December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.taylored.com This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp. hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash mix cut ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"crown"} = "<mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut mix ek reord"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mixmaster(a)gondolin.org> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. 21 Apr 1995: The new version of premail (0.33) is out, with direct posting, perl5 and better MH support, and numerous bug fixes. Last ping: Mon 31 Jul 95 6:00:04 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net ****+-****** 16:34 99.99% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net **+*+-****** 16:39 99.95% gondolin mixmaster(a)gondolin.org -------* -++ 1:28:04 99.92% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de -**-+-*.*-*# 46:06 99.86% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com .-.......- 13:23:04 99.84% vox remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl .--..-..-.. 23:22:24 99.99% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu #*** -****## 11:33 99.68% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com **** -****## 7:01 99.67% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*** ****** 15:31 99.32% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu **** -****## 7:38 99.17% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++++-. ++.-+ 4:01:54 99.15% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl **** ****** 16:41 98.62% crown mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net -+--- +---- 2:00:09 98.43% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org +_.-..--..+ 23:31:28 97.97% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ..--.---. 13:06:46 94.87% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi -------- -** 4:39:15 91.60% hroller hroller(a)c2.org #*--+--* -+ 3:17:36 90.05% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ***++-*****# 10:25 99.99% syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org -- ----- - 5:03:24 88.62% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ---+---- . 15:07:06 85.77% c2 remail(a)c2.org -----* -+ 3:59:22 85.39% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +++++ +++ 55:37 74.06% For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Zimmermann legal fund
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:23 PM 7/30/95 EDT, nsb(a)nsb.fv.com wrote: >To pay into non-US accounts, we need to establish banking relationships in >other venues. For the most part, we need to do it one country at a time, >which is awesomely time-consuming ..... >Remember, the requirement is not that you be in the US, but rather than you >have an account in a US bank. This is not all that hard for a non-US >citizen to do **IF** you can show up physically at a US bank. Thus, if >there's a US bank that has an office near you, you can walk in and open an >account to which deposits can be made through the US direct-deposit system, >and you're in business with FV. Aren't there some banks or similar companies that are world-wide, but have US branches? I think SwissBankCorp or somebody like that has an office in San Francisco; would it be possible for you to transfer money to someone with an account there who's really in, say, Switzerland or the UK or Hong Kong? #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #--- # Export PGP three lines a time --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/ M0V]N9W)E<W,@<VAA;&P@;6%K92!N;R!L87<@+BXN(&%B<FED9VEN9R!T:&4@ M9G)E961O;2!O9B!S<&5E8V@L(&]R(&]F('1H92!P<F5S<SL-"F]R('1H92!R M:6=H="!O9B!T:&4@<&5O<&QE('!E86-E86)L>2!T;R!A<W-E;6)L92P@( T*

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Re: The Net (short movie review)
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:33 AM 7/29/95 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote: >At 3:04 AM 7/29/95, Joel McNamara wrote: >>Don't bother. Better to wait until it hits the video shelves then have a >>party and see who can find the most (of many) technical flaws and gaffs. >>Would be much more entertaining in that context. > >Agreed. In television interviews Ms. Bullock talks about how she's "on the >net all the time" while in further conversation it's clear that all she >does is hang out in AOL auditoria and chat-rooms, probably with some >net.flack at her elbow.... So good for her. I've spent most of the evening chatting on cypherpunks and cyberia rather than writing code.... Some recent survey found that 60% of time that average folks spend on the net is communications rather than information retrieval. I rather enjoyed the movie, though I did share the experience of being one of the two or three people in the theater laughing at various technical gaffes and/or in-jokes. Obviously, you can't take anything from Hollywood too seriously technically, but they did look at a few social issues related to computerisation, such as the isolation, computer addiction, lack of face-to-face relationships, difficulty in knowing what's real when everything's on the computer, vulnerability of society to computer problems, trustability of people who tell you that you can trust their computer security system for everything - even the government uses it! So they didn't look into them too deeply - they're Hollywood. That's not their job :-) Also, I like Sandra Bullock, and I think her acting pulled the movie together more than the script did. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #--- # Export PGP three lines a time --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/ M0V]N9W)E<W,@<VAA;&P@;6%K92!N;R!L87<@+BXN(&%B<FED9VEN9R!T:&4@ M9G)E961O;2!O9B!S<&5E8V@L(&]R(&]F('1H92!P<F5S<SL-"F]R('1H92!R M:6=H="!O9B!T:&4@<&5O<&QE('!E86-E86)L>2!T;R!A<W-E;6)L92P@( T*

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Re: Sex & Crime TV filter
by thresher!thad＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hadmut, There has been an ongoing debate about this, for several years. The way that it is supposed to work is that the TV broadcasters would include some kind of rating information in the vertical interval between frames, and the TV's that are sold after a certain date would interpret these rating signals to darken the screen during shots, or more likely, programs that are deemed inappropriate to the viewer. The idea would be that parents could program their tv's to permit some range of sex and/or violence, and thus could protect their children somewhat. The chip that interprets the content does it solely based on the rating information. This is the so-called "v-chip" (v for violence, I think, not for video) that you see in the press. I think that a more reasonable approach would be to sell a box that sits between the video signal source and the TV, or that is within the TV, that is connected to some private rating service. I think that any kind of mandated rating would be unlikely to meet the qualifications of most people. Besides, what I would really like to filter out, what I find to be incredibly violent to the minds of children, is commercial advertising. Private rating services could take care of these, easily, as well. The idea of boxes outside the TV is usually casually shot down as unworkable; that kids, with their infinite time, patience, cleverness, and guile, will find a way to bypass the box. I'd say that it's worth a try. And, if it will blank commercials (and pause your VCR during them, say) I think it will have tremendous revenues to enable research into a secure solution. One such secure solution would be that you would take your TV into a shop, and have the antenna connection modified, so that any tampering would be detected. Or have it done as a house call, whatever. thad -- Thaddeus Beier email: thad(a)hammerhead.com Technology Development vox: 408) 286-3376 Hammerhead Productions fax: 408) 292-8624

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Ivy Bells, Smersh, and the Rosenbergs
by tcmay＠sensemedia.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:16 AM 7/31/95, Bill Stewart wrote: >At 12:52 AM 7/31/95 -0700, rick hoselton wrote: >> >>>Different cases - the Walkers gave away information on how the Yankees were >>>stealing Russian secrets, which the Russians patched up by encrypting. >> >>Really? Do you have a reference for this? I am interested. >No refs, this is just memory of the news. There was an undersea cable >north of Siberia somewhere that carried a lot of unencrypted military >traffic, which US Submarines were eavesdropping on. I think Walker was >the one who leaked it, and they started encrypting. Refs on the Walkers >should be easy to find in the library; there were a couple of books. There were at least 3 books, plus at least one t.v. miniseries, plus extensive media coverage. Until the Aldrich Ames case, this was about the most serious spying case in modern times. (It may or may not have been bigger than Ames, depending on the relative importance of "technical means" vs. "humint.") The undersea cable eavesdropping program was "Ivy Bells," and was revealed to the Sovs by Walker and his associates. I don't know if they also knew about via alternate sources. On the other issue, whether either or both of the Rosenbergs were spies, things have settled yet. Sudoplatov, in "Special Tasks," claims they were both spies. Others doubt it. (For you Bond fans, Sudoplatov headed up "Smersh." Russian for "Death to spies." Yes, it really existed, unlike, say "U.N.C.L.E.") On the issue of whether in the 1950s the U.S. government knew the Rosenbergs were spies, we have even less information. A trial was held and guilty verdict returned, but reasonable folks may disagree. My guess? Yes, they were probably spies. The Rosenbergs were certainly the Mumia Abu Jamals of their day. --Tim May .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)sensemedia.net | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Zimmermann legal fund
by nsb＠nsb.fv.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:24 PM 7/30/95 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >If you insist that international transactions be mediated through >US banks, you are cutting your throat. I hope my mail didn't give the impression that we are "insisting" on this. It's a matter of technical expedience at the moment, that's all. Non-US sellers who really want to use FV can do so today IF they get a US bank account. Payout through non-US banks is definitely something we plan to do, but you can't build a business today on our plans for tomorrow, especially since we don't have a firm target date. One of the relatively easiest alternatives we have discussed is good old fashioned paper checks. We could *conceivably* (this is not a promise!) set up a system to pay non-US sellers by mailing them paper checks. This is a fairly expensive process, and we'd have to pass on the costs to the sellers in the form of a service charge for the mailing, and there would be postal delays, and there would be a delay waiting for your local bank to clear a US check. Is this appealing? -- Nathaniel

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Re: Sex & Crime TV filter
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I could agree to a private filtering mechanism where each program broadcasts an ID number. A chip on the set reads this info from the dark band between frames or someplace. Private agencies rate the programs by whatever criteria sells ("Bikinis & Beer", "Motherhood and Apple Pie", whatever), and people load those rating/show lookups into their set off of the net or wherever... Certainly the government shouldn't reqire anything. The government couldn't find its ass with both hands. I bet this scheme could sell on an information value-added basis alone. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Customer Service?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Veracity suspect, but an interesting crypto story nonetheless... >Subject: Tech support story (fwd) > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- > [Urban legend of the day...] > > Subject: Stressful tech call > To: Customer Service; TechSports > > This falls into the "Why did it have to happen on *MY* shift?" category. > > A friend of mine is a chief engineer at SuperMac, and he related this > story to me. > > SuperMac records a certain number of technical support calls at random, > to keep tabs on customer satisfaction. By wild "luck", they managed to > catch the following conversation on tape. > > Some poor SuperMac TechSport got a call from some middle level official > from the legitimate government of Trinidad. The fellow spoke very good > English, and fairly calmly described the problem. > > It seemed there was a coup attempt in progress at that moment. However, > the national armoury for that city was kept in the same building as the > Legislature, and it seems that there was a combination lock on the door > to the armoury. Of the people in the capitol city that day, only the > Chief of the Capitol Guard and the Chief Armourer knew the combination to > the lock, and they had already been killed. > > So, this officer of the government of Trinidad continued, the problem is > this. The combination to the lock is stored in a file on the Macintosh, > but the file has been encrypted with the SuperMac product called Sentinel. > Was there any chance, he asked, that there was a "back door" to the > application, so they could get the combination, open the armoury door, > and defend the Capitol Building and the legitimately elected government > of Trinidad against the insurgents? > > All the while he is asking this in a very calm voice, there is the sound > of gunfire in the background. The Technical Support guy put the person on > hold. A phone call to the phone company verified that the origin of the > call was in fact Trinidad. Meanwhile, there was this mad scramble to see > if anybody knew of any "back doors" in the Sentinel program. > > As it turned out, Sentinel uses DES to encrypt the files, and there was > no known back door. The Tech Support fellow told the customer that aside > from trying to guess the password, there was no way through Sentinel, and > that they'd be better off trying to physically destroy the lock. > > The official was very polite, thanked him for the effort, and hung up. > That night, the legitimate government of Trinidad fell. One of the BBC > reporters mentioned that the casualties seemed heaviest in the capitol, > where for some reason, there seemed to be little return fire from the > government forces. > > O.K., so they shouldn't have kept the combination in so precarious a > fashion. But it does place, "I can't see my Microsoft Mail server" > complaints in a different sort of perspective, does it not? > Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Re: Sex & Crime TV filter
by Frank Stuart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[...] >The idea of boxes outside the TV is usually casually shot down >as unworkable; that kids, with their infinite time, patience, >cleverness, and guile, will find a way to bypass the box. >I'd say that it's worth a try. And, if it will blank [...] I hadn't thought of that before. I wonder how many kids will get zapped trying to bypass the chip on the inside. Frank Stuart | (Admiral Grace) Hopper's Law: fstuart(a)vetmed.auburn.edu | It's easier to get forgiveness than permission.

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Re: Sex & Crime TV filter
by tcmay＠sensemedia.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:13 PM 7/31/95, Robert Hettinga wrote: >I could agree to a private filtering mechanism where each program >broadcasts an ID number. > >A chip on the set reads this info from the dark band between frames or >someplace. > >Private agencies rate the programs by whatever criteria sells ("Bikinis & >Beer", "Motherhood and Apple Pie", whatever), and people load those >rating/show lookups into their set off of the net or wherever... > >Certainly the government shouldn't reqire anything. The government couldn't >find its ass with both hands. I bet this scheme could sell on an >information value-added basis alone. The "VCR-Plus" codes that are already published essentially offer this code already. Thus, one looks in the channel lisings and finds "Debbie Does Fort Meade" has a VCR-Plus code of "31415926," which one enters to set recording times, etc. (This even has some low-level crypto content, as the VCRPlus coding system was a topic of much debate a couple of years ago.) True, this takes work. (Though some satellite systems offer it via a point-and-click interface, on the actual t.v. screen.) The key difference between this setup and the "in band" proposal RAH is making is that VCR-Plus is "out of band." But the point is that the info is there in both cases. The infrastructure for using this to block stuff doesn't exist in most t.v.s or VCRs, but then it wouldn't exist either with RAH's in-band program labelling approach (which I expect is coming anyway--my cable system reports on what network it's seeing, even as the networks alter lineups, and reports time, system status, etc....all presumably in the 4-line interval, etc.) What's really flawed about these "lockout" schemes is that the installed base of televisions and VCRs is NOT going to go away, that no magic wand is going to give a single mother who wants to control what her children watch a new t.v. or VCR. As some non-stupid Senators noted, the V-chip system will go into the households who need it the _least_! --Tim May .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)sensemedia.net | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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