December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: java flaw
by tomw＠orac.engr.sgi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <DGMpss.5q6(a)sgi.sgi.com>, fc(a)all.net (Dr. Frederick B. Cohen) writes: >> >> At 06:59 AM 10/17/95 UTC, jerry the golden retriever wrote: >> > A security feature in Java scans for viruses before activating the >> > applet. >> >> I hope that this is false. >> >> Even if one had genuine artificial intelligence, it would be impossible >> to detect all viruses, only particular viruses and classes of virus. >> >> If Java is secure, virus scanning should be unnecessary, indeed >> impossible, because there could be no code configuration capable >> of acting as a virus. >> >> If virus scanning occurs, then it is possible to write a virus in Java, >> then Java is inherently insecure. > To be more precise, if there is programming, sharing, and transitive > information flow, viruses can reproduce and spread (as proven > mathematically in the mid-1980s). Sice Java offers sharing of > programs and (for not at least) transitive information flow, viruses > are possible. I'm certainly no expert on viruses, but doesn't that have to be transitive flow of executable information? If I'm just shipping data around, there's no way you can infect me. Does Java allow the client to upload an applet to the server? Can applets persist between netscape sessions? If the answer to both of these questions is no, then the viability of viruses should be substantially degraded. -- Sure we spend a lot of money, but that doesn't mean | Tom Weinstein we *do* anything. -- Washington DC motto | tomw(a)engr.sgi.com

1 0

Re: Postscript in Netscape
by tomw＠orac.engr.sgi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <DGn8F6.50y(a)sgi.sgi.com>, fc(a)all.net (Dr. Frederick B. Cohen) writes: > Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist Wrote: > ... >> If a user configures a postscript viewer that has not had the >> file operations disabled as a helper app to any web browser then >> they are opening themselves up for a world of hurt. The same is >> true if they just download the file and run their viewer on it >> manually. The same is true if they configure /bin/sh as an >> external viewer. >> >> Obviously everyone should heed perry's warnings and emasculate >> their postscript interpreters before using them to view files >> of unknown origin. > WRONG!!! Netscape claims to be "secure" - hence it is Netscape's job to > be secure - regardless of the user's use of their product. Otherwise, > the ads should read: > "Netscape can be used securely by sufficiently knowledgeable > users who have emasculated their postscript interpreters before > using them to view files of unknown origin, and who have removed > all other known, unknown, and/or undisclosed security holes from > their systems. Otherwise, Netscape is insecure and should not be > trusted." If the user sets up a postscript viewer as an external viewer for postscript files, it's not Netscape's fault if the viewer does something insecure. -- Sure we spend a lot of money, but that doesn't mean | Tom Weinstein we *do* anything. -- Washington DC motto | tomw(a)engr.sgi.com

1 0

REMINDER: SF Federal Building, Oct 20, 1015AM: Bernstein case
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last reminder! Come to the Federal Building in SF this Friday at 10:15AM, go upstairs to Judge Marilyn Hall Patel's courtroom, and Be There for the first skirmish in the trial of crypto export controls. 450 Golden Gate Avenue in downtown SF, two blocks from Van Ness. We've gotten a lot of press interest. Both the legal-newspapers in SF, the Examiner, and many others will be covering it. Some of them breathlessly asked, "Will the cypherpunks hold a demonstration?", but what we will demonstrate is how the legal system can turn against the bureaucrats and authoritarians who currently hold crypto hostage. This will be a low-key meeting, quietly bearing witness, at least before we adjourn to a probably rowdy lunch at Max's Opera Cafe at Van Ness and Golden Gate Avenues. If you can't come to the hearing, at least come for lunch! And don't forget, it's a costume party: Dress like a banker. Even you bitbankers. Even me. See you there! John

4 3

Re: [NOISE] Re: Postscript in Netscape
by Julius A. Cisek 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:31 PM 10/18/95 -0400, you wrote: >The point is, Netscape CLAIMS to provide security - Miscrosoft doesn't. What do you mean by claim? That a software "does something", right? So if a manual claims that copy will make a copy of a file, but someone has hacked it to delete instead, isn't that the same thing? Okay, it's a bad analogy (take cover, a few more follow) but do you see my point? Don't get me wrong. I follow your logic, I just don't see how this will benefit the internet business. Many car manufacturers claim that their air-bags make their cars safe, but do we expect them to add a disclaimer that this is not the case when the car is set on fire? When I buy The Club for my car am I expected to believe that it makes my car invulnerable to burglary? Yet the manufacturer "claims" just that! I think pressing your idealism would render the word "secure" useless in any situation, whether we're talking about software or diapers. >On my machine, if you replace copy with delete, it will be detected >before it does the delete, and, unless you are very skilled, when I tell >it to copy, the corruption will be automatically corrected. This is >because I use an "integrity shell" - something you guys at Netscape >probably never heard of. Personally, I haven't (but it sounds interesting). So should the OS provider tell it's users to use the integrity shell? I get the feeling you think we're all a bunch of fledgling and ignorant fools here. In reality some of the brightest people I've ever met work here. And everyone here is taking personal pride in our products and staying very much on top of what's going on around us. We're not trying to pull a fast one, we really want this stuff to work (and I truly believe that we make the best, most secure browser on the market, period). >> There's a point at which one has to hand off the assessment to the buyer. > >The point I have been trying to make that many on this list seem to ignore >again and again, is that Netscape makes the security claims. If you don't >provide effective protection, don't make the claim. If you want to make >the claim back it up with something other than media hype. We really don't control the media hype (we certainly don't have the $$$ to buy a Rolling Stones song) and it (the media) has the potential to hurt us as much as it can helped us. Again, I see your point here, but this is capitalism after all. I'm sure if our "holes" are bad enough then we will be naturally selected out of the picture. I know, it would be nice to avoid the damage to the "customer", but there is no way to do that. The only way someone on the internet can be truly secure (whatever that means) is not to be on it at all. However, as a user of the Navigator I'm not terribly paranoid about my security being breached. *To me* the product IS secure because breaching that security is hard enough that in all likelihood no one will bother. > - making inadequately supported claims about a nebulous > thing called "security". To me security doesn't mean anything absolute and I think it's wrong for anyone to argue for absolute security because it's unachievable. To me security means making it harder for people to mess with my "stuff". Therefore the Netscape claim is quite reasonable. > - using it as a basis to get people to invest millions (billions?) > of dollars. People have invested in much more dangerous endeavors throughout history. What's wrong with that? And I'm sure there are people who are investing in Netscape for other reasons (like, for example, because we're really cool, which I can tell you is absolutely true <g>). > - plans to use it to move millions, and eventually billions of > dollars over the Internet, potentially placing a fair chunk of the > world economy (I'm mot kidding) as well as individual privacy > (and thus freedom) at risk. Not any more than credit cards are already doing! Come on, a trash can at K-Mart is a lot less secure than the Navigator. I do understand the difference, but there is no such thing as absolutely secure transactions involving money in any medium. The point is to try and make it hard enough to make it a rare occurrence. I feel that we do that. > - may succeed unless people who do understand the implications > find a way to fix the thing. Maybe we will do that here! <g> Again, you're not giving us enough credit, imho. >These things concern me, so I will stand my ground regardless of the >flames and ask, yet again, for someone at Netscape to tell us what you >mean by "security" when you make claims about it >why your claims are strong enough for a big chunk of the world economy >to rest on it. If we truly are so evil and/or stupid, people will find out and the competition will crush us. Frankly, I'm more worried about people who try to "protect the ignorant masses" than a hacker who breaks my code for a credit card transaction. >(I won't repost my >questions from a few days ago since you have already ignored them) I did not ignore them. I didn't see them. They must have been in a thread that was not interesting to me. Also, I only casually glance at this group when I have a free moment, which isn't very often. Ugly disclaimer: This post is not an official Netscape statement. As a matter of fact it's not a Netscape statement at all. I am merely posting from my Netscape account. I'm truly sorry about this, but that's just part of the business. Therefore, please don't make any "claims" based on this post. ~Jules (Julius Cisek) /- __ - mailto:jules@netscape.com Server Eng, NETSCAPE /\ >\=/\ --- http://home.netscape.com/people/jules MtnView-CA-USA-Earth \/ -\/ -- p:415.528.2968 f:415.528.4122 ---===> COGITO ERGO VROOM <===---

1 0

Re: PA Remailer Concerns
by goldberg＠superlink.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:47 PM 10/14/95 -0700, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: >Has anyone examined the legislative history associated with this statute? > >I would be surprised if they were singling out anonymous remailers. They may have had other concerns regarding phone abuse, e.g., long distance fraud. > >Then again, I could be full of it... > > Doesn't necessarily matter what the legislative history was. When some prosecutor trying to make a name for himself hooks onto this language to prosecute an anonymous remailer or other perceived miscreant, nobody will remember what the intent was. The casebooks are full of perversions of original intent. Jon Goldberg

1 0

Re: Postscript in Netscape
by suednim＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I somehow think they've only gotten started. Sue....Alice's cousin, waiting on real e$$$$ to start. >Dr. Frederick B. Cohen wrote: >> >> Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist Wrote: >> >> ... >> "Netscape can be used securely by sufficiently knowledgeable >> users who have emasculated their postscript interpreters before >> using them to view files of unknown origin, and who have removed >> all other known, unknown, and/or undisclosed security holes from >> their systems. Otherwise, Netscape is insecure and should not be >> trusted." > > Why did I know you would be showing up in this discussion? You >wouldn't be related to alice de 'nonymous would you? > > I don't believe that Netscape claims to be some magic bullet that >will suddenly make your system secure when you install it. We also >don't claim that it will detect viruses. > > Dont you think we've wasted enough bandwidth on this? I'm sure >most readers of this list are sick of it by now. > > --Jeff > >-- >Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist >Netscape Communication Corporation >jsw(a)netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw >Any opinions expressed above are mine. > > -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

1 0

crypto export from the UK
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could people in the UK please tell me what the crypto export laws are like there? I know someone who wrote some really great crypto code in the UK but isn't willing to distribute it because of crypto export laws... I was under the impression that it was legal to export crypto from the UK. -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

1 0

Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
by tomw＠orac.engr.sgi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <DGoAr7.L5s(a)sgi.sgi.com>, kelso(a)netcom.com (kelso) writes: > Hi, > One method to take the heat off of the last remailer > in a chain would be to call on our friend the "one > time pad". A message is split into two equal parts > that only make sense when the two parts are 'xor'ed > together. The seperate parts are then sent through > different paths to the final recepiant (or newsgroup). > The reader would have to 'xor' the parts together in > order to read the message. The remailer could not be > blamed (as the message was unreadable to him). > The drawback is that the message would be unreadable > until both pieces showed up. No, the drawback is that then all the readers of the newsgroup would complain that this remailer was cluttering up the newsgroup with unreadable garbage. Twice. Here's another modest proposal. I note that once you've sent a message, there appears to be no way for a recipient to reply without knowing who the originator is. A simple addition to the remailer protocol would be to encrypt the message and the control information seperately. This would allow the sender of a message to provide a pre-packaged method for returning a reply. The recipient of the original message could then just blindly send his reply to the starting point remailer specified in the original message by tacking the pre-packaged routing information on to the front of his message. -- Sure we spend a lot of money, but that doesn't mean | Tom Weinstein we *do* anything. -- Washington DC motto | tomw(a)engr.sgi.com

2 1

Re: MKE Threat Assessments
by futplex＠pseudonym.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[quotes pulled out of context, sorry] > I also strongly believe that you gravely overestimate the threat of MKE, I like to think of MKE in terms of a scenario like the Watergate break-in. Imagine that Haldeman and Dean pull the right strings to get Liddy the escrowed keys used by the Democratic National Cmte. to encrypt their campaign plans. George Bush's favorite millstone, J. Danforth Quayle, seemed to do a pretty good job of manipulating the legal system when it looked like Brett Kimberlin wanted to chat with the media about his pot customers. I believe this sort of abuse is a significant threat. > [and] probably overestimate the interest LEAs have in your personal affairs, Ordinarily, I'd say you're right (speaking only for myself). But I suspect that my active contributions to this list may have put my name in somebody's Oracle database. (I certainly underestimated the LEAs' interest in Leonard Bernstein's personal affairs.) What a waste of time and tax dollars ! -Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com>

1 0

Re: Simple Hardware RNG Idea
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:20 PM 10/5/95, Simon Spero wrote: >On Thu, 5 Oct 1995, Norman Hardy wrote: .... >> You presumably use the oddness of the count for your random bit in some >> predetermined time interval. External radiation can change, but not bias >> the parity. If the counter saturates, the counter may be biased towards one > >Hmmm. But isn't this method slightly biased? If the probability of N >events < the probability of N+1 events, wouldn't you need a large number >of events per bit to make the bias insignificant? .... What you really need is entropy (information). I propose concatenating several counts and sending them thru MD5. The counts are distributed the same way but are independent so that the entropy of the concatenation is the sum of the entropies. Each count has a Poisson distribution. That tells you how many bits of entropy there are in the input to the MD5. Take that many bits, rounded down, as your random bits. If there are an average of x bits in a time interval then the probability that the count will be exactly K is (x^K/(K!))exp(-x). That is the Poisson distribution. The entropy is then: - sum[i=0 to infinity] (x^K/(K!))exp(-x)log( (x^K/(K!))exp(-x)) = - sum[i=0 to infinity] (x^K/(K!))exp(-x)(log(x^K/(K!)) - x) = - sum[i=0 to infinity] (x^K/(K!))exp(-x)(K*log(x) - log(K!) - x) Here is a klutzy Scheme program to evaluate these: (define (sum g)(letrec ((ss (lambda (n) (if (= n 0) (g 0) (+ (g n) (ss (- n 1))))))) (ss 30))) (define (log2 x)(/ (log x)(log 2))) (define (fact n)(if (= n 0) 1 (* n (fact (- n 1))))) (define (p x k) (* (/ (expt x k)(fact k))(exp (- x)))) (define (en n)(sum (lambda(x) (let ((c (p x n))) (if (= c 0) 0 (* c (log2 c))))))) (en 1) => 2.07 (en 3) => 2.92 (en 10) => 3.73 (en 15) => 4.0 I.e. if 1 count is expected on average there are two bits of entropy in the count (supprising!) and if the count averages 10 then there are 3.7 bits worth. It goes up as the log. Before you bet your enterprise on this scheme consider that the math was done at 03:30 AM.

1 0