December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: skronk
by strick＠techwood.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

THUS SPAKE "Kipp E.B. Hickman" <kipp(a)warp.mcom.com>: # FYI: # # If you haven't already, I suggest you take a look at the SSL spec # (http://home.mcom.com/info/SSL.html) [ carbon to cypherpunks, whom i think would be interested] i've been looking at that. It seems that a special port has to be allocated for each TCP service. So it's not clear to me how to find out if others on the net offer SMTP with SSL, or how I can put SSL into my X11 clients & server. You see what I'm getting at? It also looks like some heavy equipment is necessary to manage these RSA certficiates. Is there anything like PGP's keyring management for manipulating my web-of-trust? Where do I find the docs? # It does what you are trying to accomplish (I think), and it is already deployed # in production code (the Netscape client and server products). In addition, we # announced this week a free (for non-commerical use) reference implementation. # The code will be out on the net as soon as the lawyers are happy :-) aha ... that's the missing link. I'd certainly like to add it to the protocols that SKRONK advertizes and negotiates, but doing my own implementation of these complex protocols, and building machinery for using non-PGP certificates, was way more than I could handle. Please beat your lawyers to a pulp, until they make it useful for us. If I can't create generally useful things with it, and share it with thousands of others on the net for free, it's not going to be used by the cypherpunk community. I recommend you put your reference implementation in the public domain (except for the RSAREF component). Or take Matt Blaze's crypto offerings from AT&T as your model. best regards, strick

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Da Judge-L FAQ -- We are not Amused
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It has come to Our attention that Our FAQ, the Da Judge-L FAQ, is being distributed amongst the rabble. We are not amused. The so-called Cypherpunks List, having been a party to this illegal and "most heinous" distribution, is hereby invited to appear in our Chambers on the morning of Tuesday, 29 February, 1995, at a place of our choosing. Defense will be heard, and then the guilty will be punished. Royally Yours, Da Judge-L

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Re: S314 and potential hell-raising
by Jaeson.M.Engle＠josaiah.sewanee.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>enlisting the ACLU, the EFF, and any other group potentially willing >to pour money into a legal battle. Fuck the EFF, they already lost they're place in importance. The ACLU is a very good place to start however. Ideas?? _____________________________________ {-: Jaeson M. Engle || jme(a)josaiah.sewanee.edu :-} {-: www server: http://josaiah.sewanee.edu/ :-} {-: Finger 'jme(a)josaiah.sewanee.edu' for my Public :-} PGP block.

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Four Horsemen
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Message-Id: <v01510101ab5ecb0e67cd@DialupEudora> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just a quick question: someone asked me the other day what the "Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse" were, and I told him 1) Drug Dealers 2) Terrorists 3) Pedophiles 4) Pornographers Did I get it right, or did I have a synaptic misfire somewhere along the line? Ken = Ken Kirksey And the Clinton administration launched an attack on = = kkirksey(a)world.std.com people in Texas because those people were religious = = Mac Guru & Developer nuts with guns. Hell, this country was founded by = = religious nuts with guns. - P.J. O'Rourke = -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLzkbhOsZNYlu+zuBAQHVigQAzkp3fIlEfT82zSaRZPkIqkkaDJ5MNyRK SOOq0QwAMB1/bGNGda0plC+aNGT1RnSpNJTS/8ISIJTDCwbmJGFYGxvRSgqyUkXO dQrd6pLbYIxH1sTPIaAoM4BnmUhYzr5L4TauPgqTLYhqGKDa8RWbHggjLyTr/UfF drRgBOM919Q= =OcUi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Jefferson Wheel Cypher
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Message-Id: <v01510103ab5ed2c136c8@DialupEudora> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A couple of questions regarding Thomas Jefferson's Wheel Ciphyer: 1) How would you classify this cipher? It looks to me like a polyalphabetic with the plaintext also being the key, kind of like an autokey. Am I correct, or is this cipher a different animal entirely? 2) Can anyone point me to references on the cryptanalysis of this cipher? Many thanks in advance, Ken = Ken Kirksey And the Clinton administration launched an attack on = = kkirksey(a)world.std.com people in Texas because those people were religious = = Mac Guru & Developer nuts with guns. Hell, this country was founded by = = religious nuts with guns. - P.J. O'Rourke = -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLzkjt+sZNYlu+zuBAQEwPgP/XMWm/qDr1A0D49iBJdYNOX18j3DNbBvG xTOvSrzNziq9jq4026+TNpM3+PVGiji85yL3053jG26I0dJbckkVFr1PBfXmLrua nHBt5t/qy7RSvjsW80ZreeqVKwulo3NtT+XuWjU7EXZDSPUZts4JuHnGdlqQRiMo 1ERDP4+StM0= =PcEo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Seals and Sealing Waxes
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Message-Id: <v01510102ab5ecd95ffb0@DialupEudora> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > "All crypto is economics," and this is what made seals and sealing wax so > useful for so long. Saying "seals were duplicatable from the start" does > not mean this feat was easy, even if technically possible. > > In fact, the fine details produced by a good seal are hard to exactly > emulate with a copy. Even on a two-dimensional surface. And with the advent > of three-dimensional surfaces, which sealing wax made possible, the fine > detail of a good seal was in fact very hard to forge. But not impossible. According to Kahn, the Austrian Black Chamber was quite adept at forging seals in the late 1600's / early 1700's. They were able to take sealed correspondence in at 7 a.m., unseal it, copy the message, re-seal it, and have it back in the postal stream by early afternoon. There was only one recorded case of them re-sealing a message with the wrong seal, and that was because the seals were so similar. All this is from memory, since I don't have my copy of _The Codebreakers_ here at work, so I may be off in some details. Ken = Ken Kirksey And the Clinton administration launched an attack on = = kkirksey(a)world.std.com people in Texas because those people were religious = = Mac Guru & Developer nuts with guns. Hell, this country was founded by = = religious nuts with guns. - P.J. O'Rourke = -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLzkeVusZNYlu+zuBAQG5HgP+LuE0aOG6UxgZp/IrZCm2y9ESi9AT13v+ ePMulQHUXUv8cc4m0RTjD35+cmKSKADrP6L1oC6BCia+5d3Rhidh2KcqaoQZQLvc rSuXbPgUpM7VJBOELtxc68CLJTpyaHBHvORJ//xH+/kN/++2f110+hZMwvgynrRd Pj54hvqthKA= =Jhff -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: MIME based remailing commands
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb(a)nsb.fv.com> writes: >Excerpts from junk.interesting: 7-Feb-95 Re: MIME based remailing co.. >"Perry E. Metzger"@imsi. (2553) >> > > It is being remailed via a MIME-based structure where two new content types >> > > are defined: multipart/remail and application/remail-commands. The >> > > multipart/remail type is supposed to be composed of two parts, the >> > > application/remail-commands part which has remailer commands, and the >> > > other part which is the "payload" to be remailed. >Perhaps you might consider writing up an informational RFC to define >these types? I think that would be very useful. -- Nathaniel Well, that was just an example; I was making those names up off the top of my head in order to concretize what I understood Perry was suggesting. I can see that putting remailer commands into a specific part of a MIME multipart message has some advantages. Right now we are basically having the remailing commands be mail header fields. But really people aren't supposed to just make up new fields like that. I think the "name space" of these fields is protected somewhat more than many other aspects of communication protocols on the net. Is there precedent for adding service-by-mail functionality in this way? I am not completely comfortable with it. And as we think of new functionality and new commands they all have to get added at this top level, the same visibility and name space as "Subject", "From", and "To". OTOH it does have the advantage that it is easy to do, at least with the "::" pasting token idea (which perhaps would need to be documented in its own right). If we did use a separate message part we'd have our own little name space to use, with no fears of conflicting with someone else. (Maybe "Latency" might be used in a future extension of RFC822 for some other meaning than what we are using it for.) I am not sure what has to be done to get an RFC approved but I suspect that adding mail header fields would be much more likely to hit opposition than adding yet another MIME type. What does Mixmaster use for its commands? Does it use "::" followed by Anon-Send-To: and such? Or some other format? Maybe it should be made MIME compliant from the beginning. This way we are moving with the current, the flow of the net, rather than across it. Hal

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Judges-L FAQ
by Craig A. Johnston 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It has come to my attention that the Judges-L FAQ is being distributed by someone who obtained it on this list, and being sent to people made to look as if it has issued from David Stodolsky. I must inform you that this FAQ is copyrighted material, and you are requested not to distribute it. -Craig

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Wiretaps & terrorism
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Why the FBI doesn't really need wiretaps) (Part of a continuing series) >From todays (Feb 8) Boston Globe, page 3 by Larry Neumeister, AP New York- the FBI was on the trail of three of the World Trade Center bombers nearly four years before teh explosion that killed six and injured 1,000, the government said yesterday. In evidence presented at the trial of Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman and 10 others, the FBI also said it had bugged the Sheik's phone a week before the blast. The surprising testimony - a day ater a key defendant switched sides - indicated that the government had more extensive knowledge of the planning for the trade center bombing than it had acknowledged. And it reaised anew questions about why the FBI was unable to prevent the 1993 bombing, one of the most serious terrorist actions in the United States. ...

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LESM - Link Encrypted Session Manager
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I finished hacking Matt's ESM to do link encryption yesterday, but for some reason the mail I sent to cypherpunks didn't get echoed back to me, so I'm sending this again. To install: get ESM and RSAREF, make sure you can compile ESM, then replace the esm.c with my hacked version and recompile. To use: same as ESM, but there's an extra option "-b bandwidth", the default is 100 cps. I've attached the modified esm.c here since it doesn't include any crypto code. To get ESM, write to cfs(a)research.att.com and state the following: - you are in the US or Canada, and - you are a US or Canadian citizen or legal permanent resident, and - You've read and understand the license and export conditions. RSAREF is in ftp://rsa.com/rsaref/ Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLzqTtTl0sXKgdnV5AQEmbgP8CRxE+RCGsDXwwShWhZKGytSywyWZ8RXB RPBHZmk6UgdpCR2VVo8wXjcPuEv4SHp9ZjhFTq53JZ/s3YcV5FxF33/ivSlh1Ra4 P8GSYnoEaIJoFrJyagukbBUaY6zWCx0PcnsLoVArCxujwRYwfrQvHdiNx13z7bJh OSEhhoE9djg= =PY8P -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- E-mail: Wei Dai <weidai(a)eskimo.com> URL: "http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai" =================== Exponential Increase of Complexity =================== --> singularity --> atoms --> macromolecules --> biological evolution --> central nervous systems --> symbolic communication --> homo sapiens --> digital computers --> internetworking --> close-coupled automation --> broadband brain-to-net connections --> artificial intelligence --> distributed consciousness --> group minds --> ? ? ? This message contains a file prepared for transmission using the MIME BASE64 transfer encoding scheme. If you are using Pegasus Mail or another MIME-compliant system, you should be able to extract it from within your mailer. If you cannot, please ask your system administrator for help. ---- File information ----------- File: lesm.c Date: 8 Feb 1995, 23:57 Size: 19769 bytes. Type: Text

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