December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Phil Z getting through customs
by Brad Shantz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

attila <attila(a)primenet.com> wrote: > answer the questions truthfully and they can not detain you??? Not true, I've been detained by Canadian customs for doing just that. Everything went reasonably smoothly thanks to the customs officials lack of knowledge of NAFTA. However, one of my travelling partners had trouble with customs due to ...hmmm... their lack of knowledge of NAFTA. > Rule 1: smile regardless of the adversity That's a good rule for things other than customs dealings. > Rule 2: other than the three questions on the form, say nothing I was asked if I had any eggs. I still don't know why. > Rule 3: never use LA or Dulles -pick an airport with humans. Never use the airport in Ottawa, Ontario from out of the country. Fly to Detroit and get on a bus. Drive across the border to Windsor, Ont. Then, you can fly to Ottawa and not deal with customs at the airport. Later, Brad

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Re: [noise] The economics of super-stars - partial cite
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:55 PM 1/13/96 -0800, Rich Graves wrote: > Title refers to Sendero Luminoso, a particularly bizarre Maoist cult that > has been brutally repressed by Fujimori in recent years. Your use of the word "brutal" in this context is a little odd. Since Sendero Luminoso are extraordinarily cruel terrorists and mass murderers, it is entirely proper and appropriate for Fujimoro to attempt to physically exterminate them. Possibly what you meant to imply is that Fujimoro failed to make adequate distinction between support for the political ideas of terrorists, and actual participation in terror. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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ITAR Re-write ?
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friend, Bloomberg, the business news agency, reports 01 12 96: The U.S. Commerce Department will recommend easing export controls on encryption software after a study by the department and the National Security Agency found that American firms are being hurt.... The report's release came on the same day federal pro- secutors dropped a three-year investigation...of...Philip Zimmerman.... The government study comes a week after [the Computer Systems Policy Project] released [its] own study showing ...American companies will lose [maybe $60 billion] in U.S. computer system sales expected in 2000.... The 13-member Project ...includes International Business Machines...and AT&T.... Perhaps the let-go of Zimmerman is less a triumph of right than of might? But economic might is not the only kind of might: [Easing export controls] may pit Brown's department a- gainst U.S. defense and spy agencies.... So... [Commerce Secretary] Brown said his department will pre- pare recommendations for easing [ITAR] controls that should be forwarded to the president "within a few months." Meaning: the 13 Project members should be prepared to pay through the nose in the runup to the '96 gala. And just so they get the big picture: It's unclear if the NSA, the super-secret eavesdropping agency, endorsed the Commerce Department's conclusions in the report it jointly prepared. The newsstory reports ...federal prosecutors dropped [the Zimmerman] investiga- tion without explanation.... No explanation's required. One hostage was released. 13 others were taken. But the one release does afford the new hostages, who have deep pockets, some hope... Cordially, Jim NOTE. The newsstory's headline? COMMERCE'S BROWN PROPOSES REWRITE OF ENCRYPTION EXPORT CONTROLS. Its dateline? WASHINGTON (Jan 12, 1996 5:34 p.m. EST). Its Nando News online filename? biz6_1893.html

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Re: Reach out! Update 01 (CypherPurists trash this)
by dan＠milliways.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Regarding the *67 feature to disable Caller ID: This does not stop your ANI information from travelling with your call. It just sets the "privacy bit" to on. So standard consumer-grade Caller ID systems won't see your number. But if the user on the other end is receiving your call over a T1, they can use a Dialogic voice processing card to yield your ANI, even with the privacy bit set. A *much* better way to do this is the following: Dial the Operator. Ask him/her to dial the 800 number for you. This will result in your ANI being (000) 000-5555 (or at least that's what it does in Bell Atlantic land). I tested this a couple months ago using AT&T's 1-800-MY-ANI-IS service. I directly dialed 1-800-MY-ANI-IS and it read back my phone number. Then I had the operator dial it for me and got (000) 000-5555. This service doesn't work anymore, YMMV. Dan *************************************************************** #define private public dan(a)milliways.org Worcester Polytechnic Institute and The Restaurant at the End of the Universe ***************************************************************

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Re: Respect for privacy != Re: exposure=deterence?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:02 AM 1/14/96 -0500, s1018954(a)aix2.uottawa.ca wrote: >My apologies for responding to a political post. > >On Sat, 13 Jan 1996, Charlie Merritt wrote: > >> I feel that public exposure >> is enough to put fear into these anonymous government employees. >> You will note that when they get the mad_bomber >> some FBI guy jumps right up and takes credit, live, on TV. >> But when the Air Force orders a $300 toilet seat NO ONE is credited. > >It's interesting how we advocate anonymity for ourselves but not for our >opponents. Feeling righteous? Maybe I don't understand your point, but... 1. Individual private citizens acting on their own deserve privacy and anonymity. 2. Government employees receiving paychecks based on tax dollars stolen from members of the public do not. 3. Individuals not harming others deserve privacy and anonymity. 4. Government employees threatening citizens with large fines and jail time, for doing what we consider right and good, do not. Get the picture?

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Re: New! Improved! CryptoLib 1.1 now available.
by David Vincenzetti 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Announcing CryptoLib - Release 1.1 12/21/95 > Jack Lacy, AT&T Bell Labs > > CryptoLib is a portable and efficient library of primitives > for building cryptographic applications. It runs under most versions > of Unix as well as DOS, Windows and Windows-NT (and 95). > > We are pleased to make CryptoLib source code available without charge > to researchers and developers in the US and Canada. (Because of export > restrictions on cryptographic software, we are only able to make the > software available within the US and Canada to US and Canadian citizens > and US permanent residents.) also available in Europe as: ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/math/cryptolib_1.1.tar.gz Ciao, David

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Fwd: Scrambled software gets an OK
by thad＠hammerhead.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This was printed in the San Jose Mercury News this morning. I'd have just posted a pointer to it, except that it was in the "private" part of their web pages... Scrambled software gets an OK -- Exports: Foreign encoding unfair to U.S. firms, Commerce Department says. Bloomberg Business News WASHINGTON -- The Commerce Department will recommend easing export controls on encryption software after a study by the department and the National Security Agency found the restrictions are hurting U.S. firms, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown said. Such a move may pit Brown's department against U.S. defense and spy agencies, however, setting the stage for a White House battle over one of the last computer technologies still covered by export controls. ``I'm interested in promoting American exports,'' Brown said. ``If your foreign competitors are exporting products with encryption capability and you are not, that puts you at a tremendous competitive disadvantage,'' he said. Encryption software turns information, such as files and credit card numbers, into indecipherable material that can be sent across networks without fear of tampering to the recipient, who can then unscramble it. Under current U.S. law, encryption technology that exceeds certain technical thresholds is considered a ``munition.'' Those who would export such technology need explicit permission from the government. The United States justifies the export restrictions by saying law-enforcement agencies would be hamstrung in their efforts to stop terrorists, spies and criminals without them. The computer industry counters that encryption software is available from other countries, and the restrictions simply rob U.S. companies of business. The Computer Systems Policy Project, a joint effort of 13 top technology companies released its own study showing that U.S. companies will lose as much as 30 percent of the $200 billion in U.S. computer system sales expected in 2000 because of federal laws limiting exports of encryption products. Brown said his department will prepare recommendations for easing those controls that should be forwarded to the president ``within a few months.'' It's unclear if the NSA endorsed the Commerce Department's conclusions in the report it jointly prepared. Representatives of the NSA were unavailable for comment. Brown's assertion comes a day after federal prosecutors dropped a three-year investigation of Boulder, Colo., software designer Philip Zimmermann, whose encryption program called Pretty Good Privacy was posted on the Internet, the worldwide computer network. Published 1/13/96 in the San Jose Mercury News. -- Thaddeus Beier thad(a)hammerhead.com Technology Development 408) 286-3376 Hammerhead Productions http://www.got.net/~thad

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Mailing List
by Joseph Halstead 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to be included in your mailing list. jhdeval(a)soho.ios.com

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Re: Digital postage and remailer abuse
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Thus bespoke Alan Bostick: > >The very nature of this attack makes me wonder whether it would be >worthwhile to implement a digital postage scheme for remailers that >doesn't happen to be backed by real money. The remailers would continue >to be free to use, and currency exchange hassles would be avoided, but >many of the benefits of abuse prevention would be in place. So would >the infrastructure to upgrade to pay-to-play remailers at a later date. Doing something like this might also further the analogy of email to snailmail; particularly if the remailers were able to issue 'books' of stamps. It might even be possible to have each remailer issue Estamps (tm) of different 'kinds', much as there are different postage stamp 'themes'. Having different stamps from each remailer would also allow some means of tracking spammers and rip-off artists ("hmmm. an 'Elvis' Estamp. That came from hactic; let's see if they can tell us who they sold this book to.....") IF the nature of the offense were sever enough. Too, Estamp-based remailers would be a start on reputation basing: if the email goes through a postage-based remailer, there will eventually be an increased level of confidence that it isn't some kind of scam or other nuisance ("This came through vox, a postage remailer; therefore, someone had to go through some degree of bother; therefore, it's a lot less likely that it's some Frosh playing with his new Internet toy."). Of course, I could be just spitting into the wind, or posting what is blatantly obvious to everyone else :-) Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMPcwgcVrTvyYOzAZAQGK7wP+JItfxqHI/JGIKjPu9Yy7v1gVJQJTK+Bh hV/z4C22hoRweo1jnBrO47GSfjB3aJIrufPjzlm94sRyh/EM1AAGbFWEY/M30Oye fEN6paETcrE6W7arxJPZJFm2IggWYNgNrqwxToA3ZLFmC/8Sv1gH0y7PqNHxjFbz MEL/vQGpd54= =Su5o -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------- "It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into error." Robert H. Jackson (1892-1954), U.S. Judge <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> My web page: http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1148

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Re: Digital postage and remailer abuse (was Re: Novel use of Usenet and remailersto mailbomb from luzskru@cpcnet.com)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:47 PM 1/13/96, Alan Bostick wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >In article <v02120d02ad1ce02500bc(a)[192.0.2.1]>, >shamrock(a)netcom.com (Lucky Green) wrote: > >> I am not sure that postage would solve this problem. The geeks would >> individually pay for it. Still, nominal postage would solve a lot of the >> problems that plague remailnet. > >Maybe I'm misunderstanding how using digital postage with remailers would >work. I was assuming that the postage stamp would be included *inside* >the encrypted envelope, that what the remailer would do on receipt of >mail would be: (a) decrypt the envelope; (b) validate the postage stamp; >and (if the stamp is valid) (c) forward the message according to the >now-decryped instructions. The basic idea of digital postage means, as Lucky said, that individual users and individual messages would have their own stamps. (Being just numbers, it is certainly possible that multiple messages could have the same exact "stamp," but then only one of them would be valid...in the model I usually think in terms of, the first to "redeem" the stamp gets the money, all others get nothing.) So, each transmitter of a message would have to "pay the freight" with his own stamp. The idea of N different messages all carrying the "same" stamp is inconsistent with how digital postage would operate in practice. >Using this model, if the perpetrator doesn't include a postage stamp, >then the message is ignored. If the perp includes a stamp, the first >horny net geek's message is relayed but subsequent ones get bounced for >invalid postage. Yes. >If the message requires external postage (remailer processing cycle is >process postage *before* decrypting envelope), then at the very least >the horny net geeks have to get their own postage stamps, putting a step >in the way of instant gratification. What's more, doing this would >require *some* understanding of how the remailer network operates. One >should never underestimate the degree of cluelessness present on the >net, but knowing how to use remailers makes it more likely that somebody >could recognize this as a mailbomb rather than a legitimate offer. Yes. >The very nature of this attack makes me wonder whether it would be >worthwhile to implement a digital postage scheme for remailers that >doesn't happen to be backed by real money. The remailers would continue >to be free to use, and currency exchange hassles would be avoided, but >many of the benefits of abuse prevention would be in place. So would >the infrastructure to upgrade to pay-to-play remailers at a later date. I think someone tried this a couple of years ago, offering coupons for remailer use. The idea of "coupons" acting as stamps is the one most often discussed as an alternative to having full convertability to money. A person buys a block of numbers, each can be used once and only once. It's up to the user not to let the numbers out of his possession (as they can be used by whoever gets them). So long as the numbers are in the outer encrypted envelope, packet sniffers and sysadmins won't see them. So long as the remailer operator is honest enough not to claim the numbers have already been used--a reasonable assumption, at least at this time--then this should work. Coupons also get around laws about cash, banking, etc. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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