December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Government shows its hand...good news!
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)got.net: > Though it's understandable why so many are expressing anger, gloom, > anxiety, and rage over the Freeh-Feinstein mandatory key escrow draft bill, > a better attitude is that of joy. > Any way it goes, this is good news for us. > If the Safe Internet Act (or whatever it is finally called) is passed, the > Supreme Court will likely strike it down (on First and/or Fourth Amendment Joy may be an overreaction. I just wrote (in part) to ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk: Perhaps the law will be passed, then struck down by courts as unconstitutional (after campaigners have incurred some expense) and something else will replace it days later. I'm too young to be this cynical. On another subject: Micali's patents are described in AC2. (Page 97 is missing from the indexed list of Micali-mentioning pages,) On page 98 Schneier says of the advantages of key escrow: "Well, there really aren't any". -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ##############################################################

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Re: Security Flaw Is Discovered In Software Used in Shopping
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 20 Sep 1995 10:47:24 -0400 (EDT) From: Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb(a)nsb.fv.com> To: www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com Subject: Re: Security Flaw Is Discovered In Software Used in Shopping Without belaboring the point too much, I think there are a few conclusions that really ought to be drawn: -- The world has never seen unbreakable encryption software, and almost certainly never will. Nothing that human beings ever build is perfect. -- Any encryption-based scheme is only as strong as its weakest link. Generally, you don't know what the weakest link will turn out to be. -- Basing a global financial infrastructure on the unbreakability of a certain algorithm or program is at best imprudent. Bear in mind that people as well respected as Dr. Adelman -- the "A" in RSA -- are hard at work trying to figure out how, for example, to use massive parallelism to break the basic algorithms of public key cryptography. -- Keeping sensitive financial information completely off the net is always best, whether or not you are using encryption. For information on a safe, non-cryptographic alternative that has been fully operational for nearly a year, with over 30,000 paying customers, a growth rate featuring a six week doubling period, and NO break-ins to date, check out http://www.fv.com. -- Nathaniel -------- Nathaniel S. Borenstein <nsb(a)fv.com> | When privacy is outlawed, Chief Scientist, First Virtual Holdings | only outlaws will have privacy! FAQ & PGP key: nsb+faq(a)nsb.fv.com | SUPPORT THE ZIMMERMANN DEFENSE FUND! ---VIRTUAL YELLOW RIBBON-->> zldf(a)clark.net <http://www.netresponse.com/zldf> --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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No Subject
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:53 AM 9/20/95, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > This was a bad mistake on our part, and we are working hard to fix it. > We have been trying to identify sources of random bits on PCs, Macs, and > all of the many unix platforms we Maintain a 4K entropy buffer. Mingle the exact time an place of each mouse hit into the entropy buffer using some combination that will have the effect of progressively shifting bits all over the place, so that every noise bit that you get eventually effects every bit of the buffer in a complicated way. For example: Buf[p] = MouseNoise + Buf[p] + Buf[p-24] + Buf[p-55]; p = p+1; (See Knuth, SemiNumerical Algorithms, Book 2, page 27 for the magic properties of the numbers 24, 55. This rule means that buffer immediately before p depends in a non linear fashion on all the noise you have received.) Whenever you need a random number, take a one way checksum, for example MD5, of the most recently altered part of that buffer. Use that as your random number. Whenever the user has used this buffer during a session, then when he quits netscape, save the buffer after first hashing it. To hash the buffer without loss of entropy, take the hash of one block of the buffer, and XOR it onto the next block (not the block that you hashed.) Repeat for each block in the buffer cyclicly. Publish your random number and encryption code here and in sci.crypt. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Deja Vu / Re: Info please
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Dont go swimming on a full stomach. >> >Don't play with that, you'll shoot your eye out. > Always wear clean underwear in case you get hit by a car.

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Is Feinstein's comment a blessing in disguise?
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Nothing other than some kind of mandatory key recovery really does the job," the California Democrat said at a hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee's technology, terrorism, and government information subcommittee. This comment may, in fact, be a powerful weapon against ANY control. In fact, Feinstein is believing that no half-assed policy (including the current policy and Kerrey's bill) will really help law enforcement much. I can imagine why Freeh would not just jump at that conclusion full-force. He is not that stupid. If he were to hold onto that conclusion too tightly, then there is little justification for any law "encouraging" the proliferation of key-recovery products, as that would be worthless in terms of providing relief to law enforcement. Basically, Feinstein is providing further support for the long-standing argument that unless you plug every leak (a.k.a. no KR/GAK product), criminals will find the loop-hole and work around government surveillence. Ern

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Re: FCPUNX:Show Me the Warheads!
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:03 PM -0700 9/4/97, Mike Duvos wrote: >>In an interview to be aired on "60 Minutes" this Sunday, Alexandr >>Lebed, former Russian National Security Advisor, will reveal that >>his country has lost track of more than 100 nuclear bombs made to >>look like suitcases, and has no idea what happened to them. At 10:13 PM 9/4/97 -0700, Tim May wrote: > Stay away from soft targets (Tel Aviv, Haifa, the ZOG section of Jerusalem, > New York, Washington, and so on--Harbors (e.g., Haifa, NYC) are pretty > likely targets, due to the extreme ease of delivery). But also be prepared > for major disruptions and panic even if you are nowhere near the blast. Relax: Anyone who can afford nukes, probably won't use them without very good reason. By the way, I have noticed that the Israelis have lately taken a considerably more conciliatory attitude towards non state entitities. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Stewart Baker's analysis of administration crypto-proposal
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 8 Sep 1997 19:13:52 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Stewart Baker's analysis of administration crypto-proposal [Some folks have asked me why I'm sending so much encryption-related information recently. The answer is simple: this week will be a crucial one in deciding how much privacy Americans will enjoy in the digital age. This proposal is //at least// as important and newsworthy as the original Clipper Chip was, and ranks up there with the Communications Decency Act. Thanks to Stewart Baker for forwarding. --Declan] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 08 Sep 97 18:19:24 EST From: Stewart Baker <sbaker(a)mail.steptoe.com> To: declan(a)well.com Declan, here is a quick analysis of the latest leaked Administration legislative draft on encryption. Whether this language ever sees the light of day in this form, however, is open to doubt. With that disclaimer, here's what the bill seems likely to do. Stewart Baker THE LANGUAGE The draft borrows heavily from the structure and content of the Kerrey/McCain legislation--it even retains the title, the "Secure Public Networks Act". In fact, the provisions in Titles IV through X of McCain/Kerrey regarding the registration of certificate authorities and key recovery agents, liability, criminal penalties, defenses, international negotiations, authority of the Secretary of Commerce to investigate compliance with the Act, and authority for the Attorney General to bring actions to enjoin violations of the Act are largely unchanged in this draft. The significant changes are: -- gone is the section (102) that would prohibit mandatory third party escrow of keys. In its place is a new section (105) that would prohibit, after January 1, 1999, the provision of encryption services in the U.S., or the manufacture for sale or distribution in the U.S. of encryption products/systems, that do not have a plaintext recovery feature that may be turned on at the option of the user. -- gone is the exclusive emphasis on key recovery as the technology for assuring plaintext recovery. Instead, this legislation would require products and systems that permit immediate decryption without the knowledge or cooperation of the user. The Attorney General is to issue regulations describing these functional criteria, but there is no provision requiring public notice and comment on such regulations. -- gone is the language requiring key recovery agents to disclose recovery information when presented with a subpoena. In its place is language that indicates a court order or court authorized warrant is required before a key recovery agent may disclose recovery information. -- added is export license exception treatment for products that are access or recovery enabled, regardless of algorithm, key length, or even whether the access feature is activated. This would be broader than McCain/Kerrey which would extend license exception treatment to products with over 56-bit key lengths only if the product includes an access feature and the access feature is turned on at the time of export. -- retained is the provision to decontrol 56-bit encryption after one time review. However, the bill adds an Encryption Export Advisory Board, composed of industry and government representatives, to, among other things, recommend to the President whether the key length of encryption exports to be decontrolled should be raised beyond 56 bits. The President retains the final decision making authority, however. -- gone is the McCain/Kerrey provision that would authorize the Secretary of Commerce to prohibit any exports that could be contrary to U.S. security interests. -- added is a provision to permit license exceptions for voice products with encryption if the Secretary of Commerce determines that requiring an access feature would be a competitive disadvantage and permitting the export would be compatible with U.S. foreign and national security policies. -- retained are the provisions that require the use of accessible encryption products and services on any system used or funded by the Government, but this draft sets a January 1, 1999 date of compliance. -- contrary to earlier indications, there is no requirement for certificate authorities registered under the Act to ensure recovery information is escrowed with a recovery agent registered under the Act. ANALYSIS Even though expected, the big news with this draft is the introduction of domestic control of encryption products and services available in the U.S. For many, the idea of such controls is simply an unacceptable infringement on privacy. But even for those who could be persuaded of the need for such controls, the implementation date provided (January 1, 1999) is unworkable. Industry must have the time to research and develop access technology appropriate to their products, particularly in the telecommunications industry where the demand for security is increasing, but there is little or no market for key recovery and its associated infrastructure. Likewise, manufacturers cannot afford to write off the investments they have made in existing security products or services by being compelled to implement new designs before technology turnover would normally be expected to occur. A related concern would be to ensure new products with access features may interoperate with products or services that are already in use without such features. It is unreasonable to expect that users could afford to replace their existing systems with new products that include access features. The language of this draft would seem to permit such interoperability since the access feature is required only to be an option that may be turned on by the user, or not. But even if the legislation is understood as permitting such interoperability, the cost to manufacturers and consumers of meeting this new requirement could be substantial.

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Government has appealed the Bernstein case to the 9th Circuit
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

No great surprise. We have received their Notice of Appeal. We'll scan it in and put it on the Web as soon as possible. Only Lee Tien has seen it yet, and he didn't mention anything exceptional in it. Soon in http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITAR_export/Bernstein_case/Legal/ John

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Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm > Date: Mon, 8 Sep 1997 21:54:31 -0500 (CDT) > From: ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) > Nobuki Nakatuji wrote: > > > > Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm > > > > 1.key input > > 2.input key generate chaos initial condition > > 3.input key generate chaos signal(random number) > > 4.chaos initial condition plus chaos signal > > XOR plain text > > How do you generate "chaos"? I can think of several ways right off... - radioactive source - controlled water flow through a faucet - waterwheel such that each bucket contains a hole of the correct size - magnetic pendulum - jello scintillation counter - A-B chemical oscillators at their critical point - a light detector placed under a tree in a breeze or wind - Chaos Game - Foucalt Dust The real question is what algorithm is used to generate the random seeds. The above mechanical systems (eg magnetic pendulum) are excellent sources of random numbers whereas the algorithmic (eg Chaos Game) methods are more suspect and open to breaking. You might want to check out: Fractals for the Classroom: Part 1; Introduction to Fractals and Chaos Peitgen, Jurgens, Saupe ISBN 0-387-97041-X ISBN 0-540-97041-X I haven't looked at Part 2 yet so I don't have a clue as to its applicability. But considering the authors reputations I would suspect it would be worth a check out (I am planning on buying a copy anyway). ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithim (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: "Nobuki Nakatuji" <bd1011(a)hotmail.com> > Subject: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithim > Date: Mon, 08 Sep 1997 21:18:24 PDT > P(i) Plaintext,C(i) Ciphertext,K(j) Key,Ch(i) Chaos signal, > L Irrational number > > > P(),C()-->Manage in byte,Length supposing that n byte. > K()-->Character line from ASCII CODE,Length supposing that m. > > > Ch(n) > begin > Xn+1=aXn(1.0-Xn) > return Xn+1 > end > > > f(K) > begin > w = Sigmaj strtoul(K(j))j > > delay=int(w/L) > return(double)(w/L-delay) > end > > > 1.K input > 2.delay generato > 3.Ch(i) generato > 4.P(i) acquire > 5.C(i)=P(i) XOR Ch(i+delay) > 6.C(i) output Nice but as noted by others, without a better explanation of what is going on with Ch(i) the algorithm as detailed is useless. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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