December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: NSA Realists v. Nuts (Was: Re: Crypto APIs)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:02 PM 10/5/95 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > >"James A. Donald" writes: > > They want to rule over us. [...] There is no commonality of > > purpose, hence no possibility of cooperation. At 05:02 PM 10/5/95 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > I disagree. Most NSA types are probably stock government employees > who want to get their job done with the least muss and fuss. > > [...] > > I don't think the NSA is inherently the enemy at all. Signals > intelligence and protecting the U.S. and its citizens from signals > intelligence is probably necessary. Naturally members of an organization wish the organization to become great and powerful: A great and powerful Netscape would be a Microsoft. A great and powerful NSA would be a KGB or an SS. Naturally everyone likes their job to meaningful, everyone likes their job to have an impact. Everyone wants to be important. If the NSA are eyes without hands, they are impotent, they are useless. So they want hands. They want information about us to be used by the government, which means they want the government to exercise detailed control over us in response to their detailed information about us. Our function lust would, if fulfilled, give us only moderate satisfaction, their function lust, if fulfilled, would give them vast power, and hence vast satisfaction. Our function lust, if fullfilled, would give us more power over computers. Their function lust, if fullfilled, would give them more power over us. > However, in general, what you are looking at is just the > result of an entity trying to preserve itself having access to > governmental force. I doubt that there are many "national domination" > types in the agency, Despite grandstanding by the republicans, no government agency has ever been closed down, or suffered layoffs, merely because its function became completely obsolete. (Though some have suffered renamings and reshuffles, and some have been allowed to shrink through natural attrition) The guys who used to control prices in the trucking industry now work full time regulating each other. (I kid you not) We are still stockpiling helium to lift a fleet of dirigibles for world war one. (Like Dave Barry, I am not making this up, though the Republicans have planned to close down the helium agency.) Job preservation is irrelevant: They are government employees. Power is the issue. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Where is text of wiretap bill
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Did the wiretap bill, as passed, contain those magic words: "or other legal authority"? Where can I get the text of the wiretap bill? --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Supercomputer export ease
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to a squib in the local tabloid: Clinton has approved a plan to ease export restrictions on the sale of supercomputers. The decision is expected to be announced today; it follows DoD recommendations. The wording is funky enough to be interpreted a couple of ways, so here's a quote: "Under the revised policy, U.S.firms will be able to sell billions of dollars worth of high-tech computers to civilian customers around the world. Currently manufacturers must seek licenses from the Commerce Dept. to sell a computer that can perform more than 1,500 million theoretical operations per second." Does that mean no more licenses, the mFLOP limit has been raised before license required, there is no limit but you still need a license? Answers today/tomorrow when the policy comes out, I guess. /r$

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Supercomputer export ease
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WSJ, Oct 6, 1995. U.S. Export Rules to Ease On Some Supercomputers Washington -- President Clinton is expected to announce today that he is easing export restrictions on certain U.S. supercomputers, a move sought by the computer industry. Administration officials say that given continuing technological advances and world-wide availability of many high-speed computers, the current restrictions are unrealistic and damaging to American companies. Critics contend, however, that easing the restrictions will exacerbate weapons proliferation. Mr. Clinton approved raising the speed of computers that may be exported to most countries to 2,000 million theoretical operations a second, or MTOPS, from 1,500 MTOPS, according to officials. For certain nations, including China, Egypt, Israel, India, Pakistan, Syria and Russia, civilian customers would be able to buy computers with speeds up to 7,000 MTOPS without prior government approval. Military customers in those countries could purchase computers with speeds of 2,000 to 7,000 MTOPS but only with an individual export license. Certain nations, such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya, would still be banned from buying high-speed computers. [End]

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Graphic encryption
by privsoft＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am currently working for a company that has a graphic encryption product called PrivaSoft. I was wondering if there were other products or engines that also provide graphic encryption. (graphic encryption is the use of a encryption algorythm to scramble an image taken of a document.) Also if any of ya'll are famillar with graphic encryption, I am looking for opinions as to its strengths / weaknesses. Steve O. Mgr. Tech. Services ************************************************* PrivaSoft TM * 1877 Springfield Ave PO BOX 600 * Maplewood NJ 07040-0600 * Tel. 201-378-8865 Fax. 201-762-3742 * Http://www.privasoft.com/privasoft * E-mail: privsoft(a)ix.netcom.com * *************************************************

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Re: Graphic encryption
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I am currently working for a company that has a graphic encryption > product called PrivaSoft. I was wondering if there were other products > or engines that also provide graphic encryption. (graphic encryption is > the use of a encryption algorythm to scramble an image taken of a > document.) Is there anything particular in graphic encryption? I usually encrypt graphics and document images as regular files with regular encryption... Hadmut

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Re: subjective names and MITM
by jbaber＠mi.leeds.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This discussion can be divided into two separate situations. The first of which is exemplified perfectly by Hal: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com writes: >m5(a)dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) writes: > >hfinney(a)shell.portal.com writes: > > > This situation with the MITM is actually about the same as if you were > > > communicating insecurely in the first place. You are exposed to all of > > > the same risks. > >The only way to achieve the level of security offered by physical face > >to face communication with a person is to have a physical face to face > >conversation at some point. If you only ever communicate via > >electronic means, you are always subject to the risk of dealing with a > >synthetic entity. (I think.) >I don't think so, or at least the risk can be minimized much more than in >the model where we just say that we're communicating with keys, therefore >a MITM is perfectly legitimate because it's just a matter of who holds >the keys. Suppose I want to talk to PC Magazine columnist John Dvorak. >Suppose I find a VeriSign certificate for his key, with his name and >employment information. I've never met him. We've never had a face to >face conversation. Yet I claim I can communicate with considerable >security with Dvorak using this certificate, certainly more than if I >just use any old key which is lying around with his name on it, one which >may be owned by a MITM. Here the wish is to communicate with a 'real' person. A person that actually exists and has an in-built reputation that is separate from his key. This is very much a real life situation and is very similar to the first time that you meet someone - it is very hard to know that someone is who they say that they are, few people ask for ID and even ID is possible to fake (an old key that is actually owned by a MITM). In this case the person is known (of) and not the key - therefore it makes sense to attempt to ensure that the link between the key and the person is a strong (trustworthy) as possible. However this is not the case in the second situation: I could say that know that I enjoy reading mail from some people on the list, that I agree with some people on the list or that some people on the list hold very strong opinions on certain subjects. However this would not be correct as I have not met anyone else on the list in person (we do not all live in the US). It would be more correct to say that I enjoy reading mail from some addresses on the list (etc.) - I have no real idea whether hfinney(a)shell.portal.com is Hal or actually Tim expressing different views. If I mail Hal therefore I am actually mailing the entity that sends mail to the list from that address and I would do so being pretty sure that I was communicating with the person who mails here - but I would have no idea whether he is actually male, female, blond, brunette etc apart from what I chose to believe from others. Now mail is far easier to fake/intercept than a digital signature/encryption - at least I hope so. Therefore if Hal where to sign all of his messages I could check the signatures with a public key obtained from anywhere at all and if they passed then I could be confident that the messages were all written by the entity with control of the secret part of the key - at least far more confident than I am at all of the mail from hfinney(a)shell.portal.com actually comes from there. So instead of me getting the idea that hfinney(a)shell.portal.com posts interesting messages I get the idea that the holder of the secret key posts interesting messages - I would probably still use the mail address as keys are less convenient with current mail readers but that is an implementation problem. Hals reputation is therefore transfered to they key - no matter where I got the key from. So if I send encrypted mail to the person with the private part of Hal's key I can be sure that it can only be read by the person who actually sent the messages pertaining to be from Hal. So the MITM problem is 'defined away' in the case where a reputation grows with a key but is still a major problem where you want to transfer a ready made reputation to a key (as in the first example). In effect the key becomes a pseudonym and you can be sure of communicating with the pseudonym safely but can not be sure of anything about the pseudonum that you have not experienced yourself without trusting someone else (VeriSign in the first example). Thus the problem is more reputation transfer than anything else. Jon C. Baber jbaber(a)mi.leeds.ac.uk http://www.chem.surrey.ac.uk:80/~ch02jb/

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Re: Graphic encryption
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199510061517.IAA10725(a)ix5.ix.netcom.com>, privsoft(a)ix.netcom.com (Steve ) wrote: > I am currently working for a company that has a graphic encryption > product called PrivaSoft. I was wondering if there were other products > or engines that also provide graphic encryption. (graphic encryption is > the use of a encryption algorythm to scramble an image taken of a > document.) > > Also if any of ya'll are famillar with graphic encryption, I am looking > for opinions as to its strengths / weaknesses. The description you give us is meaningless. The strengh of an encryption alogirithm must depend only on the algorithim and key used, not on the data (in your case graphics) being encrypted. It is utterly irrelevant _what_ is being encrypted, all that matters is _how_ it is being encrypted. Send us the algorithm and source code and we'll take a look at it. And by the way, "proprietary" algorithms are generally junk and should not be relied upon by security concious individuals and businesses. Only algorithms that have undergone extensive peer review should be considered for use. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMHVT7yoZzwIn1bdtAQEUOgGAnyOPIjo4D18AUDNDzXAcqRLXO7vcaRiw ode3TBA5gLm1FaGPSEk5y5g3VKiVS6ai =bV6Z -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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National Secuirty Science and Technology Strategy
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This excerpt is from the summary of a long policy statement on the National Security Science and Technology Strategy published by the White House on September 19. The full report is well worth reading -- it addresses military, economic, intelligence, scientific and technological issues and lays out projected initiatives. Has anyone seen news reports on this? ----- >From URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/White_House/EOP/OSTP/ nssts/html/execsum-plain.html Executive Summary _______________________________________________________ In March 1995, President Clinton ordered a sweeping reexamination of the United States Government's approach to putting science and technology to the service of national security and global stability in light of the changed security environment, increasing global economic competition, and growing budgetary pressures. This National Security Science and Technology Strategy, the product of that reexamination, is the country's first comprehensive Presidential statement of national security science and technology priorities. It augments the President's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement by articulating science and technology policies and initiatives that support the President's three primary national security objectives: enhancing our military readiness and capabilities, preventing conflict from occurring through engagement with other nations, and promoting prosperity at home. It advances that document's central approach of preventing conflict and maintaining the capability to respond should conflict occur. It is built on the recognition that our security depends on economic strength as well as military power. And it is grounded in the conviction that investment in science and technology is central to our ability to meet the challenges ahead. This National Security Science and Technology Strategy defines our new approaches to applying science and technology to the challenges that most directly affect our nation's security. [snip balance of summary]

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Re: Graphic encryption
by Rev. Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 6 Oct 1995, Lucky Green wrote: >And by the way, "proprietary" algorithms are generally junk and should not >be relied upon by security concious individuals and businesses. Only >algorithms that have undergone extensive peer review should be considered >for use. It's OK, when these guys were spamming Usenet a few weeks ago with their product announcement (admittedly, they did at least keep it to comp groups) they said it was export-approved. Therefore, it can be pretty much written off from a security standpoint - it's at best as good as 40-bit RC4, and I sure wouldn't use that for secure communications. I'd still like to know how it works so we can see just how insecure it is, though. Mark

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