December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Denning's misleading statements
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:12 PM 1/28/96 -0500, Ben Samman. wrote: >There's quite a few folks in the Yale CS department that are pro-Clipper >or fence sitters. They justify it in class by claiming that law >enforcement needs these abilities if LE is to remain effective. They're quite correct - it's a problem of values and goals, and theirs differ from mine. IF law enforcement is to be effective (at those things it's effective at, like self-preservation and politician-electing), then it WILL need this increase in power. Because otherwise we WILL move to crypto-anarchy. I hope we will anyway, and perhaps the tackiness of the Clipper forces will encourage the general public to get there faster rather than slower. BTW, the reason Swiss banking laws were so strong for so many years was because the Nazis were pressuring bankers to give out information on their Jewish customers... #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs

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pub key
by an253362＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all! Interested in discussing underground matters of cypherpunks. Send your pgp pub key for more privacy. FYI, my pub key: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2i mQCNAzCao3cAAAEEANtplwCQqBOzXFfnHqUj6DCUfxhGPNH4J5/GadrqHjxSboDd E0PEaXqg3JvAxMckmvasugDSK80rzEwgYJspeVuh6Cuq2fLhcFwGi1zn2mDrDlzO 0rQB8+CPj3dc03Eih9h8UvMcPl41VDwdtSV7CYXa5isMqw1fwh4YWpiTx+FtAAUR tAxIZWxsJ3MgQW5nZWyJAJUDBRAw8rfgHhhamJPH4W0BAdezA/9hu5OUg6hiEuJ4 CU2cPdeoesTt8IfyGmAI7QCe5fXnGuNFTDjdlzS7FBUUE13ci5RNBUUs+jUNHeWp ubyNBT0jvZUsTOBsrftrBxCW9PpeqZCXXSpxFx8XOgjdAQmf7a9bAKvq0IWx5/19 0NozRdmy61sBGMzFMNuSayLS3qR7kbQfQW5nZWxvIDxhbjI1MzM2MkBhbm9uLnBl bmV0LmZpPg== =Wv6H -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- --****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi

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[UTTER NOISE]Re: FV Demonstrates Fatal Flaw in Software Encryption of Credit Cards
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> INFORMATION IS INSECURE THE MOMENT YOU TOUCH A KEY. > >> This does not mean that Internet commerce is dead. Any scheme that is >> not based on self-identifying one-way financial instruments such as >> credit cards will be essentially unaffected by this problem. Moreover, >> even credit cards may be made safe on the Internet using one of two >> approaches: secure hardware add-ons and the First Virtual approach. etc. My name for this kind of software: Terminate and Stay Clueless ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw(a)best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995

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Re: Downsizing the NSA
by Karl A. Siil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:18 PM 1/28/96 EST, Dr. Dimitri Vulis wrote: >I went to a talk by Andy Koenig a few weeks ago and he claimed that even >though AT&T is laying off people (and splitting) they're still hiring every >internet/security person they could find. I don't know if this is tacky or politically incorrect for this list (so I'll keep it short), ... Speaking for my security group, this is correct. Anyone interested is urged to send me private e-mail. Karl

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 29 Jan 96 6:45:43 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net *+***+* 10:20 99.99% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com +-++++++++++ 44:43 99.99% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org #####*###*## 6:24 99.98% c2 remail(a)c2.org +**+******** 16:42 99.96% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ++-++++--+++ 2:20:51 99.96% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de -+___.-+--++ 13:18:57 99.96% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com ** ###-*#### 3:55 99.94% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org #**** ****** 3:33 99.89% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -------++-+ 1:34:41 99.83% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *#+ *+*+-+## 17:44 99.82% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com *## # #*#+*# 2:10 99.72% hroller hroller(a)c2.org ############ :31 99.53% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi .__--.._ .- 27:57:50 97.03% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net + #+### #### 2:06:45 94.21% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ...-_.-_. 24:28:54 92.68% rahul homer(a)rahul.net *+***--** ## 17:20 99.69% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net +**** +*+* 14:48 83.47% replay remailer(a)replay.com ** 6:00 56.93% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ** 8:12 55.13% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu * 8:49 8.99% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: "German service cuts Net access" (to Santa Cruz)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:43 PM 1/28/96 MET, Olmur wrote: >The difference is, that the German government was not ordering this >block. German prosecutors are sending intimidating messages to various ISPs. Some ISPs are more easily intimidated than others. The messages fall short of saying "You will be prosecuted if you do not obey", but they do say "You may be prosecuted if you do not obey." --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: "German service cuts Net access" (to Santa Cruz)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:08 PM 1/28/96 -0800, sameer wrote: > When I worked for Walnut Creek CDROM they had to remove > "Castle Wolfenstein" from one of their CDs because they wouldn't have > been able to ship to Germany if they didn't. In "Castle Wolfenstein" you run around shooting Nazis, just as in "Doom" you run around shooting demons. And similarly Zundel is not a Nazi, he is an anti fascist. Hmm, these "Anti nazi laws" look suspicious like pro Nazi laws. Seems that the government of Germany is primarily concerned about their own hurt feelings, and to hell with the hurt feeling of the Jews. > >-- >Sameer Parekh Voice: 510-601-9777x3 >Community ConneXion, Inc. FAX: 510-601-9734 >The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 >http://www.c2.org/ (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: "German service cuts Net access" (to Santa Cruz)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:04 AM 1/29/96 -0500, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: >You're actually quoting from an inspired bit of trolling. See my recent >message: "Ernst Zundel impersonator on Usenet" Oops: I guess I should read *all* my cypherpunks mail before I start sending off stuff. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: CP LITE: A Censorship Device?
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think the mail-to-news gateway is better than a "lite" list at this point. On Sun, 28 Jan 1996 03:54:31 -0600, Carol Anne wrote: >I've been watching this CP Lite thing develop. >Sounds like an attempt to moderate the list. >I mean it's easy to post out of it, >but hard to answer to it. >And all of the good back and forth discussion >gets lost in a backwash of private email. >There is just no way I will send someone an >email to a posting they post out of there. >I think that would be a disservice to everyone here. >Love Always, >Carol Anne >-- >Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress >*********************************************************************** >Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 >My Homepage >The Cyberdoc >*********************************************************************** >------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- >M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M >MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ >MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` >------------------------------------------------------------- >for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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Re: Downsizing the NSA
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 28 Jan 1996 02:04:52 -0800, Tim wrote: [..] >However, as Phill notes, the NSA and other intelligence agencies are now in >that most dangerous of positions: a powerful agency or department casting >about for something to do. >Spying on citizens and keeping the keys to their private communications and >diaries is not an appropriate option. >AT&T is downsizing, IBM downsized a while back, so why couldn't the NSA >just do the right thing: admit that the Soviet threat is no more, >congratulate the victors, and downsize by 20,000 employees? Perhaps they are worried about the implications of putting thousands of cryptographers into the private sector? And what if you were one of them? You'd probably have a hard time using or publishing anything classified. Not to mention the usual governmental conflict-of-interest work rules (for low-level employees the standards of who you can work for after leaving the government is a lot stricter than if you were a cabinet member). Just a thought.

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