December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

sameer's lawsuit??
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Some entity calling itself Sameer may have said: > One of my ex-users who is now suing me has posted to > alt.anonymous. You might want to read about it. Look for the subject > "THE FACTS ON COMMUNITY CONEXION" > (this guy is a wellknown spammer) Could someone forward this post to cypherpunks? I can't get ahold of a reliable newsserver ...... Thanks, Micahel Ellis <mellis(a)alpha.c2.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMSKE2Qqs/Oe38tFJAQG8nwP/RCqIfKZrSXfhgsGBG+P61fBvzzXM6fdR QmRtA/xYcxTUW7TZmjvsvQAnpUQYSpywB84FFUhHB7w8cdxJBZVHg53tYyuDuAHU q4InJbbS+9AsFeoCGspy7ADqn4DU8gmLpIZ6mxGb37hBav10xlVYaUm7IyYjej+Z WWSakPnjcVk= =W2v0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Some thoughts on the Chinese Net
by cme＠cybercash.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>The more complex portion (from my perspective, at any rate) is a >modification of the standard TCP/IP protocol, requiring that each packet >be signed by its originating user. That's the killer. Signatures take a huge amount of CPU time. Signing each packet is not going to be cost effective. However, they could have an authenticated key exchange and then symmetric- encrypt each TCP/IP connection. That can perform -- and has the nice side effect [from the Chinese POV] of depriving the NSA of Chinese civilian net intelligence. As long as the key exchange is signed, everything travelling using that key is authenticated implicitly. +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)cybercash.com http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |CyberCash, Inc., Suite 430 http://www.cybercash.com/ | |2100 Reston Parkway PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | |Reston, VA 22091 Tel: (703) 620-4200 | +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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DES_ono
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Citing the crypto-expert BSA study noted here by Matt Blaze, Computerworld of 2-12-96: "Standard Encryption Vulnerable To Attack. Banking's most trusted technique for funds transfer questioned." It reports on puny crypto and DES desperation, with an "Oh, no, please" by the ABA. DES_ono [Thanks to BC]

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Re: Online Zakat Payment: Religious tithe.
by Ashfaq Rasheed 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steven I was referring to Tim May comments. I am sorry if I was not clear in my response. Thanks! Ashfaq Ahmed > From sperkins(a)andromeda.rutgers.edu Thu Feb 15 13:45:35 1996 > X-Sender: sperkins(a)andromeda.rutgers.edu > X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Light Version 1.5.4b11 (32) > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type> : > text/plain> ; > charset="us-ascii"> > To: Ashfaq Rasheed <ashfaq(a)corp.cirrus.com> > Subject: Re: Online Zakat Payment: Religious tithe. > Content-Length: 2796 > X-Lines: 67 > > Ashfaq: > > Please note that the lines you underlined were written by Mr. May and not by > me. As a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, blessed be his name, I would > not write such comments. > > Steven C. Perkins > > > > At 07:28 PM 2/14/96 -0800, you wrote: > >> From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Tue Feb 13 10:34:37 1996 > >> To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> > >> Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >> Subject: Re: Online Zakat Payment: Religious tithe. > >> In-Reply-To: <ad4541d1000210045325(a)[205.199.118.202]> > >> Mime-Version: 1.0 > >> Content-Type> : > TEXT/PLAIN> ; > charset=US-ASCII> > >> Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >> Precedence: bulk > >> Content-Length: 971 > >> X-Lines: 20 > >> > >> On Mon, 12 Feb 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > >> > >> > At 10:07 PM 2/12/96, Steven C. Perkins wrote: > >> > Once again, the gutter religion of Islam reveals the derangement of its > > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > >> > so-called Prophet. > >> > > >> > The world really needs to get around to nuking these folks. > >> > > >> Oh, Come now! Islam may in its present form be a religion deeply hostile > >> to liberty. But since "nuking" the whole Islamic world would not be > >> itself much of a defence of freedom, the only long term answer is to > >> promote within Islam the same kind of Reformation as eventually made > >> Christianity half decent. And Tim's comments do not contribute to that. > >> I don't know how many internet servers there are in the Middle East. > >> But, if I were an intelligent fundamentalist, I'd be copying it all over > >> the place. "Look", I'd be saying, "these people really do mean another > >> crusade to destroy us and our faith". > >> > >> I can understand Tim's disgust with these people. But I do question his > >> manner of expressing it. > >> > > > >Actions of certain individual or group does not reflect what the actual > >religion is. Examples of this can be found on every religion. > > > >Somebody generalizing as above reflects his/her own closed/blocked mentality. > > > >Look at yourself, if you can fall to such degrading levels and since you > >happen to be a member of this mailing list, it is not ration to think as > >every cpunks as demented as you are. > > > >Ashfaq Ahmed > > > > > ***************************************************************************** > Steven C. Perkins sperkins(a)andromeda.rutgers.edu > User Services Coordinator, Rutgers School of Law at Newark > 15 Washington Street Newark, NJ 07102 > VOX: 201-648-5965 FAX: 201-648-1356 > http://www.rutgers.edu/RUSLN/rulnindx.html > http://www.rutgers.edu/lawschool.html > "Raise your voices to the Sky. It is a Good Day to die." Chief Crazy Horse > ***************************************************************************** >

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Re: Some thoughts on the Chinese Net
by cme＠cybercash.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:31 2/15/96, Jon Lasser wrote: >How would packets coming into the country be marked / passed on? Presumably, you'd need a Chinese-approved identity key in order to get packets into the country. >So it seems that, in general, the Chinese supression of the net is >possible. A frightening thought. Or, if you think about potential >implications 10 yrs down the road here, a sobering thought. Hold on.. Assuming we really believe the net is a good thing, if the Chinese block it, they're hurting themselves. We don't need to get bent out of shape. They could as easily refuse to connect to the rest of the world. The more they repress their population, the more their population will want to rise up in protest -- maybe not this millenium but probably in the next. All we have to be sure of is that we don't let the Chinese dictate to us what content we can provide. It's like the CDA. The Chinese might choose to implement a nation-wide SurfWatch at all connection points at its borders. ...their problem, IMHO.... +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)cybercash.com http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |CyberCash, Inc., Suite 430 http://www.cybercash.com/ | |2100 Reston Parkway PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | |Reston, VA 22091 Tel: (703) 620-4200 | +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: The Emotional Killer (or out of the frying pan and into
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 02:51 PM 2/14/96 -0500, tallpaul wrote: >On Feb 11, 1996 23:48:29, 'jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com>' wrote: > > >>At 11:59 PM 2/11/96 -0500, tallpaul wrote: >>>I want to write on the theme posted to the list in the message below >where >>>J. Bell wrote "It is their ACTIONS that I feel violate my rights; that is > >>>what justifies my seeking their deaths, should I choose to do so." >>> >>>First, one thing that marks the sane adult from the child and the >floridly >>>psychotic adult is the sane adult's knowledge that "feelings" and "facts" > >>>are two different things. >>> >>>It is one thing to "feel," as J. Bell or all of us might, that our rights > >>>have been violated. >>> >>>It is another thing to maintain, as J. Bell uniquely appears to do, that >>>the "feeling" gives him the right to seek another person's death. >> >>You're clearly confused. I was responding to an accusation that I was >>defending seeking somebody's death simply because of a disagreement of >>OPINION. My comment was intended to remind the reader that it is the >>ACTIONS of a person which justify the self-defense; not simply the >>disagreement. > >I disagree and I believe that my quote (reposted by J. Bell) of his >original statement supports me. He mentioned "ACTIONS" and he mentioned >"OPINIONS" but he relied on his "feelings" as the touchstone of reality. >More than ever I believe that he genuinely cannot understand the >difference. He still confuses his "feelings" which exist nowhere but inside >his head with "ACTIONS" which exist outside his head in the real world. Frankly, I think you are deliberately engaging in nit-picky semantical arguments when your fundamental position is bankrupt. I've always made it clear that I don't "assume" that every person is right in his belief that his rights have been violated; rather, I point out that whether they are right or wrong, ultimately you (and me, and society) must deal with the FACT of that belief. If the person (people?) in question is actually wrong, then consider it a useful task to explain to that person WHY his beliefs are wrong. If he's RIGHT, he has the right to act to defend his rights. The question of whether any given person is right, in any given belief, is an interesting matter, but it is only marginally relevant to the subject of "Assassination Politics." Ultimately, people WILL act on what they believe to be true; you can't just stick your head in the sand and make them go away. You can try to convince them they're wrong, or you can try to defend yourself against their (allegedly misguided) actions: That is your choice. Get back to the subject at hand and I'll be happy to continue to debate. Engage in silly semantics and I'll be pleased to ignore you. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMSN1V/qHVDBboB2dAQFObAQAnYKsS2YqWwWVatdTCYBvcq2eGdXD4UNf 0hLC15BHPcK7PPNx2RbgevjatE8+NFCDXsgOYdANDDcCLo9KiXGtHjOg9790msuX sCLGKkZkijXNe64Bu2tpvcYT1Aqs+PVrYiAad/itieIvCQ3v1GdWSAvuULuNVqP0 TZptrXTDYtE= =SJtm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Remailers Pose Risk
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Computerworld, February 12, 1996, Front page: Stealth E-mail poses corporate security risk By Gary H. Anthes Anonymous remailers on the Internet are emerging as a threat to national and corporate security, some experts warn. These remailers are Internet sites that strip the names and addresses from electronic-mail messages before passing them along anonymously to prople or newsgroups. For corporate information systems managers, stealth E-mail is especially troubling because it allows hackers to attack systems, steal trade secrets and broadcast them worldwide without leaving an audit trail for authorities to follow. "Anonymous remailers have a lot of nasty potential," said Stephen T. Kent, chief scientist for security technology at BBN Corp. in Cambridge, Mass. "They have the broadcast potential of the news media but without the possibility of recourse if something is unsubstantiated or defaming is published." Critics are calling for strict limits or an outright ban on remailer sites, but others insist they are a safeguard against electronic snooping by abusive governments and should be considered a political freedom. Anonymous remailers have been used in a variety of criminal acts, including distributing pornography and computer viruses, violating copyright laws and harassing people with nasty messages. One snowy day last month, for example, about 25% of the workforce at a defense contractor in Rockville, Md., went home after they received a bogus E-mail message dismissing them for the day. The message originated from an anonymous remailer that allowed the user to impersonate a senior company official. But there are more scary, less publicized uses of remailers, said Paul Strassmann, former director of defense information at the Pentagon. Stealth E-mail also is used extensively by Russian criminals, often former KGB agents. "This method of communication is a favorite for engaging the services of cyber-criminals and for authorizing payment for their acts through a third party." Strassmann said. Its Reputation Precedes It Perhaps the best-known remailer site is in Finland at anon.penet.fi. The Finnish server was used last year to publish confidential and copyrighted scriptures from the Church of Scientology. It also was used to reveal the secret source code used by RSA Data Security, Inc. in some of its encryption products. Last year, police raided the Finnish site and seized records and computer gear as part of an investigation of alleged copyright infringement. The administrator of anon.penet.fi offers this warning to new users: "I believe very firmly that it's not for me to dictate how other people ought to behave. But remember, anonymous postings are a privilege, and use them accordingly. Remember, this is a service that some people who use newsgroups such as alt.sexual.abuse.recovery need. Please don't do anything stupid that would force me to close down the service." One remailer advertises itself as a way to thwart attempts by intelligence agencies to trace illegal traffic, Strassmann said. It holds all incoming messages until five minutes after the hour, then remails them in random order. The messages are sent through five to 20 other remailers, with a stop in at least one of the several countries noted for lax law enforcement, he said. Yet other experts say the threat from remailers is greatly exaggerated. "We've had remailers around for a while, and society hasn't fallen," said Mike Godwin, staff counsel at the Electronic Frontier Foundation in San Francisco. "We've had anonymous communication in the U.S. for years, you can use a public telephone, send a letter without a return address or engage in a cash transaction." Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Ohio law that required the authors of political posters and pamphlets to identify themselves. "In the case of political speach, you can't make people tell you who they are," said Patrick Sullivan, executive director of the Computer Ethics Institute in Washington. But Sullivan said the police raid on the Finnish remailer was prompted by the Church of Scientology's legitimate complaint about violations of copyright law. "I haven't heard many uses of remailers that haven't involved, at the very least, being disrespective and, at the most, trying to cause harm of some sort." he said. _________________________________________________________ Battle against remailers an unfair fight Think of anonymous remailers as enemies you can't fight face to face, says Paul Strassmann, former director of defense information at the Pentagon and now a lecturer at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. "Anonymous remailers are here to stay," he said. "That means the old military paradigm of retaliation falls apart. The whole theory of warfare has been if someone attacks you, you can attack them. But when you are anonymous, there is no one to shoot at." Strassmann said society myst look for defenses in the health sciences, not among electronic technologies. "The history of public health teaches us that suppression of any disease must be preceded by a thorough understanding of its behavior, its method of transmission and how it creates its own ecology," he said. "As in the case of smallpox, yellow fever, flu epidemics, AIDS or malaria, it will take disasters before the public may accept that some forms of restrictions on the electronic freedom of speech and that privacy may be worthwhile." - Gary H. Anthes _________________________________________________________ Do's and don'ts Unethical or illegal uses of anonymous remailers: - To spread viruses or other malicious software - To harass or commit libel - To violate copyright laws - To encourage others to commit unethical or illegal behavior Legitimate uses of anonymous remailers: - For "whistle blowing" - For political speech - For encouraging frank but constructive exchanges of opinions _________________________________________________________ Article also contained chart on how to use anon.penet.fi, not included here. [Thanks to BC for transcribing]

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Re: Assassination Politics(tm) was V-chips, CC, and Motorcycle Helmets
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I've changed the Subject: to more accurately reflect the contents] My purpose on this thread is to examine the limits of Jim Bell's idea of Assassination Politics. My ground rules are to assume that it is a natural outgrowth of the technologies of anonymous cash and anonymous remailers. As such arguments that it is immoral are only valid to the extent that they bare on individual's decisions to particpate in an assassination. I believe that we have general agreement that high government figures are not subject to sanction via assassination politics because they already enjoy Secret Service levels of protection. I also believe that Jim and I disagree about the significance of Salmon Rushdie. Jim thinks that the lack of anonymity in the Mullah's assassination bounty is repelling possible assassins. I disagree. A question worth asking is, How much does it cost the British government to protect Mr. Rushdie by keeping his location secret and providing other unspecified protection. If anyone knows the answer, it could help build an economic model of Assassination Politics. Jim Bell said: >Actually, I think the primary targets will be either the middle level >manager types, or the ones who have attracted a substantial amount of bad >publicity by "following orders." Lon Horiuchi (the sniper who shot Vicki >Weaver) for example, would be a excellent example of a person who'd try to >claim, "I was just following orders." Okay, maybe he was, but so was Adolph >Eichmann. I agree that Jim's idea of targeting certain specific individuals, such as the sniper above might work. >Once the tax collectors/enforcers were targeted, the rest of the government >wouldn't be able to operate, and would collapse. However if you tackle the whole tax system, you get into problems of scale. The IRS alone (according to their web page) has over 110,000 employees, and we havn't even mentioned the state and local employees. I don't think killing one or two will have a sigificant effect (that is occuring now). I will assume that you have to successfully kill about 10% to have enough effect to shut off the government's money supply. Attacks at this scale will be difficult because while people will have perfect anonymity in cyberspace, they won't enjoy it in physical space. Neighbors, survalence cameras, etc.; in fact all the technology that makes privacy so hard to achieve today will be available to catch the assassins. The police will also be more motivated to utilize the technology for this class of people than they would for drug dealers, pimps and other low lifes. These points will tend to raise the price of assassinations. Let us assume that we can buy assassinations for $50,000 per person. Times 11,000 people is $550 million dollars. That is quite a sum. I need to see an analysis which shows how to raise money on this scale. Bill

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Re: Netscrape's Cookies
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:34 2/14/96, Alex Strasheim wrote: >> >>I'm curious if anyone knows which sites use/modify it. >> >AFAIK, the only site that uses it is *.netscape.com >> >> That is not quite true. There are other sites that use the cookies. (It is >> not very common though...) > >A good place to read about cookies is http://www.illuminatus.com/cookie; >I think there are pointers to cgi/perl stuff that manipulates them. > >Cookies are very helpful for database and commerce applications. I'm >using them for a crude online store, as a way to let the web server keep >track of who has what in their shopping basket. Cookies are a godsend for shopping baskets. Saving state without them is a major pain. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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RE: Cookie Crumbles
by Blake Coverett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >What are the chances that NSCP might add a feature that would >allow customers to say yes or no at login to tracking their >movements at any site visited, with a friendly notice that >tracking analysis was being done? The netscape browser could assert that tracking was not desired to it's heart's content, but that doesn't prevent the server from tracking any state it wants about you. (The typical non-cookie approach being to include a session identifier in all URLs) regards, - -Blake -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i iQCVAwUBMSOODrmr67p11D8rAQHg8wP/fdjXkJFGuFCyCFr7oyP+z5B6a4S4RNd7 3nkzLVIhil6fHW78CKohGmjVPwuwiz81FGRobfsAoQKgUW0zCMI4SmI9Parxk63A Ly5ckTVf+oDI6WWbyXg39xr7lMPKUqzfyzi3M7nDVXEPNZXLKH58+WJoR0eUsUyW 7AWwcEOducM= =DGYR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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