December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

apache/ssl now commercially available
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've finally gotten the licensing taken care of. Whee! http://www.c2.org/apachessl/ -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org/ (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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Re: Air Force hacks Navy? Eeeek!
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:57 PM 12/22/95 -0500, fc(a)all.net (Fred Cohen) wrote: >I thought the ET article indicated an exaguration, but if it's true that >there are no Battleships in the US Navy anymore and that the attack was >run using DoD crypto equipment and networks, it's a heck of a lot >different than buying an off-the-shelf Internet package and taking down >the fleet. > >I have no doubt that someone with enough expertise, classified knowledge >and equipment, access, and assistance can get some limited control over >some US Navy ships for some period of time - but I seriously doubt that >a computer whizzkid can take over the fleet from a PC via Email. Depends on how much of a firewall the Navy's got; it may be that the guy really did a dialin to the Pentagon using passwords, or maybe that the ship really does have network connections without adequate security. People _do_ build dialin and other gateways to get around corporate firewalls, in spite of company policy; wouldn't surprise me if the military has the same problem. About 20 years ago, you could dial an FX line in Des Moines which connected to a line at Offutt AFB in Nebraska and autorotored to a radio circuit up to Looking Glass. Looking Glass had a small PBX; you could dial a 2-digit extension to reach somebody on the plane, or dial back down to the ground. At one point, the radio officer on the plane noticed two lights on on the PBX when nobody on the plane was talking on the phone; the rapidly ensuing investigation found a guy in the barracks using a 16-button Autovon phone dialing through the system to call his buddies in Guam. As one might expect, the phone lines coming down from Looking Glass are authorized to call anywhere in the world, at any precedence/preemption level they want to :-) While I don't personally know either the radio officer or the guy who got busted, I do have a friend who was around there when it happened... And similar nonsense is probably still possible today, unless Murphy's left the military. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # .... Heading back to The Big Phone Company

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Re: cyphernomicon FTP site?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:07 AM 12/20/95 -0800, you wrote: >At 12:59 AM 12/20/95 -0800, you wrote: >>At 9:18 PM 12/19/95, Vinod Valloppillil wrote: >>>Anyone know where I can FTP a full copy of the cyphernomicon? >[Much deleted] >>Anybody who plans to download the entire linear file and then print it out >>must be missing a bits in his shift register. > >There are reasons to want a non-html version. The best being uploading to >your favorite text-oriented BBSes. (Or crypto-oriented BBSes.) Not >everyone has access to the web. (Yes, I know it is blasphemy...) It's also nice to be able to read it offline, or feed it to grep, or load copies of it to other sites to reduce congestion on Netcom... #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # .... Heading back to The Big Phone Company

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Re: Java and timing info - second attempt
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:31 PM 12/18/95 -0800, Jeff Weinstein <jsw(a)netscape.com> wrote: > In Netscape Navigator 2.0 Java and JavaScript do not have access >to crypto routines. At some point in the future this will probably >change, but only after we understand the implications much better >than we do today. Doug and/or Amanda Barnes posted some Java crypto stuff a while back, I think using RSAREF; don't know the platform issues. As far as timing goes, Bad Guys can always run accurate timing on their own machines, even if Innocent Victims don't on theirs. However, it may be worthwhile to allow the Java browser users to set the resolution on the clocks available to Java scripts. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # .... Heading back to The Big Phone Company

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Re: CFS and Linux
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So the master is at last fallen. Kudos to Mr. Jim Choate and Dr. Dimitri Vulis for having the courage of their convictions to help unmask AT&T's deceit in claiming to support Linux and free software when, in truth, it is doing just the opposite. Maybe, just maybe, we can seize this opportunity to advance the cause of justice, if not justice itself (true justice would require AT&T to recognize its obligation to our heros at Berkeley and pay them their USD 25,000). I call upon us all to expose AT&T for what it is! Had your software erased by the CFS install programme? Return their own medicine! Sue them! Tired of Blaze's prattle about how he is a Linux-lover even though he can't be bothered to use Linux? Challenge him! Tired of AT&T and Netscape employees stealing your resources? Configure your servers to deny W3 access to AT&T and Netscape computers! Linux isn't perfect, but its open environment is a good start for building REAL secure software. Don't let AT&T's lies bully you into abandoning it! CFS will never run under Linux until it is plucked from the monster's grasp. We, too, are guilty when we continue to invite the monster not only to walk in our midst unchecked, but to sleep in our homes as an invited, nay, paid, guest. Alice de 'nonymous ... <an455120(a)anon.penet.fi> ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: Fred Cohen: Re: CFS and Linux
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:05 PM 12/23/95 -0500, Steve Simmons wrote: > Fred and Perry are two peas in pod, Perry is an asshole. Fred is a stupid ignorant asshole who talks nonsense. Perry often mixes useful, accurate and informative information in between the insults. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Fred Cohen: Re: CFS and Linux
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:04 AM 12/23/95 -0800, Eric Murray wrote: >I'd even be willing to testify in court as to the nature of >Fred's reputation. I'm sure the operator of the Firewalls list >would be too. Fred's reputation is so low he cannot be defamed. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Mailing list
by John K. Mackenzie 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Put me on your list if you get anything started.

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Spread-Spectrum computer clock?
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recently there has been a substantial amount of discussion concerning the use of accurate timing in an attempt to uncover encryption keys, by carefully noting the length of time that a decryption takes in a computer of a known cpu speed. I have noticed that most of the discussion focussed on the delay time of the overall operation done over a network, for example a LAN or perhaps the Internet, but it has been recognized that imprecision due to indeterminate network timings make such a tactic problematic at least. However, being a ham and occasionally listening to the various odd noises produced by a computer when you tune a VHF or UHF ham radio to a harmonic of the clock speed, it ccurred to me that the delay times WITHIN a particular encryption/decryption would be far more easily measured with local RF snooping. I would imagine that if you can determine even a fraction of a bit of key from a network "ping," you could do a lot better "listening" to the execution of a program within a few hundred feet with an ordinary radio receiver and a sophisiticated analysis program. Okay, I admit, this is certainly not a new idea. The military's TEMPEST program is to build electronic equipment which is so "quiet" that it is impossible (or, at least, arbitrarily difficult) to capture useful information by inadvertent radio transmission. Obviously, that is out of the league (not to mention the budget) of the vast majority of the users of personal computers. Nevertheless, it seems to me that if we as a community of computer users are interested in security, we should not merely focus on the mathematics and algorithms used and their reliability, but also secondary methods to break the systems involved. True, most of us are not sufficiently interesting "targets" to justify this kind of attack, but machines such as encrypted remailers are sufficiently "high value" that protecting them would be worth a little extra effort I'm not under any illusion that we can hope to make them "snoop-proof", but a little effort should substantial raise the difficulty level.. More than a year ago, it occurred to me that it might be worth it to build a CPU clock replacement module that took the place of the main CPU crystal oscillator, and replaced it with a oscillator module whose frequency was (very long period!) pseudorandomly varied, possibly with a resolution of 16-bit and over a range of perhaps 1%., with the frequency varying every few tens or hundreds of microseconds. The result, I presume, is that every operation synchronized to the microprocessor clock would vary in time and would be hard to "tune" with a normal radio receiver. It seems to me that this would make the resulting computer harder to "bug" using standard equipment. If this were do-able and were in fact done, it would probably be worth it to "tailor" the spectrum of variation in clock speed so that these variations do not tend to average out over "long" times, for example a few hundred milliseconds or even tens of seconds. This would at least help to disguise the decryption-time information that is commonly discussed. A complicating factor is the fact that modern motherboards often generate their microprocessor clocks using PLL synthesis from a master clock, probably the 14.318 MHz clock. On the one hand, that might make the process easier; only one clock to vary. On the other, it is at least conceivable that there are some devices in any given computer which depend on a precisely constant clock speed, and would not tolerate such variation. This was probably more true in the early days of the IBM PC; today you usually see separate crystals on any cards that need truly specific frequencies. (Hey, I didn't say this was a perfect solution, merely one that would raise the barrier a bit...) Other potential tactics. (Some of which are already happening; if anybody out there is more informed about such techniques, please tell me) 0. Copper-screen cages. Okay, maybe this appears to be a bit too obvious, but it really isn't too involved: A few years ago, I happened onto a roll of honest-to-goodness copper screen; sort of line window screen but made of pure copper. Sewn/soldered into a bag, it would make an excellent cover. (openings required for floppies and CDROMS, as well as cables are obviously a complication, but... 1. Use CPUs with Internal caches as well as external caches, both to reduce the amount of electronic noise transmitted to antenna-length wires outside the microprocessors, as well as make external memory accesses less predictable and less frequent. Fortunately, I suppose, the natural transition to 486's, DX2's and DX4/4s) and Pentiums has make this happen without any anti-snooping motivaition. 2. Eventually, CRT's will be replaced with some sort of matrix-type displays that emit far less useable information and will be easier to shield. 3. Filtering of every wire that comes out of the computer's case, primarily using a combination of ferrite beads and decoupling capacitors. This would be especially true of the telephone line, which would be accessible from outside a house or office. Also, use of multiple powerline filters/surge protectors in series. 4. I'd pay particular attention to the keyboard interface and its associated microcontroller: Years ago, I speculated that if a VFO (voltage to frequency converter) was placed on the data line between the keyboard and the computer, it would transmit the identity of every key pressed. (This would obviously include passwords, too) (Does the keyboard hardware of the typical PC allow echobacks, whcih would allow the CPU to fill the CPU/Keyboard channel with apparently meaningless random garbage, thwarting RF overhearing of this data?!?) And I wouldn't be surprised if the NSA has built replacement keyboard controllers to be used to surreptiously replace on garden-variety keyboards, controllers which deliberately "broadcast" such information in an even easier-to-discern pattern. Even a short access to such a keyboard and it might be telling your secrets. Even if a black-bag job wasn't possible, If it were possible to tune to its normal keyboard microprocessor operation rate, and given a known keyboard scan pattern a particular pressed key could be identified. Given how cheap keyboards are these days, a slightly paranoid person might buy one from a trustworthy source and glue the case shut to prevent tampering, and replace it monthly with cast-offs. 5. While this isn't my area of expertise, it occurs to me that softrware should be written to complete operations in an identical time frame, no matter the input data. While this has already been hashed over on the nets, the "solution" that is typically discussed involves adding a null loop at the end of the real operation, and contining only after the "wall clock" shows enough time has passed. This isn't an adequate solution, I think, if local RFmonitoring of the computer can be done. (It will know when the actual result ended) A better (and, sadly, more inefficient) method would involve executing BOTH branches of conditional jump, and only using the data generated from the desired half at the very end.. Another possibility might be (for certain large mathematical algorithms) is to split up the functions and to execute them in a "random" order, with enough "dummy" operations inserted to further disguise the facts. For example, if you're multiplying two 1024-bit values to get a 2048-bit result, program this to be done in a pseudrandom order and intersperse any operations with pseudorandom operations to disguise it. (A pseudorandom interrupt generator might help, here.) 6. Think like an NSA hack. If I were such a sneaky bastard, I'd try to figure out a way to module a visible LED on the computer's case with data, or modulate the video display's brightness to signal slow-speed data.. Well, that's just a few thoughts. There's a lot more material out there that ought to be discussed. Admittedly, these subjects can appear to be a bit more than a little paranoid, but without such discussion we're almost certain to be at risk.

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Jingling Bells
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

That NY Times upbeat shopping report on gift-horse laundering recalls Judeo-Christo-Muslim-Buddhist-whatever X-marketing of indulgences to complicitously blessed international drug-running bandit-patrons of days gone by. Battling the state for tax-whack is the grand legacy of brawling twix cult and state. Tithe or tax, forgiveness or the noose, adorable mass-murderer, theism or atheism, no exit, you're hoisted. It's a fine compact for building monuments to bedrugged faith of earthly pleasures, temples and capitols, cons spiritual blessing and caressing cons secular for percentages generous. Bedrugged with the rich history and rewarding journalism of such back-scratching by gods of mammons galore, one wonders how many Caribbean rimmers of yet unadvertized international cults are now bulging their laundry sacks cuts of the drugs. To the cults of rome and jerusalem and mecca for swamplords of rickety blow-downs, of scientologists mimcking these venerable predecessors, add the ex-swiss bankers now sweltering in hellish Cayman, the hot-eyed ex-usa's with kids in college, sole-practitioner very hungry beagles, all deeply inhaling the colombian aroma. All offering mother goose refuge from Sam, off-shore, in the cave of shadows, any world of illusory power where you're willing to pay the stiff-arm dues for protective delusion. There's no fee meal like that served by god-mammon's own earthly courtesans and courtiers sweet-and-sour abrading innermost money=immortality fears. CoS's E-meter-cleaner is dead-on for E-cash-drug jingling bells.

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