December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: More FUD from First Virtual
by Ed Carp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> > Subject: Re: More FUD from First Virtual > To: khijol!netcom.com!ecarp(a)homeport.org > Date: Sun, 10 Dec 1995 13:08:29 -0500 (EST) > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List) > Ed Carp wrote: > > | Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> > | > jim bell wrote: > | > > | > [Good points about cost of transactions deleted] > | > > | > | The answer, I think, it that there would be no problem finding people to > | > | take that risk in exchange for the return, ESPECIALLY if they have some > | > | input into the design (level of security) of the system. They might insist > | > | on 2048-bit RSA keys, instead of 1024-bit, for example. > | > > | > (I know its only an example, but...) > | > > | > Key length is not what is needed for better security; more > | > solid code and better interfaces are needed. (I might also argue for > | > hardware keys that are more difficult to steal..) > | > | Nonsense. The code is pretty solid, the interfaces aren't very > | difficult. What is needed is better human management of keys. Why > | brute-force, why look for weak keys, why bother calculating how much > | safer 2047-bit keys are rather than 1024-bit keys when someone can > | look on your HD and find your secret key, when they can open your > | desk drawer and find your pass phrase or password, when they can > | guess that you used your wife's maiden name as your password? > | > | Adam, I don't understand why you wrote nonsense in the first > | paragraph, then followed it up with textbook attacks such as: > > I use PGP becuase its pretty good, but if I was going to trust > all my money to it, I'd want better code (especially in key > management. And the Mac port needs a few man months of work. ;) I > don't know how solid the code is in the ecash client. I do know that > Netscape & Microsoft can't seem to ship decent code. (This is a > reflection of the way the industry has evolved; the first system to > require a bigger processor due to creeping featuritis gets the most > market share. Quality of code seems to be unimportant.) No flame at > Netscape here; they're doing what the market, conditioned by MS to > never expect bug free code, seems to want. As I understand it, the problems in the code aren't the result of the underlying algorithm being flawed, but a flawed implementation, especially in the areas of key management, RNG, and the amount of information revealed in the final encrypted product. As far as anyone can tell (unfortunately, as BS pointed out, we don't have the mathematical tools to prove one way or the other that RSA or BBS or any of that algorithmical "stuff" is secure or not) the algorithms are secure. The problem can almost always be traced back to either a poor implementation or poor QA/QC, something that TQM and all the current management buzzwords are going to do nothing to fix. > Further, the interfaces are not decent. Ever tried teaching > your mother to use PGP? I have a lot of smart freinds; a lot of them, > while understanding how easy it is to read mail in transit, haven't > found a PGP front end thats easy enough to use that they will use it. I wasn't referring to the user interface, I was referring to the code interface, but I'll comment on the user interface. For most people, crypto is *hard* to understand. If it's easy to understand, you're probably making a LOT of assumptions about key management for your user, and some of those are almost certainly going to be bad ideas - that's why PGP gives you such flexibility. If you want to shoot yourself in the foot with PGP, Phil will certainly let you, but not without warning you first. IMO, taking the complexity out of the key management process will almost certainly lead to designers and programmers making bad decisions about how the process should work, and that's going to lead to a whole host of problems, most of which will come home to roost at PZ's doorstep. Yes, you and I and most people on this list know that this is bullshit, but you'd be amazed at what people will believe - witness the "ASCII virus" crap we all had to endure a few months back. There were a lot of people who actually believed it. I haven't found *any* PGP code that was well-integrated into anyone's mailer (including my own). Maybe the code for Pegasus is different - I certainly hope so. I, as well as many people, have got wrapper scripts around vi and emacs and pico that will do automatic encryption/decryption/signing for elm and pine, but that's not Windows. If I could get my mother to use UNIX, she'd find that she can send and receive encrypted/signed email as easily as she can unencrypted/unsigned email - the back-end work has all been done for her. The problem is, she'd rathet "do Windows" - the overall OS interface (if one can all Windows an OS) is a *lot* easier to work with and understand than UNIX is. So, she's stuck with Pegasus and Eudora and such - and no way to do encryption and signing without having to go to a lot of trouble. > (This is not an invitation to send me your favorite GUI to PGP > (although if anyone has a web page of all/most of them, with reviews & > comments and maybe even screen shots, I'd like the URL.) I would, too... :)

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Re: Still more on the Digicash protocol
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: futplex(a)pseudonym.com (Futplex) It seems to me that end-to-end encryption is not significantly more important for remailed messages. Really, there's less information in the message when it emerges from the last remailer, so there's less to protect than in the ordinary case. Furthermore, it may not even be feasible, since I may not have a public key I can associate with my correspondent. ------------------------------------------ A possible solution: the correspondent generates a new public key and sends it as part of the transaction. The key is then wiped afterward. Sorry if this isn't possible due to something that I've misunderstood. -Allen

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Re: Free calls to Govt (fwd)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been told that number is out of date. Since I forgot to save it, would someone who did check and find out? Thanks, -Allen

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Re: Warning about Pegasus Mail and PGP (fwd)
by Adam Hupp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where can you get the Open Encryptor PGP interface? -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQBtAzCNppQAAAEDALhWZl7IuGZ9zZT5bACo0b/1L0Nv0C72vKHIO3IHh+cwpHHa 2Ozb9aeO0UvXGwkkZIYgUm0EvmzKh7yb1GTLvBp5kXpR3I9w+Yj4LGlBDERpUWw6 x4ED49pwDnz1Hl5FBQAFEbQYYXNoIDxhaHVwcEBwcmltZW5ldC5jb20+ =PtJK -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Windows .PWL cracker implemented as a Word Basic virus
by daw＠quito.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <95Dec10.175318edt.1732(a)cannon.ecf.toronto.edu>, SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N <sinclai(a)ecf.toronto.edu> wrote: > My understanding was that MD4 had been broken once, at the cost of > much computer time. Not *that* much computer time... In my copy of Hans Dobbertin's paper, the abstract says ``An implementation of our attack allows to find collisions for MD4 in less than a minute on a PC.'' As far as I know, the difficulty of inverting MD4 is still an open problem -- but why would you want to use a broken algorithm like MD4 when you can use MD2, MD5, or SHA? - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMMtrRCoZzwIn1bdtAQGQwQF+JlWjDgMCs+Y6nO/tUzrXcd9wJCrTLHx2 NlC+1bHspTvJSXSD29M73rfeyOfWOTtQ =4jl6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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mailing List
by John H. Wynne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please put me on your mailing list

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[NOISE] REQ: "Markov" filter as recently posted in .shar form
by Damaged Justice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Apologies, but I already tried all standard net searches on this. Someone recently posted a .shar archive for a program called Markov, which filters input Usenet posts and outputs a reasonable facsimile of that person's "style". (It was posted in one of the "Alice" threads, in response to the claim that posting styles could be a unique form of identification.) I also looked on the archives at hks.net, but had no luck there. If some kind person will post it again, I'll give it a home on my page of WWW resources. I have the binary, and am impressed and amused enough to keep it for regular use.. anyone for alt.usenet.kooks.markov? -- http://yakko.cs.wmich.edu/~frogfarm ...for the best in unapproved information EmmaGoldmanCamillePagliaMarieCurieAynRandSapphoDianaToriAmosPJHarvey&Demona Hate, hate your enemies save, save your friends find, find your place I feel a groove comin' on | speak..speak the truth | Freedom...yeah, right.

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GAK Query
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steven Miller, in his "Civilizing Cyberspace," remarks in his coverage of encryption issues that: ... the Administration is trying to split the [GAK] opposition by working with private industry groups on compromise escrow strategies that would let government agents see the contents of decoded messages without getting access to the escrowed key itself. [p. 306] Does anyone know more about this tactic, whether it is being pursued, or the legal and technical procedures for decoding and seeing the messages? As previously noted here: Civilizing Cyberspace: Policy, Power and the Information Highway Steven E. Miller (CPSR Board) Addison Wesley, 1996 ISBN 0-201-84760-4

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Re: NSA rigs Crypto machines according to Balto Sun
by Ulf_Moeller＠public.uni-hamburg.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

pcw(a)access.digex.net (Peter Wayner) writes: >So, is this what happened at Crypto AG? Is this what happened at Netscape? What happened to Crypto AG is that they are -- at least partly -- *owned* by the German secret service BND. I'll try to give a rough translation of a section from a book by Erich Schmidt-Eenboom: "The BND would like to put a Clipper chip of their own, an exclusive federal German back-door, into the encryption devices delivered abroad. Rumors are persistent that this already happens -- illegally, of course. For that purpuse, camouflage companies such as the Crypto AG in the Swiss Steinhausen am Zuger are preferredly used. A former Crypto financial manager confirmed to FOCUS magazine: The company's owner is the Federal Republic of Germany. Crypto AG has been delivering crypto devices to armies, polices and secret services in about 120 countries for over 40 years. The enterprise got into the headlines when Crypto employee Hans Buehler was arrested in March 1992 in Iran for threadbare espionage accusations and was released only 9 1/2 months later on bail of one million dollars. The true reasons for the arrest can only be guessed. According to the records of the Bern police, Buehler was classified as a security risk after his release by the west German ministry of defense and then was fired by Crypto AG. The Zuerich lawyer office assigned with indemnification claims, Gloor & Sieger, draws the conclusion that "Iran has been suspecting for some longer time that the crypto deviced delivered by Crypto AG had never or no more conformed with Iranian security needs". Further they state: "It is a fact (...) that for several years, articles kept appearing in the international press reporting decryption of classified messages encrypted with Crypto devices". Some signs indicate that the suspection that Crypto devices have been manipulated on purpuse is not at all out of place. During his arrest in Iran, Buehler has been interrogated about reports in news articles of the above kind for months. Crypto devices have been tested and certified by the BND central office for encryption affairs and later by the BSI. In addition to that: After the murder of exile politician Bachtiar by an Iranian death commando in Paris, the BND decrypted an encrypted radio message by the Iranian secret service VEVAK at no effort." German original: From: frank(a)artcom.de (Frank Rieger) Newsgroups: de.org.ccc Subject: Crypto AG (Behördenverschlüsselung) Date: Wed, 28 Jun 1995 15:13:31 +0200 Organization: ART + COM Lines: 26 Distribution: world Message-ID: <frank-2806951513310001(a)penny.artcom.de> In der Liste der Firmen die Verschlüsselungsgeräte für Behörden anbieten war auch die Crypto AG in der Schweiz. Zu dieser Firma fand ich gerade eine interessante Textstelle in (1): "Den eigenen Clipper-Chip, das exklusive bundesdeutsche Hintertuerchen, wuerde der BND gerne in Verschluesselungsgeraete einbauen die ins Ausland geliefert werden. Hartnaekig haelt sich das Geruecht, dass dies manchmall bereits geschieht - illegalerweise, versteht sich. Dabei bedient man sieh hevorzugt Tarnfirmen wie etwa der Crypto AG im schweizerischen Steinhausen am Zuger . Eine Firma, von der ein Ex-Crypto-Finanzmanager gegenueber der Zeitschrift FOCUS bestaetigte: Besitzer der Firma ist die Bundesrepu blik. Die Crypto AG ruestet seit Ueber 40 Jahren Armeen, Polizei und Geheimdienste in rund 120 Laendern mit Verschluesselungsgeraeten aus. In die Schlagzeilen geriet das Unternehmen, als der Crypto-Mitarbeiter Hans Buehler unter fadenscheinigem Spionagevorwurf im Maerz 1992 im lran verhaftet wurde und erst neuneinhalb Monate spaeter gegen Zahlung einer Kaution von einer Million Dollar freikam. Ueber den wahren Grund der Verhaftung lassen sich nur Vermutungen anstellen. Laut Akten der Berner Polizei wurde Buehler nach seiner Haftentlassung vom westdeutschen Verteidigungsministerium als Sicherheitsrisiko eingestuft und daraufhin von der Crypto AG entlassen. Das mit Schadenersatzfarderungen betraute Zuericher Anwaltsbuero Gloor & Sieger kommt in einem Schriftsatz zu dem Schluss, "dass der Iran schon seit laengerer Zeit den Verdacht hegte, dass die von der Crypto AG gelieferten Chiffriergeraete den iranischen Sieherheitsbeduerfnissen nicht oder nicht mehr entspraechen". Weiter heisst es :"Tatsache ist (. . .), dass ueber mehrere Jahre hinweg immer wieder Artikel in der internationalen Presse erschienen sind, welche von der angehliehen Dekryptierung von klassitizierten Meldungen, welche mit Crypto-Geraeten chiffriert worden sind, berichten." Einige Indizien deuten darauf hin dass der Verdacht, Crypto-Geraete seien mit Absicht manipuliert worden, keineswegs abwegig ist. Ueber Berichte in Zeitungsartikeln der erwaehnten Art wurde Buehler waehrend seiner Haft im Iran ueber Monate weg verhoert. Crypto-Geraete sind von der BND-Zentralstelle fuer Chiffrierwesen und spaeter vom BSl geprueft und abgenommen worden. Hinzu kommt noch folgendes: Nach der Ermordung des Exilpolitikers Bachtiar durch ein iranisches Todeskommando in Paris war es dem BND ein l eichtes, einen verschluesselten Funkspruch des iranischen Geheimdienstes VEVAK zu dechiffrieren." (1): Schmidt-Eenboom, Erich: Die schmutzigen Geschäfte der Wirtschaftsspione; ECON Verlag 1994, S. 230f. (OCR-&Konvertierungsfehler vorbehalten)

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Paul Kocher's timing attack
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Paul Kocher's brutally clever timing attack against on-line implementations of RSA, DSA and fixed-exponent Diffie-Hellman is reported on page A1 of Monday's New York Times ("Secure Digital Transactions Just Got a Little Less Secure" by John Markoff). The attack requires only a few thousand ciphertext samples and works against most implementations of public-key cryptosystems in which the attacker can measure accurately the target's computation time for each sample. I think Kocher's paper is online somewhere; I'll post the URL when I find it. -matt

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