December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

CID
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>I've got the specs for a program to use with your modem to generate >>what'll resemble a full CID. So with the computer set up to dial, even >>standard voice calls too and faxes, too, can be equipped with a fake >>field (or "header" if you will), displaying a homemade caller ID. >> >>Since it uses the exact same structure as the real caller ID, no telco >>along the entire system will ever doubt it. I can send the full >>specifications if you are seriously interested in doing the code in >>full or in part. Sorry, I can't implement it myself (lack of skills). I, for one, would be *very much* interested in receiving the specs and any additional information you could provide. Dave Merriman (not _caring_ who you are, where you're from, etc :-) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP public key and fingerprint. PGP encrypted Email welcome and encouraged. War is Peace. Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is Strength. No?

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California Code online
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For the "book disadvantaged" among us, I saw a reference today to the California civil code online. It is at: http://www.law.indiana.edu/codes/ca/codes.html. The form of this URL suggests that other states might be there, too, but I didn't look. This is a very nice presentation, structured with each section in a separate page, and a nice table of contents. I was browsing the commercial code which has lot sof interesting info on commercial paper and other subjects of interest with regard to digital cash. Hal

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Re: Admiral Inman
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Our enemies are industriously corrupting the language in order to make the ideas of liberty inexpressible. In particular they are seeking to make the concepts behind the declaration of independence and the bill of rights unspeakably and therefore, they hope, unthinkable. .................................................... Do you think that 'our enemies' are doing this consciously, purposefully, deliberately? Do you think that they know these concepts well enough to apprehend what it is about their meanings that should be corrupted? Do you think that, having understood what these concepts represent, they are in such abhorrence of them that the only thing they can do, short of physical fighting against the promoters of the concepts, is disorient everyone into a confused state of cognitive indeterminancy & inefficacy? Maybe that's what happened to Inman during his rejection speech! Blanc

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White Knight Remailers [was: Guerrilla Remailers]
by N. Cognito 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Tue, 22 Nov 1994, Adam Shostack wrote: > Real remailers (with return address features) should probably >be advertised in alt.support.* and alt.recovery, in order to build a >class of "good" users for them. Nb, I don't see this use as superior >to any other, I simply see it as being politically useful to provide >anonymous services to a group of people who society seems to think >should be anonymous. > > "But Brad, you can't shut down my remailer. Its used to let >victims of sexual abuse post anonymously to the net!" I have been thinking along these lines lately, too. The situation with the reputation of the twwells.com anon-server and its continued use in spite of those questions by under-informed individuals in the alt.sexual.abuse.recovery newsgroup have motivated me to do a couple of trial postings there. So far I have posted the "remailer.help.all" file from chaos.bsu.edu as a "how-to" and the most recent update posted here of Raph's Reliable Remailers List as a "where-to." Neither has generated any visible response in the newsgroup as of yet. My thinking is that it would be a Good Thing to post this kind of information on a regular basis (weekly?) to some of the "support" and "recovery" newsgroups. Unless I begin drawing a lot of flames for inappropriateness, this is what I plan to do in the immediate future. Introducing the people using those groups to remailers, encryption, etc. would not only be helpful to them, but would also be helpful to the publicly perceived reputation of remailers, etc. in just the manner to which Adam alludes. N. Cognito =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= N. Cognito "Don't put no constrictions on da people. an234(a)vox.xs4all.nl Leave 'em ta hell alone." -- J. Durante =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= public key available via keyserver -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtJrYqL3ipYu3mvVAQGMKwQAnkkKRHVrnqOwXbnNLfZTZ6IZRt4dwrP1 f4ubBMjjva9mvlZVTc2073ZmdwQaiEdGfmM4j7QE7NN71fIILl0/qPsvQsePYiDE a3ZsppzV6HftQPISyoBV+GgA58Sx9eTJe8pTEojpF3xT2KKzPcRnOl3uX/WQo7iR /CcwnT1kx5s= =x95Z -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Voice PGP, When?
by jamesh＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Punksters; Do we know when Voice PGP will be available? Can anyone point me to more info about it? I understand that "Call Security" does not include source, so I don't think I can consider using it. I'm wondering if I should continue writing my own. JJH -- Relationships are like modular furniture... Dardy Chang

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PGP
by jwhull＠cats.ucsc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey y'all, I saw Gengis Kahn's note on alt.usenet.kooks. Could you send me over your manifesto or what have you and anything accessible on PGP. Thanks Will Hull <jwhull(a)cats.ucsc.edu>

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cyphertext-only remailers / cryptanalysis code ?
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Alex Strasheim writes: > One solution that I've thought about is only passing messages which are > composed of cyphertext. Does this make any sense? This sounds useful, but I'm curious how you would enforce it. I would think you'd need to do some nontrivial statistical analysis to be reasonably sure you weren't allowing various binaries, uuencoded files, etc. with faked PGP headers, without preventing people from using other encryption schemes. I'd say this is the flip side of the challenge faced by governments trying to outlaw transmissions using strong crypto. Incidentally, I'd love to get pointers to online pieces of code which perform various statistical tests on data to find patterns characteristic of particular encryption schemes, &c. for cryptanalysis. I want to cryptanalyze a couple of encryption algorithms and would like to do some experimental work. Please send me mail directly and I will summarize to the list later on. My starting points are Applied Crypto, the CEB, and Tim's Cyphernomicon. -L. Futplex McCarthy; use "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply PGP key by finger or server; "Better watch what you say, or they'll be calling you a radical...a liberal" --Supertramp "[CIA/KGB mole Aldrich Ames] took information in shopping bags out the front door" --miscellaneous Congressperson -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLtJ3tWf7YYibNzjpAQGOVwQApexTVG/PfeHNQcE+xr5lsCWxtnC13/EL GE8A8T77YavVQDUt3P7zWH8nw05OUosUgwe3QQKu+rRQGV1Y5dLcpxMQIk/iFSE1 3hMzZYCv6L6OQ0wyt8VOuEGmg8ffvBIod9C9i9PndmHZY73j3WPoSbDXLsBXlQu4 my8Oz2NLAP4= =Zxlu -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Guerilla Remailers
by anonymous-remailer＠xs4all.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: skaplin(a)skypoint.com (Samuel Kaplin) > Has anyone else given thought to "Guerrilla Remailers?" Basically someone > obtains an account on one of the freenets or similar free account, sets up > a remailer and lets it sit for a while. (Until telnet and/or phone logs > are overwritten) After this time frame the address of the remailer is > posted. The remailer then would be used until it is shut down by the Powers > that be. The account would be set up under a bogus name etc. This would I think such a scheme would be limited by how difficult it is to integrate the remailer software into the Freenet mail routines. Most Freenets (at least Toronto, Buffalo do) use a generic type of software, Freeport, developed by the Cleveland Freenet. I'd need other's comments as to how easy it is to configure the remailer software to integrate with the Freeport software that you get a working remailer. If that step is possible, then yes, it is certainly possible to set up a guerilla remailer. > make the remailer the ideal candidate for the last hop in a remailer chain. > (After all if they can't find Juanna DuBone or Jack Mehoff they can't apply Both Cleveland and Buffalo, at last check simply require you to send in a signed form (that you can capture when you log in) as to your age, address, etc. No photo ID (ie Drivers license etc) is required so a phoney account is relatively easy to set up.....I know...I had one on the Buffalo Freenet until certain anarchistic activities got it canned :>. However....here is another interesting point. I'm a Canadian, living across the border basically from Buffalo and Cleveland. Not only would the authorities be unable to do anything due to it being a phoney account, but being across the border would also place me beyond the pale of the U.S. authorities even if I actually was ever tracked down. All that would happen is the account would be shut down. Same for a U.S. resident utilizing the Toronto, Victoria or Ottawa Freenets. Overall, this is an interesting concept and I'd be willing to give it a shot. They key facet of it is whether we can configure the Freeport software with the remailer software.....or vice-versa.

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Re: Brad Templeton, ClariNet, and remailers
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <aaf7ed2a000210042b2a(a)[17.205.6.17]> you stated: : I might be the (ex-)remailer operator in question. I find Brad's lack of : knowledge about remailers quite surprising in light of almost 4 hours of : conversation devoted solely to this topic, by telephone, over the course of : a month. My remailers have been used several times, to redistribute ClariNet articles, apperantly ClariNet has an "snitch"-line where people can mail to to get an reward, some people have the courtisy to inform the remail-operator that they have done so. I have *never* received any request for information from ClariNet. (maybe because my 5-line disclaimer says it all: the account used was an anonymous-remailer: so if you donnot like that, start your own !!) Regz, -- Exit! Stage Left. Alex de Joode <usura(a)xs4all.nl>

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Re: DC-Net implementation
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

acspring(a)knoware.nl (Andrew Spring): > >Using a central node to coordinate the DC-net traffic requires that the > >participants trust that central node. If the central node is evil, > A collation of N-1 nodes will always produce garbage; the whole set is > needed for the message to fall out. > Example > ... > A sends 14 - 5 = 9 to Central node > B sends 5 - 11 = -6 Central nodes are not nice for various reasons, including the usual networking and security (trust) advantages of wide distribution. IAC a central node is not necessary; for example, if each node were to output to the next: B sends Anum XOR Brnd (XOR msg) to C where Brnd is B's random number, msg is B's message (if any) and Anum is the similarly generated output of A. This is much closer to the original DCNet _bit_ flipping - the first XOR checks for equality while the second commits the 'lie' In this case whatever number A gets from D is the output of the net. There are lots of interesting cryptographic sub-protocols to make too much trust unnecessary. I also believe that error-correction is best left to lower levels of the network - there's no need for a DC Net not to assume a reliable data channel. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." rishab(a)arbornet.org Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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