http://joc.mit.edu/> Grey Flannel Suit <howardas(a)aol.com> This report and previous CDA Updates are available at: <http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/top/> <http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/EFF_ACLU_v_DoJ/> <http://www.epic.org/free_speech/censorship/lawsuit/> To subscribe to the fight-censorship mailing list for future CDA updates and related net.censorship discussions, send "subscribe" in the body of a message addressed to: fight-censorship-request(a)andrew.cmu.edu Other relevant web sites: <http://www.eff.org/> <http://www.aclu.org/> <http://www.cdt.org/> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Entropy Estimator
by hoz＠univel.telescan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 12 Apr 1996 at 20:58:19 Timothy C. May wrote: >At 9:06 PM 4/12/96, rick hoselton wrote: >>... I have these two 8-million byte >>files. One is a recording made by a geiger counter, every bit >>is uncorrelated with anything else in the universe ... >No, this is not the case. Suppose your file of 64 million bits of entropy >is stored as "Rick's Geiger Counter File,"... I left the word "you" out of one sentence. My line breaks are very strange. I wrote "chronologist" when I meant "horologist". I revealed a US-centric point of view, and I broke a New Year's resolution by contributing to the noise level on the cypherpunks mailing list. But I did not forget to say: >...every bit is uncorrelated with anything else in the universe ... :) Rick Hoselton It's not really fair to call me crazy, just because one of my personalities is paranoid/schizophrenic. Rick F. Hoselton (who doesn't claim to present opinions for others)

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Federal Court Friday for Henson
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: hkhenson From: hkhenson Subject: anouncement Date: Thu, 11 Apr 96 10:31:13 PDT Lines: 248 To those who have not been following the antics of the Scientologists in their epic battle with the Net, and various cryonicist, extropians, cypherpunks, pensfa, kabuki, and bay area folks: After a Temporary Restraining Order was issued against well known net.person Grady Ward by the Scientologists, I looked up one of the forbidden documents on the news spool, commented on the criminal aspects of the contents, and posted it to the net. A week later *I* was served with a 3 inch stack of legal papers. There will be a hearing for me in Federal court, Friday, April 12, sometime between about 9:30 and 11:30. It might be kind of fun, since I am starting by trying to get the judge to disqualify himself. If you want to know *way* too much about this subject, the meat of the court filings are at: http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/scientology/henson/home.html And here is the my posting (sanitized), a threat letter, and my response. Sorry for the spam and the short notice. Wide distribution, especially to news media encouraged. Keith Henson ************** H. Keith Henson San Jose, CA 95123 408-521-0614 Ronald M. Whyte, Federal Judge Northern District of California San Jose, CA Open Letter to Judge Whyte Dear Judge Whyte: In the company of perhaps 100,000 other people (the readers of the Usenet newsgroups alt.religion.scientology, alt.activism, alt.2600, comp.org.eff.talk, and misc.legal), I read the TRO against Mr. Grady Ward and "all persons in active concert." Was it your intent for this order to apply to random persons on the Internet such as myself? If so, I believe the TRO is a violation of my First Amendment rights to discuss the criminal activities of the cult of Scientology. Upon reading the TRO you approved, I sorted the list of documents attached and ran a text search on the news spool on one of my accounts to see if any of these documents were there. Some were-- though it is impossible to tell if they are the real thing or not. I pulled out the first one which came up. I had not been inclined to look at this material before (it's *boring*), but your TRO inspired me. Assuming this is real, I can see why the "Church" of Scientology is trying to suppress this material. If carried out, the instructions in this particular bulletin amount to *criminal* acts, to wit, the practice of medicine without a license. I reproduce this widely available document in its entirety for your edification. > HCO BULLETIN OF 14 NOVEMBER 1978 [snip all but name, I an under a TRO not to disclose the contents.] Please note that point 4 states that this process of "blowing BTs" cures illness. The phrases "cease to read" and "no longer read" refer to "auditing" with an E-meter. The "Church" of Scientology is under Court orders stemming from FDA actions in the early 1970s against making such claims involving the use of E-meters. This bulletin (assuming it is real) is written evidence of the level of contempt the "Church" of Scientology has for the Courts. Scientology even has policies on using the court system to abuse critics and former members. Forbidding discussion of this particular document, including quoting it entirely, is clearly against the public interest as well as a violation of my First Amendment rights. Unless, of course, copyright law can be used to prevent disclosure of instructions for criminal activity. With respect to "all persons in active concert," I have certainly been sympathetic to the ideals Mr. Ward espouses, and felt much of the rage he must have felt when (as he puts it) the "criminal cult of Scientology" sent Gene Ingram, a wanted felon, to obtain pictures of Mr. Ward's children from his mother by deceit. For what reason did the "Church" of Scientology need pictures of Mr. Ward's children? Were they planning a kidnapping or was this just a tactic of intimidation? This would certainly be an interesting question for you to skillfully ask of the members of the law firm which paid Mr. Ingram for this particular service. They will be in your court Friday. I know that taking a stand against Scientology is likely to subject me and my family to the same abuse Mr. Ward has experienced. But there comes a point where people of good will *must* stand up to criminals--even to those who are experts in using the courts to harass. If you think I am being too harsh in this matter, I can supply you with nearly unlimited affidavits and court findings which show a consistent pattern of criminal behavior for this cult over decades of time. Friday I will provide to you a letter from Mr. Arnie Lerma to Judge Brinkma about the stunts pulled on Mr. Lerma in a related case. Many of those who read these news groups are outside of the US, and thus not subject to your authority. I, however, am local to San Jose and will be in your court Friday morning. It is my position that the public interest in this matter should override *all commercial* copyright concerns. The entire corpus of material the "Church" of Scientology is trying to keep from public view is so at odds with what cult victims are told when they are suckered into it as to constitute fraud--thinly disguised as "religion." On the other hand, if you feel the TRO *does* preclude quoting examples of the copyrighted, trade secret, criminal instruction manuals of the "Church" of Scientology, please let me know. Sincerely, H. Keith Henson President/CEO Xanadu Operating Company [CoS threat letter, and my response. Posted on alt.religion. scientology, comp.org.eff.talk and misc.legal] Yo folks! Another letter from Helena showed up in my mailbox. [posted and mailed, cc to Judge Whyte] >Dear Mr. Henson, > > I represent Religious Technology Center ("RTC"), the owner >of the confidential Advanced Technology of the religion of >Scientology, and the holder of exclusive rights under the >copyrights applicable to the Advanced Technology materials. >Among these copyrighted and confidential materials are the >Advanced Technology materials of certain levels known as "NED for >OTs Series." Boilerplate. Do you have a macro programmed with this introduction? > I have been informed that you have posted NOTs Series 34 to >the Internet without the authorization of my client, who, of >course, would not have given such authorization had it been >requested. That I did. In particular the HCOB of Nov. 14, 1978. I presume by your complaining that RTC acknowledges this material to be an official copyrighted, trade secret, instruction manual for criminal activities? No wonder you want to keep it from being discussed! > I also see that you are claiming that you have talked >to the court and that this justifies your posting. You would have to be exceptionally dense to avoid noticing that the quoted document was right in the middle of a letter to Judge Whyte. > I am hereby placing you on notice that NOTs Series 34 is a >copyrighted, unpublished work. And I am hereby placing RTC on notice that the HCOB of Nov. 14, 1978 contains claims and instructions which seem to me to be both criminal in nature and in violation of certain court orders against the "Church" of Scientology. > Not only is it subject to the TRO >issued by Judge Whyte against Grady Ward (and will be subject to >the preliminary injunction once issued), it is also subject to a >preliminary injunction issued by Judge Whyte in Religious >Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communications, Inc. against >Dennis Erlich. In both instances, the injunction is against Ward >or Erlich and their "agents, servants, and employees, and all >persons acting or purporting to act under his authority, >direction or control, and all persons anyone acting in concert or >in participation with any of them who receive notice of this >Order." These injunctions were issued on the basis that RTC was >likely to succeed on the merits of its claims. Well, lets see. I am certainly not any kind of "agent, servant or employee" of either Dennis Erlich or Grady Ward, nor do I act under any kind of direction or control. Now, you can go argue with Judge Whyte that all persons who happen to read a.r.s, agree with Grady or Dennis that CoS is a scam of a cult, and take independent action are "acting in concert or in participation." Lots of luck. > > You have also included in your notice a request for people >to send you the NOTs materials. I am not interested in just *any* old NOTs materials. I asked for NOTs materials which amounts to instructions for criminal acts, such as those found in the HCOB of Nov. 14, 1978, or fraud. I believe discussion of this subset(?) of these materials is in the public interest. I am prepared to go to court to defend my right to quote from and discuss the criminal acts and policies of the "Church" of Scientology. > Please be informed that the >California Uniform Trade Secrets Act prohibits even the >*acquisition* of materials containing trade secrets. I simply do not believe that anything which can be found by a few seconds of searching on any one of a hundred thousand computers all over the world can be considered a "trade secret." What is a non-profit *Church* doing with trade secrets anyway? Trade secrets are for *profit* making commercial companies. Or perhaps fraudulent scams. > It is for >this reason that Mr. Ward was enjoined under trade secret law. >Your solicitation of these materials is a violation of that law >and an inducement to others to do so. As I pointed out above, I asked for material which amount to criminal instruction manuals or material which shows evidence of fraud on the part of Scientology. It will be very interesting to be enjoined in a First Amendment pursuit which is so clearly in the public interest. You really should try. You don't even have to hire a process server. Give me a call, beeper # 408-521-0614, and I will come down to Mr. Hogan's office and pick up my papers. > I am setting forth below the TRO issued by Judge Whyte and >the notice which I posted after the TRO was issued. I hereby >demand that you cease and desist from any and all further >posting, reproduction, display, distribution, solicitation or >acquisition of NOTs Series 34 or any of the Advanced Technology >works of the Scientology religion. > > Sincerely, > Helena K. Kobrin Well, Helena, I am going to put it a little nicer than Grady would, but you can take your demand, fold it till it is all corners, and stick it where "the Sun don't shine." And, just to show I mean it, I am *again* asking for NOTs or any other Scientology "AT" materials, acquired by legal, or *illegal* means which describe criminal acts, amount to criminal instruction manuals, or show the fraudulent bait and switch nature of Scientology. It is my intent to comment on and post this material in the public interest. I do not believe that either copyright law or trademark law will prevent the publication of information relating to unlawful acts. If you think otherwise, I suggest you check with a couple of tobacco companies. > NOTICE TO READERS: > > On March 6, 1996, Grady Ward posted a message to the >Internet soliciting a NOTs pack. In a later posting, Ward [snip for bandwidth] Keith Henson SP 4, bucking for SP 6

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