December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

re: Validating credit cards
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Actually can think of several phleneomum that would satisfy but first need to separate transactions into relating to electronic items and relating to physical items. In the case of physical items, pickup for shipping is probably done in batches (example: for FedEx the last pickup typically at 5 pm). It is not necessary to verify transactions instantaneously but rather when the order is processed /shipped. This could be done in a batch mode syncronized with order processing. In the case of electronic media there are two choices: either immediate access or delayed access. In the first case either access can be granted or immediate verification can be done. In the case of immediate access, it should be limited to items of restricted value. In delayed access the same batch processing mode can be performed (during the 0-dark hours most likely). This leaves only cases where immediate access must be granted and I suspect that in most cases the vulnerability of 6-24 hours of access before verification will be small. Where the possible loss is low, we are back to (a). So in the small proportion of transactions where immediate verification and transfer is necessary, I have no doubt that the existing infrastructure can handle it. At "slight additional charge" by the credit card company no doubt. Warmly, Padgett

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Re: art-stego
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

.WAV files are potentially a good place to store stego information. With a 16-bit file, as many as 8 of the least significant bits in each sample can be replaced with encrypted info without making the file sound too wierd (depending on the natural background noise of the recording). If you make one of those "waves on the beach" relaxation things, you might be able to get away with even more. Another thing--just a wild idea--test the randomness of encrypted data by storing it in an 8-bit mono .WAV (your choice of sample rates) file and listening to it. Any correlations or patterns in the data should show up in the playback as hums, clicks, squeals, or something. It may even be possible to determine the algorithm by the sound patterns--a sort of "audio cryptanalysis." Has anyone tried this? Are there any .WAV stego programs out there? Jonathan Wienke

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Re: Looking for code to run an encrypted mailing list
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wrote : >> >> Poster crypts mail with pgp using list exploder key. List exploder decrypts >> mail and recrypts with keys for all current list members and then sends the >> mail. >> >> [I don't want all the list members to need to know every other list members >> public key] > At 09:24 PM 3/4/96 -0800, Alan Bostick replied: >Is this the right way to go about doing this? > >If the mailing list has N members, then, for each message posted to the >list, the list processor must decrypt the message and then reencrypt it >N times. > Hmm thats not what I meant - I just envisioned giving all the recipient public keys to pgp and saying letting it do the rest. This does result in all recipients gettingthe key fingerprints of all other recipients which is not a problem in my application. Alan goes on to suggest sumthing very similar except that he does not decrypt the body first - which apart from meaning I'd have to hack pgp acheives the same effect. The overal intent was to have a message go from one list member to all others with a) a signature to provide strong attribution and a measure of non repudiation b) low probability of interception c) only the gateway has to have all the public keys. Inbound the process looks like this: decrypt and validate signature (leaving original signature) add gateway info (sender signature validation, date received etc) sign the whole thing with the gateway key. crypt with all list member keys (i.e. one message readable by any member) send to members. Several people have pointed me at PGPdomo which I now have a copy of and will be looking at as a basic for this (assuming it's not an exact fit already).\ [thanks to all those who responded] John -- John Pettitt email: jpettitt(a)well.sf.ca.us (home) jpp(a)software.net (work)

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None
by NSA Spook 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Spook is back! Hello everyone! The Spook is back! mixmaster(a)spook.alias.net is now functional again with bothe Type-I and Type-II remailers. The Type-II remailer supports news posting via mail2news(a)myriad.alias.net. The PGP Type-I key is the same as the old spook. The Mixmaster key however, is new. For your records: spook mixmaster(a)spook.alias.net 5c46a4b6c2cf00bfc7f693be81f88554 2.0.3 vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net bb460f08811a98682def423d30852d11 2.0.3 flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net 8b52e01256d96db2cefb21a081c64d34 2.0.3 secrets secret(a)secret.alias.net 834795b553fa43cbf33bea8f490a2b77 2.0.3b6 anon mixmaster(a)anon.alias.net e3ca4cc5beb9934ae6d52dd27da80332 2.0.2b shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net ab3c9b8f6c593ec7af312f5cfec49a9b 2.0.3 treehole treehole(a)mockingbird.alias.net 2c9f098377bf4f068751683f803834f5 2.0.3 mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com db91418edac3a4d7329feaee0b79c74f 2.0.1 knight mixmaster(a)aldebaran.armory.com 6bb0d89a29fd188c67b8e04516b5af33 2.0 rebma mixer(a)rebma.mn.org e7d84921298b0aadaf8f050d145ccf03 2.0b11 replay remailer(a)replay.com e3e2b4d67314b6165ee03b0b0ae07a7f 2.0b11 hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl bf61835a7b3cfa59c409caeab4e8a222 2.0b11 crynwr remailer(a)crynwr.com 64c62de6b347b3050fbb6e94c649112d 2.0b11 q q(a)c2.org c44e1cb0f0709465c21b07ac972bf973 2.0.1 ecafe-mix mixmaster(a)remail.ecafe.org fff0d827161069a26ca44dead777c9ec 2.0.1 amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com f37b7c77cd62ede86abb6e10c09601c1 2.0.3 black-ice mix(a)black-ice.gateway.com 42048f5769ecdd8df71abf49389fb3ac 2.0.3 yap remailer(a)yap.pactitle.com cb0ffde1d93706502e3b9a2dea3b12cb 2.0.3 alpha mixmaster(a)alpha.c2.org fb2afc9b497be22ad18abf1c41996eb0 2.0.2 lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu a76c3fda7294a6695c5e6a931d1c0b73 2.0.3 gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org ed590656117439564465d5cc539864ad 2.0.3 nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com f59733a7f257900b09eb138764259a38 2.0.3 mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com db91418edac3a4d7329feaee0b79c74f 2.0.1 -----Begin Mix Key----- db91418edac3a4d7329feaee0b79c74f 258 AATL25WGQY5CMM0/xBjYtuN6IT75h+aBQwwKqZZc isOrqdsl8HWAzARrB0iAtcr34c2qqPBzSRNa5UE8 d3jOYu/wp9K9M5abUSRogcDl7gkPlqxc+e72SdKd 2Gdgib8VDGVLpJdaPk4uSY/pkmsYB30OaQH3W8dU PPciTvSJKAYcTQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net bb460f08811a98682def423d30852d11 2.0.3 -----Begin Mix Key----- bb460f08811a98682def423d30852d11 258 AAShg2h4xGHueryUFNsFBbtSGZBcj+oDImFMkOZA EQPcbeG6ReEnTnoQ8HBgwtx9isMT9hZ93lBaRY07 ygupHQRi6f+FnlQEZTKqOe+8E+WyDx+ox/1ywgt+ KGFOW+t8WRXA/loKuqD0KH4pwpe7FYE0arGbtm4J EscGM2DE3TeS3QAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- knight mixmaster(a)aldebaran.armory.com 6bb0d89a29fd188c67b8e04516b5af33 2.0 -----Begin Mix Key----- 6bb0d89a29fd188c67b8e04516b5af33 258 AATOSyg7N2PVg9VgA8voDWglq6ESNBLqH0heB2iE NfvmR/VnyAHCb4ZBtHzvM7ZRBdXYmH/Jt490wg6O ZCbhcIceFKSsibLEH77+111isAhUbHvn0Nh9gOI7 5ngjOGDQaLQvGUbNHRXQaPAZ0rc4lv9gmChJONOJ 7sFC2J96QR4aewAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- rebma mixer(a)rebma.mn.org e7d84921298b0aadaf8f050d145ccf03 2.0b11 -----Begin Mix Key----- e7d84921298b0aadaf8f050d145ccf03 258 AASjOGqzTLdjweTMiwirrpVNqXj/ODJVyh9pEo5i q5ERILOd1hMNKY9XLNFYM30mUR/Fkh0MnYI/ujWz OTb0rR2a31nvmaLMdaB75nTdGJwHitCmo8k2eTjL XQsXV6zKrzXGp8H8NO34DAFWJy1qVcev+6lLAWGy j/fsJJyJNtl94wAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- replay remailer(a)replay.com e3e2b4d67314b6165ee03b0b0ae07a7f 2.0b11 -----Begin Mix Key----- e3e2b4d67314b6165ee03b0b0ae07a7f 258 AATZBfJhv+DGg4OEfQfgVnzZZpumEZHI9CES+Ux2 dBp9RBPpJnAtLpcAyCIkNjSaik0togcKhFgcR3nt XIrWclJ/uO/Z1fqW7ESLwzXozCpqnG5S/y6mUPuL 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ed590656117439564465d5cc539864ad 2.0.3 -----Begin Mix Key----- ed590656117439564465d5cc539864ad 258 AATXSsts2yKvzw3LUZ7ZhW7a66vr236RzIucoPIl PSNoWhlGEgo0kx28MjepovxOz/CSUwYOC+9McFOE oX1xxMag0FiyOXg+pj8NGZj3JVLU3wqTA4aTsoWd njGRlqYen31TbWMh+BOdjqRJXUUHF5U+/acbmsdE njjw+6DFw8PkpwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- treehole treehole(a)mockingbird.alias.net 2c9f098377bf4f068751683f803834f5 2.0.3 -----Begin Mix Key----- 2c9f098377bf4f068751683f803834f5 258 AATbAJfluLcAdyjxCbL3inzUHRbarWgLZRzIILCZ rtIYBpw/lGC6AcEJpheq/gl7r1f60B2CPNPTpMZb GJHAQnPUyTRZ9PNJ+UBExaFYUABOR06Nz392K9Gx mBZDrWDqb/q/c5wHp8PSGpfTiSCF9awWctuSsT3e S4W9kpCaxRweewAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com f59733a7f257900b09eb138764259a38 2.0.3 -----Begin Mix Key----- f59733a7f257900b09eb138764259a38 258 AAS9p2Sdua2d0mtVhhj0qS+RZzawvOCP4Uo2HZZA R3asMJNIVWQyi0jKnOxnHYAr6EizrUX7GdeVVtQw gcjrqhnf1QWMLCZU0L5418uNmbqswGbIVsTK3nsE ShWieAl61R4EDerMheDDlBkuKLTGkOAs4UTAL+Mf fanvf9nqRolmOQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- spook mixmaster(a)spook.alias.net 5c46a4b6c2cf00bfc7f693be81f88554 2.0.3 -----Begin Mix Key----- 5c46a4b6c2cf00bfc7f693be81f88554 258 AATTyAxnMTTfT5rCnOBCajbfwl7Zj32oGPrTxRcj YDbZb/czR3bR6Yb/uEOtJjhz3tq8gkxEt4XAw+gV cdBxsPYTg3VPoPYO1F6CvmWxUwWkgwx+URibZoWN yGcLefH06Wdon7hhQZI3LzpXbL9p4zseVKr4fD5y lpjefLNO2Ww4mwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix 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PARTY PICTURES PLUS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, This should be my last post about my party [sound of crowd cheering]. Because several of you wanted more info about the pictures and/or felt slighted by the file identification tabs, I have added additional information: http://www.c2.org/party/masquerade/ Enjoy. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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re: NYT on crypto
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I thought that, for the most part, the telegraph systems described >above were to reduce cable charges (1 code word instead of a 15-word >sentence, a huge savings in those days). Was one use however I seem to recall citations dating back to Niccolo Polo reguarding the use of trade codes & that was a while before the telegraph. If I were really curious, would also check out Reuters, Lloyds, Rothchilds, and the Borgias. Would not be surprised to find a reference in either/all "The Prince", "The Art of War", and the letters of Nathan Hale. However I suspect that Markoff really meant to be referring to mathematical algoritms such as the LOASDR. I suppose that only dates back to the diameters of stygi (sp ?) about the same time that passwords were first recorded (and changed daily). Warmly, Padgett ps if anyone has a spare LOASDR or CMSDR, I would be interested 8*).

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Re: Assassination Politics 9!
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mar 04, 1996 14:45:02, 'jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com>' wrote: Mr. Bell, The Economist terrorism report is unusally thoughtful and open-minded, and considers the benefits of savaging innocents from the perspectives of a variety of deeply held beliefs. But after revewing the plenitude of those who have murdered for understandable motives, it does point to a very small group who truly lack any rationale for earthly comprehension. Not that I want to get on your "Shit, shoot that fucker" list, but take a look at it to double-check that you're not skydiving into the wrong maelstrom. It's pretty long, but I'll gladly scan it and send it along. If not that, read Tim's pithy warning today about shit-stormtroopers provoked by the daredeviltry of extreme-unctuous freedom fighters.

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Re: Assassination Politics 9!
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:45 PM 3/4/96, babybell@pacifier wrote: >Most traditional "terrorism" (as least "traditional," by the standards of >the last 20 years) is thought to involve relatively unfocussed attacks >against people and locations, but in situations where attacks against >selected government officials would be far more selective and effective. <...> >Since I propose exactly that kind of replacement, I am presumably not the >most ingratiating figure to these people. Now I understand why you seemed to be "not the most ingratiating figure"--you must've nominated me for assassination. oooo$$$$$$$$$$oooo oo$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$o oo$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$o o$ $$ o$ o $ oo o$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$o $$ $$ $$o$ oo $ $ "$ o$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$o $$$o$$o$ "$$$$$$o$ o$$$$$$$$$ ** $$$$$$$$$ ** $$$$$$$$$$o $$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$ """$$$ "$$$""""$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ "$$$ o$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$o $$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$" "$$$$$$oooo$$$$o o$$$oooo$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ o$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$"$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$"""""""" """" $$$$ "$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$" o$$$ "$$$o """$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$"$$" $$$ $$$o "$$""$$$$"""" o$$$ $$$$o oo o$$$" "$$$$o o$$$$$$o"$$$$o o$$$$ "$$$$$oo ""$$$$o$$$$$o o$$$$"" ""$$$$oooo "$$$o$$$$$ $$$""" ""$$$$$$oo $$$$$$$$$ """$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$ $$$$$

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Re: Diffie-Hellman for Matchmaking?
by Dimitris Tsapakidis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok, I am reposting this, with more detail this time. Hope this answers the two questions I received. I want to design/find some matchmaking protocols. I define matchmaking as follows: Bob must find out whether Alice has declared (commited) her interest in him, if and only if he has declared (commited) his interest in her. Before he does so, he can at most know that a girl is interested in him. Another description: Bob and Alice can have a date if they both commit to each other. If only one commits, nobody will ever find out about it. Below are the protocols I came up with. They all depend on the Diffie-Hellman "common key" as derived in the DH key exchange. - T is the trusted third party. - hash_k() is a keyed hash function with key k. - pseudo(Alice) is a pseudonym for Alice. - n is a large prime. - g is a primitive element mod n. - A is Alice's secret exponent. Her public key would be g^A mod n. - Alice's and Bob's "common key" would be g^(AB)mod n ---- 1. The mediated off-line one: - T selects a secret k (which he uses for the duration of a month, say). - Alice is interested in Bob, so she calculates a=g^(AB)mod n and anonymously and securely sends it to T along with pseudo(Alice). - T calculates c=hash_k(a) and broadcasts c and pseudo(A) to the planet or puts them on a bulletin board. - Bob is ignorant of Alice's actions. If he ever decides that he likes her, he calculates and sends a=g^(AB)mod n to T (plus pseudo(Bob)). T will calculate hash_k(a) which equals c. T broadcasts c plus pseudo(B) so both Alice and Bob will know they have a match. If Bob is not actually interested in Alice, he doesn't perform this step at all, so nothing happens, and Alice just assumes Bob is not interested. Replay is not an issue here. 2. The mediated on-line one: - Alice is interested in Bob, so she calculates a=g^(AB)mod n and ANONYMOUSLY approaches Bob. - Bob calculates b=g^(BX)mod n, where X may or may not be Alice. If Bob is not interested in anyone, he could tell Alice to leave, or select a random X while calculating b. - Alice and Bob want to compare a and b. They generate a random k using some coin-flipping protocol. Then they send (possibly pseudonymously) hash_k(a) and hash_k(b) to T who compares them and announces the result. Using a keyed hash function reduces the trust on T, compared to protocol (1), I hope. Now, T has to conspire with one of the parties to get the "common key". I suspect this can be improved using the Digital Envelopes protocol as described by Fagin, Naor and Winkler in "Comparing information without leaking it" to replace the hashing. 3. Non-mediated on-line one: This third protocol would remove T in (2). Alice and Bob would compare their "common keys" directly. The problem here is fairness i.e. to ensure nobody finds the result of the comparison first. If this was possible, people could "probe" other people's interests and terminate the protocol as soon as they find the answer (i.e. the result of the "common key" comparison). I think ZK protocols would be of use here. I am still working on this one. ---- Assume that in any of these protocols Alice calculates her "common key" with X: a=g^(AX)mod n which means that she is interested in X. The reason a must remain sercet is that if X learns it, he could calculate all possible b(Y)=g^(YX)mod n until he finds a Y such that b(Y)=a, in which case he will find out Alice is interested in him. Note that X will not try all possible values for Y, but will use the public keys of all the girls, instead. I would appreciate any comments on these protocols and on the use of DH "common key". Dimitris -- Dimitris Tsapakidis PGP keyID: 735590D5 dimitrt(a)dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk MSc in Information Security, This space reserved Royal Holloway, University of London for future use. Origin: Thessaloniki, Macedonia, Hellas

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Re: Truelly Random Numbers
by Tim Fulbright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Now I, a lurker for two months, am truelly confused! L. Deitweiler must be right. Surely one of you cyperpunk fellows could hack together a dongle with some kind of AD converter and buffer ram to gather a Truelly Random Bitstream off the environment every couple of milliseconds easier than this raindrop scheme or recording the fan, you're haviung me on!. Let's go back fifty years and get a vacuum tube to fitfully flicker? I who know next to nothing about electronics suspect there is surely enough noise present in electornic devices to gather a random bitstream that you could chop anywya you needed? Anyway, y would you need a WAN for constant raindrop number generation when you could just set up your random number node out in LaPush or up in Volcano sampling every minute ot so : ) ? My second overall question is, isn't the emphasis on encryption of e-mail and e-mail emposters somewhat shortsighted? What if, for the masses which is all that counts, e-mail migrates to voicemail? The issues aren't the same with voicemail, eg PK validation problems go out the window since voicemail validation could take the form of an PK encrypted voicegram. . Something the matter with that? It might also prevent robots from posing as persons while still allowing aliases.. Please pardon this interruption! I really do admire the frankness and quality of your newslist, its democratic open discussion on the most vital political issues facing our time ; but after reading your mail I think that either I need seriously wising up, or, somebody must know where the real newsgroup is! -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Requires PGP version 2.6 or later. mQCNAzBzoaUAAAEEAKwZn14pn79xPqUJW5SbJqU/B1uEtD29xe4/nXedIlc66yt0 +Zh8t/LZtO8CAQn4N5tqzN+cW0ot4yfB1lV2HYOkLCqtfeGqrZbv0q8auR0OV8fQ NvHRdlK5fbZKtFKzEA1y/eh5BQv6pq9YDsoScNdORuynOFYo60208YzGKULxAAUR tEJUaW1vdGh5IEZ1bGJyaWdodDwxMDAwMjIuMzE2N0Bjb21wdXNlcnZlLmNvbT48 Wys0NCwgMF0gMTc4MjYxMTY1MT4= =gSuk -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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