December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Children's Books Mentioning Privacy
by DarScott＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tuesday I will be giving a talk on Children's Books with Freedom Themes, but I have not found anything on e-mail privacy or privacy in general. Any suggestions? Fiction or Nonfiction. Dar Scott

2 1

Re: Netscape competence
by amanda＠intercon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excuse me, but Adam Shostack didn't write that paragraph you quoted. Amanda Walker <amanda(a)intercon.com> did, as I recall. Nope, Adam wrote it. I just followed up to him with additional vitriol :). Amanda Walker InterCon Systems Corporation

1 0

Clarification of my remarks about Netscape
by Amanda Walker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several people have asked me to clarify my recent comments about Netscape. I am more than happy to oblige. First of all, let me begin by saying that I am a biased observer, and that all of this is my personal opinion. My annoyance with Netscape is also closer to the surface this week than it normally is, due to a variety of factors (including having just returned from the San Jose IETF meeting). My initial comment, and the ones that follow in this message, are thus more frank than is my usual style on, say, public Usenet newsgroups. That being said, here are some of the data that has gone into my impressions of Netscape so far. (1) Netscape plays very fast and loose with HTML. Rather than participating in the existing standardization efforts, they have indiscriminately added "extensions" to it that are not supported by any other client software, and which in some cases go directly against HTML's markup-oriented structure. This only adds more confusion to an already muddy area, delays the prospects for a standard HTML specification, and divides the WWW into "WWW Classic" and "Netscape-compatible". Personally, as a strong proponent of universal interoperability, I find this reprehensible. There is no need to bypass existing efforts just to add cosmetic value to your own software. (2) The Netscape Secure Sockets proposal has an extremely poor security model. It is not an end-to-end security model, but rather relies on transport level security, which is in my view dangerously inadequate for reasons which should be obvious to most of the folks on this list. It is also tied directly to the RSA certification hierarchy. Now, for those of us who have X.509 certificates rooted in the RSA Commercial Certification authority, that's fine, but it also means that any other WWW client that wishes to interoperate with Netscape's "secure servers" must license TIPEM from RSA Data Security, and consequently pay RSA's rather high royalties, unless the software is free (in which case RSAREF can be used). This serves as a direct barrier to competition from other commercial vendors. This is not all bad--I happen to like RSADSI's products and technology--but promoting a transport-level security system instead of an end-to-end one is to my mind simply irresponsible. There has been no peer review of Netscape's security model--it was simply implemented by fiat, without regard for the IETF standards process. I find that this leaves a very bad taste in my mouth. I also heard similar sentiments from a wide variety of other attendees at the IETF, including members of the IP Security working group, people who attended the Secure HTTP BOF, and others. This leads me to believe that it's not just a matter of me leaping to wild conclusions. (3) Netscape is viewed as a "loose cannon" by most of the other commercial players in the WWW arena, mainly because they have introduced a fair amount of FUD into the HTML standardization effort, while simultaneously promoting themselves as being standards-based. Members of Apple's "Cyberdog" project and Microsoft's web projects, who *are* trying to contribute to the standards process, had particularly excoriating things to say in this regard. Now, as I said, I am biased and my comments about Netscape are strictly my person opinions. I will be perfectly willing to revise these opinions as I receive more data. For example, if Netscape takes a more active part in the standards process, works with RSA to secure wider availability of the underlying technology required by their proposals, and generally demonstrates a willingness to play nicely with other children, that would be great, and I'll just as strongly defend them as I am panning them now. However, in my view, they have not shown a good initial track record. Only time will tell. Amanda Walker InterCon Systems Corporation

1 0

The Four Horsemen
by Mats Bergstrom 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the recent essay "Anarchy" by T.C. May: The use of encryption by "evil" groups, such as child pornographers, terrorists, abortionists, abor- tion protestors, etc., is cited by those who wish to limit civilian access to crypto tools. We call these the "Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse", as they are so often cited as the reason why ordinary citizen-units of the nation-state are not to have access to crypto. A problem with the Four Horsemen is the various definitions currently in use on the Net. Two of them are generally agreed upon: Drug Dealer and Terrorist. Usually either Pedophile or Pornographer is the third. The fourth varies the most: Tax Evader, Spy etc. Abortionist and Abortionist-Killer are new prospects. Who were the Original Four? (No, I'm not asking about White, Red, Black and Pale.) Mats quit

2 1

Real-time surveillance of the police
by crawford＠scruznet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In the December '94 issue of Wired, ("Watching the Detectives", p. 141), Sandy Sanfort describes Bob Fleming's work to make real-time permanent recordings of the body positions of police officers. One could place a small sensor on each wrist and ankle, and record the positions (and velocities) of the cops body to with a _centimeter_, anywhere in a city. The advantage for cops is that a fallen officer can be quickly located, and a cop's claim to have witnessed an event can be corroborated by demonstrating that he was actually there. The advantage for society is that the cop's behaviour, such as billy-club swinging velocity, can be monitored. It could detectgunfire, too, by measuring the kick that is transmitted down the cop's wrist. This would work to the extent that the equipment is actually mounted on the cop it claims to belong to, so some manner of authentication would be needed. Also discussed is the idea of car or helmet mounted cameras, transmitting images continuously, to be stored by a neutral third-party, in the event of a legal challenge, either from the accused claiming that the cop is lying, or of claims of police brutality. After the Rodney King incident, I had the notion, (which I did not act on to actually promote, I'm sorry to say), that organizations representing people that feel persecuted by the law could issue disposable cameras to all there members. For example, if a street gang felt the cops were thumping their members with unwarranted enthusiasm, the gang could purchase a case of cameras at the local Price Club, and everyone could carry them to photograph the cops. In addition, cameras could be unobtrusively mounted on car hoods, perhaps with three or four such cameras multiplexing their images onto a single videotape (one wants a wide, but not necessarily tall aspect ratio; three such cameras with fisheye lenses could cover the hole perimer of a car). The VCR would be in a fireproof safe welded to the car frame (or use a surplus flight recorder package), so it would take extra effort for a cop to conceal the evidence of wrongdoing after mistreating the driver. It would also be handy for assigning responsibility in traffic accidents. Yes, that's right - keep surveillance cameras going on _yourself_. If you're not doing anything illegal, you've got nothing to fear from taping everything you do. Of course, after the difficulty the City of Santa Cruz had in establishing a Police Review commission, and considering that its powers were eviscerated in light of a lawsuit threat by a police union, I expect that it will be difficult to convince our Nation's Finest to adopt this new technology - though I'm sure they'd be happy to apply it to parolees and those serving on probation. Adoption could be initially achieved, though, by pointing out to private security firms that their liability could be reduced by monitoring their employees - obvious slackers could be immediately fired, troublesome guards could be disciplined, and the firm could demonstrate in court that the guard was nowhere near the scene when the plaintiff claimed to have been beaten by a guard. Private security guards have nowhere near the influence that police unions do, and so would have little power in arguing against it. Later on, cities faced with expensive lawsuits could strike a deal with the liability insurance companies to save money if the city cops use this stuff. After the DT fiasco, and the mention yesterday of the DOJ's new Big Brother Database, I thought you'd like to hear that someone's working on giving Big Bro the stick too. I personally feel that a society that _needed_ to do this to its cops is an abhorrent society. But perhaps we could strike a deal with Big Bro - if you don't tap our phones, we won't pass laws to tap your cops. Best Wishes in this Holiday Season, -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLusCMKJTibhK6XY5AQF+IAP+MCHtgnCbJc96lrOcoNt0HWal4nNF7JVN t6qIM6DDdGp5+IEimHTzgkUlUSZ4ojcIYEbjaae8Q58VRMOQ9zFaZlIWSeTTgZiQ wXIicZJreKeonTI0mwZauAbtmuEy3vWRp19Qf2fYwaMOY3QLy1vhTgG7g2iRpccI T6YspCxcYdw= =YK34 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCPAy7JYr8AAAEEAJ4GpoYcH5abkSq5FZQ9LxoP9oKKQDXHRGZT8QCcnVZ8o87H p9kEaUJIyzGbMHpO7C09qShwcrII2VfCZ77iWlBglmdLEa/dKXRCSWMFF52RcSDh zJF8m0wE2SZ9x4Y6KuXM3RwJVdEKLhsAImxckvfj0UBvb5xtJ6JTibhK6XY5ABEB AAG0LU1pY2hhZWwgRC4gQ3Jhd2ZvcmQgPGNyYXdmb3JkQHNjaXBwLnVjc2MuZWR1 PokAVQMFEC7p5d9yRW2Du2TJYQEB7YMB/2ToOoN7aVNUnGyykxKAVjvMDcMGgSPM IR3+wUqzpAyH43tEwKBHStYj2jSlHimRXWi6lpvSwZ7rKsOtQoeSlnCJAJUDBRAu yWQXolOJuErpdjkBAaRSA/48+f7RqKXbsLJIEx8b0A0XuA/671B6L7PiC3BS5kMh QtIlRxFlgTLUp03D2TlbEyqoaJwwIjE71k3+V2rM712WGiDlQSRjtrU21/QDNzbZ C48r+pUBO7bLHe/16ED8tgsSONH+7DIdQGw6uN1v4aTiOk2HxgDHGa3RjEewbrfW 2w== =bZwx -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Michael D. Crawford crawford(a)scruznet.com <- Please note change of address. crawford(a)maxwell.ucsc.edu <- Finger me here for PGP Public Key.

2 1

What Happened to Xenon ?
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anybody know what became of Xenon ( qwerty(a)netcom.com ) ? I did a finger of his account and got back unknown user ... He seemed like somebody who was in the spot light , funny that he just dropped out of sight . ^X

1 0

Broadcasts and the Rendezvous Problem
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Seems to me that one of the fundamental building blocks necessary to a host of anonymous services is a means of rendezvousing in a manner that is not vulnerable to traffic analysis. The obvious solution to this is through the use of a broadcast medium. Has anybody created an alt.* group purely for remailer-associated rendezvous? If not, it seems like that would be a very worthwhile direction to pursue: with such a mechanism, nodes of a "remailer net" can surface and disappear with minimal disruption to the net. Folks spend a lot of time bemoaning the transience of specific instances of remailer nodes: why not turn this into an advantage by architecting a network of system that is resilient against the destruction and/or compromise of individual nodes? - -- Todd Masco | "'When _I_ use a word,' Humpty-Dumpty said, in a rather cactus(a)hks.net | scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean - cactus(a)bb.com | neither more nor less.'" - Lewis Carroll - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLut3AioZzwIn1bdtAQHocwGAq/KWiFGi2nJ4Kuve/0jUv1xX5aAJknWc NRfJUts3Y0PfKZZbSETEwYPNfX48O4TB =NIBb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

comments on emoney story
by steven＠echonyc.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's been a few comments about my Emoney story in the December WIRED and I thought I'd clarify a couple of things. FROM JOHN YOUNG: >And, yes, for the Chaum-uncharmed, Mr. Chaum was rude to Mr. >Levy. Whether Mr. L. is rude in kind to Mr. C. is an exercise >left to the reader. For the record, I didn't consider Chaum rude to me. Actually our interviews (which were considerably lengthy) were quite cordial and not at all contentious. In fact, I think gracious would be be a better way to describe Chaum's behavior towards me. Perhaps John is thinking that David's reticence to publicly talk about some personal stuff is akin to rudeness. If that's what came out in the story, it was certainly unintentional. And I certainly hope I was not rude to Chaum in the article. I tried to portray him fairly, give him his say, and explain his work so that people would agree with me that it is extremely important. BTW, Chaum has indicated that he had no problem with the article. FROM KAWIKA DAGUIO: > ><As you can guess there are two opposing camps on [anonymity]: > ><U.S. Government Agencies AAA .. ZZZ DigiCash Corporation ><The American Bankers Association - vs - assorted cypherpunks ><Microsoft Corporation assorted privacy advocates ><The Borg at least one Libertarian > > ******************************* >Whoa! Much of content of the discussions I had with Mr. Levy >concerned the importance of protecting privacy and security for >everyone. None of those comments made the cut. Yes, I have >concerns about fully anonymous digital cash, but while I am not a >full on crypto-anarchist, neither am I a crypto-facist. I confirm this, and it wasn't my intent to make Kawika a crusader against anonymity, but someone who, as he says, has concerns about anonymous cash. I've gotten some good feedback on the article, but unfortunately on the bio line Wired misspelled my email address (!) so I'm probably missing some of the best remarks. _______________________________________________________ Steven Levy steven(a)well.com steven(a)echonyc.com author, Hackers, Artificial Life, Insanely Great contributor, Macworld, Wired "When the going gets weird, the weird turn pro." _______________________________________________________

1 0

Re: DDJ on RC5
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Alan Olsen writes: > The January 1995 issue of Dr. Dobbs has tw articles of interest. [...] > - An article on RC5 by Ron Rivest! (Which includes source code!) Does it differ substantially from the code in the preprint, ftp://theory.lcs.mit.edu/pub/rivest/rc5/rc5.ps ? - - -L. Futplex McCarthy - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLut/PGf7YYibNzjpAQG6UwP/SR+SJoimlppN79PrW2B3W8otK3ZbkQX7 YTbdIy84mloYHLTLpY+XnzTSJ+yY6rarqi/QFia2MNpKoLySBmRVFU2LuGcZyj+b Xh3w7GPqJF3Re2acfdRicIjY3QTU3dryTqC9v9qEq90rCGWXZAHryoV7ALwPnoG0 UvxogTSS2bY= =5twK - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuuAdSoZzwIn1bdtAQHqdQF+MMVvMfQgFJF7sne7Dn0ACypFccBbWjgn TOc7YK2sL5RxxzNGyB+Bid+50vNT0rIt =1Fv5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Globe and Mail Article On Forged Posting
by werewolf＠io.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Ok, here is the text of the story about the "Forged Bob Rae Posting" from the Toronto Globe and Mail. An examination of the story only indicates how far our journalists and politicians have to go in understanding the Internet! ============================================================================ Tories cause uproar in legislature Rae furious after Harris distributes prank letter circulating on Internet - From THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Toronto, December 9, 1994 pg A6 BY JAMES RUSK and MARTIN MITTELSTAEDT Queen's Park Bureau TORONTO - Progressive Conservative Leader Michael Harris caused an uproar in the Ontario Legislature yesterday by presenting a prank letter circulating on the Internet computer system that is purported to have been written by Premier Bob Rae. The computer message has Mr. Rae making tasteless references to Ontario's Attorney-General Marion Boyd and commenting on the trial of Karla Homolka, who was convicted in the slayings of two Ontario schoolgirls. A copy of the letter obtained by The Globe and Mail warns that "this message is NOT from the person listed in the from line. It is from an automated software remailing service" in California. This message was on the letter from the time the company received it and passed it on to the computer bulletin board where Internet users can read it, said Gwen Rachlin, director of operations for Portal Communications of Cupertino, Calif., through which the message was posted. However, the copy distributed by the Conservatives yesterday did not contain any notice that it was a fake, and Mr. Harris made the sensational claim that the letter could indicate a security lapse in the Premier's Office. A furious Mr. Rae criticized Mr. Harris outside the legislature, accusing him of leading to the "Americanization of Canadian politics" through the use of "dirty tricks. "I really do think that Mr. Harris has reached a genuine new low. I think it's a low that I hadn't anticipated he would hit, but in my book he's hit it," Mr. Rae said. It is relatively easy for an Internet user to send fake messages on the system, which links millions of computer users around the world. But Mr. Harris said a lapse could have occurred in the Premier's Office, allowing someone to send the letter. Mr. Harris told reporters that he raised the issue out of a sense of worry that foreign governments could get on the Internet and place fake messages about the province. He was quick to add that he didn't think the Premier wrote the letter. "Clearly it didn't come from the Premier or anyone close to the Premier. But it does raise the security question," Mr. Harris told reporters. Mr. Rae lashed out at what he called "the dirty tricks stuff, the right-wing nonsense that he's coming up with every day. . . and then this stuff." When Mr. Rae found out Mr.Harris's aides had distributed the letter to the media, he said he couldn't believe the party "would engage in that kind of tactic. This is unbelievable. Today, you have managed to lower the tone of this place. " The Premier then stormed out, and the Speaker called a 15-minute recess to allow the tempers of the MPPs, many of whom were shouting at each other, to cool. It was the last day of this sitting of the House. The copy of the letter distributed by the Tories to the media had the obscene references blacked out, although Mr. Harris had given Mr.Rae an original copy. A press release issued by the Conservatives referred to Mr. Rae as "road-kill on the Information Highway," and exulted, "Internet Bob: the hacker is hacked. " Mr. Rae called these comments "bizarre." The phony message, which was posted on Saturday in a computer bulletin board called ont.general, was discovered by the Premier's Office on Tuesday, but the office decided that it could do nothing about it. Mr. Rae recently announced that he had an address on the Internet. Ont.general is a computer bulletin board on which Internet users discuss life and public issues in the province, said Larry Sherman, president of Internet Seminars of Woodbridge. A message can be removed from the board only by whoever posted it, and it was decided that to make a fuss about it would draw unnecessary attention to it, an official in the Premier's Office said. The official, who asked not to be named, said the office has not launched an investigation into where the message came from. Ms. Rachlin said the company received a call from police about the letter yesterday afternoon. But she said the company had already had "some incidents" with the source of the message. She added that she was ready to co-operate with the police. The source of the message was an account that provides a service that allows people anonymous access to the Internet, she said. Mr. Sherman said it is very easy to post a false message on a bulletin board and to make it appear that it came from a computer different from the one that sent it. By going through a California bulletin board, "obviously someone has gone way out of their way to send that in," Mr. Sherman added. Even so, the message can be traced, said Rick Broadhead, co- author of The Canadian Internet Handbook. "If they [the sender] have gone through a service, it is going to take some more work to trace it," Mr. Broadhead said. But looking at the log records of the computer service, police can follow the message back to the originating computer. The use by the Conservatives of the fake letter again puts the spotlight on the party. Last months, the Tories played pranks at an NDP convention sending in a camera crew that shot pictures ridiculing Mr. Rae, including a doctored video sequence that seemed to give the Premier a stutter. The picture were broadcast as dinner-time entertainment at a Conservative convention the same weekend. The Tories also bought a copy of a labour bill sold at an NDP fund raising and paraded it around their convention like captured trophy. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBLuuWG3BFBj7pSNyhAQG9mQf+PkUbz0M1KGoEF74yhFppu90+P7NUP0QW ew1Hzb0kTX214vCGSepo5+UTD2VRE9xuLSbQKH3HQAaXwL+LTS1sCUcRSOdWHG+4 u0NcNHVsY/rBojeEirWDa+5+Ma1fsfYKa9hq0qdzimbvP5UUQA/y9PGkh7o1Y/fn ad3v6t2ttOEHrYu7YBq4DX9HUcMGMJrGY3FQQhKEzuWnIRyc/x33XFj/M9x8p+uf wh9h4FJFE5jWp520P3mmAK0+10F/IbmxUJ2f4RTBawOwEVViOM6gYm1XnCsxO1YB BG9HPLBJUMquLkpPu9GxtmNsX5Dmtcipr8ZADz/szT3b7bxIUzqHww== =SNgW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0