December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: CFS and Linux
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> AT&T's refusal to support CFS and other so-called "secure" software > under Linux is typical and to be expected. This is the dumbest thread I've ever seen. First of all, AT&T lets Matt distribute CFS and other crypto related tools from an AT&T site. In the current legal environment, I think that's a good show of "support". Second of all, Matt has put in a lot of effort to make CFS usable to Linux users. I have personally gotten help on more than one occaision from Matt with CFS and Linux, and I've seen him answer lots of questions on the CFS users' mail list. Here's an example: when I first started using CFS, the documents were formatted with a macro that wasn't included with the most popular linux distributions. I pointed this out to Matt and took the time to rewrite the docs using a different macro, so Linux users would be able to read it. I'll bet he's done dozens of fixes to make CFS run better on Linux boxes. What's more, Matt recently took the trouble to set up a Linux box for the sole purpose of testing CFS on it. I love Linux and I use it, but the fact that everyone has a slightly different distribution makes it a tough platform to support. As Matt's already pointed out, most of the problems that people have with Linux and CFS seem to stem from a broken rpgen that come with some, but not all, distributions of Linux. Finally, as Perry pointed out, neither Matt nor AT&T owe us anything, so it would be impossible to find fault with Matt even if he hadn't done any work to support Linux. Lots of people run CFS on Linux. I'd even be willing to bet that Linux is the most popular CFS platform, judging from the traffic on the list. If you can't run CFS on your Linux box, you might want to consider the possibility that you don't know what you're doing.

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corporate bashing
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There have been some recent posts here flaming AT&T, Netscape, and people like Matt and Jeff who work for them. These posts seem to come out a paranoid mindset that distrusts any institution with power, and a romantic idea that the cypherpunks are subversive idealists fighting for truth and justice in the face of overwhelmingly powerful opponents. The truth is that several important institutions have contributed a lot to the fight for privacy. That may not be romantic, and it may not fit well with some people's adolescent fantasies, but it is what's actually happened. The New York Times, the most influential paper in America, has consistently argued against censorship on the net. MIT, one of our most prestigious universities, has taken on the free distribution of strong crypto tools and lent considerable credibility to Phil Zimmermann. AT&T funded the research Matt Blaze did which deomonstrated that a forge chip would interoperate with an escrowed one. If we had to pick one single thing that killed clipper, it would probably be that deomonstration. Netscape not only put crypto into its products, it's opening them up so that they'll talk to other people's products. This is a big step forward: even if Netscape caves into GAK, you'll be able to talk to one of Sameer's Apache-SSL servers in the Netherlands. GAK is unenforceable if standards are open and interoperability is possible. And despite the complaints of many here, Netscape has taken a strong stand aginst GAK and ITAR. Even Microsoft's Bill Gates has apparently written well and persuasively aginst GAK. None of this is conincidental, and if you don't understand why you ought to read Friedman's "Capitalism and Freedom". We are not extremists. There is nothing extreme about believing that an email you send to your spouse or your friend ought to be private, or that people ought to be able to read and write about whatever subject interests them. The extremists are those who are fighting so hard to preserve the possibility of totalitarianism.

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bashing (fwd)
by fc＠all.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From fc Sun Dec 24 19:04:04 1995 Subject: bashing To: cp(a)proust.suba.com (Alex Strasheim) Date: Sun, 24 Dec 1995 19:04:04 -0500 (EST) In-Reply-To: <199512242356.RAA03010(a)proust.suba.com> from "Alex Strasheim" at Dec 24, 95 05:56:44 pm X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL22] Content-Type: text Content-Length: 1253 > > 1 - You must top slandering people. > > 2 - You must stop using anonymity as a way to avoid being responsible. > > No. > > You must learn how to decide whether or not you want to believe something > by looking it's plausibility and where it came form, and when you do learn > that you need to realize that other people know how to do it as well. I'm all for believing or not believing based on your understandings, but this is not the same as slander or irresponsible behavior hidden behind false identity. I'm also in favor of anonymity, but not for the purpose of slander. There are a lot of good and valid reasons for anonymity, and I believe that it is a basic requirement of freedom, but we will lose the ability to be anonymous if enough of us abuse the freedom. > Don't blame anonymity for your own or others' inability to think critically. I don't and didn't blam anonymity for this. I blame people who hide behind anonymity as a way to be irresponsible without apparent recourse. Evaluating statements and giving your opinion is not the same as making insluting, untrue, and crude remarks about individuals. -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net/ Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236 -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net/ Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236

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Re: PGP timeline FAQ... comments requested
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 22 Dec 95 13:37:35 GMT, you wrote: [..] Great job. A couple of suggestions... Version histories, with differences in each version. Also good to debunk the "PGP before version x isn't safe to use" myth. Might also want to throw in info about PGP hacks (mainly outside US), development of other software like SecureDrive, SFS, HPack (an archiver that uses PGP keys for digital signatures of files or encryption), development of anonymous remailers that use PGP, and even something about planned future developments (PGP 3.0, PGPPhone, etc...) >Long live the Pretty Good revolution, >Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> Merry solstice, --Mutant Rob

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[Rant] Flame threads
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Well, this is getting real unpleasant... So far we have at least three distinct flame threads going on and all of them are being pretty fucking pointless. I am gpoing to address a few issues concerning this just to get them off my chest and then I am going to drop the issue. Alice and the Net Scrooge thread: I agree that Netscape owes a bit more to people who help them out, but some of your statements come from so far into left field that they are suffering from lack of oxygen. Where does AT&T come into the break of SSL and Netscape? AT&T may licence Netscape, but they do not own it. As a licence, I cannot see how they would bear any financial responsibility for fixes, breaks or other security breaches. The only reason I can see for the anger directed against them is because they are a big company. Still, your arguments do not follow. As for Netscape... They have been trying pretty damn hard to clean up their act. They are actually FIXING bugs that are being reported and not just forwarding them to Dave Null. This is an incredible improvement over past versions. I think the IPO has had a positive effect becuase now they have to act like a real company and have real quality control. This is a good thing! Hopefully they will keep up the good work on bug fixes. (We will see if they have yet fixed the HP4 print header bug in 2.0b4 though...) The Anti-Jeff/Matt/AT&T/Netscape thread: People are not a wholly owned subsidiary of their company. I judge people by their actions and not who they work for. Jeff Weinstien has worked pretty hard to get things done right within Netscape. That is not an easy feat. (I know this from experience.) He may sound defensive at times, but who would not after some of the shit he has to take from idiots who have no clue as to what it takes to get things done in a corporate environment. So far he seems to be doing a pretty damn good job for Netscape and the crypto community at large. As for Matt Blaze. He has done more for the crypto community as a whole that most anyone I can name. His accomplisments are pretty impresive. Anyone who can break Clipper and describe the break in just eight pages deseves a bit more credit than the anon-twits give him credit for. (Plus CFS and the various other crypto code he maintains and distributes.) So far the attacks on Jeff and Matt as being somehow corrupt seem more to weaken any efforts this list has and not to help them. Fred Cohen: You have no respect for the freedom or opinions of others. You expect the net to operate under your terms and under your rules. You want people to be "responsible". From what I have read here that seems to mean "punishable". I do not like some of flames I have seen, but I do not threated legal action against them. You have. I have meet the keeper of the list. He is a very nice guy and i would not want to see him go through hardship because of some whacko with a faschist control complex. Fred -- Go somewhere else. I suggest you get together with Dan Gannon and his ilk. I think you will find him more to your liking. (Or maybe the $cientologists. They are into sueing anyone who disagrees with them. I am sure they will help you start a list with your control fetishes in mind. Maybe you can borrow a few of their lawyers.) BTW, Fred has been killfiled on my mailreader. I am sick of listening to the twit. To understand what an honor this is... He is the only person I have killfiled on this or any mailinglist. Sorry to inject this much noise to the list. I am pretty damn hot over the amount of shit I have waded through in the last few days. The legal threats from Fred were the final straw. If toad.com ever needs financial support fighting legal battles from twits such as Fred, they will have my support! I know Perry will find all of this off topic. It probibly is... It just needed to be said due to my own peace of mind. Back to the regular scheduled flamethrowing... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMN4ToeQCP3v30CeZAQFQHQf/U7xnRgq+J50EbEE2qXyPTDjKxq3O1Px1 kY2TtVfSCa5202PL8n7PrMDq9OSvz+IlK1/jmGR8vwncbUerWbZCht23rzK5Kxfn FnCMPZg0/dCSg/2wsh4O71VU759Gs7lv7cPW2PX2Cjv2RhQ5dqixjui1Tai6DHvG MSUREvyZf113DJEpWp9GzIARaZVoUK74YgKHnQxjZjYtTI7AqMs+45bf9DyBwYkc HugoHdsJJ4YuAoozSfuejIkPqlxLY9FDc+4jZBpf6VUr7NpAhYEhrg4VdeENe293 Vd5rJZb0295rDeqIz16hOkoTlQ7vSIglttXufzFNjQVcqaV8YJPSQw== =QObR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | Remember: Life is not always champagne. Sometimes it is REAL pain. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmerman unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Only accepting e-mail from known parties
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com writes: > Eric Murray wrote: > > | Where we're headed is mail filters with PGP imbedded (PGP 3 will > | make this much easier) that check incoming mail for a valid signature > | for certain PGP keyid/fingerprints and pass that mail along. > | Other mail that doesn't match gets tossed into a 'junk' folder > | or thrown away if you really don't want to talk to anyone that you > | don't already know. > > I agree with the assesment of where we may be going, but the > technology is available now. (Marshall Rose uses it; if you want to > get mail into his private mailbox, offer him some $ via imbedded FV > authorizations in the mail, and it goes into his inbox. If he thinks > it was worth his time, he doesn't charge you.) > > Anyway, the code is defeintely available now. The back end is a > little kludgy, but it was needed for an auto ley retreival script. > This could easily be hacked to include a +pubring=$people line. The > script gives you a keyid, which you can then use to filter on, ie: <shell script> This is much better than nothing. This would stop the e-mail being sent to everyone who's ever posted to Usenet. I see a couple of attacks: 1. Alice only accepts signed e-mail from Bob. Carol receives a signed e-mail from Bob to Carol, sends 10,000 e-mails to Alice (via sendmail) with From: bob, same body+signature, possibly varying message-ids and subjects. 2. Alice only accepts signed e-mail from Bob. Carol, a rogue sysadmin, intercepts an e-mail from Bob to Alice, sends 10,000 more copies of it to Alice (via sendmail) with From: bob, possibly varying message-ids and subjects. As I keep pointing out, pgp-signing the body is not enough. --- Dr. Dimitri Vulis Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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ROS_pig
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-25-95. NYPaper: "Fear Of Freedom: The urge to censor persists." Anthony Lewis column. The very essence of the on-line world is freedom. The effect of the "indecent" prohibition of the telecom bill will be to reduce all users of cyberspace to the level of children. That is exactly what Justice Felix Frankfurter found unconstitutional writing for the Supreme Court in 1957, about a Michigan law that banned sales to anyone of material unsuitable for children. "Surely," he wrote, "this is to burn the house to roast the pig." "Coming Soon to Computers Everywhere, a World's Fair." John Markoff. In an era when the Internet has become synonymous with commercialism and instant fortunes, Carl Malamud's commitment to public service has set him apart. Mr. Malamud maintains that there are still two ways to build the Internet. One is the high-stakes high-visibility route of initial public offerings in the stock market, the money-raising approach being pursued by people like Netscape Communication's founders, Jim Clark and Mark Andreeson. The other route, Mr. Malamud maintains, is by soliciting funds and building viable public works projects that benefit the common good. 2 in 1: ROS_pig (13k)

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: all of the "ek" tags have been verified correct. Apologies to those who were inconvenienced by incorrect "ek" tags in the past. Last update: Mon 25 Dec 95 6:45:54 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ***+*+****** 7:48 99.98% c2 remail(a)c2.org -+++++++.-++ 1:29:45 99.96% replay remailer(a)replay.com ******+***** 9:47 99.95% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com .#**+####### 11:36 99.94% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu #*#-####*#+# 12:47 99.91% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++ +++++++++ 39:31 99.89% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net ++--_.--++++ 4:25:47 99.88% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu -+*++##+###* 15:14 99.86% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de .-+++++-+-++ 4:08:57 99.85% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ***+**++.-- 5:58:46 99.75% hroller hroller(a)c2.org -##+####.-## 47:58 99.75% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net * *+* **.--+ 3:44:23 99.69% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net #*++*** --- 1:19:08 99.68% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com # :23 99.48% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +-+++____.- 20:55:03 99.27% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com -.-.-----. 14:54:08 99.16% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net * *+* * ** 13:17 98.94% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ----- --++- 3:09:50 98.65% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi _....-.--- * 13:40:31 98.35% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org --____.-*+ 18:46:33 96.41% rahul homer(a)rahul.net *#++***-+##* 21:00 99.97% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org -####**-# 27:03 65.05% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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New release (v1.3.2) of CFS encrypting file system available
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Perhaps this isn't the best time for me to post this here; apologies in advance if this sparks another flame fest. -matt] Source code for the latest version (release 1.3.2) of CFS, the Cryptographic File System, is now available upon request for research and experimental use in the US and Canada. CFS pushes encryption services into the Unix(tm) file system. It supports secure storage at the system level through a standard Unix file system interface to encrypted files. Users associate a cryptographic key with the directories they wish to protect. Files in these directories (as well as their pathname components) are transparently encrypted and decrypted with the specified key without further user intervention; cleartext is never stored on a disk or sent to a remote file server. CFS employs a novel combination of DES stream and codebook cipher modes to provide high security with good performance on a modern workstation. CFS can use any available file system for its underlying storage without modification, including remote file servers such as NFS. System management functions, such as file backup, work in a normal manner and without knowledge of the key. CFS runs under SunOS and several other BSD-derived systems with NFS. It is implemented entirely at user level, as a local NFS server running on the client machine's "loopback" interface. It consists of about 5000 lines of code and supporting documentation. You must have "root" access to install CFS. CFS was first mentioned at the work-in-progress session at the Winter '93 USENIX Conference and was more fully detailed in: Matt Blaze. "A Cryptographic File System for Unix", Proc. 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Fairfax, VA, November 1993. (PostScript available by anonymous ftp from research.att.com in the file dist/mab/cfs.ps.) and in Matt Blaze. "Key Management in an Encrypting File System", Proc. Summer '94 USENIX Tech. Conference, Boston, MA, June 1994. (PostScript available by anonymous ftp from research.att.com in the file dist/mab/cfskey.ps.) Version 1.3 of CFS also includes ESM, the Encrypting Session Manager. ESM provides shell-to-shell encrypted sessions across insecure links and requires no OS or network support. It is useful for typing cfs passphrases when logged in over the network. ESM needs RSAREF 2.0 to compile and is tested only on SunOS and BSDI. ESM is the first released part of a suite of session encryption tools that are described in Matt Blaze and Steve Bellovin. "Session-layer Encryption." Proc. 1995 USENIX Security Workshop, Salt Lake City, June 1995. (PostScript is available from ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/sesscrypt.ps) The new version of CFS differs from the version described in the papers in a few ways: * The DES-based encryption scheme has been strengthened, and now provides greater security but with the online latency of only single-DES. * Support for the smartcard-based key management system is not included and a few of the tools are not included. * An impoved key management scheme now allows chaning the passphrase associated with a directory. * The performance has been improved. * The security of the system against certain non-cryptanalytic attacks has been improved somewhat. * User-contributed ports to a number of additional platforms. * Hooks for adding new ciphers. * 3-DES, MacGuffin, and SAFER-SK128 encryption options. * Timeout options allow automatic detach of encrypted directories after a set time or period of inactivity. CFS is distributed as a research prototype; it is COMPLETELY UNSUPPORTED software. No warranty of any kind is provided. We will not be responsible if the system deletes all your files and emails the cleartext directly to the NSA or your mother. Also, we do not have the resources to port the software to other platforms, although you are welcome to do this yourself. The software was developed under SunOS and BSDI, and there are also unsupported user-contributed ports available for AIX, HP/UX, Irix, Linux, Solaris and Ultrix. We really can't promise to provide any technical support at all, beyond the source code itself. We also maintain a mailing list for CFS users and developers; subscription information is included with the source code. Because of export restrictions on cryptographic software, we are only able to make the software available within the US and Canada to US and Canadian citizens and permanent residents. Unfortunately, we cannot make it available for general anonymous ftp or other uncontrolled access, nor can we allow others to do so. Sorry. Legal stuff from the README file: * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 by AT&T. * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software and in all copies of the supporting * documentation for such software. * * This software is subject to United States export controls. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED * WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NEITHER THE AUTHORS NOR AT&T MAKE ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE MERCHANTABILITY * OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. If you would like a copy of the CFS source code, please read to the end of this message and then send email to: cfs(a)research.att.com DO NOT REPLY DIRECTLY TO THIS MESSAGE. You must include a statement that you are in the US or Canada, are a citizen or legal permanent resident of the US or Canada, and have read and understand the license conditions stated above. Be sure to include an email address in a US- or Canada-registered domain. The code will be sent to you via email in a "shar" shell archive (a little over 300K bytes long).

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Re: corporate bashing
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Fred seems to have been slipping through my filters in recent days. Though I usually trash any message containing a reference to him, I thought that this latest escalation into the ionosphere of net-sillies begs to be brought to heel... On 24 Dec 95 at 17:20, Fred Cohen wrote: > and that anonymity should be used as an escape from > responsibility for what they do and say. If you want to > remain free to speak your mind, you have to become > responsible in at least two ways: > > 1 - You must top slandering people. > 2 - You must stop using anonymity as a way to avoid being > responsible. > > When I say must, I am not intending to mean anything less. > If the cypherpunks continue to do these two things, they will > rapidly find that they are doing more to destroy all of our > rights to free speech in the Internet than they ever did to > encourage freedom of expression. There are several things wrong with this, but first, just on the surface: Fred has now dropped his cyberdrawers and stands before us displaying the ugly engine of his manhood, the handle by which he maintains a grip on his pointless existence. He reveals himself to be yet another in that small, tired parade of self-appointed lightning rods -- people with so little of import in their lives that they have to resort to trolling for what they can claim are offenses against them, then flex the borrowed, imagined musculature of mindless law to rise in self-righteous threats of exercise of vindictive wrath. This is worse than "My big brother will kick your ass!" It is like a 90-pound weakling going to the beach with a large but retarded cousin in tow. The idea is to troll to get sand kicked in his face, then to point to the drooling cousin and use him as a lever to gain and exercise control over the hapless dupes of the ruse. Freds have existed on BBS's, and before the technological age in most small clubs and societies. In the Internet they show up in newsgroups and on mailing lists, and when crossed they ALWAYS descend to threats of legal action. So predictable, so utterly dull and unimaginative, they are like the party guest who has that inappropriate laugh, who doesn't seem to notice that pairs of people are together, who approaches people oddly and, in the end, makes a scene and reveals himself to be a complete fruitcake. Unmoderated fission looking for a place to fulminate. Fred, you've come to the wrong place. If you want to be ignored, just pack your terminal and stay home with the sitcoms. Noone asked you to interject your trolls and threats here. You invited yourself, and whatever you are suffering is of your own creation. Speaking of Freds brings me to a more interesting aspect of this nonsense: How do we know there is only one Fred? Fred doesn't sign his messages... oh-oh. This attack of deja vu feels like I've had it before. Why do I get the feeling that Fred is about to embarrass himself terribly by blurting out some of the poison that fills his soul? Let him who hath not slandered cast the first suit. We Jurgar Din (that will have to suffice: I do not yet live in a free country) +"The battle, Sir, is not to the strong alone. It is to the+ +vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, Sir, we have no + +election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now + +too late to retire from the contest." -Patrick Henry 1775 + -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMN8TVEjw99YhtpnhAQFDngH/cTzEDHzxYZ7Z9jOmoALxaIdxpgpvlIr+ /zsZndz1KfQlqUunH5i7YsJS7tm/XOsrRcWQgKQEr9WaI8wRgrqh5g== =Hl/v -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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