December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

clipper and export
by Jonathan Rochkind 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is anyone else distrubed by the way that encryption export policy and the clipper chip seem to be linked {in administration policy, and in the press? The letter from Gore to Cantwell certainly indicates this. He got her to refrain from trying to liberalize export by saying that he'd look into relaxing clipper. This seems awfully insidious, for a variety of reasons. I think everyone has got to make greater efforts to seperate these two issues in the public s mind. If we need to prevent encryption export for national security reasons, as the administration alleges, then that doesn't neccesarily have any relation on whether we need to adopt key escrow too.And if key escrow is neccesary for law enforcement, as they allege, that doesn't say _anything_ about whether encryption export should be liberalized or not. Of course, scrutinizing administration policy revelas the link without too much dificulty. They want to make clipper a de facto standard, and the only way they're going to be able to accomplish this is by refusing to allow exportation of anything _but_ clipper. But the administration isn't publically giving this line of reasoning, because it makes them look bad, and shows that they are mis-using the legislation that allows them to ban exportation of encryption for their own pro-Clipper strategies. But they still manage to link the two issues, as in the "compromise" with Ms. Cantwell, without giving any good reason for the two issues to be related! I don't think we should let them get away with this. If the two issues are going to be linked like this, we the public have got to demand and explanation or rational for doing this. Why did the administration basically offer to re-think clipper _if_ Cantwell didn't try to liberalize export? And when they can't give a good answer, we the cypherpunks have got to offer our explanation. As it is, they're getting a tactical olitical freebie. They've managed to link the issues of export restrictions and clipper such that Joe Public sees how the policies are linked, _without_ giving any actual reasons for the link, because those reasons would make them look so bad.

4 3

Re: Voice/Fax Checks
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:19 AM 7/20/94 UTC, j.hastings6(a)genie.geis.com wrote: >"Attention Businesses...Accept Personal and Business Checks Over The >Telephone (or by fax) for Your Orders, Payments, Collections and >Donations!" > >If you want more details about this, drop me a note. I have no >other connection with the company besides the fax from a sales guy, >so far. Does anyone out there know something about this concept? >Could this be useful for a digital cash bank interface? Say that you're selling something and someone says "I'll mail you a check today." This lets you say: "Don't bother. Take out the check you were going to send me, read me the routing code and check number on the bottom. Give me your name and address and the bank's name and address as they appear on the check, the amount you will pay and the date. I'll collect that check electronically without you having to bother to send it." They reconstruct the check as an electronic payment order and submit it. Works. Even easier if they have a fax of the check. DCF Privacy 101 - States without mandatory auto insurance: Alabama, District of Columbia, Iowa, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin. (The last time I looked -- updates welcome.)

2 1

Re: GUT and P=NP
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

James A. Donald writes: > I was referring to the proposed quantum computers. > > > Since such machines do not operate algorithmically > > > > This statement is exactly wrong. Such machines *define* a class of > > algorithms. > I recommend that you read the following paper. > E. Bernstein and U. Vazirani, {\it Quantum Complexity > Theory}, Proc. 25th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computation, pp. 11--20 > (1993). James, without reading the paper, can you tell me why the following argument is incorrect? 1) By definition, if something can be computed by a turing machine, then it is an algorithm (Lewis and Papadimitriou) 2) a quantum computer can be simulated by a TM with exponential slowdown. (claimed by you on the Extropians list, but also claimed by Feynmann I believe, not about qm computers, but qm systems in general) then by (1) and (2), it follows that 3) quantum computers are algorithmic (if not, it would contradict 2) and possibly 1) It doesn't matter how slow the turing machine runs the simulation because we allow an arbitrary time along with the infinite tape to complete the computation. -Ray

4 4

Re: "Key Escrow" --- the very idea
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

if you really want to propose an escrow system we can live with, I would demand that it include: 1. unambiguous ID of the person being tapped in the LEAF-equivalent 2. multiple escrow agencies, at least one of which is the NSA HQ (for its superior physical security) 3. watchdogs as escrow agents (e.g., ACLU, Rep & Dem parties, CPSR, EFF, NYTimes, ...) with authorization to look for abuses of authority and to refuse to release keys in such cases and to publicize such cases as well as bringing them to the attention of law enforcement for prosecution. 4. user-generated escrow keys, to reduce the chance of anyone having a backdoor way to get the whole escrow key database.

9 10

Ethics of Anonymous Remailers (Re: Needed for a computer ethics class)
by ghio＠kaiwan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Fri, 2 Sep 1994 11:09:40 -0600 > From: Patrick Juola <juola(a)suod.cs.colorado.edu> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Needed for a computer ethics class > > > Does anyone have a concise, citeable statement about why anonymous > remailers are a good thing? Some sort of position statment by > Julf would be ideal. Similarly, if anyone has something for the > *other* side of the coin, I'd love to see that. > > I'm in the process of writing a course on computer ethics for > the University of Colorado at Boulder and I think anonymous > remailers would be a good subject for an essay assignment, but > I need enough material (ideally, primary source material) to > lay the groundwork first. > > Patrick No, but it's something that I often get asked. I would be interested to hear examples of good things that people are using my anonymous remailer for.

1 0

L D Weller????
by Matt Hewn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From alt.privacy: > From CompuServe's Libertarian Political Issues Forum > > Subject: #216752-Oceania? > From: Scott A. Kjar 70402,3124 > To: L D Weller 71011,1743 L D Weller sounds absurdly close to our net.loon... BTW, the article is on the apparent Oceania scam. -- Matt Hewn <matthewn(a)uiuc.edu> -- Information is not knowledge; knowledge is not wisdom; wisdom is not truth. Truth is absolute.

1 0

Re: Questions about Microsoft and Software Key Escrow
by Mike_Spreitzer.PARC＠xerox.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm thinking here about software schemes; by "any public-key system" I mean any where the encryption is done by software.

1 0

Mother of All Clipper Systems?
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The trends are ominous. Outside of this forum and my contacts and sources, I've also been corresponding today with Whit Diffie, Jim Bidzos, John Gilmore, and Eric Hughes. How fast could a system happen? Depends on the nature of the "emergency," how far along the code is (my guess: not in the next several months), and all sorts of legal issues. The upcoming conference, which I just excerpted, suggests that international key escrow is very far along. The National Health Care thing could mandate a national ID card (called something else, of course), and this could happen shortly after enabling legislation passes. Combined with growing waves of illegal immigrants.... Anyway, it may or may not all fit together. But if all does, we could be facing the "mother of all Clippers." (The clipper of all mothers?) Here's a well-written piece on national ID cards. I found it in the cpsr group (see, Jim, we *do* read other newsgroups). I've made a few notes and marks, especially in sections mentioning the uses and timing that could fit with a new crypto initiative, such as SKE. --Tim Newsgroups: comp.org.cpsr.talk From: emery(a)tc.fluke.COM (John Emery) Subject: Re: National ID and "slippery slope" Message-ID: <CtMA76.9Bq(a)tc.fluke.COM> Date: Wed, 27 Jul 1994 20:57:02 GMT ... >From the news reports I've seen lately, it does appear we are heading toward a national ID card for all citizens. For instance, PC WEEK had a front page article on May 9th, a couple months ago entitled, "Postal Service, IRS developing national identity cards; Clinton may give OK": "The Clinton administration is working on creating an identification card that every American will need to interact with any federal government agency. The card initiative came into the forefront at last month's CardTech/SecureTech Conference in Crystal City, Va..." "Sources close to the administration said President Clinton is also considering signing a pair of executive orders that would facilitate ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ the connection of individuals' bank accounts and federal records to ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ a government identification card..." "At the conference, postal representative Chuck Chamberlain outlined how an individual's U.S. Card would be automatically connected with the Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Treasury, the IRS, the banking system, and a central database of digital signatures ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ for use in authenticating E-mail and other transactions." ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ (Tim: This would fit nicely with an SKE system, don't you think?) "While the U.S. Card is only a proposal, the Postal Service is prepared to put more than 100 million of the cards in citizens' pockets within months of administration approval, which could come at any time." ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ As long as one doesn't interact with the Postal Service (e.g. doesn't use mail), the IRS (doesn't earn taxable income), and doesn't have a bank account then it won't be a "must carry" card. However, this doesn't include very many people in America. Another source says "Digital Media reports that the Clinton administration is laying plans to create an encoded national identity card. Every citizen would be obliged to use the new "U.S. Card" in all dealings with any federal agency and in 'virtually every other legally binding electronic transaction made by U.S. citizens.'" "...To further increase electronic surveillance of citizens, Clinton has reportedly prepared two executive orders that would allow the IRS to monitor personal bank accounts and 'automatically collect taxes based on the results." ("Clinton readies national identity card," _Strategic Investment_, June 22, 1994, p. 2) The Seattle Times reported on July 13, 1994 that "The United States, in a response to its ability to control illegal immigration, may soon ask every American to carry a national identity card..." So the answer is yes, it is intended to be a national ID card. I find it hard to believe that every citizen will not have to carry one of these cards. For all practical purposes, given these proposals implemented, it would be quite inconvenient to leave home without it. This is something that we should all take seriously. -- John Emery emery(a)tc.fluke.COM -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Signature Stripping a Bad Idea
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reasons why attempts to automatically strip signatures a bad idea: * Breaks the assumpton that remailers are not reaching in and twiddling internals of a message. * Maybe a signature is _desired_ at some point. * Can lead to various problems, especially if implemented badly. We've had this debate before, and the consensus was that treating a remailed block as inviolate is a "win." Certainly anyone can announce this "feature" as a service, sort of a "Dummie's Remailer." Like censor services (that screen your mail), such things are easily imaginable, but should never become the norm, and should never be mandated. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: Catch-22
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Since E-mailing a few copys of my 3DEA-PGP.ZIP file >and having said file posted on two FTP sites. >"ftp.wimsey.bc.ca" and "ripem.msu.edu" >It seems that the tax man sees $ in his eyes. >I received a nice package with letter from... > United States Department of State > Bureau of Politico-Militart Affairs > Office of Defence Trade Controls >So, it came to their attention that I need to pony up $250 >in order to "register" with said office. Problem is they >want proof of my business in order to register. But, I don't >have a business. What is it then. When bureacracies do silly things, the best recourse is to seek media attention.

1 0