December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Costs of Credit Card Fraud and Brute-Force Codebreaking
by Flame Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

fc(a)all.net wrote: >I think a lot of people miss the distinction between automated message >cracking and dumpster diving. Dumpster diving is not free. It costs at >least a dollar each to get credit card slips by dumpster diving. > >Consider that in order to use the information, you have to get the slip, >pull off the numbers, enter them into a computer (or even worse yet, >create a phoney card or make a phone call) in order to use the >information. The break-even point for an automated cracking and usage >system is more than a dollar per stolen card. My parallel processor >is actually more cost effective for crimilar theft via credit card fraud. Well, a few years ago I partially satisfied my phone-phreaking habit in the following manner: I would walk up to a busy intersection in a comercial area and stroll through the various gas stations located there, collecting receipts that careless customers had forgotten to take with them after using the "pay-at-the-pump". Then I would visit the pay phones at the nearby mini-malls. It sure didn't cost me a dollar a number. The cost/value of a card number depends a lot on what you seek to gain. If it's free phone calls, your costs are basically nil. If you want free gas, it'll cost you $500 or so for the card reader/writer and a few old cards. If you have a system for extracting thousands of dollars from each card, economics of scale would probably justify the $10000 rc4-breaker. ...or you could just hack netcom, steal the mother lode and be set for life... (Hi Kevin! drop me a line when you get out; ya gotta love those plea-bargains - 30 year sentence reduced to 8 months! ;-)

3 2

Load-sharing for Key Cracking
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone should look at Condor, ftp.cs.uwisc.edu. It's designed to share spare cycles. /r$

1 0

64 bit keys breakable by the NSA or just some random key length?
by zinc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- cpunks, i was thinking about the recent Clinton/LEA proposal regarding exportable crypto. the new rules would allow 64 bit keys to be exported, as long as the master key was made available through some key escrow service. now, we know it is relatively easy to break a 40 bit key. additionally, we know it is nearly impossible to break 128 bits. i'm not so sure how hard 64 bits is (need to brush up on that ol' mathematics some time...). why did the govt pick 64 bits? is this length still within the range of the NSA if they really wanted to read something but didn't feel the need or want the exposure of obtaining a key from escrow? i'm curious if anyone thinks this gives us a little more info on the capabilities of the NSA regarding brute forcing a key. additionally, since this *is* an escrow system, why didn't the gov't just go with the unbreakable 128 bit key length? - -pjf patrick finerty = zinc(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu = pfinerty(a)nyx.cs.du.edu U of Utah biochem grad student in the Bass lab - zinc fingers + dsRNA! ** FINGER zinc-pgp(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu for pgp public key - CRYPTO! zifi runs LINUX 1.2.11 -=-=-=WEB=-=-=-> http://zifi.genetics.utah.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMDYyb03Qo/lG0AH5AQGhDwP/c2NmiU3IwQSAPuYyFgLG3o8Tc+8i9v7b j8+vdT9wwmBM0hMXtIya6Dnb9hHo+oyBJkL+70N44sV7gy+J6LlZQcY/dNICAdD5 lEJ67YEfKp5Mb010MljsEcwMEIhjZ/IWrhSZipg4rkfIutXCIj6iNvOtOgi9WjKW wz1j7FimJpI= =1j3L -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Cypherpunks on IRC?
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Where do the CPs hang out on IRC? I am just giving IRC another try and there was no CP channel (There is now). Perhaps we are too busy writing code? <g> - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMDY13yoZzwIn1bdtAQHe7QF8CyJJsrUtP7RPckKwRegQ1yTUbL7wreip moqo7qqcehtE5efi4aCHPMleBU7eZNH/ =DWBj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: 64 bit keys breakable by the NSA or just some random key length?
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <Pine.LNX.3.91.950819123758.27374A-100000(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu>, zinc(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu (zinc) wrote: >why did the govt pick 64 bits? is this length still within the range >of the NSA if they really wanted to read something but didn't feel the >need or want the exposure of obtaining a key from escrow? > >i'm curious if anyone thinks this gives us a little more info on the >capabilities of the NSA regarding brute forcing a key. additionally, >since this *is* an escrow system, why didn't the gov't just go with >the unbreakable 128 bit key length? I think the obvious conclusion would be because 64bits is crackable if need be and if you have the resources the goverment has. Not for routine monitoring of undesirables, but for those special cases where they don't want to expose their activities by requesting a warrant. - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMDY3jSoZzwIn1bdtAQGV3gGA26/BZOnXiuMuO8IDgGCnnONVhVtL4/o1 5HVVD3Mqfjp3Sr7QJMQMrfD4JRWRphTL =evHi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Apologies
by Brian Lane 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry, the group of SSL related files wasn't supposed to go to the list. Its been one of those weeks, you know? Brian ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- "A little rebellion now and then is a good thing." | PGP Key and .plan -- President Thomas Jefferson | email Subj: blane-info =============================================================================

1 0

Re: Economic Model for Key Cracking
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:29 PM 8/18/95, Howard Cheng wrote: >We need to make sure that someone did do the work honestly, but I don't know >how to check this (other than doing the work yourself to confirm the results, >but this defeats the whole point of the system). Perhaps we should require >that people buy the work first, and when they report the results, they get >the money back + some profits. The "abstract protocol" that works in many economic transactions is simple: _spot checks_. That is, random samples. You don't have to do all the work yourself. "Quality Control" (QC) is based on this. The "Inspected By: Foobar" tags on manufactured items provided traceability/feedback to a manufacturer--a reputation system, if you will. Lot numbers, seals, etc. Yes, this is an obvious point, but it's interesting because the "spot check" is a kind of protocol that is almost like "cut and choose" in its crypto connotations. >Assuming everyone is honest, I am sure many people in businesses As the Great Leader once said, "Trust, but verify." There is no reason to make assumptions about honesty: just spot check the work and downgrade the reputation of anyone who slacks off or is deceitful. (This "web of distrust," in terms of black marks in reputations, is as important as the web of trust. The same, really. And yet another reason why one doesn't want government=root, as they would undoubtedly frown on anything that was "discriminatory" or "hurtful to the differently abled.") --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Liability for Key Cracking in Idle Hours?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a feeling that many businesses will set policies to try to stop their workstations and computers from being used in key cracking attempts. They don't now, mainly because for one thing they don't even know about it, and for another thing, it would be a headache to try to administer such a ban. However, the notion that "IBM Corporation" or "Bank of America" will say "Sure, use our idle CPU time to try to crack keys!" seems farfetched. California is one jurisdiction that has made "hacking" a crime. Not clear what this means, but some construe it to mean that any attempts to break into the account of another--or crack a key--is a crime. Not tested in court, etc. But will Bank of America want to decide whether a key cracking effort is a "legitimate academic exercise" (such as the SSL Challenge was, as it involved no damage to any party) or an attempt to use their computers to break into an account or to otherwise compromise a transaction? (I am NOT saying that key-cracking = hacking, in the negative sense of "hacking," but I can certainly imagine cases where it would be. And when Microsoft Network comes out, soon, I think a lot of people will want to poke holes in its security, as we've already seen a bit of. Corporations will not likely take kindly to being involved in something like this.) Thus, I expect something in between the extremes: -- corporations fear liability and will not openly encourage this, even to make a few extra bucks (and it's not at all clear how such bucks would be made, or if big companies would give a rat's ass about earning a few dollars a night....) -- but people with access to these machines will continue to use them for key cracking, factoring, etc. challenges. Could I be wrong in this? Sure. Maybe companies will not care. I doubt this, though. Damien may be able to tell us if Ecole Polytechnique has raised any questions about his highly-publicized attack on the SSL Challenge key. I will _speculate_ that the normally-security-conscious French are considering policies against this. After all, this is one of the countries that bans private possession of strong crypto. (Or, as a French computer scientist told me recently, "Sure, one can apply for a license for crypto...the procedure is the same as applying for a license for your own private Exocet missile.") --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

2 1

DAM_lyz
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Information Week of August 28 has a cover story on "Internet Theft." It sees security threats in "freeware public-key encryption algorithms and anonymous remailer programs." BlackNet is red-flagged. Laggard law is cited. "This is where all the crime will be in the 21st century," says Joseph Seanor, a federal government intelligence veteran. "Law enforcement officials are trying to get a handle on it, but they really can't stop it." Seanor adds, "When it comes to technology, criminals always seem to be one step ahead of law enforcement." If you can't steal the damthing: DAM_lyz

1 0

Re: SSL Challenge #2
by Ian Goldberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there a standard way we're supposed to get together to divvy up the keyspace? Not knowing of any, I'll just announce that I'm working on those keys that start with "a", from 0xafffffffff down to 0xa000000000. I seem to be getting about 200000 to 400000 keys/sec, so it should take about another 2 days (assuming the machines stay up that long...). If anyone wants to join in, feel free. Get original source from http://pauillac.inria.fr/~doligez/ssl/slave.c (Damien's code), and patch it with the diff at the bottom. Note: I don't think there's any crypto in the diff, and the rest of the sources are in France, so this should be OK with the spooks. But you never know... Compile the patched source on anything you can get, and run ./slave -t -d csclub.uwaterloo.ca 9114 The IP is 129.97.134.11 if you need it. You can add -v or -V for more verbosity, and -n num if you have num processors. - Ian "REALLY hoping I didn't screw up the code..." --- dist/slave.c Thu Aug 17 15:19:52 1995 +++ slave.c Sat Aug 19 13:54:25 1995 @@ -297,18 +297,18 @@ register int i; /* set up the block of data */ -#define x0 0xb894890e -#define x1 0x2eb90ebf - x2 = 0x00074450 + ((~stpoint << 4) & 0xff000000); -#define x4 0xa784af30 -#define x5 0x6913f879 -#define x6 0x539b2520 -#define x7 0x75ae60a0 -#define x8 0x90ebbf51 -#define x9 0xe10c2cf8 -#define x10 0x11ac18ea -#define x11 0x2114834c -#define x12 0x000080b6 +#define x0 0x9109c0fb +#define x1 0x15a61060 + x2 = 0x00368f3f + ((~stpoint << 4) & 0xff000000); +#define x4 0x7bea0730 +#define x5 0x61eb659d +#define x6 0x7441bbfa +#define x7 0x5f3a45e8 +#define x8 0x38e6d5c6 +#define x9 0xa1a88cd6 +#define x10 0xf82ecaae +#define x11 0x0296e2c8 +#define x12 0x000080a4 #define x13 0x00000000 #define x14 0x00000188 #define x15 0x00000000 @@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ int w; strcpy (progname, "worker"); - nice (40); + nice (5); while (1){ sock = open_socket (); if (sock == -1){ @@ -547,7 +547,11 @@ Verb1 ("SIGCHLD received\n"); while (1){ +#if 0 pid = wait3 ((void *) &chldstat, WNOHANG, NULL); +#else + pid = waitpid ((pid_t)-1, (void *) &chldstat, WNOHANG); +#endif if (pid <= 0) break; Verb2 ("got child: %ld\n", pid); for (i = 0; i < nproc; i++){ @@ -610,6 +614,7 @@ } } if (!ignore_ttys){ /* then look at ttys */ +#if 0 d = opendir ("/dev"); if (d == NULL) fatal ("opendir"); while (1){ @@ -629,6 +634,7 @@ } } if (errno) fatal ("readdir"); +#endif } } @@ -901,7 +907,7 @@ if (entry == NULL) fatal ("gethostbyname"); memcpy (&serverhost, entry, sizeof (serverhost)); - sanity_check (); + /* sanity_check (); */ speed_test (); init_devices (); supervisor ();

2 1