December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Conference report - resolving security workshop
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:55 PM 2/22/96 -0800, Raph Levien <raph(a)c2.org> wrote: > The biggest problem with S/MIME is that the signed and encrypted >format reveals who made the signatures. Obviously, this has severe >consequences for anonymous mail. Believe it or not, a lot of people >care. For example, the car manufacturers do not wish to broadcast the >email addresses of their employees over the net. > One technical workaround is to do it the MOSS way - first, sign the >message, resulting in an intermediate S/MIME message, then encrypt >that into a second S/MIME message. I'd recommend that implementors >make provisions for such recursive formats; I think it's likely that >we'll see a lot of these on the Net. Recursive-capable formats are clearly the way to go; the difficult problem is deciding how many layers of recursion to do while decoding (e.g. all the way down, or one layer at a time asking the user for each round), which is largely a user-interface issue rather than a platform issue, though it also lets you build limited-purpose tools instead of an all-singing, all-dancing camel of a platform. Unfortunately, the formats being considered give you too much known plaintext to make triple-encryption a useful way around the 40-bit-key silliness. */MIME has MIME headers, PGP has the (expendable but present) ------BEGIN. A new MIME header like X: parameters where parameters are ignored would limit you to three bytes of known plaintext, which is at least a start. >The prevailing philosophy of the PGP people is that the PGP >application itself should not decode MIME formats - that should be the >job of a separate application. It seems to me that this is going >against the tradition, though. In the past, if you got a PGP message, >you just ran it through PGP. Now you won't be able to do that. The prevailing philosophy is also that we need to build an API toolkit so PGP components can be easily included into programs. This means that PGP will inherently no longer be able to decode all the PGP-based messages, which may have different layers of other material wrapped around them. PGP/MIME is probably one of the better excuses for doing so, as are improved keyring-handling applications. > Earlier, I mentioned that two and a half protocols survived the >day. The remaining one is MSP. It's actually not a bad protocol. Where can we find the new specs for MSP? > It was announced that there will be a free reference implementation >of MSP, available to US citizens. Will it be GAK-enabled? #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com / billstewart(a)attmail.com +1-415-442-2215 # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs Pager +1-408-787-1281

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consent
by amp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: amp * EMC.Ver #2.3 ] -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm not completely sure of the attribution here, as cypherpunks appears to be sending batches of messages to me with grunged From lines. VN> . How exactly is consent extractedH^H^H^H^H^H^ requested? "Government is not reason, it is not eloquence, it is force; like fire, a troublesome servant and a fearful master. Never for a moment should it be left to irresponsible action." G. Washington. Consent is extracted by force of arms. VN> . When exactly is consent identified? I believe that the rulers of this country consider the lack of politicians hanging from town squares to indicate implied consent. VN> . How exactly is government applied to the consentees? VN> (caning, jailing, fines, etc.) And death. VN> . How exactly do consentors change methodologies when they VN> suddenly realize that they, too, can be subject to their own device? I'm not sure what you mean by this. If you are asking how the rulers react when they find themselves subject to their own evil devices, I would say that they generally attempt to change the rules. An example of this is that it is almost impossible to sue a federal officials because of the broad immunity to prosecution afforded by current federal law. VN> . Why should non-consenting citizens live with governing methods VN> which in fact conflict with the pursuit of those three human VN> virtues: life, liberty, happiness? Fear of the goverment monopoly of force? VN> Supposedly, government is devised for ruling the "unruly"; a matter VN> for definition and (dis)agreement which can provide endless hours VN> of amusement for authoritarians, especially in court. And those courts can be used to further browbeat the citizens through inconsistant rulings on vaguely written laws. I believe vague laws are one of america's great evils because of the uncertainty they bring. VN> I hear tell that many who are no longer amused are now learning the VN> many uses of encryption. Thus the list. And arming themselves with more lethal munitions as well. Interesting questions. I believe that there is a larger groundswell of resentment here and elsewhere than governments believe. Consider, when breaking federal law is this easy... #!/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL $m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2%Sa 2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*',$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length$n&~1)/2) Then something is _truely_ wrong with the laws. replies to amp(a)pobox.com please. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMS6lIodTfgZXlXydAQEgiAf/ZEqghXk424n4ybj/QXl6yZL21FWvjLJE 37IrvYslw6HLERd3t9k28LC4hUXvhm56c7of3YeUHKsrbTsZyydqrxLE4DaiRkCB mTTkChzvB+LH8V2q5PxMOW/YZQqzcyTnufVQKKHYy68RajLjUErLU5MSl9ICPgMh Kicx04xsueYGPcwD88m5v18uLJPf+LJTZhliqBehHI4Ta7BIi96VgF9lIXfx/GTS FeSru0EMYSn9S82WfnnsZX4sYeVHhvsxWPdRyeFOQHtlJ9hlH6/ehv+94Rzrh2yo s2AoUh/aUfVrZBboCiJCDF9E4gOX1PfsS/Dn9yKo/vW52/cbA1UPjQ== =SjfE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Cypherpunks vs. Coderpunks
by attila 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

** Reply to note from Perry E. Metzger <perry(a)piermont.com> 02/13/96 1:29pm -0500 [snip] = The thing that makes Cypherpunks worthwhile is that its a place where = you could, once, get news updates about GAK, information on the latest = research into cryptography, organize mass key crackings, discuss APIs, = talk a bit about the politics of cryptography, etc. = sounds like we're having the sme problems as "democracy" --it soon becomes irrelevant! example: I was out of town for 6 days: I returned to find 1056 messages in the sorted mailbox! yes: 1056 messages which it took close to an hour to delete almost 800 of them as irrelevant. some you can discard automatically depending on the author, some by content, etc. but I agree: it is clutter. = Now, we get anonymous posters putting up bits on corruption in the = DEA, sections of Tsutomu Shimomura's sex life, and other garbage. I = don't give a damn if you think "Perry's a whining asshole; no one = appointed him God", the stuff I'm mentioning is almost totally = irrelevant to the topic at hand. (I *still* see no relevance to the = late great Kevin Mitnick discussion, and frankly, I don't give a damn = if he's in jail.) I also really am not impressed enough with the = justification for why Jim Bell's "ideas" need to be discussed here. = well, it's probably worthwhile to announce the events, but not to comment ad infinitum on the gossip, the inferences, etc. --as you put it: the sex life of TS, particularly at the expense of one long term member. jim bell had the chance to publish his ideas --I read them --once. I may be an "idealistic anarchist," but they are anarchy after the fact of submission to a government. OK, they have been stated, but further discussion needs to move to another forum. auto-trash filter.... another major part of what I auto-trashed were two 50+ threads on some senseless topics which I have already forgotten. I suspect the poor snake was beaten to death by the BC Fat Lady.... = For some people without jobs (I won't name names) there is no problem = with this. However, some of us have trouble keeping up, and = unfortunately Cypherpunks has content that is key to our work and = interests. = THIS IS THE PROBLEM! Even if you do not have a fixed schedule, are not most of not data miners? It cost me over an hour to trim the message list from 1000+ to 200+. WE NEED SOME SELF-RESTRAINT. = Sadly, there isn't another place with the momentum where people are a = bit more polite and talk about the same information. = unfortunately, the more publicity we receive, the more extraneous nonsense will be copied or target to us as a group. = Yet. = well, I justify coderpunks since it breaks the ongoing technical discussions away from the mainstream cypherpunks. most of the information appears in cypherpunks itself, but if I must restrict my time, coderpunks comes first = Perry as you say, Perry: 'I don't give a damn if you think "Perry's a whining asshole; no one appointed him God"' I agree: 'I don't give a damn if they think "Attila's a whining asshole; no one appointed him God"' after all, as far as I know, I'm still "nobody" in the overall scheme, even with a Piled higher and Deeper! who _really_ cares what I think? -attila "Fools fear adversity, but the wise man listens only to his conscience; or in other words, "You've got exactly thirty seconds to get off my property before I start shooting, hippie." --Ching Chow cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com

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Re: TIS--Building in Big Brother for a Better Tommorrow
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:02 AM 2/23/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: >At 11:16 PM 2/22/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >>And we should all remember, again, that basic observation: even if "key >>escrow" is needed to recover *stored* files, it sure ain't needed for >>*communications*!! > >If a key is being generated for two way communications, then it should be >generated via a protocol like Diffie-Hellman which leaves no recoverable >knowlege of the key outside the participants, and discarded when the >session is over of frequently, whichever occurs more often. This procedure >will reduce the incentive for rubber hose attacks to recover these keys. I noted long ago that one disadvantage with having a single, standardized encryption chip (like Clipper, even with the key-escrow un-enabled) is that the NSA has plenty of money in its budget to build a fake chip that can be installed during a black-bag job. True, if they could fake one chip they could fake 10, but it's harder to do and the demand for any single kind of chip might drop to one per year. Unfortunately, a sufficiently-complex FPLD would probably sub for anything if it were in the right package...

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"E-Money" is trademarked
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FYI, I learned tonight that Electronic Funds Clearinghouse, Inc., holds the trademark "E-Money" which is licensed to E-Money, Inc. a Delaware Corporation. See the Web page http://www.efunds.com I guess I will have to rename my E-Money mini-FAQ. Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Re: REM_ote
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alex Strasheim <cp(a)proust.suba.com> wrote: >> Marianne Mueller, Java security engineer, also said the chances of such >> hacking occurring are "remote." > >This is the sort of bullshit that gets companies in trouble. Reminds me of this old saying: When you put your head in the sand, do realize what part of your anatomy is most visible to the rest of the world... :) JFA **** OLD KEY: DO NOT USE ANYMORE UNLESS FOR VERIFYING SIGNATURES **** 1024 bits Key ID:57214AED 1995/10/04 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> Key fingerprint = 84 96 76 AE EB 7C AB 15 88 47 87 B0 18 31 74 9F

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"Internet Security: Your Worst Nightmare"
by an44880＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Those were the words beaming on the cover of this week's _Information Week_. The totally worthless article on internet security contained this little gem: Federal Law enforcement agencies, alarmed by the growing threat of Net-related security breaches and crimes, are stepping up their investigations of online intrusions. "We're aware that this is a serious problem for any industry using the Internet," says Jim Freeman, special agent in charge of the FBI's San Francisco office. "The ultimate solution will be through better technology such as encryption, but we will investigate any crimes in which a computer is used as an instrument of intrusion or fraud. Complete with a picture of Freeman standing in front of an American flag. --****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi

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Re: Internet Protest!
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:13 AM 2/23/96 -0600, m5(a)dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) wrote: > Is anybody so seriously delusional >that they imagine poor Bill Clinton having to work his way through all >the mail with elm? It's really not that tough - g/Bill Of Rights/d They're already about half done ..... #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com / billstewart(a)attmail.com +1-415-442-2215 # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs Pager +1-408-787-1281

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Remember, RC4 is now PC1
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:46 PM 2/24/96 GMT, aba(a)atlas.ex.ac.uk wrote: >I don't see any stigma attached with IPG admitting they have a PRNG >seeded with a key, and XORing the PRNG stream with the data - this is >exactly what RC4 does. >From now, instead of saying "RC4" let us say "PC1, (formerly known as RC4)" That will teach them to trademark names. We will forget their names. The net views intellectual property rights as damage and routes around them. Every time you say RC4 without saying "Trademark of some bunch of lawyer scum" you theoretically break the lawyer made law. So let us stop doing it. Serve them right. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: [Off topic] Re: Easy Nuclear Detonator
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:05 PM 2/22/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >Actually, your design still is vulnerable to my objection, as my >objection was specifically to your intermediary chamber concept. > >Your intermediary chamber, if surrounding the blasting cap, is likely to >detonate to one side first, at a right angle to the axis of the chamber >to the explosive assembly. What I anticipated, to tell you the truth, was a long intermediary thin tube (again, 1 mm diameter for concreteness, just as an example) BETWEEN a chamber surrounding the cap, and the secondary chamber. (the secondary chamber would be carefully designed to spread the shock front evenly) I fully intended to avoid all of the possible consequences of weird explosive modes in common blasting caps. What really mystifies me is that you would think somebody who was intelligent enough to be capable of building a bomb could possibly be unaware of the strange behavior of common blasting caps? Do you think we're all stupid out here?!? Last time I talked to Dr. Edgerton in his lab (You _do_ know about Dr. Edgerton, don't you?!? EG+G?), in about 1978 or so, he showed me some interesting pictures he had taken of blasting caps exploding, and the weird patterns they made. Believe me, from that moment onwards I had no illusions about the predictability of the common blasting cap. BTW, the reason Edgerton paid a bit of attention to ME, as opposed to every other lowly undergrad at MIT, was the fact that I did something he had tried many times and failed to do: For my strobe laboratory project, I decided that I was going to photograph a popcorn kernel opening up at 10,000 frames per second. He called it "impossible": I called it a challenge. That is why I did the project. I showed him 11 frames taken a few weeks later. Dr. Edgerton was suitably impressed. >> >1> Interference from the milling shape and accuracy o f the openings to >> >the tubes containing the liquid explosive. >> >> Quantify, quantify. How much of a problem? > >Clever question given that I am without any information as to the exact >shape of your tubes, if they are bowled down towards the explosive >assembly, or what their exact width (excepting your vague 1mm figure) >might be. You make some guesses as to material, but these two are fairly >flimsy even by your own admission. I don't expect you to be able to "use ESP" and anticipate all the exact mistakes somebody could make. Rather, you should be willing to accept the principle, and explain how much inaccuracy is "too much," and try to give an example of an error that would produce an inaccuracy of this magnitude. So far you've done none of this. I have to conclude you were simply trolling, or intentionally spreading FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt) without genuinely trying to get involved in an interesting hypthetical idea. BTW, while I do indeed consider this as purely hypothetical, on the offchance you're a FUDmeister from the government, you should be aware that _I'm_ fully aware that while the main form of radioactive emanation from Pu-239 is alphas which can be stopped by a piece of paper or a few inches of air, I am also fully aware that the decay produces a substantial quantity of gamma radiation (whose exact wavelengths and energies I can easily look up in my trusty CRC Handbook). So don't bother flying an airplane equipped with a gamma ray detector over my house; while I haven't the inclination to do the calculations, were it important to do so I'd calculate the minimum thickness of lead required to reduce the gamma intensity to below-background levels (using gamma-ray cross section tables and the appropriate equations), double or triple it, _and_ ensure that anything I did manage to acquire would be invisible to even a secretly-placed nearby detector at all times. And I'm also fully aware of ground-penetrating SAR (and the possibility of mobile variants) and JSTARS and terahertz radar, etc, so don't bother scanning. >All you need to realize to appreciate the problem is that if you do not >have a precisely milled end, with a precise depth into the compressing high >explosive outer face, you have differences in how and when the various >faces of the explosive assembly are going to initiate. If you make your >tubes narrow, it becomes very hard to mill the ends of your tubes, and if >you widen the tubes, it exagerates the distortive effect of >irregularities in the tube ends. But you should be able to estimate the magnitude of the errors. Given a certain detonation velocity, for example, and assuming some sort of localized slowdown/speedup to to this velocity, you should be able to estimate (even if only accurate to a factor of 2-3) the amount of error present at that particular junction. Again, the fact that you have never done even this rudimentary analysis is quite telling. You've revealed nothing that I wasn't aware of, and that was apparently quite intentional. >I'm not in the business of designing nuclear initiators. I expose poorly >thought out explosive engineering as a hobby. Your best solution is to >mill each tube exactly alike, right down the the degree of bend and slope >of arc as well as shape of either end. But you could have figured that >out without me spelling it our for you. More likely, I would have velocity-tested sample configurations down to 10 nsec accuracy, which would have revealed any unexpected error sources from temperature and/or pressure variation, as well as mechanical considerations such as bent tubing, etc... [stuff deleted] >But they don't. The timing problem is quite significant. Why do you >think high speed and superaccurate switches are so well guarded? There >isn't an easy grassroots substitute, if there were, the switches would be >fairly useless. Maybe that's the secret. I already anticipated this. If it's the government's motivation to keep "terrorists" from trying to build a bomb, then their first line of defense might be to make it appear more difficult than it really is. They also know that secrets which are actually turned into running, installed hardware eventually leak to the public, meaning that it might actually be better to keep THEIR bombs complicated, and to not use simplifying hardware. >> >Remember, kryonic switiches are necessary even when dealing with the >> >speeds of electric conductivity. The velocities of even hydrazine based >> >explosives are signigicantly lower. The margin for error is similarly lower. >> >> How low? Be specific. > >Again, I don't know what your dimentions are. Hydrazine explosives tend >to detonate around 8500-10000 m/s. The speed of transmission of electric >impulses through a given conductive medium is certainly much higher. Why do you keep mentioning "hydrazine explosives" when I didn't? Are you some sort of "one-trick pony"? > >> >Plutonium gun is still the easiest method for the home grown nuclear >> >device, even if it requires more fissile material. >> >> The "gun" design wasn't used with the plutonium, because IT WOULD NOT HAVE >> WORKED! "Fat Man," the bomb dropped on Nagasaki, used the implosion method. >> "Little Boy," the gun-method bomb, used U-235. Plutonium detonates far too >> rapidly to use the "gun" method. The >> scientists knew that in 1945. You seem to be at least 50 years behind the >> times. > >You are correct this time. My fault. Uranium should have been in there. >Typo on my part. Finally! He's able to admit a MISTAKE! >Hey, be my guest. If you had a critical mass worth of plutonium you're >playing around with the wrong list, and, I might add, wasting your time >with anything but the black market for the material. If I had some, or for that matter if I even wanted some, would I be advertising the fact on an "NSA-required-reading" list BEFORE I'd done all this work?

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