Apologies to those who have already seen this.
Eric Blossom
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Return-Path: <ipsec-request(a)ans.net>
Date: Wed, 1 Jun 94 17:20:36 EDT
From: "Juan A. Garay" <garay(a)watson.ibm.com>
To: ipsec(a)ans.net
Cc: amir(a)watson.ibm.com, hugo(a)watson.ibm.com
Subject: Tunnel protocol revisited
Jim,
We (Amir Herzberg, Hugo Krawczyk and I) took a look at your key
negotiation protocol for encrypting tunnels.
We applaud your bringing up the issue; we fully agree that this constitutes
an essential component of any secure architecture for Internet.
In this note we present a secure tunnel establishment protocol that is
related to, but different than yours. The remainder of the note is
organized as follows. We first sketch the requirements/goals for/of
a key establishment protocol. This is combined with comments and observations
about your proposal. We then present the protocol in two stages: a high
level design, followed by an implementation-oriented description. We
conclude with a review and more detailed comparison.
(WARNING: this is a long note.)
GOALS OF A KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
1. Provide a shared session key. Your protocol achieves this from public
keys. However, it should be possible in general to obtain a session
key from a "master" shared key. The master key itself could be
obtained from the public key, but not exclusively. Besides being
more efficient, this approach would accommodate a variety of solutions,
like key distribution centers, manual key installation, key cacheing,
etc. In particular, the life span of a master shared key can cover
several sessions; in each of these sessions a new (session) key is
derived from the master key using conventional functions which are
significantly more efficient than public-key operations.
We maintain this distinction between master and session key throughout
the rest of this note.
An integral part of a key exchange and session establishment
protocol is the mutual authentication of the parties. This provides
to each party assurance on the authentic identity of the other.
Also, included in these protocols is the negotiation of tunnel
parameters.
2. Efficiency. It is important to minimize both the number of flows and the
the number of exponentiations (with large exponents).
While the number of exponentiations required by your proposal is 8,
our scheme support different variants that require from 2 to 4
exponentiations only (and no exponentiation at all if the parties
already share a master key).
Our scheme does not use Diffie-Helman, although it can be
accommodated in the protocol. The reason is that D-H is expensive
(4 exponentiations), but, as you mention, takes care of the
"rubber hose" attack. This effectively poses a tradeoff
in terms of the number of exponentiations that are required
to achieve a certain level of security (see item (3) below).
Key cacheing is also an important efficiency consideration.
In your protocol, public keys are used in each session to derive the
session keys. In our approach, public keys are used to obtain master
shared keys, which in turn are used to obtain the session keys.
3. Level of Security. Our protocol is immune to the exposure of one of the
private keys (indeed, an adversary needs to discover the private keys of
both sender and receiver to derive the tunnel's key). We feel that this
should be sufficient for the vast majority of applications.
Your protocol, on the other hand, is secure even if both keys are
exposed, at the expense of using Diffie-Helman.
Simplicity and being amenable to analysis and proof are important
features of any cryptographic protocol. Our protocol is structured,
simple, and thus easier to analyze. (Indeed, methods similar to those of
[1,2] can be used to establish the protocol's desired properties.)
Here's our proposal. We first present the high-level design, including
only the relevant information - the additional information (e.g., tunnel
parameters) which requires authentication is omitted here for simplicity.
We then specify the optimized implementation in more detail. Also for the
sake of clarity, in the high level description we present the two protocols
(i.e., master key exchange and session establishment) separately, and then
indicate how to combine them.
THE MASTER KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
There are two parties, S and R. We assume that S and R posses an
authentic public key of each other, as well as share a nonce (a random
number). The nonce serves as a challenge for guaranteeing the freshness of
the authentication (i.e., avoid replay attacks). Sharing a nonce is not
essential; it can be replaced by use of time stamps (at the expense of
requiring good clock synchronization) or by adding an extra flow to the
protocol (at the expense of performance). The nonce also serves the purpose
of your Reply Identifier, namely, alleviating the effect of clogging.
In any case, we stress that our nonces require no secrecy, i.e., they can be
transmitted in the clear.
S (for sender) is the party that initiates the protocol.
We first include a brief explanation of the terminology:
K_X: Random string chosen by party X.
N_X: A nonce (i.e., a random number) chosen by X.
E_X: RSA encryption with X's public key (this is your RSA1).
We assume that the information is padded with a random string
prior to encryption.
SIGN_X: X's RSA signature (your RSA2).
More specifically, by SIGN we mean first apply MD5 to the signed
information, and then apply RSA (i.e., exponentiation with X's
private key.) Since RSA operations require an argument as long as its
modulus, and the MD5 output is shorter than this modulus, then
the RSA operation will be performed on the concatenation of MD5 and
some other fields in the packet to complete the modulus length
(probably, with added randomness and redundancy). Details TBD.
K: The shared master key, outcome of the protocol.
MAC_K: A Message Authentication Code (or function) which is applied
to a piece of information for authentication using a secret key K.
Examples include block ciphers, e.g. DES, in MAC mode, or key-ed
cryptographic hash functions, e.g. MD5 with prefixed/suffixed key.
(MAC mode of block ciphers is like CBC encryption mode but only the
last block is output.)
Here's the two-flow protocol. Initially, S and R share N_R:
S R
S randomly chooses K_S, N_S
Let E_1 = E_R(K_S)
E_1, N_S, SIGN_S(E_1, TIME, N_S, N_R)
------------------------------------>
R randomly chooses K_R, N'_R
Let E_2 = E_S (K_R)
E_2, N'_R, SIGN_R(E_2, N'_R, N_S)
<-------------------------------------
Both S and R compute the new master key as K = K_S XOR K_R.
N'_R is the nonce to be used next time, i.e., S and R set N_R:=N'_R.
Observations:
1) The use of TIME in the S-->R flow is not strictly necessary. If the random
nonce is not kept, then R may agree to use the time instead.
2) SIGN_R in the return flow is not really necessary either, it
can be replaced by MAC_K(E_2, N_S, N'_R).
The advantage of this is efficiency (i.e., less exponentiations),
at the price of not being homogeneous in both flows.
This replacement of SIGN by MAC doesn't hold for the first flow,
where the signature is mandatory
(i.e., anybody can choose K_S and compute E_R(K_S) and MAC_K_S(...)).
3) R first verifies the signature, and only if this succeeds it decrypts K_R
(this reduces computational overhead, e.g., against
clogging, since signature verification is much cheaper than decryption).
4) The protocol is in some sense minimal, since 2 flows are always
needed, as well as secrecy and authentication each way (thus the 2
exponentiations). This can be made even cheaper by letting
only one party choose the key (in which case the compromise of the
private key of this party would compromise the exchanged key).
5) The above protocol uses 4 exponentiations in total (2 by each party).
Using variant 2) reduces the number to 3 (2 by S and 1 by R). By
using also 4) the number of exponetiations can further be reduced to
2 (1 per party).
Our proposal is based on variant 2).
THE SESSION ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOL
We now turn to the process of establishing a session between S and R.
This includes mutual authentication and the exchange of a session key (SK).
We assume that S and R already share a master key K, as well as the nonce N_R.
The protocol becomes:
S R
N_S, MAC_K(TIME, N_S, N_R)
------------------------------------>
R randomly chooses N'_R
N'_R, MAC_K(N'_R, N_S)
<------------------------------------
Let T be the MAC expression in the return flow, i.e., T = MAC_K(N'_R, N_S).
Then, both S and R compute SK = F_K(T) and SK becomes the new session key.
Here F_K is a pseudorandom function with index K (K is the shared master
key). Roughly speaking, pseudorandom functions are characterized by the
pseudorandomness of their output, namely, each bit in the output of the
function is unpredictable if K is unknown.
Some of the functions used as MAC are also used as pseudorandom functions,
e.g., DES in MAC mode. Some key-ed hash functions, as MD5, are also conjectured
to be pseudorandom (although there exists less evidence for that than in the
case of DES; the same is true for the use of these functions as MAC).
Observations:
1. Notice that the session key SK is not explicitly transmitted. This avoids
the need to encrypt this key as well as the need to authenticate it.
The authenticity of SK is derived from the authenticity of the
expression T.
2. The method can be readily extended to derive in turn several session keys
(different keys may be needed, for example, for confidentiality and for
integrity verification).
3. Notice that this protocol involves no public key at all.
THE COMBINED PROTOCOL
When exchanging a master key it is desirable to also have a mechanism to
derive a session key. This is obtained by combining the two protocols
presented above. This allows S and R to establish, starting with their
public keys, both a master key AND a session key in just two flows. The
first flow (from S to R) is the same as in the master key exchange protocol
described above. For efficiency, the second flow uses observation 2)
of that protocol.
S R
E_1, N_S, SIGN_S(E_1, TIME, N_S, N_R)
------------------------------------>
E_2, N'_R, MAC_K(E_2, N'_R, N_S)
<-------------------------------------
Let T' be the MAC expression in the return flow, i.e.,
T' = MAC_K(E_2, N'_R, N_S). Then, both S and R compute SK = F_K(T') and
SK becomes the new session key.
Remark: the similarity between this protocol and the above session
establishment protocol allows having the same packet format for the
flows of both protocols. This is presented in detail in the next
section.
IMPLEMENTATION
We now describe the implementation aspects in more detail. (We are
borrowing the layout you used in your note.)
Most importantly, we stress that both the master key exchange protocol
and the session establishment protocol use the SAME packet format for the
different flows. Thus, we get added functionality without the penalty
of managing more packets.
For the sake of clarity we start with a description of the packet for the
case of master key exchange, and then comment on the use of the same packet
format for the session key establishment task.
Some of the details are still left undefined. Some of them are already treated in
your proposal; others will be added once/if the group shows interest in this
proposal.
The contents of the protocol's first flow (in the master key exchange
protocol) are as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| S's IP address | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| R's IP address | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Protocol Id; flow #; length of signature (16 bits) | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Length of public key; Options (prot. mode, tunnel param., etc)| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + |
| K_S | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ E_1 |
| Random pad | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | *
| Time | MD5 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| N_S | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |SIGN_S
| N_R | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + |
| HASH | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
Where:
"Tunnel parameters" includes all the administrative data, such as tunnel
lifetime, etc.
"Protocol Id"
"Protocol Mode" is basically a bit(s) indicating how should the contents
be interpreted.
The field K_S and the subsequent random pad do not appear in plain but
encrypted under RSA_R (this is E_1 in our notation).
The encryption can be extended, if desired, to hide additional fields
(e.g., the protocol parameters).
The HASH field contains the result of MD5 (or other one-way hash function,
if desired) computed on all previous fields (or in all fields that require
authentication).
NOTE: The position of N_S and N_R as the last arguments in the computation
of MD5 is intentional. The effectiveness of these nonces as freshness
guarantee is enhanced by fixing their offset relative to the beginning
or end of the authenticated arguments.
The signature (using the private key of S) is applied to information of
the length of the RSA modulus in use. This information MUST include the
result of the HASH in the last field and may include other
authentication fields as well as additional random padding and
redundancy. These details TBD. We recommend, as Jim did, having the
nonce N_R included since this represents a good check against clogging.
(Notice that the variability on the signature scope is represented in
the above figure by the *).
The order of operations is as follows.
For S:
- Encrypt (i.e., E_1);
- perform MD5; and
- sign.
For R (upon receiving):
- Open signature;
- verify N_R;
- verify MD5; and
- decrypt.
Here's the master key exchange protocol's second flow:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| S's IP address | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| R's IP address | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Protocol Id; flow #; length of signature (16 bits) | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Length of public key; Options (prot. mode, tunnel param., etc)| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + |
| K_R | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ E_2 |
| Random pad | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + |
| Time | MAC_K
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| N'_R | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| N_S | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| MAC |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The field K_R and the subsequent random pad do not appear in plain but
encrypted under RSA_S (this is E_2 in our notation). The encryption
can be extended, if desired, to hide additional fields.
The MAC field contains the result of MAC_K computed on all previous fields
(or in all fields that require authentication). As explained above for MD5
computation, also here the position of N'_R and N_S as the last fields in the
computation of MD5 is intentional.
The order of operations. For R:
- Encrypt (i.e., E_2); and
- compute MAC_K(...).
Upon receiving (S):
- Verify N_S;
- decrypt; and
- compute MAC_K(...) and compare with MAC field.
USE OF ABOVE PACKETS FOR THE SESSION ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOL. Notice that
the second flow of both protocols (master key exchange and session
establishment) is identical except for the field E_2 in the first case.
Therefore, the packet for the second flow of the session establishment
protocol is identical to the one described above with the E_2 field omitted.
Since E_2 is a variable length field (depending on the modulus size) one
can use length 0 to accommodate the second flow of session establishment.
As for the first flow, in the case of session establishment no public key
operations are required. This means the following:
a) There is no need to use the field E_1 (this is similar to the omission of E_2,
discussed above); and
b) the HASH field in the above packet is used as the MAC field of the session
establishment protocol (128-160 bits will accommodate both cases).
SUMMARY
We have presented a protocol for the establishment of a secure tunnel.
The protocol supports the exchange of a shared (master) key for the
communicating parties as well as the establishment of secure sessions
between them. The sharing of a master key uses public key to a minimum,
and for session establishment (including session key exchange) no public
key is required. Moreover, our solution supports scenarios where shared
keys are obtained by different means, e.g., manual key installation
("sneaker-net"), key distribution centers, etc., and takes advantage of the
cacheing of these keys.
This added flexibility and functionality relative to Jim's proposal comes
without additional price in complexity (system- and computation-wise).
On the contrary, our solution accommodates the above scenarios with protocols
that require a) minimal interaction (i.e., two flows), b) a single and
compact packet format, and c) minimal computational overhead (only 3
long exponentiations).
REFERENCES
[1] R. Bird et al., "Systematic Design of Two-Party Authentication
Protocols," Proc. Crypto '91, August 1991.
[2] Bellare, P. Rogaway, "Entity Authentication and Key Distribution",
Advances in Cryptography '93, Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes on
Computer Science #773
