December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Encrypted Email
by Connie Sadler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anybody briefly summarize for me some options for encrypting email that are secure? I know about PGP but I need something for (my environment) with an easy to use interface (PC-Windows) - for use by people who really aren't very computer literate. Any ideas? Thanks! Connie

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re: [NOISE] Chi Sun Times SS# Sweepstakes
by Weld Pond 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Lynne L. Harrison" <lharrison(a)mhv.net>: > There may be *an ulterior motive* of getting the person's ssn, i.e., for >the purpose of the newspaper (and the winner) reporting winnings to IRS. In >addition, the newspaper may also feel that, in selecting a 10-digit number, >it probably will not repeat such as someone's birthdate. Personally, I lean >towards the former. Why not just make giving up your SS# a condition of receiving the prize *if* you are a winner like lotteries do? I think the real reason is they need a unique number and are lazy and uncreative about generating one from the info people send in. Weld Pond - weld(a)l0pht.com - http://www.l0pht.com/~weld L 0 p h t H e a v y I n d u s t r i e s Technical archives for the people - Bio/Electro/Crypto/Radio

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The future will be easy to use
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a quote from Bill Gates' book: The mechanism that will make this possible is based on mathematical principles, including what are called "one-way functions" and "public-key encryption." These are quite advanced concepts, so I'm only going to touch on them. Keep in mind that regardless of how complicated the system is technically, it will be extremely easy for you to use. You'll just tell your information appliance what you want it to do and it will seem to happen effortlessly. (Thanks to the anonymous person who typed it in) We may not all like Bill Gates, and some of us even boycott his software, but we must admit he is a very shrewd businessman and knows which side of his toast is buttered. I think this paragraph is right on the mark. The competition for which cryptographic protocol wins will be decided on the basis of usability. The "dark forces" are no doubt aware of this fact, and have already made some advances in this area. One example is the Fortezza card. If cypherpunks are to have any hope of getting their vision of strong crypto implemented and deployed, it has to be in the context of usable systems. Form this perspective, let's take a look at the recent thread on "establishing trust." Carl Ellison advocates the MOSS alias system. My understanding of this system is that individual users associate "aliases" with public keys. If done right, it can work well. However, from a usability perspective, it is just one more trouble spot. First, on what basis will users decide which keys are worthy of being assigned which aliases? Public keys are big hunks of base64 encoded gibberish. They are difficult to present in a user interface, difficult to communicate in alternate, known secure channels (such as telephone calls and face to face communication). There is no way that a person could memorize one. The other issue is how much time and energy the user has to spend keeping the alias database up to date. There is no way to communicate securely with anyone who's not in the database. If the user is communicating with a large number of people, then it's very tempting to get sloppy. There's no way around it. This kind of system will not make it in the big time. As I see it, any system that does must have the following properties: * Some variant on the Web of Trust. * Online key-servers for getting keys in real time. * A clean mechanism for validating keys through alternate channels. There are three possible outcomes: we build it, the NSA builds it, or Microsoft/Netscape builds it. This last outcome might not be so bad, but only in the first one can we rely on our principles being advanced. Raph

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Re: GOST for sale
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:43 AM 11/24/95 +0100, Mats Bergstrom <asgaard(a)sos.sll.se> wrote: >According to a short article in a Swedish newspaper (DN) >with the title 'Spy Code of KGB can make computers safe', >JETICO INC., located in Finland (Tammerfors), introduced >a new crypto system on the world market last week. It's >based on GOST, the Russian federal standard algorithm. >This product, called BestCrypt, is implemented at least >partly in hardware. Alledgedly it uses 'GOST 28147-89', >whatever that stands for. > >GOST is probably very secure - a huge keyspace (256 bits) and >KGB would not have left a trapdoor for NSA to take advantage >of, would they? >From what I've read of GOST, it's really a family of cyphers with different sets of S-boxes - routine military gets one set, top secret gets another, civilian govt another, etc. Aside from possible differences in security level for the S-boxes, one motivation is that you can't take civilian govt decryptors and use them to read or forge top secret military crypto, etc. If this is correct, then some sets of S-boxes probably do have trapdoors (at least susceptibility to differential cryptanalysis_; how good are the ones that Jetico is selling, what credentials do they have to convince us their cryptanalysis is good enough, and why are they doing parts of it in hardware? #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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[NOISE] Chi Sun Times SS# Sweepstakes
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Chicago Sun-Times is running a contest in which readers are asked to send in their social security numbers. Someone will win a cash prize after a random drawing. I can't figure out the angle on this. If they simply want to run a promotional contest, why are they asking for ssn's? If there's an ulterior motive, what is it? Are they going to sell the list? Would they have a use for it themselves? The frustrating thing is that there are probably many millions of Americans who will give away the keys to the store for next to nothing. The feds probably made a tactical error: instead of trying to force mandatory key escrow down our throats, they ought to have offered everyone who is willing to submit to voluntary escrow a chance to win a Chrysler Minivan. -- Alex Strasheim, alex(a)proust.suba.com

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Re: Virus attacks on PGP
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:40 11/26/95 -0800, Thomas E Zerucha wrote: >That woudl be interesting - even with the speaker "off" the power surge >causes clicking and other signs. Not to mention that the interrupt count >would start moving (of course the virus could replace the entire OS and >would only have to find 300K chunks to hide in). I looked at the memory usage on my 1meg Mac and 5meg is used for the system. I have no idea what it is all being used for. A lot can hide there. Bill Frantz

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Announcement: mixmaster 2.0.3 released!
by Mixmaster 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Announcing the release of Mixmaster version 2.0.3 Among other improvements it includes an new and improved Makefile. Installing Mixmaster is a SNAP! For information about Mixmaster, and how to get it, check out http://obscura.com/~loki or read the Mixmaster FAQ which will be posted soon. -Lance

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Re: The future will be easy to use
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:06 AM 11/27/95 -0800, Raph Levien wrote: > As I see it, any system that does must have the following > properties: > > * Some variant on the Web of Trust. > > * Online key-servers for getting keys in real time. > > * A clean mechanism for validating keys through alternate channels. > > There are three possible outcomes: we build it, the NSA builds it, or > Microsoft/Netscape builds it. Specs, anyone? I suggest a few requirements: Store the keys, and information about the keys in a *real* database (for windows apps, we can redistribute the Microsoft access and or the paradox database engines royalty free, and drive them through ODBC to minimize dependency on specific vendors.) Support tree of authentification: A key that is *named* Peter by Sam, or *named* Informix Corporation by the Delaware corporate registrar, shall be considered equivalent to any other key given the same name by same authority, whether that authority be Dark Unicorn, or the state of Delaware. This last property is essential if PGP keys are to be used as a basis for exchanging promises to pay and directives to pay. A very common use of this feature, pending the development of user friendly software that makes every man is own bank and his own credit rating agency, would be as follows: Sam generates a long key on a clean off line computer: He uses it to name itself Sam and to name several shorter keys "Sam". He then puts the private long key on a floppy disk and buries it in a hole in the ground along with his gold and his stash of SKS ammo, and most likely never uses it again. He publishes the long public key, and uses the shorter private keys for actual encryption. From time to time, he changes keys, without any disruption or inconvenience. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Cray's New T3E
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WSJ, Nov 27, 1995 Cray Research to Unveil 2nd-Generation Parallel Processor for Technical Market By William M. Bulkley Cray Research Inc., bidding to reassert its dominance of high-end scientific supercomputing, is expected to unveil tomorrow a new parallel-processing supercomputer with unprecedented speed. The Eagan, Minn., computer maker has been best-known for its multimillion-dollar vector supercomputers that use just a few very powerful processors. The new Cray T3E will be its second-generation parallel processor. Unlike its predecessor the T3D, it operates without being connected to a traditional vector supercomputer. People familiar with the machine say it will have a theoretical top speed of more than one trillion operations a second, or one teraflops, a measure of supercomputer speed. Currently the only planned teraflops machine is one that Intel Corp. is building for the Energy Department's Sandia National Laboratories. 'Back in the Game' "We look at this as evidence of Cray reasserting its franchise in the technical computing market," said Debra Goldfarb, who follows supercomputers for International Data Corp., a market research firm in Framingham, Mass. "Cray's back in the game." The smallest models are likely to be priced at well under $1 million. Buyers will be able to increase power by adding just a few processors at a time in the future making the systems "highly scalable" in industry parlance. The T3E can be built with as few as 16 processors or as many as 2,048 processors. "This reconfirms Cray's capabilities to build very efficient high-performance computers," said Philip Samper, chairman and chief executive officer, who was hired last spring. Cray has said it will report a net loss for the current year, reflecting restructuring charges as Mr. Samper cuts costs, and sales are weak as customers have been waiting for new generations of both Cray's T90 vector supercomputers and the T3E. Mr. Samper said that Cray will be profitable in the current fourth quarter on an operating basis before an expected restructuring charge, and "We expect to be profitable in 1996. That's very important for this company." Mr. Samper, who declined to discuss details of the T3E, said in an interview, "We have $100 million in orders already in house. When customers get so excited they put money on the line, that's the ultimate test." The T3E won't be available for sale until the end of the first quarter of 1996. Cray's total backlog was $355 million at the end of the third quarter, including orders for the T3E. Cray, the longtime leader in scientific supercomputing, faced challenges from a host of smaller companies in the late 1980s as well as three big Japanese computer makers. But with the end of the Cold War, military need for supercomputers diminished, Cray's sales plateaued and several of the smaller companies went out of business. Offsetting Some Declines Analysts estimate the high-performance-computer market at about $3 billion a year, with growth in commercial markets for large databases and video-servers for interactive-media, offsetting declines in government business. International Business Machines Corp. and Silicon Graphics Inc. have both grown rapidly by selling parallel-processing systems in those markets. Cray sells small commercial supercomputers and commercial servers for computer networks of Sun Microsystems Inc. workstations. However, analysts say it needs revenue from the high-performance scientific market to rebound. Jay P. Stevens, an analyst with Dean Witter, says sales in the current year will fall 27% to $615 million from $921.6 million. Next year he forecasts a 20% rise to $808 million. Mr. Stevens predicts a net loss before charges for 1995 of $73 million, or $1.25 a share, compared with net income of $55.7 million, or $2.32 a share, in 1994. Mr. Samper said that during the year, Cray has reduced research-and-development spending by 16% and lowered overheads. He said it plans to buy more parts from outside suppliers, and is also controlling costs by negotiating with government agencies to have them pick up certain research and support costs. -----

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Re: establishing trust
by cme＠clark.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greg, >Subject: Re: establishing trust >Date: Mon, 27 Nov 95 12:20:47 +1000 > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Did you intentionally not provide the same key that this was signed with? I added the key you provided, but PGP still couldn't find the right key for this signature. > from the same person. I even know who they came from: the person who > is capable of signing with key 0xXXXXXXXX. > >I hate to point this out, but that isn't true. >Anyone can create a key with any chosen keyid and >attach the same publicly known name to it. Of course -- sloppiness on my part -- trying to minimize my own typing. Pardon me. One must use a hash of the key or the key itself to identify it -- not merely some portion of the modulus -- and the ID field has to be large enough to rule out a brute force search on the spoofer's part. The PGP KeyID problem has merely to do with PGP's own access mechanisms. Successful verification of a signature by some key is linkage enough to that key. If multiple messages/files verify by the same key, they are linked together no matter how the key is identified. The problem you identified comes from the fact that PGP doesn't let us know with enough certainty that the same key was used for two different signatures. In fact, PGP just tells you the UserID of the key which verified the signature -- as if that UserID were (a) unique and (b) meaningful. The keyID isn't displayed. For a version of PGP to suit my tastes, the unique UserID would be assigned by me alone -- and the file of those assignments (called "aliases" in TIS/MOSS) would be protected under my own signature (or, equivalently, encrypted under my own conventional key -- the same one protecting my private keys, perhaps). - Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | | ``Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song.'' | +---------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison (aka Mother) -+

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