December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

FTC ok's Intel buy of C&T [CNN]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > January 13, 1998: 10:56 a.m. ET > > NEW YORK (CNNfn) - The U.S. Federal Trade Commission said Tuesday it > would no longer try to hold up Intel Corp.'s $420 million acquisition > of Chips and Technologies Inc. > [INLINE] The FTC did say, however, that it would continue to > investigate the merger as part of its more extensive look into Intel's > operations. Earlier, the FTC had sought a preliminary injunction to > halt the merger. > [INLINE] The FTC was apparently concerned that Intel would gain an > even larger market share of the chip market with the acquisition of > Chips and Technologies, a leading laptop computer semiconductor firm. > [INLINE] The FTC has been eyeing Intel carefully because it believes > that Intel's strong chip business, estimated to control more than 80 > percent of the world's market, could raise antitrust concerns. [text deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Fed's train more technology workers? [CNN]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > By MICHELLE LOCKE > Associated Press Writer > > BERKELEY, Calif. (AP) -- America needs more computer workers -- a lot > more. > > That was the message from three Cabinet officials who unveiled > strategies Monday for finding more technology-literate workers as the > U.S. economy enters the information age. > > Their proposals ranged from spending more on education and training > grants to putting out a new message: It's hip to be high-tech. > > "American minds really created the information age economy and > American minds can continue to lead it if we nurture the immense > talent pool here at home," said Education Secretary Richard Riley. > > Or as Deputy Labor Secretary Kathryn O'Leary Higgins said with a > smile, "We're from the federal government and we're here to help." [text deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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1 Question to Dr. Froomkin...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sir, Do you accept that the Constitution of the United States of America is the supreme law of the land and therefore the ultimate legal authority within its borders? ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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An offer to Dr. Froomkin...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sir, I can understand your emotional reaction to some of my wording, it is its specific intent to ellicit such a reaction. It's a measure of the readers maturity to be able to ignore the noise and focus on the issues. However, in this particular case this seems to be working in the negative respecting my goals. So, in order to open channels of dicussion I would like to make an offer. I will desist on the use of these psychological warfare techniques and their destabalizing effects on your emotional state *if* you will return to an open discussion without resort to ad hominim and straw man arguments and address the issues directly and in plain language without resort to legalistic verbal camouflage to skirt the main points. Thank you for your time in considering this offer. Sincerely, ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Schneier's metrocard cracked
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From schneier(a)visi.com Mon Jan 12 18:21:01 1998 > Subject: Re: Schneier's metrocard cracked > In-Reply-To: <199801122150.NAA11668(a)comsec.com> from Information Security at "Jan 8, 98 11:40:23 pm" > To: guy(a)panix.com > Date: Mon, 12 Jan 1998 17:19:22 -0600 (CST) > Cc: cp-lite(a)comsec.com > > Information Security wrote: > > Dr. Dim wrote: > > > > > > I heard on the radio that the security scheme used in New York City metrocards > > > (designed with much input frm Bruce Schneier) has been cracked and that the > > > "hackers" can now add fare to the cards. > > > > > > Does anyone know any details? What encryption did Schneier use? > > > > It sounds like a procedural thing. > > > > Something like there was a way to swipe cards and have the > > system wrongly think it updated the card. > > > > The city announced that every cardreader in the system > > is going to be recalibrated, and this will cause problems > > for "a few" existing cardholders. > > That's not my design. Counterpane consulted on the next generation > cards, not the current mag stripe cards in the NY system. The > protocols we developed are not currently being used in any fielded > system. > > Bruce A subsequent news report said hackers were taking discarded (single-use?) MetroCards and "reprogramming" them so they would work again. However, the description didn't sound like it was really hacking... The MTA said only 6 fraudulent uses of this was happening per day, and 40 of these total per day. "Of these"? The MTA said there was some limited tolerance for nicked or scratched cards, and in this situation - where the software guessed that it was a scratched card - that it was programmed to be "lenient" and let them in. The news report showed the MTA's new recommendation for carrying MetroCards: sliding them into a protective container for travel. The mag-strip cards suck. ---guy

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Microsoft Exploratorium, from The Netly News
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

********** http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1685,00.html The Netly News (http://netlynews.com/) January 13, 1998 Which Way the Windows by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) Looks like it's upgrade time not just for Microsoft Windows, but also for Microsoft's legal strategy. As engineers frantically debugged the Windows 98 beta last week, senior Microsoft executives roamed Washington, D.C., apologizing for their previous arrogance and saying they had been misunderstood. Call it Microsoft PR 2.0. "What we have not done is communicate" the way the software works, Robert Herbold, Microsoft chief operating officer, told The Netly News last Friday. But will Microsoft's new humility appease federal judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, who already issued a preliminary injunction against the Redmond firm? He's scheduled to hear from the company's lawyers and the Department of Justice this morning. Both have spent a good chunk of the last month complaining about each other: The government says Microsoft violated the judge's order, and Microsoft says the government is "poorly informed." As his attorneys argue the law, Bill Gates will be practicing politics -- a skill that will come in handy if Congress holds more antitrust hearings when it returns in late January. Pundits have made much of Gates's Democratic sympathies, another image he's trying to discard (or at least upgrade). Today Gates is scheduled to sit down for a private chat with technophilic House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia), who will also tour the Microsoft campus. [...] *********** http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/afternoon/0,1012,1686,00.html The Netly News / Afternoon Line January 13, 1998 Microsoft Exploratorium The ugly guts of Microsoft Windows were on display today during a six-hour federal district court hearing in Washington, DC. Attorneys from Microsoft repeatedly pointed at a list of hundreds of .DLL and .EXE files and challenged the government to answer one deceptively simple query: Which files are part of Internet Explorer? The outcome of the case may well turn on the answer to that question, which lies at the heart of the Justice Department's beef with the software giant. Last month Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ordered Microsoft to stop using its operating system's popularity to force-feed Internet Explorer to computer makers. But, again, which files belong to Internet Explorer? The government's witness ducked the question. "I can't go through your list and say which files are unique to Internet Explorer," replied author and computer consultant Glenn Weadock. "I don't think it's possible or even especially useful to define a list of files and say this is part of, or this is not a part of Internet Explorer." Which Microsoft has argued all along -- their browser is integrated into the operating system. Yanking it out, the company says, would be like amputating a leg: a person could only hobble along, at best. The government views this as a weak excuse, at best. "The court issued a very simple, broad order and Microsoft through its actions defied rather than complied with that order," said Justice Department trial attorney Phillip Malone. The government is asking Judge Jackson to hold Microsoft in contempt and levey a million-dollar-a-day fine. The hearing will continue tomorrow when Microsoft vice president David Cole testifies. - By Declan McCullagh/Washington -------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- the moderated mailing list of politics and technology To subscribe: send a message to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu with this text: subscribe politech More information is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Should police knock before entering - SC to decide [CNN]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > SUPREME COURT CASE: SHOULD POLICE KNOCK BEFORE ENTERING? > > SCOTUS graphic January 13, 1998 > Web posted at: 2:14 p.m. EST (1914 GMT) > > WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The Supreme Court was being asked Tuesday to > decide whether law enforcement officers should ring the doorbell or > knock before entering a building if they sense danger. > > The case focuses on a 1994 incident in Oregon. Hernan Ramirez fired > his gun after police broke in his garage window after they received > a tip that a fugitive was in the Ramirez house. It was a tip that > turned out to be wrong. > > Ramirez fired his gun without knowing that those intruding were law > officers, and once he realized who the intruders were he > surrendered. > > "The police fire back a fusillade of fire, screaming 'police! > police!' -- this is the first time Mr. Ramirez realizes that the > police are there," said public defender Michael R. Levine. > > Even though Ramirez was not the fugitive that police had been > looking for, they still arrested Ramirez on weapons charges since, > as a convicted felon, he was not permitted to possess a gun. > > A federal judge later ruled that the police search had been > unconstitutional. The federal government then brought the case to > the Supreme Court, arguing that the increased danger in that > particular case had warranted the window-shattering no-knock entry > into the Ramirez building. [text deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Privacy & Anonymous service providers?
by William Knowles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm working on a web page that would include a list of Internet providers that either offer anonymous accounts or a better degree of privacy not usually seen by regular ISP's. Below is a list of providers that offers these services that I have been able to put together, I'm wondering if there are some that I am missing. To avoid noise on the list and I'm no longer a member of the cypherpunks list, please e-mail me privately. Paranoia http://wwww.paranoia.com Data Haven Project http://www.datahaven.com L0pht Heavy Industries http://www.l0pht.com Offshore Information Services http://www.offshore.ai Cyberpass http://www.cyberpass.net SkuzNet http://skuz.wanweb.net LOD Communications http://www.lod.com The Nymserver http://www.nymserver.com Sekurity.org http://www.sekurity.org Hotmail http://www.hotmail.com Thanks in advance! William Knowles erehwon(a)dis.org == The information standard is more draconian than the gold standard, because the government has lost control of the marketplace. -- Walter Wriston == http://www.dis.org/erehwon/

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mobile agents paper
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nelson Minar <nelson(a)media.mit.edu> pointed out in email to me the relevance of his thesis proposal and paper "Computational Media for Mobile Agents" to the discussion on autonomous agents as a means to deploying eternity servers and remailers etc. http://www.media.mit.edu/~nelson/ (Not read it yet). Adam

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Plan 9's auth() function - partialy secure distributed computing
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From ravage(a)ssz.com Tue Jan 13 17:51:44 1998 Date: Tue, 13 Jan 1998 17:51:42 -0600 From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)ssz.com> Message-Id: <199801132351.RAA29535(a)einstein.ssz.com> X-within-URL: http://plan9.bell-labs.com/magic/man2html/6/auth To: ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com Subject: auth [search] [index] delim $$ define lbr ' roman "{" ' define rbr ' roman "}" ' NAME ticket - authentication service DESCRIPTION This manual page describes the protocols used to authorize connections, confirm the identities of users and machines, and maintain the associated databases. The machine that provides these services is called the authentication server (AS). The AS may be a stand-alone machine or a general-use machine such as a CPU server. The network database ndb(6) holds for each public machine, such as a CPU server or file server, the name of the authentication server that machine uses. Each machine contains three values important to authentication; a 56-bit DES key, a 28-byte authentication ID, and a 48-byte authentication domain name. The ID is a user name and identifies who is currently responsible for the kernel running on that machine. The domain name identifies the machines across which the ID is valid. Together, the ID and domain name identify the owner of a key. When a terminal boots, the user is prompted for user name and password. The user name becomes the terminal's authentication ID. The password is converted using passtokey (see auth(2)) into a 56-bit DES key and saved as the machine's key. The authentication domain is set to the null string. If possible, the terminal validates the key with the AS before saving it. For Internet machines the correct AS to ask is found using bootp(8). For Datakit machines the AS is a system called p9auth on the same Datakit node as the file server the terminal booted from. When a CPU or file server boots, it reads the key, ID, and domain name from non-volatile RAM. This allows servers to reboot without operator intervention. The details of any authentication are mixed with the semantics of the particular service they are authenticating so we describe them one case at a time. The following definitions will be used in the descriptions: $CH sub c$ an 8-byte random challenge from a client $CH sub s$ an 8-byte random challenge from a server $K sub s$ server's key $K sub c$ client's key $K sub n$ a nonce key created for a ticket $K lbr m rbr$ message $m$ encrypted with key $K$ $ID sub s$ server's ID $DN sub s$ server's authentication domain name $ID sub c$ client's ID $UID sub c$ user's name on the client $UID sub s$ user's name on the server A number of constants defined in auth.h are also used: AuthTreq, AuthChal, AuthOK, AuthErr, AuthTs, AuthTc, AuthAs, and AuthAc. File Service File service sessions are long-lived connections between a client host and a file server. Processes belonging to different users share the session. Whenever a user process on the client mounts a file server (see bind(2)), it must authenticate itself. There are four players in an authentication: the server, the client kernel, the user process on the client, and the authentication server. The goal of the authentication protocol is to convince the server that the client may validly speak for the user process. To reduce the number of messages for each authentication, common information is exchanged once at the beginning of the session within a session message (see attach(5)): Client->Server Tsession($CH sub c$) Server->Client Rsession(${CH sub s},~{ID sub s},~{DN sub s}$) Each time a user mounts a file server connection, an attach message is sent identifying/authenticating the user: Client->Server Tattach($K sub s lbr AuthTs, ~ {CH sub s},~{UID sub c}, ~ {UID sub s}, ~ K sub n rbr , ~ {K sub n} lbr AuthAc, ~ {CH sub s}, count rbr )$ Server->Client Rattach($ K sub n lbr AuthAs,~{CH sub c},~count rbr$) The part of the attach request encrypted with $Ksubs$ is called a ticket. Since it is encrypted in the server's secret key, this message is guaranteed to have originated on the AS. The part encrypted with the $K sub n$ found in the ticket is called an authenticator. The authenticator is generated by the client kernel and guarantees that the ticket was not stolen. The count is incremented with each mount to make every authenticator unique, thus foiling replay attacks. The server is itself authenticated by the authenticator it sends as a reply to the attach. Tickets are created by the AS at the request of a user process. The AS contains a database of which $ID sub c$'s may speak for which $UID sub c$'s. If the $ID sub c$ may speak for the $UID sub c$, two tickets are returned. UserProc->AS $AuthTreq, ~ CH sub s , ~ ID sub s , ~ DN sub s , ~ ID sub c , ~ UID sub c$ AS->UserProc $AuthOK, ~ K sub c lbr AuthTc, ~ CH sub s , ~ UID sub c , ~ UID sub s , ~ K sub n rbr , ~ K sub s lbr AuthTs, ~ CH sub s , ~ UID sub c , ~ UID sub s , ~ K sub n rbr$ Otherwise an error message is returned. AS->UserProc $AuthErr$, 64-byte error string The user passes both tickets to the client's kernel using the fauth system call (see fsession(2)). The kernel decrypts the ticket encrypted with $K sub c$. If $UID sub c$ matches the user's login ID, the tickets are remembered for any subsequent attaches by that user of that file server session. Otherwise, the ticket is assumed stolen and an error is returned. Remote Execution A number of applications require a process on one machine to start a process with the same user ID on a server machine. Examples are cpu(1), rx (see con(1)), and exportfs(4). The called process replies to the connection with a ticket request. Server->UserProc $AuthTreq, ~ CH sub s , ~ ID sub s , ~ DN sub s , ~ xxx, ~ xxx$ Here xxx indicates a field whose contents do not matter. The calling process adds its machine's $ID sub c$ and its $UID sub c$ to the request and follows the protocol outlined above to get two tickets from the AS. The process passes the $K sub s$ encrypted ticket plus an authenticator generated by /dev/authenticator from the $K sub c$ ticket to the remote server, which writes them to the kernel to set the user ID (see cons(3)). The server replies with its own authenticator which can be written to the kernel along with the $K sub c$ encrypted ticket to confirm the server's identity (see cons(3)). UserProc->Server $ K sub s lbr AuthTs, ~ CH sub s , ~ UID sub c , ~ UID sub s , ~ K sub n rbr , ~ K sub n lbr AuthAc, ~ CH sub s , ~ 0 rbr $ Server->UserProc $K sub n lbr AuthAs, ~ CH sub s , ~ 0 rbr$ Challenge Box A user may also start a process on a CPU server from a non Plan 9 machine using commands such as con, telnet, or ftp (see con(1) and ftpfs(4)). In these situations, the user can authenticate using a hand-held DES encryptor. The telnet or FTP daemon first sends a ticket request to the authentication server. If the AS has keys for both the $ID sub c$ and $UID sub c$ in the ticket request it returns a challenge as a hexadecimal number. Daemon->AS $AuthChal, ~ CH sub c , ~ ID sub c , ~ DN sub s , ~ ID sub c , ~ UID sub c $ AS->Daemon $AuthOK$, 16-byte ASCII challenge Otherwise, it returns a null-terminated 64-byte error string. AS->Daemon $AuthErr$, 64-byte error string The daemon relays the challenge to the calling program, which displays the challenge on the user's screen. The user encrypts it and types in the result, which is relayed back to the AS. The AS checks it against the expected response and returns either a ticket or an error. Daemon->AS 16-byte ASCII response AS->Daemon $AuthOK, ~ K sub c lbr AuthTs, ~ CH sub c , ~ UID sub c , ~ UID sub c , ~ K sub n rbr$ or AS->Daemon $AuthErr$, 64-byte error string Finally, the daemon passes the ticket to the kernel to set the user ID (see cons(3)). Password Change Any user can change the key stored for him or her on the AS. Once again we start by passing a ticket request to the AS. Only the user ID in the request is meaningful. The AS replies with a single ticket (or an error message) encrypted in the user's personal key. The user encrypts both the old and new keys with the $K sub n$ from the returned ticket and sends that back to the AS. The AS checks the reply for validity and replies with an AuthOK byte or an error message. UserProc->AS $AuthPass, ~ xxx, ~ xxx, ~ xxx, ~ xxx, ~ UID sub c$ AS->UserProc $AuthOK, ~ K sub c lbr AuthTc, ~ xxx, ~ xxx, ~ xxx, ~ K sub n rbr$ UserProc->AS $K sub u lbr AuthPass, ~ roman "old password", ~ roman "new password" rbr$ AS->UserProc $AuthOK$ or AS->UserProc $AuthErr$, 64-byte error string Data Base An ndb(2) database file exists for the authentication server. The attribute types used by the AS are hostid and uid. The value in the hostid is a client host's ID. The values in the uid pairs in the same entry list which users that host ID make speak for. A uid value of * means the host ID may speak for all users. A uid value of !user means the host ID may not speak for user. For example: hostid=bootes uid=!sys uid=!adm uid=* is interpreted as bootes may speak for any user except sys and adm. FILES /lib/ndb/auth database file /lib/ndb/auth.* hash files for /lib/ndb/auth SEE ALSO fsession(2), auth(2), cons(3), attach(5), auth(8) Copyright © 1995 Lucent Technologies. All rights reserved.

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