December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: BofA+Netscape
by alano＠teleport.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Lads, > >I thought many of you would be interested in the text of this story. I'm >wondering if anyone has any comments on the excryption mechanism (i.e. >"eavesdropping" protection) being used. I believe, from my visits to the >Netscape (formerly Mosaic) Communications Inc. offices that they are using >RSA, but I'm not sure how *secure* their implementation is (eg. key size, >etc.). I'll be contacting my local branch to inquire as to how soon I'll be >able to use the service and will post my experiences with it as soon as >possible. If you check their WWW page, you will find information on the Secure Sockets Layer. It explains the algorythm used (RC4) and key size (40 bits). The specification is available from a web page off of their site. With the latest version of Netscape, you can enable a "secure" connection with their site. To do so use: https://home.mcom.com/ as the home page address. (You need at least .96 to do this.) I am not certain as to their key exchange protocol... | "Encryption ROT13s your mind." | alano(a)teleport.com | |"Would you rather be tortured by the government | Disclaimer: | |forces or the people's liberation army?" -mklprc | Ignore the man | | -- PGP 2.6.2 key available on request -- | behind the keyboard.|

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Callback phones
by Ben 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I picked this up on the alt.2600 newsgroup. Seems like it could be used for things like privacy enhancement if it was coupled with a credit card/cashier's check that wasn't in your name along with perhaps a call back loop. Ben. Begin Forwarded Article: __________

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Big Brother database
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm watching a congressional hearing on C-SPAN about the "Computer Criminal Tracking System." Jim Martin of the National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics is testifying, describing an FBI database under development. As an example of its intended use, he gave the following example: A hitchhiker could be stopped by police and required to submit fingerprints. These fingerprints could transmitted digitally to obtain instant identification and "criminal history" information about the hitchhiker. Criminal history information would include information from federal, state, and local authorities. Mr. Martin also observed that, while existing Justice Information databases are now used only for law-enforcement, firearms licensing, and "national security purposes," he envisions that the new database could be expanded in its uses to include "non-criminal justice" applications. Why should I have to provide fingerprint identification on demand to cops? What are the "national security" applications of existing databases? Imagine all the potential "non-criminal justice" applications for the new database. What happens when this database gets linked up to the "citizen tracking and employment eligibility" database under construction? Do we then have a de facto (cardless) national ID? I think so. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.9.i iAMtyPingInAfakeKeYBecaUSeSomePeoPleOnACErtaINMailiNGLIStarereQU IRinGtheUseoFDiGiTaLSiGNAturES.DoESTHIsMaKEaNYSenSEtoyOU?ItDoESN 'TTOMEsOIAMdoINgTHisInsTEAdblAHBLahbLAHbLahBlAHBlahBlahbLAHBlahb blAHBlahbLAh blAHb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Big Brother database
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The above line is a recycled pgp signature header. Save those bits! > >Mr. Martin also observed that, while existing Justice Information >databases are now used only for law-enforcement, firearms licensing, >and "national security purposes," he envisions that the new >database could be expanded in its uses to include "non-criminal justice" >applications. Oh, hot diggety. >Why should I have to provide fingerprint identification on demand to >cops? 'cause they'll shoot you or toss you in jail if you don't? > >What are the "national security" applications of existing databases? Finding out which spys in the CIA have been deducting payments on their new Jaguars. > >Imagine all the potential "non-criminal justice" applications for the >new database. Child support, vagrancy, alimony, using cash instead of plastic, parking tickets, income taxes, state taxes, municipal taxes, tax taxes, environmental terrorism (remember that tree in your yard you cut down?), jaywalking, having a hole in your sneakers, picking your nose, Un-American activities (ie, disagreeing with the Kongress), Tax Fraud (ie, trying not to give any more your money than you have to to the Tax Gestapo), reading books on the Prohibited Publications List, Violation of National Health Policy (ie, eating junk food, or otherwise placing an 'undue burden' on the National Health Kare System), and any other kind of mopery and dopery they can think up. If you can think of it or do it, they'll make it illegal, immoral, or Socially Irresponsible. > >What happens when this database gets linked up to the "citizen >tracking and employment eligibility" database under construction? grab your ankles. >Do we then have a de facto (cardless) national ID? I think so. You got it, Bunky. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 3.141592654 ThIsIsAfAkEsIgNaTuReBlOcKsOtHaTtHeSiLlYcYpHeRpUnKsReMaIlErAtToAd DoEsNoTtHrOwUp,IfYoUCaNrEaDtHiS,ThEnYoUnEeDtOgOoUtAnDbUyYoUrSeLf SoMeViSiNeToMaKeYoUrEyEsFeElBeTtEr-PlEaSeAcCePtMyApOlOgIeSfOrThE rIdIcUlOuSnAtUrEoFtHiSuSeLeSsBiToFcRyPtO- FlUfF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)fohnix.metronet.com for PGP public key and fingerprint. PGP encrypted Email welcome, encouraged, and preferred. "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable." John F. Kennedy

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Algorithm Example Question
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- What is the Knapsack algorithm and could someone please give me an example of it? Is this single time key encryption? Thanks. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLupl0V/ScHuGXWgVAQHgPwQAi9n9ucLZCAAYdzFxNXzVeduPptzLLrmL sHVW1FJZuY00IR3psFxBb7ZZfl5ZXqdMT+CfzKBG5uIk13kKFyW7/HqOIWjsg3zj cAof9Nb2kFvojClAV79FSyc9B3Quch5KqA/gFngCatjMPid3+1JWVebUY2H7AWf8 cF2hl/nGthI= =7n9l -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- According to John Perry Barlow: *Join EFF* "Jeff Davis is a truly gifted trouble-maker." *email <info(a)eff.org>* *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** "When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl!" JPB

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The Sapphire Stream Cipher
by Michael Paul Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

THE SAPPHIRE STREAM CIPHER The Sapphire Stream Cipher is designed to have the following properties: * Be useful for generation of cryptographic check values as well as protecting message privacy. * Accept a variable length key. * Strong enough to justify _at least_ a 64 bit key for balanced security. * Small enough to be built into other applications with several keys active at once. * Key setup fast enough to support frequent key change operations but slow enough to discourage brute force attack on the key. * Fast enough to not significantly impact file read & write operations on most current platforms. * Portable among common computers and efficient in C, C++, and Pascal. * Byte oriented. * Include both ciphertext and plain text feedback (for both optimal data hiding and value in creation of cryptographic check values). * Acceptable performance as a pure pseudorandom number generator without providing a data stream for encryption or decryption. * Design in a little extra strength where there is doubt about what attacks might be a threat. HISTORY AND RELATED CIPHERS The Sapphire Stream Cipher is very similar to a cipher I started work on in November 1993. It is also similar in some respects to the alledged RC-4 that was posted to sci.crypt recently. Both operate on the principle of a mutating permutation vector. Alledged RC-4 doesn't include any feedback of ciphertext or plain text, however. This makes it more vulnerable to a known plain text attack, and useless for creation of cryptographic check values. On the other hand, alledged RC-4 is faster. The Sapphire Stream Cipher is used in the shareware product Quicrypt, which is available at ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/qcrypt10.zip and on the Colorado Catacombs BBS (303-772-1062). There are two versions of Quicrypt: the exportable version (with a session key limited to 32 bits but with strong user keys allowed) and the commercial North American version (with a session key of 128 bits). A variant of the Sapphire Stream Cipher is also used in the shareware program Atbash, which has no weakened exportable version. I don't recall ever reading anything about using a stream cipher like this for the generation of cryptographic check values, but it seems like it should be a fast technique compared to some existing hash functions. OVERVIEW The Sapphire Stream Cipher is based on a state machine. The state consists of 5 index values and a permutation vector. The permutation vector is simply an array containing a permutation of the numbers from 0 through 255. Five of the bytes in the permutation vector are moved to new locations (which may be the same as the old location) for every byte output. The output byte is a nonlinear function of all 5 of the index values and 7 of the bytes in the permutation vector, thus frustrating attempts to solve for the state variables based on past output. On initialization, the index variables are set (somewhat arbitrarily) to 1, 3, 5, 7, and 11. The permutation vector (called the cards array in the source code below) is shuffled based on the user key. This shuffling is done in a way that is designed to minimize the bias in the destinations of the bytes in the array. The biggest advantage in this method is not in the elimination of the bias, per se, but in slowing down the process slightly to make brute force attack more expensive. Eliminating the bias (relative to that exhibited by RC-4) is nice, but this advantage is probably of minimal cryptographic value. KEY SETUP Key setup (illustrated by the function initialize(), below) consists of three parts: 1. Initialize the index variables. 2. Set the permutation vector to a known state (a simple counting sequence). 3. Starting at the end of the vector, swap each element of the permutation vector with an element indexed somewhere from 0 to the current index (chosen by the function keyrand()). The keyrand() function returns a value between 0 and some maximum number based on the user's key, the current state of the permutation vector, and an index running sum called rsum. Note that the length of the key is used in keyrand(), too, so that a key like "abcd" will not result in the same permutation as a key like "abcdabcd". ENCRYPTION Each encryption involves updating the index values, moving (up to) 5 bytes around in the permutation vector, selecting an output byte, and adding the output byte bitwise modulo-2 (exclusive-or) to the plain text byte to produce the cipher text byte. The index values are incremented by different rules. The index called rotor just increases by one (modulo 256) each time. Ratchet increases by the value in the permutation vector pointed to by rotor. Avalanche increases by the value in the permutation vector pointed to by another byte in the permutation vector pointed to by the last cipher text byte. The last plain text and the last cipher text bytes are also kept as index variables. See the function called encrypt(), below for details. PSUEDORANDOM BYTE GENERATION If you want to generate random numbers without encrypting any particular ciphertext, simply encrypt 0. There is still plenty of complexity left in the system to ensure unpredictability (if the key is not known) of the output stream when this simplification is made. DECRYPTION Decryption is the same as encryption, except for the obvious swapping of the assignments to last_plain and last_cipher and the return value. See the function decrypt(), below. C++ SOURCE CODE FRAGMENT The original implimentation of this cipher was in Object Oriented Pascal, but C++ is available for more platforms. /* sapphire.h -- Interface for the Saphire stream cipher. Dedicated to the Public Domain the author and inventor (Michael Paul Johnson). This code comes with no warranty. Use it at your own risk. Ported from the Pascal implementation of the Sapphire Stream Cipher 9 December 1994. unsigned char is assumed to be 8 bits. If it is not, the results of assignments need to be reduced to 8 bits with & 0xFF or % 0x100, whichever is faster. */ class sapphire { // These variables comprise the state of the state machine. unsigned char cards[256]; // A permutation of 0-255. unsigned char rotor, // Index that rotates smoothly ratchet, // Index that moves erratically avalanche, // Index heavily data dependent last_plain, // Last plain text byte last_cipher; // Last cipher text byte // This function is used by initialize(), which is called by the // constructor. unsigned char keyrand(int limit, unsigned char *user_key, unsigned char keysize, unsigned char *rsum, unsigned *keypos); public: sapphire(unsigned char *key = NULL, // Calls initialize if a real unsigned char keysize=0); // key is provided. If none // is provided, call initialize // before encrypt or decrypt. ~sapphire(); // Destroy cipher state information. void initialize(unsigned char *key, // User key is used to set unsigned char keysize); // up state information. unsigned char encrypt(unsigned char b = 0); // Encrypt byte // or get a random byte. unsigned char decrypt(unsigned char b); // Decrypt byte. void burn(void); // Destroy cipher state information. }; /* sapphire.cpp -- the Saphire stream cipher class. Dedicated to the Public Domain the author and inventor: (Michael Paul Johnson). This code comes with no warranty. Use it at your own risk. Ported from the Pascal implementation of the Sapphire Stream Cipher 9 December 1994. */ #include <mem.h> #include "sapphire.h" unsigned char sapphire::keyrand(int limit, unsigned char *user_key, unsigned char keysize, unsigned char *rsum, unsigned *keypos) { unsigned u, // Value from 0 to limit to return. retry_limiter, // No infinite loops allowed. mask; // Select just enough bits. retry_limiter = 0; mask = 1; // Fill mask with enough bits to cover while (mask < limit) // the desired range. mask = (mask << 1) + 1; do { *rsum = cards[*rsum] + user_key[(*keypos)++]; if (*keypos >= keysize) { *keypos = 0; // Recycle the user key. *rsum += keysize; // key "aaaa" != key "aaaaaaaa" } u = mask & *rsum; if (++retry_limiter > 11) u %= limit; // Prevent very rare long loops. } while (u > limit); return u; } void sapphire::initialize(unsigned char *key, unsigned char keysize) { // Key size may be up to 256 bytes. // Pass phrases may be used directly, with longer length // compensating for the low entropy expected in such keys. // Alternatively, shorter keys hashed from a pass phrase or // generated randomly may be used. For random keys, lengths // of from 4 to 16 bytes are recommended, depending on how // secure you want this to be. int i; unsigned char toswap, swaptemp, rsum; unsigned keypos; // Initialize the indices and data dependencies. // Indices are set to different values instead of all 0 // to reduce what is known about the state of the cards // when the first byte is emitted. rotor = 1; ratchet = 3; avalanche = 5; last_plain = 7; last_cipher = 11; // Start with cards all in order, one of each. for (i=0;i<256;i++) cards[i] = i; // Swap the card at each position with some other card. toswap = 0; keypos = 0; // Start with first byte of user key. rsum = 0; for (i=255;i>=0;i--) { toswap = keyrand(i, key, keysize, &rsum, &keypos); swaptemp = cards[i]; cards[i] = cards[toswap]; cards[toswap] = swaptemp; } toswap = swaptemp = rsum = 0; keypos = 0; } sapphire::sapphire(unsigned char *key, unsigned char keysize) { if (key && keysize) initialize(key, keysize); } void sapphire::burn(void) { // Destroy the key and state information in RAM. memset(cards, 0, 256); rotor = ratchet = avalanche = last_plain = last_cipher = 0; } sapphire::~sapphire() { burn(); } unsigned char sapphire::encrypt(unsigned char b) { // Picture a single enigma rotor with 256 positions, rewired // on the fly by card-shuffling. // This cipher is a variant of one invented and written // by Michael Paul Johnson in November, 1993. unsigned char swaptemp; // Shuffle the deck a little more. ratchet += cards[rotor++]; swaptemp = cards[last_cipher]; cards[last_cipher] = cards[ratchet]; cards[ratchet] = cards[last_plain]; cards[last_plain] = cards[rotor]; cards[rotor] = swaptemp; avalanche += cards[swaptemp]; // Output one byte from the state in such a way as to make it // very hard to figure out which one you are looking at. last_cipher = b^cards[cards[(cards[ratchet] + cards[rotor] + cards[last_plain] + cards[last_cipher] + cards[avalanche])&0xFF]]; last_plain = b; return last_cipher; } unsigned char sapphire::decrypt(unsigned char b) { unsigned char swaptemp; // Shuffle the deck a little more. ratchet += cards[rotor++]; swaptemp = cards[last_cipher]; cards[last_cipher] = cards[ratchet]; cards[ratchet] = cards[last_plain]; cards[last_plain] = cards[rotor]; cards[rotor] = swaptemp; avalanche += cards[swaptemp]; // Output one byte from the state in such a way as to make it // very hard to figure out which one you are looking at. last_plain = b^cards[cards[(cards[ratchet] + cards[rotor] + cards[last_plain] + cards[last_cipher] + cards[avalanche])&0xFF]]; last_cipher = b; return last_plain; } GENERATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECK VALUES (HASH VALUES) For a fast way to generate a cryptographic check value (also called a hash or message integrity check value) of a message of arbitrary length, simply generate a set of 20 bytes (160 bits) by encrypting zeroes. The output so generated is the cryptographic check value. To generate a cryptographic check value when message integrity is desired but encryption is not (for example, as part of a digital signature process), either use a "standard" key (like four bytes of zero) or simply bypass the "card shuffling" part of the key setup (for even more speed). The plain text is still fed to the encrypt function, but the ciphertext is discarded until the check value is generated. SECURITY ANALYSIS There are several security issues to be considered. Some are easier to analyze than others. The following includes more "hand waving" than mathematical proofs, and looks more like it was written by an engineer than a mathematician. The reader is invited to improve upon or refute the following, as appropriate. KEY LENGTH There are really two kinds of user keys to consider: (1) random binary keys, and (2) pass phrases. Analysis of random binary keys is fairly straight forward. Pass phrases tend to have much less entropy per byte, but the analysis made for random binary keys applies to the entropy in the pass phrase. The length limit of the key (255 bytes) is adequate to allow a pass phrase with enough entropy to be considered strong. To be real generous to a cryptanalyst, assume dedicated Sapphire Stream Cipher cracking hardware. The constant portion of the key scheduling can be done in one cycle. That leaves at least 256 cycles to do the swapping (probably more, because of the intricacies of keyrand(), but we'll ignore that, too, for now). Assume a machine clock of about 256 MegaHertz (fairly generous). That comes to about one key tried per microsecond. On average, you only have to try half of the keys. Also assume that trying the key to see if it works can be pipelined, so that it doesn't add time to the estimate. Based on these assumptions (reasonable for major governments), and rounding to two significant digits, the following key length versus cracking time estimates result: Key length, bits Time to crack ---------------- ------------- 32 35 minutes (exportable in qcrypt) 33 1.2 hours (not exportable in qcrypt) 40 6.4 days 56 1,100 years (kind of like DES's key) 64 290,000 years (good enough for most things) 80 19 billion years (kind of like Skipjack's key) 128 5.4E24 years (good enough for the clinically paranoid) Naturally, the above estimates can vary by several orders of magnitude based on what you assume for attacker's hardware, budget, and motivation. In the range listed above, the probability of spare keys (two keys resulting in the same initial permutation vector) is small enough to ignore. The proof is left to the reader. INTERNAL STATE SPACE For a stream cipher, internal state space should be at least as big as the number of possible keys to be considered strong. The state associated with the permutation vector alone (256!) constitutes overkill. PREDICTABILITY OF THE STATE If you have a history of stream output from initialization (or equivalently, previous known plaintext and ciphertext), then rotor, last_plain, and last_cipher are known to an attacker. The other two index values, flipper and avalanche, cannot be solved for without knowing the contents of parts of the permutation vector that change with each byte encrypted. Solving for the contents of the permutation vector by keeping track of the possible positions of the index variables and possible contents of the permutation vector at each byte position is not possible, since more variables than known values are generated at each iteration. Indeed, fewer index variables and swaps could be used to achieve security, here, if it were not for the hash requirements. CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECK VALUE The relatively large portion of the state altered with each byte encrypted (relative to alledged RC-4) contributes to a rapid avalanche of generated check values -- probably more than is needed. A single bit change in a message causes a radical change in the check value generated (about half of the bits change). This is one good feature of a cryptographic check value. Another good property of a cryptographic check value is that it is too hard to compute a message that results in a certain check value. In this case, we assume the attacker knows the key and the contents of a message that has the desired check value, and wants to compute a bogus message having the same check value. There are two obvious ways to do this attack. One is to solve for a sequence that will restore the state of the permutation vector and indices back to what it was before the alteration. The other one is the so-called "birthday" attack that is to cryptographic hash functions what brute force is to key search. To generate a sequence that restores the state of the cipher to what it was before the alteration probably requires at least 256 bytes, since the index "rotor" marches steadily on its cycle, one by one. The values to do this cannot easily be computed, due to the nonlinearity of the feedback, so there would probably have to be lots of trial and error involve. In practical applications, this would leave a gaping block of binary garbage in the middle of a document, and would be quite obvious, so this is not a practical attack, even if you could figure out how to do it (and I haven't). If anyone has a method to solve for such a block of data, though, I would be most interested in finding out what it is. Please email me at m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org if you find one. The "birthday" attack just uses the birthday paradox to find a message that has the same check value. With a 20 byte check value, you would have to find at least 80 bits to change in the text such that they wouldn't be noticed (a plausible situation), then try the combinations until one matches. 2 to the 80th power is a big number, so this isn't practical either. If this number isn't big enough, you are free to generate a longer check value with this algorithm. Someone who likes 16 byte keys might prefer 32 byte check values for similar stringth. OTHER HOLES Are there any? Take you best shot and let me know if you see any. I offer no challenge text with this algorithm, but you are free to use it without royalties to me if it is any good. LEGAL STUFF The intention of this document is to share some research results on an informal basis. You may freely use the algorithm and code listed above as far as I'm concerned, as long as you don't sue me for anything, but there may be other restrictions that I am not aware of to your using it. The C++ code fragment above is just intended to illustrate the algorithm being discussed, and is not a complete application. I understand this document to be Constitutionally protected publication, and not a munition, but don't blame me if it explodes or has toxic side effects. ___________________________________________________________ | | |\ /| | | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | \/ |o| | PO Box 1151, Longmont CO 80502-1151 USA Jesus is alive! | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj/README -. --- ----- .... | | ||| \ \_/ | PGPprint=F2 5E A1 C1 A6 CF EF 71 12 1F 91 92 6A ED AE A9 | |___________________________________________________________|

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Re: BofA+Netscape
by amanda＠intercon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> It my personal feeling that Netscape doesn't have the right > talent mix to develop secure software. It's my personal feeling that Netscape doesn't have the right talent mix to develop *any* Internet software, secure or not. Although, I have to say, I've never seen a startup that pissed off so much of the Internet industry and user community in so short a time. Even Apple & Microsoft agree that Netscape is brain dead... Amanda Walker InterCon Systems Corporation

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Re: BofA+Netscape
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Amanda Walker wrote: >> It my personal feeling that Netscape doesn't have the right >> talent mix to develop secure software. > >It's my personal feeling that Netscape doesn't have the right talent mix to >develop *any* Internet software, secure or not. Although, I have to say, >I've never seen a startup that pissed off so much of the Internet industry >and user community in so short a time. Even Apple & Microsoft agree that >Netscape is brain dead... Would you mind elaborating? -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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nym based remailer proposals
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Current nym based remailers suffer from the same insecurity that all return address share. It is easy for an opponent to trace a return address by sending many messages to that address, and watching the traffic generated. If the remailer uses a database of nyms to real names (like Julf's penet remailer) then all security rests with the integrity of the operator and the security of that one system. These security problems can be avoided, while still providing the benefits of a "replyable" address. I suggested the following scheme at the last San Diego Cypherpunks meeting. It was well received there, so I hope it will be of interest. Having read the help files, this is my understanding of how the current nym based remailers work. I send an anonymous reply block to the nym remailer, which puts it in a database, along with my chosen nym. This can all be done through remailers. Now anyone can send mail to nym(a)remailer.address.com and it will be sent to me using the reply block I sent. I propose two changes: 1) To facilitate replying to nyms, I should be able to send mail to the remailer indicating the nym it should appear to be from. Then a recipient would simply hit reply, and the response would go back to the real sender. 2) I propose the use of message pools rather than return addresses. With enough subscribers, the best way to do this would be using mailing lists. There already exist many tools which could filter out all pool message other than yours. Until that time, alt.anonymous.messages would be a better choice. To be practical, both of these schemes require that the user be able to filter out messages to other nyms. The remailer (which might be better called a nym server) should place the subject line of the incoming reply in the body of the message, and replace the subject line with some searchable string (e.g. To Nym: Pr0duct Cypher). Searching alt.anonymous.messages for your nym in the subject line would reveal all messages to you. While the current system would allow me to have messages sent to a message pool using a mail-to-news gateway, I am not now able to search for messages to me, and I can not send messages "From: " my nym. -Lance (Ice Weasel) Cottrell -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLuqx5VVkk3dax7hlAQE2UAP9FEBCHyRZid7oAXHqSf2OUk63uMKzBSaE ftW5WYkXJNfyeZFXlsMqfgBorB9LBzdza4xAM+V31zKuBBe4n//i29TE25vN+Qwq FAiAQ0L4tj6KiTl/Yt7alw6b6aLm60Hj9C3MsRRAj3hBnUo2b3VViR+W9bE2n7Ox pHtTUnQQIRA= =P/bW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Encrypted mail welcome. Home page http://nately.ucsd.edu/~loki/ Home of "chain" the remailer chaining script. For anon remailer info, mail remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu Subject: remailer-help "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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"Crypto Anarchy and Virtual Communities"
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I discovered today at the Cypherpunks meeting what happened to the posts of my paper I made to the list. I converted the FrameMaker version of a paper (to be presented in Monte Carlo in early February) to plain text, with attempts to clean up most of the non-standard ASCII stuff. This paper was 43K in length, and I posted it, figuring most of you could handle it (save it, dump it, etc.). So I posted it on Wednesday. It didn't appear. So I tried again on Friday. Still nothing...and no bounce messages, no nothing. Well, Eric told me today that all messages above some size (40K, he recalls) are routed to a mailbox for manual processing. He hasn't checked it recently, so.... I hate to put files in my ftp account, as Netcom's ftp site is grossly overcrowed and nearly all attempts to access it fail. (Netcommies are roadkill on the I-way.)) But it is there, at ftp.netcom.com, in pub/tc/tcmay. (Full address for direct access is: /ftp/pub/tc/tcmay. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Cypherpunks list: majordomo(a)toad.com with body message of only: subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tc/tcmay

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