December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Zimmermann case is dropped.
by Frank Stuart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since there is no longer an ongoing investigation, perhaps now would be a good time to file FOIA requests to see if there is evidence of the Justice Department acting improperly. | (Douglas) Hofstadter's Law: Frank Stuart | It always takes longer than you expect, even fstuart(a)vetmed.auburn.edu | when you take into account Hofstadter's Law.

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Re: E-cash and Interest
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:52 PM 1/11/96, Ryan Lackey wrote: <SNIP> >By integrating all of these services under Mark Twain Bank Ecash Mint, I >would get all of the advantages of a rather pricey bank, 4-5% loss on all >my deposits, minimal privacy protection, no FDIC protection, $2500 ^^^^^ >initial deposit (not a problem for me, but it does keep many of the >people I'd like to send money to out of the system..always a feature), >and _tens_ of places to spend my ecash, only 4 or 5 of which that really >sell things. > Where do people keep getting this number. I have an account, my initial deposit was $36 ($11 for startup and $25 to play with). >-- >Ryan Lackey -*- ryan(a)pobox.com -*- http://www.netaxs.com/people/ryan/ -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re:NSA
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMPVGgyoZzwIn1bdtAQG/1wGAwFELRklL0jv58QWSXMg8Z+OUNPX1OtXJ UaI51iIBh2IjH1hggHtyMUi1B6xrlbmo =h/+n -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Domains, InterNIC, and PGP (and physical locations of hosts, to boot)
by tim＠dierks.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:00 AM 1/10/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >At 11:15 PM 1/6/96 -0500, Michael Handler <grendel(a)netaxs.com> wrote: >> ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1876.txt >>Again, I'm not too sure of the viability of this proposal. Not on >>effectiveness of proving true location -- it is more geared toward >>"visual 3-D packet tracing" -- but simply because I have _no_ fricking >>idea where our machines are (in terms of lat and long) to any degree >>of accuracy. > >There are several geography servers on the net, which can tell you >the lat/long for a city (more useful if your city is, say, >Holmdel NJ than if it's Los Angeles.) For what it's worth, you can use the mapping software at <http://tiger.census.gov> to find your location fairly accurately; you may need another map to locate yourself, since the streets are unlabeled. I managed to figure out that I'm currently at latitude 37.3435 degrees, longitude -121.8925 degrees. I think that's correct to within about 100 feet or so. - Tim Anyone with a GPS device, feel free to stop by; I'm in unit A2, and I've got homebrew in the fridge. Tim Dierks - Software Haruspex - tim(a)dierks.org If you can't lick 'em, stick 'em on with a big piece of tape. - Negativland

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Reliance Limits Considered Harmful
by Jueneman＠gte.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Suppose I am a CA. I am worried that by issuing a certificate with a >lifespan of more than 2 milliseconds I am opening myself up to unlimited >liability if for some reason, despite my best efforts, I issue an >erroneous certificate. > >I know I can write disclaimers, but that's not reliable since courts >often ignore them, and anyway it scares off customers. > >I know I can put an expiration date on the certificate, but that's not >enough. I can accumulate a lot of exposure in a few seconds, much less >weeks. > >I know I can put a reliance limit in the X.509 ver 3 certificate, but >that's not enough. Even a $1 limit could be used many millions of times. > >Is it feasabile to say: Can only be relied on once per day/week/month? >Is this something the relying parties can reasonably be expected to monitor? > >It seems to me that this sort of a limit is essential if a CA is to feel >comfortable outside Utah.... > >A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) >Associate Professor of Law | >U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu >P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin >Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here. > I have been troubled from the first with the concept of a reliance limit, in particular because of the problem Prof. Froomkin cites. In the "normal" paradigm for digital signatures, neither the CA nor the relying party(ies) have any knowledge of how many times that particular certificate/key has been used. As a result, there are few if any controls that would operate to enforce the notion of a reliance limit. Even in the electronic credit card environment where there is some sort of a closed loop system (the purchases are reported back to the Issuing Bank, and presumably would be or could be known by the CA, which is probably acting as an agent of the bank), there are some substantial problems. The first problem is one of privacy. If I have a very high credit limit, I certainly don't want to advertise that fact in a public certificate. On the other hand, if I have a low limit, I don't want to advertise that either. And in any case, the reliance limit is not intended to be a "floor limit", i.e., an amount below which it is not required to contact the credit card company for authrotization. (Floor limits used to be popular, especially in Europe where the cost of telecommuncations was high. But now almost all transactions are authorized against the customer's current balance and credit limit, and if the merchant doesn't check he can be stuck with the charge if the customer doesn't pay.) I have argued (quite unsuccessfully in the credit card community) that the reliance limit can provide a useful means of limiting the subscriber's exposure (as well as the CA's) in the event of a security compromise affecting the subscriber's private key. Since there are no perfect computer security solutions available at any price, much less an affordable price, both the subscriber and the CA have to make a tradeoff between their risks and the rewards of greater convenience, etc. I tried to get around the privacy issue in the credit card environment by treating a negative reliance limit as a percentage of the customer credit limit. But no one in the credit card industry was convinced, and maybe I'm not either. The concept of a reliance limit is enshrined in the Utah Digital Signature statute (and the ABA draft Digital Signature Guidelines), where it is wrapped up with a draconian requirement that registered CAs have to put up a surety bond or irrevocable letter or credit in the amount of 30% of the aggregate of all outstanding reliance limits. This is not just an insurance policy -- a CA's corporate assets are pledged to back up the certificates issued, not withstanding the fact that the identification system we have in this country is not sufficiently reliable to warrant such representations. And surely no CA is going to hire private investigators to check out who someone claims to be with sufficient credibility as to be able to issue certificates to individuals -- at least if they intend to charge any kind of a reasonable price for the certificates. In my personal opinion, that requirement in the Utah law makes it highly unlikely that anyone will ever become a registered CA in Utah, unless the reliance limit is set to $1 and/or the expiration period to about 1 millisecond. (Maybe the Utah statute was really trying to set up a lottery, rather than a system for registering CAs. Everyone gets to play, and if you can find a person who has invalid credentials, even if issued through an innocuous clerical error (someone misspelled the street name in someone's address), you can claim you were harmed in some way, sue them big time and collect millions. That's the American way, isn't it? :-) Although X.509 v3 provides a simple mechanism to allow additional attributes, potentially including a reliance limit, to be included in the certificate, there are at present no plans that I know of for any existing CA to actually do so, or more importantly, for anyone else's software to be able to read and comprehend those reliance limits or perform any checking. As a purely technical matter, the problem could be solved by requiring the relying party to validate the transaction (not just the certificate) with the CA in real time. (Checking a CRL database isn't good enough.) By providing a transaction amount, the CA could keep track of the extent of its liability, and could detect misuse. Alternatively, the subscriber could request a new certificate for each one time use. However, both of these "solutions" would require a significant extension to the current mechanisms, and also give rise to a number of privacy issues. In addition, there are other practical problems. If I am the relying party (or the CA), and the subscriber is using his digital signature to confirm an order to sell futures on the commodities market, how can I evaluate the potential risk? If the subscriber is selling futures for orange juice and a storm wipes out all of the orange trees, his losses could be unbounded. Similar situations could exist in the case of a signature on a patent claim, and creative people can probably think of many more cases. Although the notion of a reliance limit usually arises in conjunction with digital signatures, it would presumably apply to certificates used for message encryption, to set up encrypted sessions, etc., as well. This puts the CA in an even more difficult position, for now we are not talking about a (single) financial transaction. If I send an encrypted message to someone, and it turns out that the person who received it was not who he claimed be, I may in fact be greatly harmed. (If the message wasn't important, why would I have encrypted it in the first place. Suits for violation of privacy have resulted in millions of dollars in damages -- does that mean that the CA ought to provide a million dollar reliance limit? My conclusion after having thought about this a lot is that reliance limits are at best ineffective and at worst positively harmful. They are difficult or impossible to enforce in any meaningful way, they raise substantial privacy issues, and at least as codified in the Utah Act and the draft Digital Signature Guidelines they will almost surely act to dissuade any prudent business from setting up a licensed CA. Does this mean that the subscriber, relying party, and CA all have effectively unbounded liability, absent a stated reliance limit? No, I don't think so, but we may have to change our paradigm a little bit. Most people accept a driver's license as providing a degree of proof of someone's identity, but very few would consider it proof positive. Since the state-issued driver's license is the only practical means of identication available to a CA in the case of private individuals, that consitutes the weakest link in the system and is quite likely to remain so. The only other identification document I am aware of that is available to private individuals that provides substantially better identification than a driver's license is a permit to carry a concealed weapon. Here in Massachusetts, obtaining a pistol permit requires a trip to the local police station, where you are photographed, fingerprinted, and two or more affidavits concerning your character are reviewed prior to submitting your fingerprints and picture to the FBI, where a search of the NCIC database is used to determine if you have any prior arrests, etc. The permit card that is issued carries your residence or business address, your picture, fingerprint, date and place of birth, height, weight, complexion, hair color, eye color, and occupation. Since the Brady Bill was passed, I believe that many states have set up similar systems. (Of course many jurisdictions sharply limit who can actually receive a weapons permit. I'm only describing the process, not debating the reasonableness or unreasonableness of gun controls.) Even if state laws were amended to make this degree of identification assurance available for purposes other than weapons permits, many if not most people would have strong reservations about the privacy implications. And to the best of my knowledge, private companies are not allowed to access the NCIC, also for privacy reasons. Does all this mean that digital signatures are worthless? No, not at all. But it does mean that they are unlikely to convey a degree of surety as to someone's identity that is very much stronger than a driver's license identification. In my personal opinion, I think we need to establish a stronger degree of "no fault" protection for CAs that follow the rules. Whose rules are to be followed, and who audits them for conformance are valid issues. We clearly don't want irresponsible CAs issuing certificates to all and sundry, but we can't make the cost of entry into the business so high that no one takes on the burden of being a CA at all. The issue is how to balance risks, the costs, and the rewards equitably between the subscriber, the relying party, and the CA. In the case of the credit/debit card industry, the credit card companies charge a fee that covers both the risk and their administrative costs. If digital signatures can be used to reduce their risks, presumably the fees charged to the merchants can be reduced somewhat. But in any case, the fee that is charged is proportional to the amount of the transaction, and therefore statistically covers the risk. The real question is what to do outside of the credit card industry, where certificates may be used for transactions are much more complex, and where there may not be the infrastructure to collect a percentage fee for each use. Please copy me directly on any replies, as (to the best of my knowledge) I am not a subscriber to cypherpunks. Bob ---------------------------- Robert R. Jueneman GTE Laboratories 1-617-466-2820 "The opinions expressed are my own, and may or may not reflect the official position of GTE, if any."

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Re: Domains, InterNIC, and PGP (and physical locations of hosts, to boot)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:22 PM 1/11/96 -0800, you wrote: >For what it's worth, you can use the mapping software at ><http://tiger.census.gov> to find your location fairly accurately; you may >need another map to locate yourself, since the streets are unlabeled. I >managed to figure out that I'm currently at latitude 37.3435 degrees, >longitude -121.8925 degrees. I think that's correct to within about 100 >feet or so. > > - Tim > >Anyone with a GPS device, feel free to stop by; I'm in unit A2, and I've >got homebrew in the fridge. About 10 years ago, I bought a Loran unit from Heath, and (due to my association with some people who did laser photoplotting for PC boards) had a program written which generated a "LAT/LON" map plastic overlay. Apply over a USGS 7.5 minute map, and you can read LAT/LON directly. (It only needed to be photoplotted once, of course: positive contact printing duplicated it easily.) Only one problem: Since the width of longitude changes with latitude, a given map overlay can only be "exactly" accurate at one latitude. Still, it made estimating LAT/LON FAR easier.

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Minor correction about tax rates and witholding
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:21 PM 1/11/96, Gary Howland wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >> you think that's a bit ridiculous? i'm paid via an NIH grant given to my >> adivisor by the govt. this stipend is taxed. it didn't used to be >> (started to be taxed around '86 i believe). why the hell doesn't the >> govt just save everyone the trouble and pay me less. i'm sure they could >> get rid of a couple of IRS people this way. > >It's even sillier over here in Europe, and the paperwork is probably .. I didn't comment when the first remark was made, several days ago, but if others are going to elaborate on it, I will now comment. The government cannot simply take its cut before sending the stipend/salary for a very good reason: they don't know the final tax rates of the taxpayers! Some people will end up paying no taxes, for whatever reasons (low overall wages, lots of deductions and dependents, offsetting capital losses, etc.). Others will pay 20%, and some may even pay more (doubtful, on a stipend, but you get the point). Clearly the government cannot simply "withold" 15%, say, nor can it know in advance the precise amount to withold. A flat tax rate would make this more possible, but would still not be completely accurate. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Got this off the web - it's a link to the letter that Phil got from the US attorney: http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/usatty_pgp_011196.announce U.S. Atty. DROPS PGP INVESTIGATION! - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp(a)linux.org, ecarp(a)netcom.com 214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager 800/558-3408 SkyPager Finger ecarp(a)netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744(a)anon.penet.fi "Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families, through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a waiting soul. Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'" -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMPXZYyS9AwzY9LDxAQG4BgP+PmA6GoUSMCpnvUfo+1v1MpFX0pdg66jN Foo5yuT+G2fIG1m+K4aVrZusPHhC+tHjx2kaMqn0ZSE9nC8U32blpt01+CE+xgp3 x4q5L6llkyEK4oWSrnjbZImcjm3VIrAiaj8S3+qGfAz3FEZ5ChJZ2Q4J91lsqv5z 3FY/xiKqu60= =Nrr2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Zimmermann case is dropped.
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:29 PM 1/11/96, sameer wrote: > We've made no progress. Phil has lots lots of time and gained >lots of grey hairs, and everyone who donated to his defense fund lost >money. > The US can still harass people if they want, and make their >life hell. Yes, I think it likely that another case will be filed, a case the government senses is more winnable. In many ways, what Phil and/or some of his friends may or may not have done was too "stale." None of the Four Horsemen were involved directly, and Phil's case generated publicity that tended to make him a hero, not an Enemy of the People. I would look for something like a prosecution of a remailer operator, though only after laws are passed making it illegal to remail certain items. (Right now there is no law against redirecting a message, so prosecution would be difficult.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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C2 and the Worst Case
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- First off, this is _not_ a criticism - c2.org provides wonderful services, and I'm budgeting to buy more from them. However, I'm curious. Consider a reasonably worst case, in which ye jack-booted thugges come through the door unannounced, scoop up everything, and haul it off for examination. The question is, how much would they get? How much information about c2 users would fall into the wrong hands? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEPAwUBMPSLo33AXR8sjiylAQEHOgfPQyULO5Ni/4VCZPo8PNLbURy7bgkMG7aw UWeorZr95e8kFA3JA6VxCpmgRmStpeX78ZcN9a35Z0lguRF5+VNddzQYv/ydZxtg u5HP2stit9PG8fyP0SEGrxEVpnbwchOxtUxhuxJ7CZsZfMGWKi6EtXrQ5LhNGSCZ isoShwOXse5/XLHY3JzcrjbSa6PDHxmpwhYbkk8tyi8jQWFDDc+HbncgaC4FZL4V 2tntjx3HPe9Hy92v24K59UnzIpudVqF8f1jX6Z+m7lLzStARkNZwliRjL6pIz8G7 fz2uSXrgbAMVIkK6g9DOP3A48prob7LFnPZmEw4J6gF4fA== =+ZDY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Bruce Baugh bruceab(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~bruceab

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