December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: RealAudio website temporary password Re: RealAudio website temporary password
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green wrote: >>This is an automatic response to your request for a free user account >>on the RealAudio site. Welcome to the world of RealAudio. >> ... >>The user name you selected is: >> >>cypherpu > >The password has been changed to "cypherpunks" > Oops. Thank you for changing the password. Shall we not use writecode unless the site does not allow "cypherpunks" as the password? I get it now. Crypto relevance: http://www.realaudio.com/rafiles/npr/password/nb081801-4.ram The segment is overly optimistically billed as: "Dan Charles reports the Clinton administration has reached a compromise with the security industry about the export of encryption equipment that will protect personal computer files and allow law enforcement agencies access to them if necessary. (3:30)"

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Will Spam For Food (Not Spam) / Re: Spare DigiCa$h? / Re: AN APPEAL TO THE HUMAN RACE
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I find it interesting that the cynical/sinister/paranoid cypherpunk list members seem to be the ones who are most able to predict the future trends of events on the Internet, particularly in areas which surround very major and very minor issues. The Tim May's and Declan McCullagh's shed interesting light on the future course of major events while the Monger's and Dog Boy's turn their precognitive abilities in the direction of the more mundane aspects of the Internet as a reflection of humanity/society. The "Spare DigiCa$h" post gave me pause to reflect how long it will be before technology is sufficiently developed that when we hit our <Pause> key, "CyberBums" will approach and offer to clean our video monitor with an oily rag. Will we be cursed for offering CyberBums a form of e$pare- change which cannot be spent on email-order wine? Will laws be passed which prevent CyberBums from approaching us for e$pare-change within two relay hops of an eCa$h site? Will CyberBums sort through our killfile dumpsters for eTra$h? Was it Kevin Mitrick whose conditions of probation required him to stay off the Internet and away from computers? Will the future bring laws which permit restraining orders against individuals accessing certain parts of the Internet? Sex offenders/sex sites; burglars/financial sites; pedophiles/children's sites? It seems to me that increasing regulations and laws surrounding the access and use of the Internet will require strict laws requiring the user to be able to show verification of identity/age/criminal history/ financial history/(approved government) reputation capital, and all manner of information to place us all in categories needed to monitor our compliance with laws and regulations. Once browsers are required by law to support a certain rating system and children manage to get around it, there will no doubt be laws passed requiring fascist monitoring of who is actually using the software.(And LEA's who demand that phone companies provide them with the ability to trace/locate cellular phone users will undoubtably want the same capabilities with Internet users, in a war against anonymity.) There will be no shortage of James Love's, Kent Crispin's and Hallam- Baker's to call for "reasonable compromise" in order to facilitate fascist censorship on things which we all "unambiguously" agree on (by _their_ way of thinking, of course). The only way to prevent the atrocities perpetrated upon our rights to freedom and liberty in physical space from becoming the norm in CyberSpace is to fight against the systems, the governments and the individuals who are striving to extend their fascist control by building ElectroMagnetic Curtains in CyberSpace, is to prepare now to fight against Electronic Oppression--to prepare for an Electronic Revolution--now. CyhperDog ~~~~~~~~~ {This post contains an Email Rating System classification of: Redundant Cowardly Anonymity.} (This means than an Anonymous Coward is posting in reference to one of his/her own posts under a second anonymous pseudonym.) -------------------------------- The first Anonymous Coward wrote: > amaninneeeedeer443553444(a)aol.com wrote: > > PLEASE HELP > > What follows is an example of the CyberBums predicted by one of the > list members some time back. This A(ssh)OL(e) is using his spambot to > "Spare change?" millions of people at a time and it turns out that > besides his required, basic tale of woe, that he also has the proverbial > parent who is dying from cancer. > > Don't send him any money. > Send *ME* money. I will use it to buy enough cheap wine to enable me > to throw up on my shoes. > (Wouldn't you rather send your hard-earened money to an honest drunk > than to a lying bum?) > > CyberBum > > ----- > > I WAS A SMALL BUSINESS OWNER IN THE ATLANTA AREA. I RAN THIS > > BUSINESS SUCCESSFULLY UNTIL ABOUT 60 DAYS AGO. AT THAT TIME, 2 > > SEPARATE COMPANIES FILED BANKRUPTCY AGAINST ME FOR A TOTAL OF > > $ 47,000. I COULDN'T SURVIVE THAT. > > > > CONSEQUENTLY, I WAS UNABLE TO PAY MY CREDITORS, MOST OF WHOM > > WERE FRIENDS. THEY HAVE FAMILY AS I DO AND I CAN'T LIVE WITH THE > > THOUGHT OF DOING TO THEM WHAT HAS BEEN DONE TO ME. I'VE SPENT > > MANY SLEEPLESS NIGHTS TRYING TO COME UP WITH A SOLUTION. I HAVE > > NO WHERE TO TURN EXCEPT TO MY FELLOW MAN. MY ONLY FAMILY IS > > MY FATHER. HE IS 74 AND SUFFERING FROM DIABETES AND PROSTATE > > CANCER. > > > > I HAVE SLOD EVERYTHING EXCEPT THE CLOTHES OFF MY BACK AND MY > > COMPUTER. AFTER THIS FINAL ATTEMPT FOR HELP, I WILL BE SELLING > > IT. > > > > I WANT TO BE HONORABLE, BUT I CAN'T DO IT ALONE. I WOULD NEVER DO > > THIS EXCEPT AS A LAST RESORT, BUT I KNOW THAT I WOULD HELP > > SOMEONE IF I COULD. > > > > WILL YOU HELP ME?? ANY AMOUT WOULD BE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED. > > THANK YOU > > > > W.E. HENDERSON > > P.O. BOX 486 > > SMYRNA, GEORGIA 30081

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Re: RealAudio website temporary password
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:00 AM 8/21/95, Anonymous wrote: >Oops. Thank you for changing the password. Shall we not use writecode >unless the site does not allow "cypherpunks" as the password? I get it >now. Hey, this business of signing up the "Cypherpunks" list for a bunch of specialized services is getting old. As guerilla ontology, it's fine. The problem is that all of these messages about what the official, public password is are cluttering up the mail here ( "writecode" is not my idea of an obvious public password). And some of these public sign-ups generate reflecting messages back to the list. In terms of scaling, this sucks. And what's being accomplished? (I confess that when I first saw this announcement that we had been signed up with the name "cypherpu" and the temporary passphrase "Toledo.Francisco," I immediately registered under a different set of names. Now I see that Lucky Green has done the same thing. Hmhhhh, which one came first and is recognized by them?) --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: NSA leak (fwd)
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ian Goldberg wrote: > >To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu > >Subject: NSA leak > > > >WASHINGTON (AP) - In a rare moment of openness bordering on glibness, > > >senior official at the super-secret National Security Agency was overheard > > >at a White House press conference concerning current bans on the export of > > >enryption technology saying, "It would not take any twelve times the age of > > >the universe to decrypt a 128-bit message. Thirty-three minutes is more > > >like it." > Uh-huh. Unless the Administration has granted a secret Executive Order > repealing the Laws of Physics for the NSA, the above statement, if true, > would imply one of the following things: > > 1. The NSA has a reversible computing machine with at least 2^128*128 bits > = 5.44*10^39 bytes = 4.95*10^27 TB of memory. > 2. Their cracker changes the state of 2^128 bits in 33 minutes. > 3. They have a quantum computer, or some alien technology, or something > else we know pretty much nothing about. This above is true when analyzed within the boundaries of current cryptographical theory, but has about as much meaning as would the discounting of Einstein's work by an old-school physicist. There was a rather bizarre post to the list a few months ago which layed out a conceptual schematic of new research being done in the area of encryption. Although the post was bizarre, the information it provided was not. As a matter of fact, it seemed to be wider in scope and more advanced in its application than the level currently achieved by NSA and related covert government organizations. {And although the 33 minutes quote may lean toward bragging, it is not off by much.} Research currently being done in the encryption field by those who do *not* tell contains a smattering of new mathematical theory and a significant quantity of analysis which is a close cousin to traffic analysis. The result is that a person using _all_ of the security and encryption capabilities of a strong crypto product is likely to have secure communications, but if they neglect to perform even one of the _minor_ security steps possible, then there is a crack in their communication which can be expanded to a size large enough to drive a tank through. LEA's are not battling to squelch the use of crypto that they cannot readily break--they are battling to slow the growth of strong encryption in order to maintain their current ability to break encryption which is commonly thought to be secure. D r . R o b e r t s > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Third World Man
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:41 PM 8/20/95, Timothy C. May wrote: >And it is, as those cases were, but predicting the imminent >collapse of American civilization is usually a lose. One of my favorite quotes is supposed to be from Gibbon's _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_ . If I write a book about this stuff, it'll go right on the frontispiece. Something like: "It is quite attractive to posit the end of the world in one's analysis of current affairs, but historically, it hasn't proven to be correct." BTW, I've been looking for the exact quote for about 6 months, without having reread the whole damn book. If anyone who has actually *seen* an on-line copy of Gibbon would send me pointer to it, I would be much obliged. I have looked in all the usual places (Gutenberg, etc.) to no avail... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Not a Logic-Newbie / Re: Queries from a Cyper-newbie?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Chris Avery wrote: > 3. I'll do the www.crypto.com thing, thanks for the pointer. This may be a critical last stand on the privacy of communications issue. What gets me is the blind arrogance with which govt "servants" assume that their (even if legitimate) pursuit of crime somehow excuses or justifies diminishing privacy rights for everyone else. There must be some kind of ratio: 1,000,000 rights diminished for 1 criminal activity detected? Doesn't make sense. Don't worry about being a "Cypher-newbie" (even if you did spell it wrong in the subject header). You can always learn the "numbers" and the "terms," but at least you don't seem to fall into the category of being a "Logic-newbie" or a "Common-sense-newbie," which is far from uncommon in new (and some of the older) list members. As a matter of fact, I don't believe I've seen a post by any of the cypherpunks list members which so simply points out that one of the major reasons for the erosion of our civil rights is usurpment of them by civil servants. In effect, the "servants" have armed themself and taken over control of the manor from its owners--their "masters." "Legitimate needs" seem to have usurped "legitimate rights." All of a sudden, we are required, at gunpoint, to eat our meals only at times which conveniently fit into the "servant's" schedule. Next, we find out that the servants "don't do windows." Then we find out that the servants need to sleep in the "big bedroom" because they work so much harder than us, and that we have to sleep in the barn because they need the servant's quarters for other "legitimate needs." The "tail" of government is wagging the "Bull Mastiff" of our Constitutional rights and freedoms. Please continue to follow the cypherpunks list, as there is a decided shortage of individuals left in society who are capable and willing to understand the importance of true privacy, rights and freedom. There is no disgrace in having been round-up and penned with the rest of the sheeple, but it is a sad day, indeed, when we fail to keep an eye open for a "gate" inadvertantly left open, so that we can graze on the open range when circumstances permit. {And if the gatekeeper happens to bend over in a position that places his/her head close to your hooves...} TruthMonger

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.taylored.com This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp. hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash mix cut ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"crown"} = "<mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut mix ek reord"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mixmaster(a)gondolin.org> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. 21 Apr 1995: The new version of premail (0.33) is out, with direct posting, perl5 and better MH support, and numerous bug fixes. Last ping: Mon 21 Aug 95 6:00:07 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net +-------+--+ 2:37:07 99.99% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #.-*#***##*# 20:53 99.99% replay remailer(a)replay.com *****++**+** 11:22 99.99% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *.-*#******* 26:11 99.99% crown mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net ------------ 2:20:01 99.99% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl *****++**+** 12:14 99.99% hroller hroller(a)c2.org -##*-***##** 11:48 99.93% syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org ----------- 2:02:23 99.92% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -++------.. 9:59:29 99.91% c2 remail(a)c2.org -++++++++++ 47:13 99.90% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ++++++++++++ 55:03 99.83% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com -.-..----.- 5:50:27 99.75% vox remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl .--------- 12:10:38 99.99% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de **#***-****# 5:54 99.42% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu ###*#_.-##+# 3:53:51 99.20% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net -- --- ---- 3:01:49 99.07% gondolin mixmaster(a)gondolin.org *--*-* **+ 31:07 98.87% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com **__.++++++* 3:57:22 98.33% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com . .--._.- 16:59:51 95.74% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi +++*---- -++ 4:27:59 90.66% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ##**#***#*+# 6:58 99.99% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org - 9:53:43 10.67% For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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NEXT CHALLENGE...
by aba＠exe.ex.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Please note mail to me may bounce unless you are very careful with using addr aba(a)exe.ex.ac.uk, or aba(a)atlas.ex.ac.uk, as there are machines out here due to a physical breakin - a "RAM raid", I tried posting this on Sat, but the mailer was already out and mail is buffered, so may come out twice] A break down of Hal's challenge, could someone please check my logic in deriving an Andrew Roo's style config file for brutessl 1.0 and check my interpretation against Hal's interpretation in the previous challenge. Hal's previous challenge is indexed from his home page: http://www.portal.com/~hfinney/ I think the challenge file should look like this: -------------------------------------8<------------------------------------- # SSLbrute 1.0 parameter file for Hal Finney's 2nd SSL challenge as # posted to Cypherpunks on 19 August 1995. # # file checksum (ignoring # comments and whitespace) is 2977 CLEAR-MASTER fbc009916010a6153f8f36 CHALLENGE 07ea7b9d65eb61fabb4174e8453a5fc6 CONNECTION-ID d5e638d68ca8a1aeca2ef8c8e29602a4 SERVER-VERIFY 006599b6d2f2a736 -------------------------------------8<------------------------------------- Below I will give my resoning for each field. Each field as it is derived will be quoted with >>> Could a few people check that I have made no mistakes. Andrew Roos code is on: http://www.brute.cl.cam.ac.uk/brute/ as "brutessl.tar.gz", use "save next link as" in netscape (hold shift key down and click in Netscape 1.1). Could someone with a PC, and a 32 bit MS Visual C++ compiler handy compile a PC executable from the tarred files, some people won't have access to TAR under DOS, and a precompiled binary would be useful. Please send the binary to Piete if you do this (be sure to turn on all optimisations). I tried but my VC++ is not 32 bit, is it possible to produce 32 bit binaries which can be run from DOS with VC++ at all? Are the binaries you get with win 95 / win NT likely to run under DOS ? The keyserver will not be doling yet but please pickup the software ready to start. There is a unix based client, and a windows NT based client both available from that page. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- First message from client 0x80 0x1c 0x01 0x00 0x02 0x00 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x10 0x02 0x00 0x80 0x07 0xea 0x7b 0x9d 0x65 0xeb 0x61 0xfa 0xbb 0x41 0x74 0xe8 0x45 0x3a 0x5f 0xc6 0x80 0x1c Length field: 28 bytes follow in the packet. 0x01 MSG_CLIENT_HELLO 0x00 0x02 CLIENT-VERSION-MSB CLIENT-VERSION-LSB 0x00 0x03 CIPHER-SPECS-LENGTH-MSB CIPHER-SPECS-LENGTH-LSB 0x00 0x00 SESSION-ID-LENGTH-MSB SESSION-ID-LENGTH-LSB 0x00 0x10 CHALLENGE-LENGTH-MSB CHALLENGE-LENGTH-LSB 0x02 0x00 0x80 CIPHER-SPECS-DATA SESSION-ID-DATA 0x07 .. 0xc6 CHALLENGE-DATA [16 bytes] CHALLENGE is: >>> CHALLENGE 07ea7b9d65eb61fabb4174e8453a5fc6 first message from server 0x82 0x14 0x04 0x00 0x01 0x00 0x02 0x01 0xf6 0x00 0x03 0x00 0x10 0x30 0x82 0x01 0xf2 0x30 0x82 0x01 0x5b 0x02 0x02 0x01 0x8a 0x30 0x0d 0x06 0x09 0x2a 0x86 0x48 0x86 0xf7 0x0d 0x01 0x01 0x04 0x05 0x00 0x30 0x47 0x31 0x0b 0x30 0x09 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x04 0x06 0x13 0x02 0x55 0x53 0x31 0x10 0x30 0x0e 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x04 0x0b 0x13 0x07 0x54 0x65 0x73 0x74 0x20 0x43 0x41 0x31 0x26 0x30 0x24 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x04 0x0a 0x13 0x1d 0x4e 0x65 0x74 0x73 0x63 0x61 0x70 0x65 0x20 0x43 0x6f 0x6d 0x6d 0x75 0x6e 0x69 0x63 0x61 0x74 0x69 0x6f 0x6e 0x73 0x20 0x43 0x6f 0x72 0x70 0x2e 0x30 0x1e 0x17 0x0d 0x39 0x35 0x30 0x37 0x31 0x31 0x32 0x32 0x34 0x31 0x34 0x35 0x5a 0x17 0x0d 0x39 0x37 0x30 0x37 0x31 0x30 0x32 0x32 0x34 0x31 0x34 0x35 0x5a 0x30 0x7f 0x31 0x0b 0x30 0x09 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x04 0x06 0x13 0x02 0x55 0x53 0x31 0x0b 0x30 0x09 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x04 0x08 0x13 0x02 0x43 0x41 0x31 0x16 0x30 0x14 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x04 0x07 0x13 0x0d 0x4d 0x6f 0x75 0x6e 0x74 0x61 0x69 0x6e 0x20 0x56 0x69 0x65 0x77 0x31 0x26 0x30 0x24 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x04 0x0a 0x13 0x1d 0x4e 0x65 0x74 0x73 0x63 0x61 0x70 0x65 0x20 0x43 0x6f 0x6d 0x6d 0x75 0x6e 0x69 0x63 0x61 0x74 0x69 0x6f 0x6e 0x73 0x20 0x43 0x6f 0x72 0x70 0x2e 0x31 0x23 0x30 0x21 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x04 0x03 0x13 0x1a 0x45 0x2d 0x53 0x74 0x6f 0x72 0x65 0x20 0x54 0x72 0x61 0x6e 0x73 0x61 0x63 0x74 0x69 0x6f 0x6e 0x20 0x53 0x65 0x72 0x76 0x65 0x72 0x30 0x5c 0x30 0x0d 0x06 0x09 0x2a 0x86 0x48 0x86 0xf7 0x0d 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x05 0x00 0x03 0x4b 0x00 0x30 0x48 0x02 0x41 0x00 0xc7 0x24 0x0d 0xbd 0xfe 0x5f 0x21 0x09 0xb4 0x46 0x12 0xbb 0xc7 0x4c 0xbc 0x0c 0x98 0xe3 0x11 0x19 0x60 0x85 0x86 0x0a 0xa2 0xaf 0xae 0x8f 0xf9 0x43 0x86 0x92 0x1f 0xcc 0xd3 0x38 0xcf 0x92 0x14 0xa7 0x8c 0x89 0x07 0x26 0xd4 0x21 0x55 0xa8 0x43 0x2d 0xb4 0xec 0xce 0x24 0x73 0x5e 0x7c 0xe2 0xbe 0x22 0x2d 0xbd 0x96 0xbf 0x02 0x03 0x01 0x00 0x01 0x30 0x0d 0x06 0x09 0x2a 0x86 0x48 0x86 0xf7 0x0d 0x01 0x01 0x04 0x05 0x00 0x03 0x81 0x81 0x00 0x8f 0xbe 0x0c 0xae 0xc8 0xf0 0x22 0xef 0xae 0x83 0xb5 0xb1 0xe3 0xb4 0xd9 0xd6 0xa9 0x4a 0xb6 0x60 0x9c 0x0b 0x00 0x70 0x12 0x88 0x73 0xd1 0xef 0xe2 0x54 0xf6 0x3a 0xc7 0xa5 0xbe 0xe1 0xe0 0xdb 0x4d 0x20 0x10 0x3d 0x68 0x7c 0x8d 0xdb 0x16 0xf6 0x67 0xe7 0x1d 0x51 0xbc 0x19 0xa2 0xf6 0xbf 0x6f 0xa4 0x52 0xc7 0x7e 0x50 0x3d 0xb9 0x3e 0x1e 0x67 0xff 0xf6 0xf2 0x5d 0xe7 0x2b 0x7e 0x3a 0x7e 0x6c 0x40 0xb7 0x04 0x9c 0x2c 0x2b 0x89 0x0f 0x8c 0xb5 0x93 0xd8 0xac 0x94 0xe6 0x5f 0x84 0xe8 0x71 0x75 0x9e 0x10 0x6e 0x36 0xe6 0x14 0xfe 0xba 0xf8 0x11 0x71 0x9d 0x74 0x33 0x48 0x74 0xc1 0xba 0xcb 0xff 0x58 0x86 0x8c 0xba 0x9c 0x08 0xad 0xce 0x8a 0x02 0x00 0x80 0xd5 0xe6 0x38 0xd6 0x8c 0xa8 0xa1 0xae 0xca 0x2e 0xf8 0xc8 0xe2 0x96 0x02 0xa4 This is interpreted as follows: 0x82 0x14 Packet length, 532 bytes follow. 0x04 MSG-SERVER-HELLO 0x00 SESSION-ID-HIT 0x01 CERTIFICATE-TYPE 0x00 0x02 SERVER-VERSION-MSB SERVER-VERSION-LSB 0x01 0xf6 CERTIFICATE-LENGTH-MSB CERTIFICATE-LENGTH-LSB 0x00 0x03 CIPHER-SPECS-LENGTH-MSB CIPHER-SPECS-LENGTH-LSB 0x00 0x10 CONNECTION-ID-LENGTH-MSB CONNECTION-ID-LENGTH-LSB 0x30...0x8a CERTIFICATE-DATA [502 bytes] 0x02 0x00 0x80 CIPHER-SPECS-DATA 0xd5...0xa4 CONNECTION-ID-DATA [16 bytes] CONNECTION-ID is: >>> CONNECTION-ID d5e638d68ca8a1aeca2ef8c8e29602a4 Second message from client 0x80 0x55 0x02 0x02 0x00 0x80 0x00 0x0b 0x00 0x40 0x00 0x00 0xfb 0xc0 0x09 0x91 0x60 0x10 0xa6 0x15 0x3f 0x8f 0x36 0x5a 0x19 0x06 0x8e 0x58 0xc4 0xfa 0xd0 0x73 0xd4 0x6d 0x20 0x97 0x2f 0x85 0x95 0xb3 0xa5 0x97 0xb5 0xe0 0x63 0x91 0x61 0xb7 0x76 0x3c 0x4e 0x62 0x8b 0x02 0x2b 0x05 0x98 0xd4 0x14 0x44 0x63 0xf3 0x43 0x7e 0xa0 0xa8 0x3f 0x16 0xb2 0x43 0x4b 0x24 0x76 0xae 0xba 0x8c 0x89 0x71 0xde 0x25 0x6b 0xce 0x89 0x77 0x8a 0x30 0x2a This is interpreted as follows: 0x80 0x55 Packet length, 85 bytes follow. 0x02 MSG-CLIENT-MASTER-KEY 0x02 0x00 0x80 CIPHER-KIND 0x00 0x0b CLEAR-KEY-LENGTH-MSB CLEAR-KEY-LENGTH-LSB 0x00 0x40 ENCRYPTED-KEY-LENGTH-MSB ENCRYPTED-KEY-LENGTH-LSB 0x00 0x00 KEY-ARG-LENGTH-MSB KEY-ARG-LENGTH-LSB 0xfb...0x36 CLEAR-KEY-DATA [11 bytes] 0x5a...0x2a ENCRYPTED-KEY-DATA [64 bytes] KEY-ARG-DATA So CLEAR-MASTER is: >>> CLEAR-MASTER fbc009916010a6153f8f36 Second message from server 0x80 0x21 0x9a 0xc5 0xf7 0xd1 0x6a 0x5b 0x26 0x43 0x57 0x67 0x65 0xb6 0x3f 0x9a 0xe3 0x82 0x00 0x65 0x99 0xb6 0xd2 0xf2 0xa7 0x36 0xa0 0x7d 0xd9 0x94 0xcf 0xe2 0x33 0xb2 0x1b This is interpreted as follows: 0x80 0x21 Packet length, 33 bytes follow 0x9a...0x82 RC4 encrypted MAC [16 bytes] 0x00 RC4 encrypted MSG-SERVER-VERIFY (0x05) 0x65...0x1b RC4 encrypted CHALLENGE-DATA from CLIENT-HELLO message [16 bytes] Plaintext (MSG-SERVER-VERIFY plus CHALLENGE-DATA): 0x05 0x07 0xea 0x7b 0x9d 0x65 0xeb 0x61 0xfa 0xbb 0x41 0x74 0xe8 0x45 0x3a 0x5f 0xc6 Ciphertext (from SERVER-VERIFY packet): 0x00 0x65 0x99 0xb6 0xd2 0xf2 0xa7 0x36 0xa0 0x7d 0xd9 0x94 0xcf 0xe2 0x33 0xb2 0x1b SERVER-VERIFY is the encrypted MSG-SERVER-VERIFY plus the first seven bytes of the encrypted CHALLENGE-DATA: >>> SERVER-VERIFY 006599b6d2f2a736 So the completed challenge file is: -------------------------------------8<------------------------------------- # SSLbrute 1.0 parameter file for Hal Finney's 2nd SSL challenge as # posted to Cypherpunks on 19 August 1995. # # file checksum (ignoring # comments and whitespace) is 2977 CLEAR-MASTER fbc009916010a6153f8f36 CHALLENGE 07ea7b9d65eb61fabb4174e8453a5fc6 CONNECTION-ID d5e638d68ca8a1aeca2ef8c8e29602a4 SERVER-VERIFY 006599b6d2f2a736 -------------------------------------8<------------------------------------- Adam

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Spare DigiCa$h? / Re: AN APPEAL TO THE HUMAN RACE
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

amaninneeeedeer443553444(a)aol.com wrote: > > PLEASE HELP What follows is an example of the CyberBums predicted by one of the list members some time back. This A(ssh)OL(e) is using his spambot to "Spare change?" millions of people at a time and it turns out that besides his required, basic tale of woe, that he also has the proverbial parent who is dying from cancer. Don't send him any money. Send *ME* money. I will use it to buy enough cheap wine to enable me to throw up on my shoes. (Wouldn't you rather send your hard-earened money to an honest drunk than to a lying bum?) CyberDrunk > > ----- > > I WAS A SMALL BUSINESS OWNER IN THE ATLANTA AREA. I RAN THIS > > BUSINESS SUCCESSFULLY UNTIL ABOUT 60 DAYS AGO. AT THAT TIME, 2 > > SEPARATE COMPANIES FILED BANKRUPTCY AGAINST ME FOR A TOTAL OF > > $ 47,000. I COULDN'T SURVIVE THAT. > > > > CONSEQUENTLY, I WAS UNABLE TO PAY MY CREDITORS, MOST OF WHOM > > WERE FRIENDS. THEY HAVE FAMILY AS I DO AND I CAN'T LIVE WITH THE > > THOUGHT OF DOING TO THEM WHAT HAS BEEN DONE TO ME. I'VE SPENT > > MANY SLEEPLESS NIGHTS TRYING TO COME UP WITH A SOLUTION. I HAVE > > NO WHERE TO TURN EXCEPT TO MY FELLOW MAN. MY ONLY FAMILY IS > > MY FATHER. HE IS 74 AND SUFFERING FROM DIABETES AND PROSTATE > > CANCER. > > > > I HAVE SLOD EVERYTHING EXCEPT THE CLOTHES OFF MY BACK AND MY > > COMPUTER. AFTER THIS FINAL ATTEMPT FOR HELP, I WILL BE SELLING > > IT. > > > > I WANT TO BE HONORABLE, BUT I CAN'T DO IT ALONE. I WOULD NEVER DO > > THIS EXCEPT AS A LAST RESORT, BUT I KNOW THAT I WOULD HELP > > SOMEONE IF I COULD. > > > > WILL YOU HELP ME?? ANY AMOUT WOULD BE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED. > > THANK YOU > > > > W.E. HENDERSON > > P.O. BOX 486 > > SMYRNA, GEORGIA 30081

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Re: Export policy change
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Rich Salz <rsalz(a)osf.org> >Date: Thu, 17 Aug 1995 23:48:01 -0400 >The >reporter (Dan Charles?) said something like anyone can hold the keys, >as long as they will be made avail when presented with a court order. >He also said, US citizens will still be able to use strong crypto >without key escrow internally. The real question is whether manufacturers will bother producing multiple versions -- one domestic, one foreign. There's room for cypherpunks yet -- not only writing crypto applications but also generating emergency-access systems (e.g., for PGP) which meet our needs. - Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme/home.html | |PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | | ``Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song.'' | +----------------------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison -+

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