December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Netscape & open NNTP servers
by stephen_albert＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've got a question that I feel like I *should* know the answer to, but don't. Say I configure Netscape to point through an open http proxy, and then connect t an open NNTP server. I don't know much about how proxies work. Does the NNTP connection go through the proxy or directly from my machine? As I understand it if it does the first, then I don't have to worry about the NNTP server's log file, if any. But if it does the second, I do. Am I in the ballpark here? ObCrypto: Not-readily-traceable posting with less hassle than a mail-to-news gateway seems to have some privacy relevance, even if it's not directly crypto. Stephen "To NNTP Serve Man" Albert stephen_albert(a)alpha.c2.org <*> PGP key on request and on servers -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMQbVikimCtQtWVIdAQEjZgf+KFK8AzLY8ndSBAmWzQAwqMCmbA3IR8yl TU/c2f/FAMRypAGf+IcKIgmLAPxjbOBSvCmYv8cSXBtb/hhOFbmzIf5EY5QyfcMt OVsMk80gHJxBiUaSYetwklkRub1dqan0R2fUfQq1ey2ZUZk3OvUB4gTW5XPKNpND HxLINjJ2Ph6SH4AqCZ0hNwFkk3gtZsLGTgUHhdrkhaAKnEBSXWN9mMvkNHngScRq A0SlVehxwj8yFLF5rf1G82AM3fdZrdWhMDlWmVCkgpo5mr5AXtYpfHKa9ZsesM8O eRVvlVzXU+w4Y1B5swM5QDpezsPqxBtTn0JEb78mGM4gCoVyEi06Ow== =gwrx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Crypto Exports, Europe, and Conspiracy Theories
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:59 PM 1/24/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >In a kind of variant of the Fermi Paradox ("Why aren't they here?," >referrring to alien visitors), my question is this: "Why aren't we able to >solve this pressing problem of not being able to export strong crypto by >_importing_ it?" > >I don't think it's an accident, or laziness on the part of European and >Asian companies, that we haven't gotten around the U.S.'s laws about >exporting crypto by getting our crypto from competent programmers and >companies outside the U.S. > >Comments? How about time. We're less than a year on from the "Internet Breakthrough." It is not obvious to the non-political that stand alone desktops or enterprise LANs need crypto. The "need" for the product only develops with telecoms. Recall the fact that hardly anyone was online (or even knew what the term meant) only a short time ago as product development cycles run. We'll see. Markets are efficient but not perfect. DCF

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Re: Crippled Notes export encryption
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>So where exactly do they draw the line? You can still construct your >software in such a way that there is a clean boundary between the >crypto stuff and the rest. Right. However, if you call things like "keysize" as oposed to "state" then they will look askance. >How exactly are crypto-hooks defined? On a case-by-case basis. /r$

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Lotus Notes
by JMKELSEY＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Date: Thu, 18 Jan 1996 20:54:33 -0500 >From: daw(a)beijing.CS.Berkeley.EDU (David A Wagner) >Subject: Re: Hack Lotus? >Hack Lotus? Please do. Perhaps in this case, c2.org could have a "patch Lotus" contest, instead. Help us patch this dumb security hole, by which we're leaking 24 bits of each session key. >I would love to see the internals of how Lotus Notes does the escrow. >Every conceivable way I can see to do it seems very vulnerable to attack. > >If the receiving Lotus Notes program doesn't check whether the high 24 >bits have been escrowed correctly in the LEEF-like field, then a simple >hack to the sending Lotus Notes program to not send the LEEF field >should give foreigners true 64 bit encryption. I think this is the case. The guy who spoke at the RSA conference made reference to the fact that this new version would interoperate with full-strength domestic versions. Getting domestic versions to check for LEAFs only from foreign users is possible, but it would seem to require that Lotus was working on this idea several versions back. Otherwise, when an old domestic version gets a message from a new foreign version, it's going to accept the message without a LEAF. Depending on how Lotus Notes does their key exchange protocol, it may be possible to graft this kind of checking on, so that the older programs will work with it, too, but this doesn't seem likely at all. >If the receiving Lotus Notes program does verify that the high 24 bits >are escrowed correctly, then anyone can verify that, so in 2^24 trials, >I can recover the high 24 bits, and with 2^40 more trials, I can recover >the high 40 bits. Therefore 2^40 + 2^24 trials should suffice to hack >Lotus if this is how it works. This problem is solvable, though I doubt they've bothered. Two ways come to mind--both using information that third parties won't have to fix the problem. 1. Put another 64 bits of random salt into the RSA key exchange blob. Use this to pad the LEAF, so that it's not feasible to dictionary search the LEAF. 2. Define the LEAF as part of the RSA key exchange blob. Pad the LEAF with random bits, unknown to the receiver. Sign the whole key exchange blob. Note that #2 can be countered by hacking the software's copy of the public key. I don't see a way of countering #1 on the sender side only. (Once you get the sender and receiver working together, key escrow seems to become really hard to do.) Now, I'm very interested in whether they thought about this as a potential problem, and thus padded their LEAF intelligently, or left themselves vulnerable to a dictionary-style attack on the LEAF. This translates, roughly, to "was someone with a basic understanding of cryptography involved in this design?" Clearly, IBM has some really good people, and I suspect Lotus did/does, as well. But were they involved enough in the implementation to ensure that this was done intelligently? - From what I heard at the conference, though, I don't think they're even checking to ensure compliance. This implies that the security patch can be pretty simple--clobber the LEAF field with a bunch of random-looking bits. Of course, this tells us nothing about the other possible weaknesses. How well does Notes generate key material? How big are the RSA keys? How well do things like the key exchange protocols work? It looks to me like there are a lot of programs with encryption out there that are lucky to manage even 40 bits of actual security, even if they're allowed 64- or 128-bit keys. >Waiting to hear the technical details of how it works, >- -- Dave Wagner Note: Please respond via e-mail as well as or instead of posting, as I get CP-LITE instead of the whole list. --John Kelsey, jmkelsey(a)delphi.com / kelsey(a)counterpane.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQUVGkHx57Ag8goBAQHaRwP/er3/94io/Aa5MQyyluVqohHGyLcP5JBr ZGZMoMydeGnWp5HJ5oGO4WuWDmmqk1NNiHNFd3z8Yxt9S73LR7PvGtoyoucMkX69 f9p4DMED+bJoMWtfukxhtWufeTKDE136eUi/V8155869nAZSHngIF3WLaQCBWFqe 01WEP/GbZtg= =IDZU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Crippled Notes export encryption
by iagoldbe＠calum.csclub.uwaterloo.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <9601242357.AA02688@alpha>, Mike McNally <m5(a)dev.tivoli.com> wrote: >This sounds fishy to me. I don't recall reading anything to suggest >that export of cryptographic software (or any other munition) requires >that the stuff be *used* outside the US for an offense to be >committed; why should export of a cryptographer's wetware be any >different? Either the expertise leaves the country or it doesn't, I'd >think. Here's section 120.17 of ITAR: @ 120.17 -- Export. Export means: (1) Sending or taking a defense article out of the United States in any manner, except by mere travel outside of the United States by a person whose personal knowledge includes technical data; or (2) Transferring registration, control or ownership to a foreign person of any aircraft, vessel, or satellite covered by the U.S. Munitions List, whether in the United States or abroad; or (3) Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring in the United States any defense article to an embassy, any agency or subdivision of a foreign government (e.g., diplomatic missions); or (4) Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring technical data to a foreign person, whether in the United States or abroad; or (5) Performing a defense service on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a foreign person, whether in the United States or abroad. (6) A launch vehicle or payload shall not, by reason of the launching of such vehicle, be considered an export for purposes of this subchapter. However, for certain limited purposes (see @ 126.1 of this subchapter), the controls of this subchapter may apply to any sale, transfer or proposal to sell or transfer defense articles or defense services. Item (1) allows people to travel abroad if they know crypto. It's unclear that it allows them to emigrate or return to their country of origin. Items (3),(4),(5) seem to prevent such a person from using, or even mentioning, crypto to or "on behalf of" a foreign person. (6) is cute. Launching a missle at Iraq isn't considered export... - Ian

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Re: Ultimate Paranoia
by Dagmar the Surreal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:35 PM 1/22/96 -0500, you wrote: >For the ultimately paranoid: > Don't forget to keep all sensitive info on your standalone >machine on an encrypted filesystem. You never know who might show up >with guns and a search warrant. But this is truly paranoid. And _what_, may I ask exactly, is worng with this sort of security? ----- "In the vacuum of cyberspace, no one can hear the pedestrians scream." -- Dagmar the Surreal (as sold on TV!)

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Crypto Exports, Europe, and Conspiracy Theories
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) on Wed, 24 Jan 4:59 PM A welcome inquiry, Tim. Is it not likely that the best crypto in many of the countries is kept off the market in the national interest, cloaked in the greatest secrecy like other crucial weapons of survival? Especially to defend it from NSA-like predators. Was this not the practice in the US before public key genie escaped? And is surely still the case for the very best US crypto -- not that which can be readily purchased or purloined. The market, and PGP, are probably condoned as a cloak for the best, in the US and elsewhere. Or bait. Or traps.

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mouse droppings
by joee＠li.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the march '96 issue of macworld there's a "Viewpoint" reporting on the progress of the info superhighway. Privacy and security issues predominate the text, the primary source of which is larry irving --- "a top administration adviser on telecommunications." One issue, "mouse droppings" --- "a trail of every site they visit and for how long [on the www], was highlighted as an example of existing privacy regulations falling short of consumer expectations. Apparently, the amorphous public is shocked, *SHOCKED* I tell you , to discover that their service providers are selling the personal preference information to the highest bidder. More info in article. Would some rocket scientist speak to this terrifying mouse droppings issue? j. ercole <joee(a)li.net> ny, usa pgp public key at: http://www.li.net/~joee/autumn2.html $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$********************&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& Stand By---.sig presently being unearthed in regression therapy.

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Free speech and written rights.
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:06 PM 1/24/96 +0800, Bruce Murphy wrote: > Which brings me to another point. At least [Americans] *have* a free > speech bit in your constitution. While it's generally considered a > right [in Australia], legally that's not really good enough. About twenty or thirty years ago, there was big debate on in Australia on whether Australia should have a bill of rights. The natural rights crowd popped up from obscurity and vigorously opposed a bill of rights. They successfully argued that if a bill of rights were written down on paper, these rights would then become mere creations of the courts. This same concern is voiced in Article nine of the American bill of rights. In my judgement, America is reasonably free despite having a bill of rights, rather than because of a bill of rights. The American nation derived its cohesion from the ideology of liberty, not from a race or religion. This is the reason America has a bill of rights, and this is the reason it remains somewhat free despite possessing a bill of rights. Despite this debate and referendum in Australia, the government has been sneaking some rights into the Australian constitution by various stratagems, and I think that this will have the effect of undermining liberty. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Lotus, NSA sing in same key
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Article of that title in Jan 22 issue of EE Times: "San Francisco - IBM subsidiary Lotus Development Corp. offered an olive branch of sorts to the National Security Agency (NSA) last week, at the opening of the RSA Data Security Conference at the Fairmont Hotel. The Iris Associates unit of Lotus that developed Lotus Notes will be able to ship an international version with the equivalent [!!] of 64-bit encryption, using a concept Lotus calls "Differential Workfactor Cryptography". In the past, NSA has blocked the State Department from issuing broad licenses for packages with encryption of 40 bits or stronger. The Business Software Alliance argues that this has jeopardized sales of U.S. software overseas. The NSA has unsuccessfully tried to get U.S. manufacturers to use the Clipper chip or its software equivalent (based on a classified encryption algorithm) or an unclassified "key escrow" algorithm in which decryption keys must be held by third parties. OEMs have rejected all key-escrow concepts and have demanded international export rights for public-key cryptography methods promoted by vendors such as RSA. Lotus's compromise with the NSA concedes the agency's right to conduct signals intelligence on foreign targets. The encryption in Notes Release 4 is based on a 64-bit random number. But for the exported version of Release 4, the NSA generates a public-key algorithm and encrypts 24 bits of the key using the public RSA key. The result of this operation, the Workfactor Reduction Field [!?], is bound to the encrypted data. Foreign hackers will find the encrypted messages as difficult to decrypt as a message with a 64-bit RSA key, but the NSA will find it as easy to crack as a message with a 40-bit key." EE Times, Jan 22, 1996, page 116 sidebar ------------------------------------------------------------- "It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into error." Robert H. Jackson (1892-1954), U.S. Judge <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> My web page: http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1148

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