December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Artist self censorship (Was Chinese net-censorship) Noise
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:22 PM 3/9/96, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: > guilt. The judge then sentenced her to 30 days at MCI Framingham. We ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > are currently trying to raise money to pay for her appeal. Man, making someone work for one of the Phone Companies...that's a pretty harsh sentence! Maybe that's how that cute "MCI girl" we see on television got assigned to MCI? (Or is this MCI an example of AOL, Acronym OverLoading?) --Klaus!

1 0

Re: Bootable disks
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My understanding was that the parallel-port version of the Syquest drive would also be bootable. That is, you would boot the driver off a floppy and then the rest of the boot sequence would be handled by whatever was on the Syquest drive. THis, I thought, would let you install something like linux and the various other software to give you a very portable anon server, neatly containing a separate OS and all the "incriminating evidence" while the regular hard disk held nothing other than Windows and Doom. Is this not the case? --tallpaul On Mar 06, 1996 14:55:44, 'JonWienke(a)aol.com' wrote: >I recently installed an IDE version of the Syquest EZ 135 hard drive for a >client. Since it is a fully functional hard drive, it is bootable, unlike >the parallel port model. The biggest advantage to this type of drive is that >the cartridge (and any potentially incriminating data) can be quickly removed >and destroyed (burn it, smash it with a large heavy object, insert it into a >bulk eraser) or taken to a secure location for storage. Also, this type of >drive provides an excellent place to put swap files, which have an annoying >tendency to pick up sensitive data. That is less of a problem if you can >remove the cartridge and store it in a secure location when not processing >sensitive data. > >Jonathan Wienke >

1 0

Re: FCC & Internet phones
by Mutant Rob 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security wrote: > You seem to forget that the Internet is just about the *only* electronic > communications media not controlled/licensed by the FCC in the US. The > FCC also prohibits use of cryptography by those with amateur licenses. Yes... but the Internet is not like HAM radio. The FCC has no jurisdiction outside the US, and it would cause various problems for them to try to regulate the use of IPhone or how ISPs operate. On another note, I wonder how the Leahy bill would affect use of crypto by HAMs.... - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMUHENyoZzwIn1bdtAQE1XwF9EP/jLWWk2gd41oNnkNF88lhTpa7PvGEU iEBdP8oalQfanQz/WcBjYQ9ilXEXxOqo =+FDh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

EXR_ciz
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-5-96. TWP: "Untangling the Spy Network's Webs." Chairman Combest of the House intelligence committee yesterday proposed making the CIA's DO into a separate service and splitting the NRO into two giant technical agencies to handle satellites. The CIA would control most long-range intelligence work, some of which is now handled by the CIO and some by the NSA. The biggest change in terms of size would put the NSA, which has more than 25,000 analysts, in a new Technical Collection Agency that would also take in the managerial functions of NRO and parts of imagery analysis from CIO. 3-5-96. NYT: "Proposal Would Reorganize U.S. Intelligence Agencies." The intelligence services are held in low regard by the public and some leaders -- State complains about the quality of analytical papers; Defense bad-mouths the quantity of intelligence; and Congress gripes about too many secrets and not enough accountability. Rep. Goss, a former member of the CIA's DO, said the proposal aimed to rebuild the credibility of the agency's spies: "The whole exercise we're going through is meant to restore that." EXR_ciz

1 0

Re: (INFO) Leahy/Goodlatte introduce crypto bill
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12:17 PM 3/5/96 -0500, Voters Telecommunications Watch wrote: Dear Mr. Sadfar, By now I'm sure you've read a few items that I posted not only to you, but also to the cypherpunks mailing list, as well as the NWLIBERTARIANS(a)teleport.com list. I believe you have made a grievous error in your position apparently supporting the Leahy bill. As you presumably understand by now, based on your description of the bill it contains an extraordinarily serious flaw, in that it makes a new crime concerning the USE of encryption. Ostensibly, this is "reasonable," but I've already presented a scenario on Cypherpunks (also posted to you; as I write this it may not yet have appeared there, but I copied you) in which the government uses this provision maliciously to go after anonymous remailers. While that was merely a specific example, almost any service that protects the identity of its customers and allows them network access is potentially at a serious risk, because the US government has been known to fabricate a crime (for example, the "Amateur Action" BBS case from a few years ago) in order to make criminals out of non-criminals. As you have quoted it, Leahy's bill allows the government to, in effect, "stalk" a service provider (anonymous encrypted remailer, anonymous digital cash bank, Internet access provider, etc) and create a crime that involves the provider well beyond the standards described in this bill. The government can CREATE a crime, "to order" as it were, and snare the service provider in the net, despite the fact he has done nothing wrong. (In fact, he could be "guilty" even if there was no way, short of going out of business, to avoid the "crime.") This, I hope you agree, is totally unacceptable, but despite this, you said: >This provision only applies to you if you are using encryption to >specifically foil a law enforcement investigation AND the communication >relates to a felony AND you are using the communication to commit the >felony. VTW feels this is a fairly narrowly drawn statute that is not >likely to be easily abused. Frankly, you made an error, and "it was a doozy!" But what I fear is that you will "dig your heels in" and hesitate to admit it, and continue on calling this "a good bill." You _would_ be right about that, except for the specific portion that is referred to above. (In addition, as Padgett Petersen noticed on Cypherpunks, that portion of the bill seemingly contains an error of phrasing, although we can't tell and we are depending on your quoting of that bill. Please verify that the quotation you made was accurate, and please carefully read that portion to see if you can identify the problem both Mr. Petersen and I observed. Since it just about reverses the entire meaning of the paragraph, it is vital to know what the actual bill said and meant.) I strongly recommend that you _DRAMATICALLY_ change the tone of your support: Please make it clear that your support for this bill is ENTIRELY conditional on removing the offending section. (I see little or no problem with your description of the rest of the bill, except for a few items I mention below.) I certainly invite any challenge you'd care to make to my reasoning and logic: If you feel I'm wrong in my estimation of what the government could do with that portion of the bill, say so and back up your analysis. If, on the other hand, you recognize that I'm right, or at least on the right track, I think you have a certain moral responsibility to ensure that this "wolf in sheep's clothing" doesn't get by the shepherd. Remember, in your press release you said: >VTW believes this legislation is an excellent initiative. It would be far more accurate to say, "This legislation COULD BE an excellent initiative, if a short section were removed." >We predict that the White House will do everything in their power to >prevent Senator Leahy from liberating PGP. He will need your help to >push forward. If this is REALLY true, then he will have to listen to our suggestions, right? People listen WHEN THEY HAVE TO CONVINCE YOU OF SOMETHING. Failing to make Leahy aware of what we consider terribly wrong with that bill would be irresponsible. If Leahy REALLY wants the bill passed, and "all" the potential supporters insist on the removal of the offending section, he will have no choice but to do so, since it has already been widely predicted that the administration will oppose it. If, indeed, they will oppose it, they will oppose it REGARDLESS of whether it contains that bad spot or not. >Over the next few months, VTW will be coordinating a coalition of >names, many of which are already familiar to you. This coalition will >ask you to call and write to Congress, expressing your opinion, and >threatening to back it up with the ultimate legitimate weapon of >democracy, your vote in this election year. While I do indeed intend to vote in this election year, as you may be aware I believe there are other weapons the public will eventually be able to use against recalcitrant politicians and government employees of all types. The government is presumably well aware of my position, and it would certainly not be unexpected if they were desperately trying to avoid what I consider to be an inevitable conclusion. This particular bad section, in what is probably an otherwise-good bill, seems tailor-made to fight against developments that I think this society and "our" government can't avoid, and shouldn't avoid. I'm not asking you to endorse, or for that matter even acknowledge, my theories. However, you should at least take notice of the fact that Congress' motivations are clearly to maintain its power over the citizenry, and they will presumably act in predictable fashion to achieve this goal. We've already got them on the run; they can't pass Clipper and they knew they couldn't prosecute Zimmermann, and their position on ITAR is resoundingly criticized by individuals and industry alike. Most people agree that these rules have to change; it would be a tragedy if we "gave away the store" just to get a few trinkets. The fact is, this bill didn't have to contain the offending section, and it doesn't have to keep it. If we make our absolute opposition to that portion clear, who will stand up and support it? Only those people within government who secretly want this bill to pass, that's who! ____________________________________________________________ >A FEW QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS > >Q: Wasn't Goodlatte one of the bad guys on the Communications Decency Act? > Why is he sponsoring this bill, and can we trust him? >A: Goodlatte did indeed introduce the fatal amendment that made the House > version of the Telecomm Bill unsupportable. Nevertheless, VTW has found > that a Congressperson's vote on one sort of bill is little indication of > his or her stand on others. VTW wil closely examine any change in the > language of the bill throughout its Congressional life. Well, frankly, it looks like SOMEBODY managed to sneak in a pit into the cherry pie. (or a worm into the apple!) I wonder who could have done this? What do you want to bet that there aren't any fingerprints on it?!? >Q: Does this create a new obligations for key holders to disclose keys that > they wouldn't have to comply with before? >A: No. In fact, this bill makes it harder for a law enforcement official to > retrieve a key from a key holder, by requiring a wiretap request instead > of a simple search warrant. In my opinion, key escrow agents should be required to inform THEIR CLIENT, the actual user of the key, BEFORE giving the key to the cops. They should also be obligated to fight any such request if the key holder requests it. (Remember, if key-escrow is really voluntary, then it is a contract between the encryption-user and the key escrow agent, and the encryption user should be able to put whatever conditions he wishes on that relationship. Presumably, he would not have entered into that relationship unless he was able to control the disposition of the key.) Furthermore, the cops should not be allowed to do any decryption of any material wiretapped before they possess the key itself. In summary, I think you really need to revisit your support for this bill. It is only a short distance away from being a good bill, but that is a trip we must make if we are to protect and even expand our freedom. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMT5aHPqHVDBboB2dAQEACwP/eDky+Gi0kebbAWPYO9dX9HCQTzac3m3v YVyW4iEtGrQE78/Hmi4M2m9l4sDA3qOaFZtFhImRc4JVVWNy1Yp8JzTPbjESiB4M Q3ppLV7S9sQmYQnHIHbpJu9YVQ/j+cMIwp9tOI0FNLbXIKWhZz4t+6bfiqJWUgZK awsbDpXjYaU= =3HJl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Leahy bill nightmare scenario?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12:19 PM 3/8/96 -0800, Dan Weinstein wrote: >> Second, if what they're charging is the hindrance of an >> felony investigation, it isn't clear to me why they would be >> limiting the charging of that "crime" to only those actually who >> have committed a felony. (logic isn't the normal mode of thought for >> a government employee, you realize.) > >I agree with your concerns here, but I find it hard to believe that >the courts would allow a broader interpretation. Unfortunately, what you find "hard to believe" I find easy to believe. Remember, if this bill is passes, it doesn't merely affect YOU, it affects ME. So I suggest the burden of proof is on YOU to show that these provisions aren't going to be maliciously interpreted by the courts. >> Third, all they have to do is to "suspect" the person of a felony, >> and a >> "felony investigation" starts. That would presumably make him >> guilty of the Leahy bill's provision, regardless of whether he is >> actually participating in the crime supposedly being investigated. > >Here you are dead wrong, the bill specifically states: "in furtherance >of a felony." Its like those laws that let them charge someone with >murder in the first if someone dies while you are commiting another >felony. They must prove the original felony before they can get you >on the murder one. The real purpose of this provision, as I read it, >is to give longer sentences to criminals that use crypto. I'm not a lawyer, but I assume neither are you. Please explain the LEGAL DEFINTION of "in furtherance of a felony." If you can't, then you simply don't know how far they will go. And you're depending on the reasonableness of the government for the interpretion. >> Fourth, I gave what I considered to be a clear example of the >> hypothetical misuse of an encrypted remailer by the cops, one that >> would arguably make the remailer operator guilty of some >> "reasonable" anti-kiddie-porn statute. At that point, _he_is_ the >> target of the investigation. Unless you can show that this kind of >> action by the government is impossible, I consider it to be not >> merely possible but almost certain to occur. > >Again, the problem I see with your scenario is that I don't believe >that the courts will interpret it that way. What you think is irrelevant. Most people probably didn't realize what the government did in the Amateur Action BBS case was "legal," either. But they did it anyway. > My interpretation is that >if they serve a warrent and I don't decrypt for them and they can >prove a felony, then I will be subject to the listed punishment. Are you assuming that you have the key? Remember, if you run an encrypted anonymous remailer, and assuming you do it honestly, you won't be keeping records as to the source of the note. Thus, if they "serve a warrant" and you CAN'T decrypt the message (or tell them where it came from) then why aren't you already guilty? Remember, the wording of the proposed law doesn't require that you have full knowledge of the crime involved, merely that you act "in furtherance" of it... If you don't possess the key, but you explicitly ran your remailer so that you never it, just so you couldn't relinquish it, you have structured your operation too thwart any investigations. You are ALREADY guilty. This may not sound reasonable, but the government no longer (if it ever did) considers "reasonableness" to be an impediment to their actions. >> Fifth, it isn't clear what amount of knowledge is necessary to >> "trigger" this clause, especially in its current flawed state. >> Since ISP's and encrypted remailers might know, in general, that >> their systems can and probably are being used for SOME criminal >> activity, even if they can't identify it or the user, or decrypt it, >> etc, a broad interpretation of the resulting law could easily >> de-facto prohibit any business practices (i.e., allowing users to >> use encryption) that prevents full-scale monitoring and/or tracing. > >I disagree, it states you must "willfully endeavor" to use the >encryption as a means of obstructing the investigation. To me, this >means that it is the motivation for using the encryption. Question: What, exactly, is the motivation of a person running an anonymous remailer? His motivation is clear: To allow people to send anonymously untraceable messages. Assuming he's of ordinary levels of intelligence or beyond, he is aware that somebody may some day use his system for illegal purposes. You're going to have to explain why a court _CAN'T_ interpret this as being in violation of the law. > If I set >up an encrypting remailer for the purpose of allowing free exchange >of ideas, I don't believe I would be liable under this law. Your optimism is touching. It is also vastly misguided. >The >only way I could see a remailer charged under this is if he had solid >evidence that a specific user was violating the law, and took no >action. Gee, I wish you were right, but my experience with government thugs says that they will do anything they think they can get away with. >> This is only the beginning of the problems with this section. If >> you can explain why nothing I've described could possibly occur, I >> welcome a contrary explanation. > >I see some real problems too, but I do not see the problems with this >provision to be enough to condemn the entire bill. I don't "condemn the entire bill." I would, however, reject the entire bill if that provision remains. And morever, if we make a serious attempt to have it removed, the more they resist removing it the more we should insist it go. >I would like to >see this portion of the bill ammended to make it clear that only >those actually involved in commiting the felony would be held >responsible. There would still be a problem. What's the definition of "actually involved in committing the felony"? Are you aware, for example, that manufacturers of small plastic screw-top vials have been prosecuted and convicted simply because their vials could be used to hold small quantities of drugs such as cocaine and crack? This was a case from a few years back, BTW. I wish I could remember the cite. If you're not aware of these things, WAKE UP! Your optimism disgusts me, because it is entirely unrealistic and based on a rose-colored-glasses view of the government. >> But I would also ask this: Why, exactly, do we need this section? >> We've already been told that the opponents of this bill will fight >> it tooth-and-nail under its current wording; if that's the case then >> the presence of this section is inadequate to appease their >> unhappiness. Therefore, we shouldn't include it in the bill at all; >> it does no good. >> >> Any explanations, Dan? > >You are talking about the fringe, this, I think, was added as an >attempt to bring in those that are in the middle. Why would "those that are in the middle" object to a bill which is little more than a re-statement of rights we already believe we have?!? > That is, Those >that see the need to prevent the use of encryption as a means of >obstructing justice, but feel that we should also have a right to >privacy. There is no viable middle ground here. Any tool can be abused. > To say that there is no delema here is ridiculous, crime is >a serious problem that we are already having a terrible time dealing >with. On the contrary, my opinion is "The _government_ is a serious problem that we are already having a terrible time dealing with." Fortunately, I've found a solution, and the government is trying as hard as it can to prevent it (and "crypto-anarchy" in general) from taking root. > I think Leahy realizes that this provision will be about as >useful as the "use a gun, go to jail" laws, but wants to give those >in the middle to say that they bill will help prevent crime. Ha ha! That's rich! There is no reason that a "pro-encryption" bill has to contain any general "anti-crime" clauses. The average person is afraid of burglars, muggers, murderers, rapists, car thieves. When is the last time the average person was the victim of a crime whose investigation could be "thwarted" by the use of encryption? If you can't think of an example, you've just proved my point: This provision is entirely irrelevant to the average citizen (at least in a "positive" way) and can't be considered a "win" for him. >> Jim Bell >> jimbell(a)pacifier.com >> >> Klaatu Burada Nikto > >Good movie. I'm working on the real-life sequel. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMUG+9fqHVDBboB2dAQFd+QP/SwSs1R7dV7tStxg9Hs7Sf9X+q6rWNfa/ d9xWPRpCS81TRhRnpKUxqJu0HZsGQphaEyPRLm1G4f6Z/ZCWsnzR+0XNv6H+FPMG QKSbCLmgGxnfNEWQmB3BDDJS0KEkNGs6slUvcUS9aRBuKbW6Optu3rYgM/7DCPAq M1QkmlpC2EU= =YeFw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: U.S. State Dept criticizes Chinese net-censorship
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Paul S. Penrod" <furballs(a)netcom.com> wrote to Declan: >IF you hold to the premise that self-censorship is based in a >large part on witholding your natural inclination and/or reaction >, then yes the argument can be made that self-censorship occurs >all the time. However, I would submit that J.F.A. is correct and >that your position is but a subset of the original statement. One problem that arise in all of the discussion around this theme is that peoples have very different ideas of the terms "self- interest" and "selfishness". The collectivists and mystics have made us accept the basic premise that selfishness means "acting in a way harmfull to others". They just trained us to blank out the fact that, as rational animals who love life, our best inte- rest might very well coincide with the one of our neighboor. Man, after being a rational animal is also a social animal. There is plenty of crypto relevency in this discussion and it lies in the basic view of Man of the individuals in such discussion. Is Man an intrinsical blood thirsty beast that either kills or cry or is Man a rational animal that can enjoy life in a peaceful and constructive and exciting way? The one who have the first opinion wants more govt, more laws and GKE. The others wants freedom. JFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMUGA6MiycyXFit0NAQGlLQf8DxmsCoNvqlmbsvb87/IS5UsZOVFXgdG+ cdLSY9A0UDl7bCPtyKJ5V/kvA8VDiL5H4K/Le9yRD6pYcLWf5S9sHdMhM24odhqy 7/7lIK0ud1+4oD0SIfZyPNcSpJc0AWIMn6E6Xa2K/khtjl9qtKvS+byRyZumExrS p3ScxHPe2WJvR2wCN7lnrwzLoj8MA8+XaHomOa7pQme7z+YjmM76gi/8lzt9i+J7 tmGz39UfDQx8QAaq0NfVmUelmT80xsDxCmWU19lgdCoY2P8QGjR8pie/gZPdJiXl LtutVcefHb7cP9gKYXPHwxV4krM2urMhBM2cS469lwQqZY8VYN5NaQ== =SVWp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Public Key at http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> 2048 bits key ID:C58ADD0D 1996/03/01 fingerprint=52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91

2 1

Re: Artist self censorship (Was Chinese net-censorship) Noise
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) said: >before taking >a picture he usually asks himself about how this picture is percived, something >the he never thought twice before the FBI raid. > >Mr. Avon should think twice before commenting on self censorship does not >exist, for that could be the difference from having the door kicked in by the >black ninja turtles with the FBI or toning down your work. OK. *THAT* might be interpreted, wrongly, as self-censorship. But words have a *precise* meaning, which unfortunately, I sometimes miss in the english language. The opinion I wrote was in the *context* of the interaction of an artist with a purchaser. In that context, what govern the events is consensuality: everybody acts *uncoerced* to his best advantage. In the case you cite, the *context* is very different. But still, I would not call it "self-censorship". I do not have, on the top of my head, any precise term for it, but maybe FUD, fear of physical violence, survival tactics while harrassed by a thuggish assaulter, etc., would apply... I did not think twice, I thought about it several hundred times... Your comment is *very* interesting. It point out how peoples can so easily blank out contextual information. Forgive my bias but I personnally makes a big distinction between the volitional initiation of physical violence (or menace of) and other situations where it is absent. Regards! JFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMUF6K8iycyXFit0NAQFoBgf/Tt0zFCaRNJFBwZcxsV/v5ABnjjnAtqoT EDF0OA7+UogWT1MXL8RP58tQ2vTwUWJ1PdK/gdnwlkjpwxC0i4gRx1HpnCLOjRlL UgkUKu5qiyIWKd6upCYCMd1NCbqaffHjWr3pWxVFE/zPaCQ7mlrZZV4QBeV/bKbU djt70BQTa7WFvQwZWkVO7QcxOawjzItyZErusdEIvPz03MqbcqSaQu0NgtEy/Zwu 82CSF10uTL96TzjXm1icASiquDk8Tj+go8WqC1FZ8uK3kFHDDkEuLqzXdtG6sJKK hV4PPfehyjXXXB2CADmXMnXZVLkWU0x5Ig7l/bdOETrPhfl07Di9tQ== =1OeX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Public Key at http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> 2048 bits key ID:C58ADD0D 1996/03/01 fingerprint=52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91

1 0

Re: art-stego
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a very good idea. I wish I'd thought of it. Just bear in mind that this form of steganography is getting further away from conventional hiding, and into "pure plausible deniability." In fact, one need not even make a serious attempt to hide the encrypted bits: just call the encrypted file "art" and be done with it! (I'm not saying stego is worthless, just that there's a slippery slope one can get on, with one extreme being this fiction that "this is not an encrypted file, this is _art_!") At 7:18 PM 3/4/96, Jim Miller wrote: >The recent discussion "Chaff in the Channel" got me thinking about an >alternative to hiding random bit streams in picture files. The goal of >steganography, as I see it, is to provide plausible deniability. The Yes, all those critics who point out that steganography (not to mention stenography) is an example of the rightly-maligned "security through obscurity" are missing this point, that steganography arises in situations where the mere act of communicating is itself actionable. (Get caught in Berlin during the war with invisible ink or microdots and get hanged the next morning, whether or not the SS can read the traffic.) >problem with hiding bit streams is that you can never be sure if the >opponent has developed an analysis technique to prove a particular file >contains a suspicious bit pattern. Yes, this is why I suggested (some years back, originally) that noise be deliberately added to even images not intended for communication, as "chaff" to confuse traffic analysts. Your approach is a better one, as the "art stego" market, while small, could be self-sustaining. >The alternative to hiding bit streams is to not hide them. Use them to >generate pretty pictures. For example, modify a fractal image generator >to accept a bit stream as input. Use the bit settings to influence the >values used to iterate the fractal function. You don't have to use >fractals, any function that produces pretty pictures would probably work >as long as there was a way to extract the bit stream from the final >picture. Brute force would probably work fast enough for humans. > >One possibility is a screen saver that produces an "infinite" variety of >pretty pictures by generating a pseudo-random bit stream and using it to >help generate the next background picture. Occasionally, the picture >might be so cool you will want to send it your friends or post it on the >Net or just keep it around to look at. > >The goal is to create an innocent reason for passing around unique images >that contain random bit streams so we don't have to worry if somebody >finds the bit stream. If you live in a country that doesn't outlaw >abstract art you have plausible deniability. Now it's just up to someone to implement this. I don't expect this to be a huge market--remember what's happened to all those Mandelbrot images that were once the rage--but there's a chance it will get established as one of those "cool" apps that are tres trendy for a while. I still would expect that when the Hamas leaders in Gaza are picked up for questioning and "ArtStego" is found on their systems, along with various "abstract artworks" on their disk drives, that Mossad will not be fooled. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: Another Motivation for the CDA (Federal Sentencing Guid
by drose＠AZStarNet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 9 Mar 1996, "Dave Emery" wrote: >The article also points out that in a state with a 7% black population 43% of the >three time losers are black. Right on, bro! This is the kind of institutionalized racism that we all deplore! In fact...hey, wait a sec. Hmmm, 7% of the population; what was the percentage of black rioters in the "motorist" Rodney "Why can't we all live together?" King "peace demonstration"? Yo, homes: of the 50K gang members in L.A., what percentage is non-black? Give it a f... (oops) I mean, gosh darn rest. ObCrypto: Perry, please consult Dave Emery. Thanks! --David M. Rose

1 0