December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy?
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The second paragraph of this post seems to address a different issue than the first. The problem of correlations between a certain sender sending and a certain receiver receiving, is well known and understood. The best defense against this (as a sender) is to send messages into the remailer network with a period equal to or less than the the time required for a message with your typical chain length to pass through the remailer net. If these are sent at random intervals, then your real mail will blend with the cover traffic, and mail from you will correlate with all message receipts by all message recipients. The second paragraph seems to deal with the issue of being known as an anonymous remailer or regular remailer user. I am not sure exactly what the concern with that is. -Lance At 11:56 PM 1/5/96, Futplex wrote: >The "ultimate" traffic analysis problem, as others have observed, is >the correlation between messages sent by A and received by B via the overall >network. Hence the utility of a Dining Cryptographers' Net, PipeNet, etc. in >which the apparent bandwidth variation between any two points is eliminated. >A and B are effectively folded into the network. > >I suppose that a site that escapes detection as a Mixmaster will throw off >the correlation stats (i.e. because a message from that site to B won't be >identified as a remailed message). But such sites are elusive objects I >think. On the one hand, the site can't endure for long, or else its >throughput traffic will likely give it away as an anonymizer (i.e. it gets >lots of mail from the Mix network, and sends out similar amounts of mail to >all sorts of people and the network). On the other hand, it had better last, >or else it will look suspicious as a transient account receiving mail from >the Mix network, sending a few messages, and quickly vanishing. > >Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com> >"Dammit Jim, I'm a doctor, not a bricklayer!" > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMO9nDfPzr81BVjMVAQF1YQgAo08ndnu7Lcok3O12hCYz57j+PClp8ulk LRRGGejhTNerums+FInio2IUQK3YvWLsIUj+UkZZkYPGAV292AsKnQROzBAYZ2kd V8MdVUqolZQfFzR7VYS2n+6ARlplff0E+58X2NDHgw25welmg7Id/xJmjiIwHI8J U6eGUw0BhMKrQuXCv4NpUsYGC2ux2abOs+Y2f4pjzSSyJhLuAXJbzlr0eRYWPOj7 AU2AAs/l4xTGbErYc2F5D9pfTJe6sMkUCseIyVpsoLUMsg24LItlDOUq1feT2ppq X1LJQRu05ERt3LIhjB5JHFClxecQyw31JDZV8E2H19mawK1LIkgKNA== =MU1s -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: please stop the Mitnick stuff
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 21:16 1/6/96, John Young wrote: > Also, crypto-related: The fact that Shimomura's supposedly > secret files were not protected by encryption or other > security is what causes Littman and others to think there > was a sting (perhaps with TLA help) rather than foolish > vanity of the security wizard. [I do belive this has CP relevance.] Of course it was a set-up. Mitnick got into Shimomura's computer by impersonating the IP address of one of Shimomura's machines. The router should have never let packets in from outside that have an IP address that is supposed to be inside. That a 'security expert' would overlook such a blatant and well publicized hole in his _own_ router is inconceivable. Shimomura was trying to get someone to break into his system. If the bait was specifically for Mitnick, we may never know. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: CelBomb
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Post, Jan 6, 1996. By Uri Dan from Jerusalem Palestinian police said Ayash [The Engineer] was killed north of Gaza City when he answered a call on a cell phone rigged with two ounces of explosives. Israeli sources said the phone had been secretly traded for Ayash's real phone -- and the explosion was triggered by remote control once it was determined he was on the line. ---------- No brand name given, however, another source writes that Mot runs the IL cel net. So use that neat audio-vox wire on MicroTAC Elites only with paid-up Shin Bet dues, absent TS-immunization.

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Re: phone calls from hell
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:15 PM 1/7/96 -0500, you wrote: >SNS News Service "Exploding Phone" >January 7, 1996..15 Teves 5756..Number 850..Update from Israel >It is now being reported that the cellular phone that killed him was >detonated by a remote control. The son of Ayyash's landlord, identified >as Ikrimeh Hamad, was expected to have handed Ayyash the phone >earlier in the day. Some reports state that his whereabouts are >unknown but other reports stated that he is now hiding-out in Israel. >>>27 Heathway Court * London England * NW3 7TS * 44-181-458-6510 >Fax: 44-181-455-8701 > Copyright, Shomron News Service, 1996 > >*** > >Comment by bd: > >I suppose this phone was prepared especially for Ayyash, but the >imagination wanders. Imagine a world in which *every* cellphone >(or other net-connected computer or ....) had a little explosive built >in. For that matter, the case itself could be constructed of a plastic >explosive. > >Sure would make it easy to get rid of unwanted citizens. >Just match the voice pattern on the cellphone or confirm the password >issuing from the computer, send the special signal down the line and >*BOOM*, one less nuisance for the state. Sorta gives new meaning to the term "_Terminate_ and Stay Resident" program, doesn't it?!? (Or "end of file.")

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Re: NSA says strong crypto to China?
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Logically, it seems the best thing for the NSA to do (given the political character of the group) is to send strong-but-not-that-strong crypto out. In other words, they would want the various offically-USA recognized "dissidents" (as opposed to officially-USA recognized "terrorists") to have crypto strong enough so that the various defined-as-repressive governments cannot decrypt it while not-strong-enough to prevent NASA from reading it. -- -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong.

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Domains, InterNIC, and PGP (and physical locations of hosts, to boot)
by Michael Handler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The InterNIC (the company responsible for registering .COM, .EDU, .ORG, and .NET domains) has had a great deal of trouble lately, with people submitting malicious CHANGE DOMAIN requests (change admin or technical contact, point root nameserver entries to rival ISPs, etc). In response, the InterNIC has created "the Guardian project" which delineates who has access and authorization to change data in the InterNIC's record. Not much new cpunk relevance, but much of what has been discussed here is very applicable to this project (digital signatures, common access to databases, etc). I'm not completely pleased with their implementation, but it will do for now. They _do_ support PGP as an access controller within the Guardian project, and they have purchased a copy from ViaCrypt for this purpose. A good thing, says I. Check out their proposal: ftp://rs.internic.net/policy/internic/internic-gen-1.txt ObGPS/cpunk/physical-location-of-machines: A recent IETF proposal would create a new DNS record that encoded the physical location of a machine, encoded in latitude and longitude. This would solve the problem MIT has had in distributing PGP, i.e. where exactly is unix5.netaxs.com? However, there's nothing to stop you from adding records that say your machines are at the latitude and longitude of, say, Fort Meade... ;-) ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1876.txt Again, I'm not too sure of the viability of this proposal. Not on effectiveness of proving true location -- it is more geared toward "visual 3-D packet tracing" -- but simply because I have _no_ fricking idea where our machines are (in terms of lat and long) to any degree of accuracy. ("They're somewhere in PA." Brilliant, you can find that out via WHOIS.) The document suggests using GPS to locate your true location, but I'll be damned if my boss is going to spend $1,000 just so I can have more DNS entries to maintain... -- Michael Handler <grendel(a)netaxs.com> <URL:http://www.netaxs.com/~grendel> "Hours of frustration punctuated by moments of sheer terror."

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CelBomb
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone in IL, or elsewhere, report more on the head-job of The Engineer: Any crypto used to authenticate the target for the boombox, or to obscure links to the assassin? How was the blast specifically targeted at him and not a phone borrower? How it was set off -- by user-dialing, remote control, some other means? Any fishy smelling brand names to immediately run from? Answers urgent.

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Re: Shimomura on TV?
by Michael C. Peponis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Has anyone heard anything else about this? I am getting real sick of the > media's portrayal of the internet. They never say anything good about it. If > they were to mention C2's system they would say how it is a no-rules server > to hide thugs and pornos from the police. I am getting sick of watching this > trash. The whole realm of the internet and computers and their associated > areas are very dear to me I am sick of the media bludgeoning them to death. Douglas, Why let it bother you? You must understand that the majority of the population of the United States is working class trash, the news media is just peddeling to the masses, just like the morons that hold elected office. They can keep up the bitching, but that's a good thing, I encourage the spread of this kind of disinformation, it keeps even more of the masses from getting on for fear of being offenced. Regards, Michael Peponis PGP Key Avalible form MIT Key Server,or via finger

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Shimomura on BPF, NSA, Crypto
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Shimomura on BPF, NSA and Crypto: One of the tools I modified for my work was a sophisticated piece of software called the Berkeley Packet Filter. ... Unlike the original BPF, my version was designed to bury itself inside the operating system of a computer and watch for certain information as it flowed through the computer from the Internet. When a packet from a certain address, or for that matter any other desired piece of information designated by the user flashed by, BPF would grab it and place it in a file where it could be kept for later viewing. I had developed my initial version of the faster BPF in the expectation that I would receive additional research funding for the work from the National Security Agency. The Agency had begun supporting my work under a Los Alamos National Labs research grant in 1991, and had promised to extend their support for my work, but the funding was never forthcoming. I developed the tool, but after I completed the work, in early 1994, the bureaucrats in the agency reneged on funding. The idea of working with the NSA is controversial in the community of security professionals and civil libertarians, many of whom regard the NSA as a high-tech castle of darkness. Libertarian by inclination or by the influence of their colleagues, the nation's best computer hackers tend to possess a remarkable sensitivity to even the slightest hint of a civil liberties violation. They view with deep distrust the work of the National Security Agency, which has the twin missions of electronic spying around the globe and protecting the government's computer data. This distrust extends to anyone who works with the agency. Am I contaminated because I accepted research funding from the NSA? The situation reminds me of the scene in the movie Dr. Strangelove where General Jack D. Ripper is obsessed by the idea of his bodily fluids being contaminated. I think the idea of guilt by association is absurd. My view is very different. First of all, I don't believe in classified research and so I don't do it. The work I was undertaking on packet-filtering tools was supposed to be funded by the agency for public release. The tools were to be made widely available to everyone, to use against the bad guys who were already using similar tools to invade people's privacy and compromise the security of machines on the Internet. But even more to the point, I believe that the agency, rather than inherently evil, is essentially inept. Many people are frightened of the NSA, not realizing that it is like any other bureaucracy, with all of a bureaucracy's attendant failings. Because the NSA staff lives in a classified world, the government's normal system of checks and balances doesn't apply. But that doesn't mean that their technology outpaces the open computer world; it just means they're out of touch and ponderous. In any case, I feel strongly that tools like BPF are absolutely essential if the Internet is to have real security, and if we are to have the ability to trace vandals through the Net. If people are concerned that individual privacy is at stake, they should probably worry less about who should have the right to monitor the networks, and instead focus their efforts on making cryptographic software widely available. If information is encrypted it doesn't matter who sees it if they can't read the code. Cryptography is another example of my point that a tool is just a tool. It was, after all, used primarily by kings, generals, and spies until only two decades ago. Then work done by scientists at Stanford, MIT, and UCLA, coupled with the advent of the inexpensive personal computer, made encryption software available to anyone. As a result, the balance of power is dramatically shifting away from the NSA back toward the individual, and toward protecting our civil liberties. ["Takedown," pp. 102-04]

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Re:
by andr0id＠midwest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>[This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature >means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the >signature and forwarded.] > Am I the only one getting this message several times? (\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/) (http://www.oicu812.com Maybe one of the ) ( cheapest Internet services! ) (andr0id(a)midwest.net callsign: N9XLM) (Finger andr0id(a)oicu812.com for public PGP Key)

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