December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

The Anti-Racketeering fiasco meets Mozilla
by roy＠cybrspc.mn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I was just talking with a friend, and had the most vile thought. Mallet works part time for the Justice Department. His job is entrapment of random individuals. He has a Web server running the Netscape Commerce Server. When a potential victim is lured into looking at Mallet's home page with Mozilla, the poor sap is rewarded by a server-side push of some small piece of contraband software. Many victims will simply move off the page, forgetting that the document is now in their Netscape cache. They're toast. Others might clear their cache, but the server still shows that the file was sent. They're now guilty of both receiving and concealing contraband. And maybe destruction of evidence and/or interfering with law enforcement. I'm only raving like this because the whole Anti-Racketeering bill has me both scared and really pissed off. - -- Roy M. Silvernail [ ] roy(a)cybrspc.mn.org PGP Public Key fingerprint = 31 86 EC B9 DB 76 A7 54 13 0B 6A 6B CC 09 18 B6 Key available from pubkey(a)cybrspc.mn.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMAWbGBvikii9febJAQExKgP9HApgUEHkIaABuiQ/Lx4jfcfG6WUT7r6U TgiQ83+yvYBt2EeWIlF3uqUN4PEO8cLYsDjthpesI8nDV2HpjTCbiZ0g+zGJlOmi ps8vfRRK0A8elyCkTy2b4NlwR4Kre6iqYJfr9+ZA1rW019ZfvullZw9TAPDrhfLj cP780NHfhn4= =sRJY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: HR361
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone previously noted that HR361, the omnibus export administration act, would require the administration to assess the impact of the current crypto export controls on the software industry? I don't recall seeing mention of it, but this has been planned for awhile. There were a couple of crypto surveys, one by private industry (software publisher's association) and one by TIS for the gov't. I think. Both were mentioned in this list. /r$

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Re: Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act of 1995
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Weld Pond <weld(a)l0pht.com> responding to Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> <good discussion snipped> wrote: >That raises an interesting issue. <good discussion snipped> >Will they have to invent a huge new bureaucracy >to manage all these devices and programs? Talk about a self-answering question...How else could it be done? >There are many problems with this idea of >Government Access to Devices or Programs (GADOP). I can think of only one problem with the idea, it's called the Bill of Rights. [If there is anything left of it after this session of Congress.] >A toolset that could build many different encryption >and decryption variations based on psuedo-random input >may be a good tool to fight this nonsense. Agreed. As well as steganographic software of many kinds to hide this terrible "crime" we all love to commit, for the peace loving among us... BUT [and I hope this doesn't happen.] I fear that the anarchy resulting from this kind of statist idiocy will lead many (otherwise peaceful) folks to think that the only good tool to fight this nonsense is a good shotgun. Of course, then we can simply outlaw those, too. <good discussion snipped> Regards, Jim Ray - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh iQCVAwUBMAVlCG1lp8bpvW01AQEkAgP/doDZKY1TKgBJPy7ame16kbqU0F+BOfl/ wuIkpnsnsoyyV6Fi7KzHPLGsZU+uuMjdxLyOhtmvswKAfq6XU68GTfHuCCImiE8D 6RuaPWkn+eAQmVhXrbmf2ykZwWrnLZ4sT12eyNQjKoavuxTgFPGFqbvIASnIwe/E OLBNyviUOSA= =M7wP - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMAV0pSoZzwIn1bdtAQFPDgGAu5kR4N1OlOm++LZZX4AAraYFbcgwhRiq qN7x31Enfv4Gaocg0m4TmB4YYdJxyzht =WV8f -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Fight, or Roll Over?
by tcmay＠sensemedia.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:41 AM 7/13/95, Douglas Barnes wrote: >Since the Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act of 1995 might as well >be called the "Anti-Cypherpunk Act of 1995", I'm surprised to see >Tim throw in the towel already, when the bill hasn't even made it >through committee yet. I'd hardly call my view "throwing in the towel." What I said clearly enough was that the Washingtonians can throw out repressive legislation much faster than we can--and I speak in terms of "we" as being the EFF, EPIC, NRA, ACLU, etc., and _not_ the Cyherpunks, who have no lobbying activities to speak of. >Go underground? Well, as I read it, this bill basically makes >cypherpunks a "corrupt organization", subject to the full >impact of the RICO statutes. With the passage of this bill, we Indeed, this law makes the Cypherpunks group a co-conspirator. (In the same way that the recent Omnibus Anti-Terrorism (or whatever it's callled) criminalizes groups which support This Year's Enemies. (Like the War with Oceania--or was it Eurasia?--the friend of today was yesterday's criminal organization. For example, the Omnibus bill makes support of anti-PLO groups a crime, for foreigners, as the PLO is now, this year, our "Partner for Peace.") >will have the same status in the US as the neo-Nazis have in >Germany, and will have to adopt similar communications and >organization techniques. Who knows, maybe this is the best thing >that could happen, although I'm real curious about who will >back off to protect their ass-ets and who will actually keep >on chugging towards crypto anarchy. > >In the short term, I've renewed or started memberships in the >organizations that are likely to fight this -- but I'm also >fired up to get more easy-to-use software out there, and >do what I can to help build infrastructure that can resist this >sort of nonsense. This is all I'm suggesting, that yet another round of trying to persuade Congress people is a waste, and that the _traditional_ focus on technology is a better use of our time and effort. Others are welcome to do as they wish. I'm just expressing my view that Washington can spin out legislation faster than we can respond....they are, after all, using our tax dollars to generate new laws, and have intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies on their side with armies of lawyers and lobbyists to help. Multi-billion dollar budgets are also at stake. The lobbyists for preserving liberty are few and far between. Some would say this means Cypherpunks should step into the fray and become a lobbying group. I don't see us as having the structure or organization to become such a group. Those who wish to should probably form a real group to do this, with bylaws and elected officials. Anarchies are great, but there's no way an anarchy can have a "spokesman," or a budget for travel and lobbying, or a hundred other things that a lobbying group needs. Cypherpunks--this list--is just not in a position to be this group. --Tim May .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)sensemedia.net | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: SSL RC4 challenge
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> > Here is a challenge to try breaking SSL using the default exportable > encryption mode, 40-bit RC4. > [...] It has been pointed out to me that I made a mistake in my analysis of the SSL packets. The MAC at the beginning of the encrypted packets is itself RC4 encrypted. That means that the 17 bytes of known plaintext start 16 bytes into the stream, not at the beginning as I thought. This just means that after key setup, RC4 has to be cycled 16 times before we start comparing its output with the XOR of the known plaintext and ciphertext. I'll produce a revision of my "challenge". If no other mistakes are found I'll post it to sci.crypt. Hal

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Re: Crisis Overload (re Electronic Racketeering)
by Connie Sadler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Re: Crisis Overload (re Electronic Racketeering) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 1995 12:27:18 PDT A1-type: DOCUMENT Importance: normal >On July 13, 1995, Robert Hayden said: >Unfortunately, a system of social engineering needs to be adopted to get >massive use of cryptography started. This means, and I advocated this >from the day I entered this forum, that programs such as PGP need to be >redesigned so that the a user friendly . . . so user friendly that any >Joe Moron can figure out not only how to use them, but also how it helps >them and how it is "good" for them. This means that we need simplified >key management easy enough for the point-and-click masses to utilize. >... >Unfortuately, all I can do is stand on the sidelines and cheer, because I >am not a programmer; I'm a user and a teacher. Well put! I agree wholeheartedly! I have friends who are mostly teachers and writers who are interested in encryption from what I've told them, but their computer knowledge is pretty much limited to their word processors. A good user interface would do wonders for spreading the use of PGP. Unfortunately I am not a programmer either, but I am being motivated to become one. If only there was more time... Connie

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Re: Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act of 1995 (fwd)
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199507132116.VAA149322(a)smtp-gw01.ny.us.ibm.net>, jfmesq(a)ibm.net (James F. Marshall) wrote: > I haven't read the whole >bill, but I read the "regardless" phrase with a different emphasis. >In short, that language appears to mean that one could be pounded with >RICO for uploading crypto software even if the crypto is EXPORTABLE. The government doesn't want us to use any crypto that takes them an appreciable ammount of time to crack. It seems inevitable to me that such crypto will soon be outlawed. The same goes for anonymous remailers. It is only a matter of (very little) time. Yes, Black Unicorn is right. We need stealth encryption. Unfortunately even that won't help as much as one might think, because it can only be used by tight conspirators who are willing the to take the risk to be locked up in a concentration camp, I mean jail, for the rest of their lives. Crypto for the masses is about to fade away into history, before it ever really caught on. - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMAWlEyoZzwIn1bdtAQFIYwF+JKboVVw7qm+Ejyj0ecTp1EbqWL2YCAlb tL3RLDWA5VLcKakMh2nI3oZns0SLknGw =+fvE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Ssh security hole?
by Tatu Ylonen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(I'll forward your message to a couple of lists where it might be of interest; the original message is at end.) I think you are right in your analysis. There is indeed a problem with RSA authentication. Basically what this means is that if you log into a corrupt host, that host can at the same time log into another host with your account (by fooling you to answer to the request) provided that you use the same RSA identity for both hosts. A workaround is to use a different identity for each host you use. The default identity can be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file, or by -i options. And, yes, I think the same problem might occur with client host authentication. Though, there you would still have to do IP-spoofing, DNS spoofing or similar to get through (breaking RSA based host client effectively reduces RhostsRSAAuthentication to conventional .rhosts authentication). The protocol will need to be changed somewhat because of this. I'll think about it tomorrow and let you say you opinion about it. Thanks! Tatu Ylonen <ylo(a)cs.hut.fi> Date: Thu, 13 Jul 1995 13:08:15 -0700 From: David Mazieres <mazieres(a)pa.dec.com> To: ssh-bugs(a)cs.hut.fi Cc: rtm(a)eecs.harvard.edu, dm(a)eecs.harvard.edu, tbl(a)eecs.harvard.edu Subject: Ssh security hole? I believe there is a serious problem with the RSA authentication scheeme used in ssh, but then again I could be misreading the proposed RFC. Is the following really the case? As I understand the protocol, here is what happens during SSH_AUTH_RSA authentication. Suppose the holder of SKu, is allowed access to account U on machine B (which holds SKb). Both PKu and PKb are widely known. In addition, machine B has a session key, PKs, which changes every hour. When U on machine A wants to log into machine B, here's what I think happens based on my reading of the RFC: A -> B: A B -> A: (PKb, PKs, COOKIE) [A flags an error if PKb is not the stored value.] A -> B: (COOKIE, {{Kab}_PKs}_PKb) A -> B: {U}_Kab A -> B: {PKu}_Kab [B aborts if SKu is not allowed access to account U.] B -> A: {{N}_PKu}_Kab A -> B: {{N}_MD5}_Kab (*) [B aborts if the MD5 hash is invalid.] B -> A: access to acount U with all data encrypted by Kab. The problem is, suppose U actually wanted to log into machine C, which was maintained by an untrusted person. The person maintaining C could initiate a connection to B the minute U tried to log into C. When given a challenge {{N}_PKu}_Kbc, C could simply give this to A as the challenge to respond to, and then forward the response to B. To fix the problem, A must at the very least include B in the response line marked (*). I have reason to believe (after having just seen a lecture on authentication), that you might even need to include more. A safe bet might be (but then again I am no expert): A -> B: {(N, A, B, Kab)}_MD5 I think similar problems arise for the other authentication methods. Other than that, though, I am really impressed by by ssh. It's easy to install and easy to use. In fact, it is even more convenient to use than standard rsh, because the X forwarding happens automatically. Thanks for such a great package! David

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co-sponsors
by perry＠imsi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I searched Thomas and couldn't find any evidence of co-sponsors to the Senate bill. Am I wrong here? .pm

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No Subject
by Kevin Stumborg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

send me mail

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