December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: FCPUNX:Show Me the Warheads!
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:03 PM -0700 9/4/97, Mike Duvos wrote: >>In an interview to be aired on "60 Minutes" this Sunday, Alexandr >>Lebed, former Russian National Security Advisor, will reveal that >>his country has lost track of more than 100 nuclear bombs made to >>look like suitcases, and has no idea what happened to them. At 10:13 PM 9/4/97 -0700, Tim May wrote: > Stay away from soft targets (Tel Aviv, Haifa, the ZOG section of Jerusalem, > New York, Washington, and so on--Harbors (e.g., Haifa, NYC) are pretty > likely targets, due to the extreme ease of delivery). But also be prepared > for major disruptions and panic even if you are nowhere near the blast. Relax: Anyone who can afford nukes, probably won't use them without very good reason. By the way, I have noticed that the Israelis have lately taken a considerably more conciliatory attitude towards non state entitities. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Stewart Baker's analysis of administration crypto-proposal
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 8 Sep 1997 19:13:52 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Stewart Baker's analysis of administration crypto-proposal [Some folks have asked me why I'm sending so much encryption-related information recently. The answer is simple: this week will be a crucial one in deciding how much privacy Americans will enjoy in the digital age. This proposal is //at least// as important and newsworthy as the original Clipper Chip was, and ranks up there with the Communications Decency Act. Thanks to Stewart Baker for forwarding. --Declan] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 08 Sep 97 18:19:24 EST From: Stewart Baker <sbaker(a)mail.steptoe.com> To: declan(a)well.com Declan, here is a quick analysis of the latest leaked Administration legislative draft on encryption. Whether this language ever sees the light of day in this form, however, is open to doubt. With that disclaimer, here's what the bill seems likely to do. Stewart Baker THE LANGUAGE The draft borrows heavily from the structure and content of the Kerrey/McCain legislation--it even retains the title, the "Secure Public Networks Act". In fact, the provisions in Titles IV through X of McCain/Kerrey regarding the registration of certificate authorities and key recovery agents, liability, criminal penalties, defenses, international negotiations, authority of the Secretary of Commerce to investigate compliance with the Act, and authority for the Attorney General to bring actions to enjoin violations of the Act are largely unchanged in this draft. The significant changes are: -- gone is the section (102) that would prohibit mandatory third party escrow of keys. In its place is a new section (105) that would prohibit, after January 1, 1999, the provision of encryption services in the U.S., or the manufacture for sale or distribution in the U.S. of encryption products/systems, that do not have a plaintext recovery feature that may be turned on at the option of the user. -- gone is the exclusive emphasis on key recovery as the technology for assuring plaintext recovery. Instead, this legislation would require products and systems that permit immediate decryption without the knowledge or cooperation of the user. The Attorney General is to issue regulations describing these functional criteria, but there is no provision requiring public notice and comment on such regulations. -- gone is the language requiring key recovery agents to disclose recovery information when presented with a subpoena. In its place is language that indicates a court order or court authorized warrant is required before a key recovery agent may disclose recovery information. -- added is export license exception treatment for products that are access or recovery enabled, regardless of algorithm, key length, or even whether the access feature is activated. This would be broader than McCain/Kerrey which would extend license exception treatment to products with over 56-bit key lengths only if the product includes an access feature and the access feature is turned on at the time of export. -- retained is the provision to decontrol 56-bit encryption after one time review. However, the bill adds an Encryption Export Advisory Board, composed of industry and government representatives, to, among other things, recommend to the President whether the key length of encryption exports to be decontrolled should be raised beyond 56 bits. The President retains the final decision making authority, however. -- gone is the McCain/Kerrey provision that would authorize the Secretary of Commerce to prohibit any exports that could be contrary to U.S. security interests. -- added is a provision to permit license exceptions for voice products with encryption if the Secretary of Commerce determines that requiring an access feature would be a competitive disadvantage and permitting the export would be compatible with U.S. foreign and national security policies. -- retained are the provisions that require the use of accessible encryption products and services on any system used or funded by the Government, but this draft sets a January 1, 1999 date of compliance. -- contrary to earlier indications, there is no requirement for certificate authorities registered under the Act to ensure recovery information is escrowed with a recovery agent registered under the Act. ANALYSIS Even though expected, the big news with this draft is the introduction of domestic control of encryption products and services available in the U.S. For many, the idea of such controls is simply an unacceptable infringement on privacy. But even for those who could be persuaded of the need for such controls, the implementation date provided (January 1, 1999) is unworkable. Industry must have the time to research and develop access technology appropriate to their products, particularly in the telecommunications industry where the demand for security is increasing, but there is little or no market for key recovery and its associated infrastructure. Likewise, manufacturers cannot afford to write off the investments they have made in existing security products or services by being compelled to implement new designs before technology turnover would normally be expected to occur. A related concern would be to ensure new products with access features may interoperate with products or services that are already in use without such features. It is unreasonable to expect that users could afford to replace their existing systems with new products that include access features. The language of this draft would seem to permit such interoperability since the access feature is required only to be an option that may be turned on by the user, or not. But even if the legislation is understood as permitting such interoperability, the cost to manufacturers and consumers of meeting this new requirement could be substantial.

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Government has appealed the Bernstein case to the 9th Circuit
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

No great surprise. We have received their Notice of Appeal. We'll scan it in and put it on the Web as soon as possible. Only Lee Tien has seen it yet, and he didn't mention anything exceptional in it. Soon in http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITAR_export/Bernstein_case/Legal/ John

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Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm > Date: Mon, 8 Sep 1997 21:54:31 -0500 (CDT) > From: ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) > Nobuki Nakatuji wrote: > > > > Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm > > > > 1.key input > > 2.input key generate chaos initial condition > > 3.input key generate chaos signal(random number) > > 4.chaos initial condition plus chaos signal > > XOR plain text > > How do you generate "chaos"? I can think of several ways right off... - radioactive source - controlled water flow through a faucet - waterwheel such that each bucket contains a hole of the correct size - magnetic pendulum - jello scintillation counter - A-B chemical oscillators at their critical point - a light detector placed under a tree in a breeze or wind - Chaos Game - Foucalt Dust The real question is what algorithm is used to generate the random seeds. The above mechanical systems (eg magnetic pendulum) are excellent sources of random numbers whereas the algorithmic (eg Chaos Game) methods are more suspect and open to breaking. You might want to check out: Fractals for the Classroom: Part 1; Introduction to Fractals and Chaos Peitgen, Jurgens, Saupe ISBN 0-387-97041-X ISBN 0-540-97041-X I haven't looked at Part 2 yet so I don't have a clue as to its applicability. But considering the authors reputations I would suspect it would be worth a check out (I am planning on buying a copy anyway). ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithim (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: "Nobuki Nakatuji" <bd1011(a)hotmail.com> > Subject: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithim > Date: Mon, 08 Sep 1997 21:18:24 PDT > P(i) Plaintext,C(i) Ciphertext,K(j) Key,Ch(i) Chaos signal, > L Irrational number > > > P(),C()-->Manage in byte,Length supposing that n byte. > K()-->Character line from ASCII CODE,Length supposing that m. > > > Ch(n) > begin > Xn+1=aXn(1.0-Xn) > return Xn+1 > end > > > f(K) > begin > w = Sigmaj strtoul(K(j))j > > delay=int(w/L) > return(double)(w/L-delay) > end > > > 1.K input > 2.delay generato > 3.Ch(i) generato > 4.P(i) acquire > 5.C(i)=P(i) XOR Ch(i+delay) > 6.C(i) output Nice but as noted by others, without a better explanation of what is going on with Ch(i) the algorithm as detailed is useless. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >The interesting question that Nobuku can answer is how he generates >the key from the input. > > The key generates from chaos function. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Nobuki Nakatuji wrote: >> >> > >> >I will just repeat Prof. Choate's question, how do you generate Ch. >> > >> > >> Ch generate >> >> begin >> Xn+1=aXn(1.0-Xn) >> return Xn+1 >> end > >What does aXn(1.0-Xn) mean? That's what I do not understand. > It mean Chaos function. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >The interesting question that Nobuku can answer is how he generates >the key from the input. > > The key generates from chaos function. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Government shows its hand...good news!
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Though it's understandable why so many are expressing anger, gloom, anxiety, and rage over the Freeh-Feinstein mandatory key escrow draft bill, a better attitude is that of joy. Any way it goes, this is good news for us. If the Safe Internet Act (or whatever it is finally called) is passed, the Supreme Court will likely strike it down (on First and/or Fourth Amendment grounds). This will marginalize the crypto folks, and perhaps cause the Court to reaffirm the Patel decision and related issues. If the Safe Internet Act is never actually proposed, or dies in committee, or fails, then at least Big Brother's true intentions will have been shown. Actually, this has already happened. All of those who ever expressed doubt that Big Brother planned to ban crypto must now see we were right all along. The remaining alternate course, that the Act is passed, and then that the Supreme Court eventually affirms its constitutionality, is also good for us. For it will then mean war has been declared, and various extreme sorts of actions will then accelerate. And that could be a lot of fun. But I expect, in all seriousness, that the Freeh-Feinstein view will fade. Clinton is about to enter his lame duck phase, and sentiment seems to be against mandatory key escrow. As one ironic example, the California state legislature has voted unanimously, both houses, to send a message to Washington urging easing of crypto exports. Feinswine, being a Californian, might want to heed this. But, being a Pacific Heights socialist, er, socialite, she's too clueless to have any inkling what the issues are. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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GAK patents, anyone?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone want to guess how long until they will give 'key escrow' systems special protection? (Actually that would be a good thing, because it would make GAK more expensive :-) ----- http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/terrog.txt ----- Petitioning to Make Special Patent Applications Relating to Inventions For Countering Terrorism New patent applications are normally taken up for examination in the order of their effective United States filing date. However, the Commissioner may provide that a patent application will be advanced out of turn for examination if a petition to make the patent application special under 37 CFR 1.102(c) or (d) is granted. On July 31, 1996, Vice President Gore stated that [i]t is imperative that those seeking to prevent terrorist activities have all of the tools necessary to accomplish their task. In view of the importance of developing technologies for countering terrorism and the desirability of prompt disclosure of advances made in these fields, the Patent and Trademark Office is establishing a new category for petitions to accord "special" status to patent applications relating to counter-terrorism inventions. International terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2331 is activities that (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnaping. The types of technology for countering terrorism could include, but are not limited to, systems for detecting/identifying explosives, aircraft sensors/security systems, and vehicular barricades/disabling systems. Applications which are made special will be advanced out of turn for examination and will be treated as special throughout their pendency by the Patent and Trademark Office. Applicants who desire that an application relating to inventions for countering terrorism be made special should file a petition, with the fee under 37 CFR 1.17(i) which is presently $130.00, requesting the Patent and Trademark Office to make the application special. The petition for special status should be made in writing, should identify the application by application number and filing date, and should be accompanied by a statement explaining how the invention contributes to countering terrorism. Such statement must be set forth in oath or declaration form unless it is signed by a registered practitioner. The petition will be decided by the Director of the patent examining group to which the application is assigned. This new category for a petition to make an application special will be added in the next revision of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) to the other categories discussed in MPEP section 708.02. Questions concerning this notice should be directed to Magdalen Y. Greenlief, Office of the Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Patent Policy and Projects, (703) 305-8813. Bruce A. Lehman Dated: August 19, 1996 Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks

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