December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: The Next Hack
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199509231919.MAA01818(a)infinity.c2.org>, sameer(a)c2.org (sameer) wrote: >> >> What exactly is the point of this? We have: > > Is Netscape going to cover the cost of getting the new keys >that the servers generate signed and certified by Versign? Is netscape >going to tell its customers that they need to regenerate their >keys and get new certificates? > > Like I've said, I'm very impressed with netscape's quick >response and almost everything they've done. I would be even more impressed if Netscape made their code publicly available for examination. - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMGRoeyoZzwIn1bdtAQGg4wF/XTLT2U7mXi2MZ5pgSZQMd9VdLZJcp5MD wgBWaGCNIzsQnkwB4ZkTyjJAOwFf0OkJ =+ZRt -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Foreign language traffic on the CDR?...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I was wondering if there was a large objection to carrying non-English crypto traffic... ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Project: a standard cell random number generator
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:52 AM 9/22/95 -0700, David G. Koontz wrote: > If NSA requires real stochastic results for military crypto, what would > we as casual cryptographers feel comfortable with? The Netscape episode > shows the comfort level needs improving. > > How good is good enough? 128 bits of true entropy, in your RNG seed, and never leaked is good enough. (You one way hash the RNG numbers generated, to avoid leaking any information about your internal RNG state.) Your RNG number must of course be based on the full seed, not on some 16 bit subset of the seed. To be on the safe side, you might use 128 bytes of seed, or 4K bytes of seed, just because gross overkill is cheap, and it is kind of nice to have a seed larger than any random numbers you might really need. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: "random" number seeds vs. Netscape
by patrick＠Verity.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Nor is there anything inherently wrong with having sex without the use > of a condom. YES! Safe exec! Use software protection;) (Can you tell that when I read this I was LOL!?) > > However, it is very difficult -- VERY DIFFICULT -- to prove to > yourself that there is never an instance in which your system() or > popen() can be abused. Well...you can tell by looking, certainly that's not true when you need a condem;) > In any case, I find its often more prudent just > to strip all these things out of my code. If you don't use them, you > don't have to prove they are done properly. Paranoia is your > friend. No one can ever break you for doing something you don't do. That's true, I have to admit that I usually don't use them either. Once you know how they're coded up, and how little code is actually used, it seems silly anyway to call a popen or system and suffer the overhead of the function calls and the loss of control. > > > The problem arises when you use information given to you from > > outside as the argument to popen or system without checking it. > > Yup, but often, you'd be suprised what turns out to be outside data. You're singing to the choir. Sigh, Eric Allman's been several times surprised about what turned out to be outside data. > > In any case, you obviously also understand why this is bad, but I hope > that people out there understan -- always make sure that you are > double extra careful about the use of such calls. Thanks:) Patrick _______________________________________________________________________ / These opinions are mine, and not Verity's (except by coincidence;). \ | (\ | | Patrick J. Horgan Verity Inc. \\ Have | | patrick(a)verity.com 1550 Plymouth Street \\ _ Sword | | Phone : (415)960-7600 Mountain View \\/ Will | | FAX : (415)960-7750 California 94303 _/\\ Travel | \___________________________________________________________\)__________/

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Re: The Fortezza random number generator is not trustworthy
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A nice addition to any Netscape RNG hacks is the comment that, while Netscape may have a bug in their RNG, it's detectable and fixable; the NSA may have a BUG in theirs, and only they'll know for sure... >> Yes Fortezza cards can be instructed to produce a random number through one >> of its library calls (someday they'll have a real API). One of the >> diagnostic tools I had tested this function. What algorithm do they use? >> Haven't a clue. Sources say that the RNG implementation may vary from vendor >> to vendor (i.e., GTC, Spyrus, Mykotronix, etc.). John Gilmore's comments on CAPSTONE, subliminal channels, and FOIA blackouts certainly add depth to this suspiciousness. I'd initially not been too worried about the Fortezza (besides the obvious Master Key problems) because the NSA is letting the military use them for Defense Messaging Service. However, if the RNG might be different for different vendors, the non-military versions may be using a weak RNG, which the NSA has a backdoor to. Alternatively, the RNGs may all be the same, but there may be an option that the military can use to get full-strength random numbers while the public, not knowing this, gets weakened ones (e.g. the first n bits of the RNG may be random, and the next N-n bits may be a strong hash, while there are N-n real random bits in another register if you ask for them nicely.) On a technical note, I would have thought that Fortezza and/or CAPSTONE used some sort of hardware RNG, i.e. noisy Zener diodes or whatever. I've seen it mentioned on this list that some other NSA secure phones, such as STU-III, do that. #--- # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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Re: Court proceedings under new SAFE act]
by Omegaman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, Sep 11, 1997 at 06:12:15PM -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: > I'm reading the bill more closely. This is incredibly slick work. > > 1. When it appears that any person is selling, importing, or distributing > non-backdoor'd crypto or "about" to do so, the Atty General can sue to > stop them. "Upon the filing of the complaint seeking injunctive relief by > the Attorney General, the court shall automatically issue a temporary > restraining order against the party being sued." "distributing" Does that include paper copies of source code? How about slowly and carefully reciting source code to an audience? Writing it on a blackboard, perhaps? What if I respond to Adam Back and accidently forget to snip his .sig? (if that's not prior restraint, I don't know what is!) > 2. There are provisions for closing the proceedings -- at the request of > the "party against whom injunction is being sought." "Public disclosure of > the proceedings shall be treated as contempt of court." Can also be closed > if judge makes finding. This, of course, is what remailers are for. More prior restraint, of course. > You get notified not later than 90 days afterwards. There are a lot of > other "checks and balances" here that will be touted as safeguards. Who's being saved? Fuck 'em. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- Omegaman <mailto:omegam@cmq.com>|"When they kick out your front door, PGP Key fingerprint = | How are you gonna come? 6D 31 C3 00 77 8C D1 C2 | With your hands upon your head, 59 0A 01 E3 AF 81 94 63 | Or on the trigger of your gun?" Send email with "get key" as the| -- The Clash, "Guns of Brixton" "Subject:" to get my public key | _London_Calling_ , 1979 ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Need Pathfinder "Cypherpunks" password
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- What is the Cypherpunks password to be used with Pathfinder, Time-Warner's web site? TIA, - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMGSROioZzwIn1bdtAQHi2AGAi18zy9bn/EvI65yoyqAPcQonmp3gaB7y Di2Jqq0KLUZFR4fzvwxoM4ZVWNfafQ7r =wBeD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Important Announcement from Money & Investing Update
by Money & Investing Update 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Taxless society concerns]
by Omegaman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, Sep 11, 1997 at 12:10:41AM -0600, Warpy wrote: > First off. In such a society, who cares for the old, the sick, and the > infirm? How is such care going to be payed for? How will basic services be > maintained without the necessary taxes required to pay for them? Family. Friends. What basic services are you referring to? > Now before you start yelling at me and calling me a government > sympathiser, let me say that i am disgusted at the amount of money spent > by governments around the world on military equipment and personnel. If > such a taxless society were to eventuate there would be *hopefully* that > much more money floating around to help those who need it most. The money won't be "floating around," it will be in the pockets of individuals instead of being paid out as taxes. > But the question remains. In such a taxless society, and little or no > government, how are those less fortunate than us going to be cared for? You should do more examining of Libertarian resources on the net. And do some thinking on your own. Start with the presumption that individuals and private organizations can operate more efficiently than the government. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- Omegaman <mailto:omegam@cmq.com>|"When they kick out your front door, PGP Key fingerprint = | How are you gonna come? 6D 31 C3 00 77 8C D1 C2 | With your hands upon your head, 59 0A 01 E3 AF 81 94 63 | Or on the trigger of your gun?" Send email with "get key" as the| -- The Clash, "Guns of Brixton" "Subject:" to get my public key | _London_Calling_ , 1979 ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: "random" number seeds vs. Netscape
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:29 PM 9/23/95 -0400, you wrote: >Can you take the time between two effectively async events, and use the >low order bits of same? >For example, time between a netverk pack arriving and the next tick of >the TOD clock? And/or the system's disk IO or such? You might get some entropy there, but you can get more (though perhaps not measurably more) by using the values of both instead. For instance rand = MD5(rand, lowbits(T(clock) - T(packet))) vs rand = MD5(rand, T(clock), T(packet)) As long as you're not overoptimistic about how many real bits you've gotten, might as well actually use the version that keeps more low-quality bits than try to improve them. Also, do watch out for things that aren't really asynchronous, e.g. the next clock tick will probably happen at some even multiple of 1000000/Hz microseconds. #--- # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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