December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Bulletin: Cypherpunks say no taxes owed by moneychangers!
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:23 AM 4/8/96, jim bell wrote: >At 12:53 PM 4/7/96 PDT, Jim Gillogly wrote: >> >>jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> writes: >>>FWIW, I think that there is no capital-gains-type tax on currency >>>conversions. In other words, if I take dollars and buy yen today, and the >> >>I bounced this off a CPA, who said she would be very suprised if this is >>really the case: in general the IRS considers increases in wealth to be >>taxable, and unless there's a specific exclusion for currency transactions >>that she doesn't know about, she suspects this is not the case. As a >>conceptual counterexample she points out that you are responsible for any >>profit you make from selling your car for more than you pay for it (but, >>as you might expect, you don't get to take a loss if you sell it for less). > >That assumes that there is "profit" from exchanging currencies. On any >given transaction, there is never any "profit." The only thing that might >be called a profit is a difference in exchange rates, and that really isn't >an increase in wealth at any point. Ask that CPA to look it up. There are people and companies who make a nice business in currency exchange, ranging from the large companies one finds in international airline terminals and banks to the smaller, "Mom and Pop" moneychangers one finds in barrios and other such places. These moneychangers attempt to make a "profit" on each exchange (else they'd hardly stay in business). It will probably come as a surprise to them that, according to both a CPA and Jim Bell, no taxes are owed on their businesses, as "no wealth was created." Don't believe everything you read on this list, folks. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Friday (15 Sep) GAK meeting at NIST
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was hoping to attend and enturbulate, but my schedule doesn't quite wrap around it. Here's the schedule and talking paper they sent when I inquired. Jim Gillogly Hevensday, 21 Halimath S.R. 1995, 21:48 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- WORKSHOP TENTATIVE AGENDA Developing Federal Key Escrow Standards September 15, 1995 Hilton Hotel Gaithersburg, Maryland 9:00 Welcome, Agenda Overview Miles Smid, NIST Goals and Objectives 9:10 Discussion of Goals and Objectives Ray Kammer, Deputy Director, NIST 9:20 Initial Thoughts on Standards Development Miles Smid, NIST 9:30 Industry Perspectives (5-10 min max.) Note: We still have a few slots of 5 min. available. Please let Arlene Carlton (301-975-3240) know if you would like to make a formal presentation. 10:30 Break 10:45 Discussion Technical Considerations 11:00 Identifying Technical Issues Miles Smid, NIST 11:15 Discussion 12:00 Lunch 1:30 Breakout sessions 3:15 Break 3:30 Breakout session reports 4:15 Discussion 4:30 Future Activities (Miles Smid, NIST) 5:00 Close Note: The workshop will be held September 15, 1995 (9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.) at the Gaithersburg Hilton Hotel, 620 Perry Parkway, Gaithersburg, Maryland. The meeting will be open to the public, although seating is limited. Advance registration is requested, please contact Arlene Carlton on 301/975-3240, fax: 301/948-1784 or e-mail: carlton(a)micf.nist.gov. (9/6/95) --------------------- Developing Federal Key Escrow Encryption Standards Workshop September 15, 1995 Discussion Paper In announcements made on August 17, 1995, the Government stated its intention to work with industry and other interested individuals to develop federal key escrow encryption standards, including those implementable in software. This standard, when developed and approved, will be used by federal agencies (and others, if they so choose) in conjunction with FIPS-approved encryption techniques. The structure of the envisioned standard(s), its technical specificity, goals and objectives, important technical considerations, and issues of process must be addressed in order to move forward. Some of the more technical issues include: - Is a standard interface for the release of keys desirable? - What documentation is required? - How will operational procedures be developed? - How will conformance be validated? - Will security be evaluated? If so, under what criteria and by whom? - How will configuration control be maintained? - Are new FIPS-approved algorithms necessary? - Should escrowing be built into the Public Key Infrastructure? - Is a standard escrow system identification field needed? - Is split knowledge required? - Do systems which permit data to be encrypted for both storage and transmission need to provide for both types of escrow? - Does the government require special features (e.g., two hour access, continuous real-time decryption, etc.)? - Who will draft the standard? Timeframe? Note: These issues will be discussed at the Key Escrow Standards Development Workshop to be held September 15, 1995 (9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.) at the Gaithersburg Hilton Hotel, 620 Perry Parkway, Gaithersburg, Maryland. The meeting will be open to the public, although seating is limited. Advance registration is requested, please contact Arlene Carlton on 301/975-3240, fax: 301/948-1784 or e-mail: carlton(a)micf.nist.gov. 9/6/95 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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DES as a stream cipher
by Karl A. Siil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folks, As this sounds like a previously solved problem, I wanted to find out about using DES (or any block cipher) as a stream cipher, i.e., in a manner that keeps input and output data length equal. I don't want to use a true stream cipher, as I want to use the same key for multiple messages and stream ciphers tend to place the bulk of their overhead in the re-key. Since stream ciphers have "memory," I would have to "re-key" to the same key for each of my messages. I would rather key something like DES once and run it in CBC mode or use some other form of IV. Help or pointers to help are greatly appreciated. Karl

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No Subject
by Jason Roissetter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNSUBSCRIVE

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Leaked NSI PR About $50-Annual-Fee-for-Domain-Name
by Richard.Johnson＠Colorado.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a pointer to a very interesting draft press release, apparently scheduled for release on 18 September 1995. Short version: The article specifies $100 one-time fee for new domain name registrations, and a $50/year annual fee for all .com, .edu, .gov, .net, and .org domains. Long version: > From: rpwhite(a)best.com (rpwhite) > Newsgroups: best.general,best.announce,best.www,ba.internet,comp.protocols.tcp-ip.domains,talk.bizarre > Subject: INTERNET BEGINS FEE-BASED REGISTRATION > Date: 12 Sep 1995 12:18:18 -0700 > Organization: BEST Internet (415) 964-2378 > Lines: 495 > Approved: dillon(a)best.com > Message-ID: <434mdq$c3r(a)shell1.best.com> > NNTP-Posting-Host: shell1.best.com

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Re: Scientology tries to break PGP - and (fwd)
by kelso＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I would just like to point out that, when a LEA comes to you > to get at the contents of your computer, (s)he is not going to > patiently wait while your system wipes the offending evidence off your > hard disk. The first thing they do is make a copy of everything, so > they can work from the copy. Besides, you do have backup tapes laying > around all over the place, don't you? Sounds like a recomendation for SFS (Secure File System). It encryppts everything going to the disk. I used an SFS partition for a while. But, I swap between DOS and Linux. Havn't seen SFS for linux yet. Later, Tom <kelso(a)netcom.com>

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Denver area meeting, SUNDAY, 9/17, 2 pm
by adwestro＠ouray.cudenver.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- As usual, we'll congregate at the food court in the basement of the Tivoli, near the confluence of Larimer St., Speer Blvd., and the Auraria Parkway, and perhaps drift off to nearby libraries or restaurants after an hour or two. Email for directions or more info. Alan Westrope <awestrop(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu> __________/|-, <adwestro(a)ouray.cudenver.edu> (_) \|-' 2.6.2 public key: finger / servers PGP 0xB8359639: D6 89 74 03 77 C8 2D 43 7C CA 6D 57 29 25 69 23 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: I *swear* I have not used the term 'big-endian' in the last 10 years. iQCVAwUBMFYHkFRRFMq4NZY5AQGuGwQAmOqG0gpZHlUsmQxHcCfA2Hg30LQH9FXN xgz+gZuMWLFDNIZp/5bmodK18B4NpE4AtJH9QhA8kngb11/onVAu8aiw/EFGbTyT yHF2NVN20gGOGAYbeJzpUWHnJhPUB9QYszdwc8K0VvDtYfxq/H8mDfgDiGjNenCG z8ryBpKWYkQ= =cscS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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The Joy of Java
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> "Krakatoa--East of Java" An excellent Rant in which our Titular Leader, Tim May, sings the praises of Java and denounces an evil sect of Crypto Separatists, the self-described "Coderpunks." > Well, I was not invited to join the elite and secret > coderpunks list, but I still have some thoughts on coding > and, especially, on the opportunities offered by Java. Sorry > if this interferes with discussions of Rabbi Heir and Morris > Dees. Given the various parameters which determine the life and death of mailing lists, I fully expect Coderpunks to become moribund within six months, and its members to reunify with this list. Very few of these "I'm going to start my own list with less noise" adventures ever make it long term, absent the personalities and critical mass of interesting information which drove the list they spun off from. > 1. Java is of course not a perfect language, nor even the > best for specific applications. Other languages will > continue to thrive. Critics of the language and related > items (applet model, JDK, JITs, etc.) may point to various > problems (e.g. security). > 2. However, the "big picture" is compelling. Java arrives > at a time when a Babel of languages and platforms threatens > interoperability. C++ is despised by many (though, to be > fair, liked by many, too), and developers are adopting > Visual Basic (and the vbx widgets, etc.), PowerBuilder, > Delphi, flavors of Smalltalk (no pun intended), and > scripting languages (Perl, TCL, Python, etc.). I completely agree with this. Java incorporates the type of automatic corruption-proof memory management found in languages like APL, the basic notions of object oriented programming, fast dynamic linking, and a C-like program structure. This is powerful combination of features and gives Java the potential to do all the platform-independent things that were advertised for C before the rude reality of thousand line makefiles reared its ugly head. . The complete specification of the Java Virtual Machine means that the behavior of Java programs is perfectly well-defined, and one does not have to tweek anything which is processor or operating system dependent. In the future, I expect Java bytecode to become a significant channel for the distribution of popular applications, with compilation to fast native code on numerous platforms. Java is clean, and its concepts are easily understandable even by persons whose eyes glaze over after the first 30 pages of the C++ manual. > 4. What is so compelling, to me, is that Java programs have > an excellent chance of running on various flavors of Unix, > on Windows-95 and NT systems, on Macs, and on other systems > without changes, and without any special compilers bought by > the users! (Netscape browsers, and even Microsoft browsers, > are able to view applets, or soon will be. And cheap or free > applet viewers are available.) Expect NT to be a Unix-killer in the future. It can be ported to any machine, and its microkernel client-server design with pluggable third-party APIs permits it to manifest simultaneously the personalities of numerous different operating systems. Contrast this with the many different binary incompatible Unix flavors and its marketing advantage becomes clear. NT sales just broke one billion per year and are climbing steadily. NT and Java will be the big players in the future. If Netscape becomes its own OS, requiring no Microsoft software, it will probably capture the low-end "Web TV" market. > 6. One can imagine several applets of interest to > Cypherpunks. The ability to fairly transparently run them on > multiple platforms, effectively bypassing the platform > dependencies, is very important. Check out Hal Finney's site > for some "crytographic primitive" applets he's written. Indeed. One can imagine a nice set of Java classes and methods which interoperates with PGP, and has none of the fixed buffer allocation, limits, and awkward memory management present in PGP. Java tends to do the kinds of things PGP does very cleanly, and implementors can worry about the algorithms without being distracted by housekeeping. Any code produced can instantly be used by others in their applications. This is a powerful paradigm, encourages others to expand on existing work, and renders kludges like "PGPTools" unnecessary. > 10. "Mindshare" is the real story. Java arrives at the > right time. Cypherpunks needs--those needs that go beyond > just the "sealed envelopes and signatures" level which PGP > provides so well--are likely to fit in with this Net-centric > communications model. (I'm already thinking in terms of Java > applets for building blocks for Cypherpunk sorts of things.) Java Applets, mobile crypto agents, and the new Web-centric view of cyberspace will go a long way towards encouraging the planet-wide use of strong crypto, as well as effectively swatting annoying mosquitos like ITAR. Indeed, with Java, I can put up a Web page which teaches someone about a cryptographic algorithm, allows him to try it out and run sample data through it, and provides him with a platform-independent implementation of it to use as he wishes. All in one fell swoop. That's a pretty powerful concept. Java has come at the right time, and it will produce chaotic change in the existing order. Should be interesting. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Re: Netscape to patch shareware version
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:00 PM 9/12/95 +0200, you wrote: >>| Netscape said it received word last week that the State Department had >>| cleared that version for release on the Net, but only within the U.S., >>| owing to current export laws banning the export of encryption schemes >>| stronger than 40 bits. THe company could provide no details by press >>| time on how it would ensure that the 128-bit version wouldn't leak beyond >>| U.S. borders. >> >>Ok, any bet on how long it will take? > >It's already been exported. Evidently, one of those who bought the commercial >version sent it to Europe as soon as it was out. The Netscape "personal edition" was available in Europe on some store shelves soon after it's release. (The PE edition of netscape has the 128 bit encryption.) As for what Netscape will do in this case... They had made plans to release the 128 bit version in a method similar to what MIT uses, but they found that they could actually get people to buy a copy if they kept that one as only available by ordering it. (Who says that people will not pay for encryption?) Now all they need to do is come out with a version with a bigger key. (Hint, hint...) I will keep my personal feelings about Netscape to a minimum here. There are certain things that they do well and there are others they do not. But those problems will continue to be forwarded to Dave Null... Well, on to more profitable things. > >I note the site removed it, however, probably because Netscape Comm. Inc. requested that they do so. Netscape generally objects to anyone else carrying their browser (.edu sites with prior permission excepted). > > > > | Minister of Forced Caffinization in the DNRC | alano(a)teleport.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmerman unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | | -- PGP 2.6.2 key available on request -- | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano | <fnord> |

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Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:12 AM 5/27/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Sat, 25 May 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> > Why the first in chain? If the anti-traffic-analysis provisions are >> >working properly, it should be impossible to prove that a given first remailer >> >was the first remailer for any particular message. I had thought that even >> >civil courts required that you be the person who committed some act, not the >> >person who _might_ have committed some act. Otherwise, all the remailers are >> >in danger. This is even if someone tries an entrapment by sending through some >> >illegal material - if the courts accept that they should be allowed to do this, >> >then all the remailers they chained are going to be hit. >> >> Likewise, I don't see why the first address in the chain is vulnerable, as >> long as the message subsequently passes through at least one trustworthy >> remailer, and probably a temporary output address. > >I repeat, all it takes is one person to send through only one remailer >(perhaps even a Co$ plant) and the first in chain remailer is toasted. > >Think before you type please. You should take your own advice. The mere fact that the first link in the chain is "known" doesn't mean that it is provably involved. Without a substantial amount of bugging that the COS hasn't the resources to do, there is a big difference between them _believing_ that a given message originated there, and being able to prove it in court. And notice my caveat: "As long as the message subsequently passes through at least one trustworthy remailer, and probably a temporary output address." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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