December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Interns Sought (tele-commute), c++, tech writers & requirements
by Harry S. Hawk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

____________ The Position ____________ We are looking for several Interns from now through December. Internships are unsalaried. At the successful completion of the Internship a $200 stipend will be paid. These are "work at home" and telecommuting internships. ___________ Who We Want ___________ We are looking for C++ programmers We are looking for Tech Writers We are looking for Technical Requirements Researchers ___________ Requirements ___________ Must have the ability to communicate in English (mostly written, but verbal as well). Experience with mail applications, sendmail, and mime a plus. Programmers must have access to a system with the g++ 2.5.8 and the ability to send RFC-822 E-mail. Tech Writers should have access to an ASCII editor (emacs preferred). Researchers should be able to surf the Internet and have access to technical libraries. You can be located anywhere in the world. We hire without regard to race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or any physical disabilities. Be able to sign and return by mail a non-disclosure agreement. __________ Who we are __________ We are PowerMail, Inc. a privately funded commercial venture incorporated in the state of Delaware. We are building a state of the art e-mailing list software in C++; The name of the product is MailWeir(tm). _______ Details _______ We are looking for programmers with solid C++ skills to build objects for us. There a lots to chose from; many are quite interesting. We are looking for tech writers to help with system level and end user documentation. We are looking for technical requirements researchers. These researchers will investigate various standards including RFC, ISO, IEEE, etc. and write functional requirements for various objects to be compliant with these standards. __________________ Please get in touch __________________ Please send your resume and qualifications to: exi-powermail(a)powermail.com Please send ASCII resumes only. _______________ For Information _______________ For more information on any position, please send mail to habs(a)powermail.com Don't send resumes here. /hawk -- Harry S. Hawk habs(a)panix.com Product Marketing Manager PowerMail, Inc. Producers of MailWeir(tm) & PowerServ(tm)

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have written and installed a remailer pinging script which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html Please let me know about any other remailers which I missed. I've only included remailers which can mail to arbitrary addresses, so I already know chop and twwells are missing. This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu/pub/raph/premail-0.22.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.bsu.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 10-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"chaos"} = "<remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk oldpgp. post"; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk oldpgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"kaiwan"} = "<ghio(a)kaiwan.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"jpunix"} = "<remailer(a)jpunix.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"wien"} = "<remailer(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at> cpunk pgp hash nsub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash"; $remailer{"soda"} = "<remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu> eric pgp. post"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"usura"} = "<usura(a)xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"leri"} = "<remail(a)leri.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"desert"} = "<remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp."; Last ping: Mon 12 Sep 94 6:00:01 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- wien remailer(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at -*+*******-* 17:09 99.99% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu ****##****+* 7:12 99.99% c2 remail(a)c2.org -+***+*+**** 18:16 99.99% jpunix remailer(a)jpunix.com **++##**** * 5:40 99.99% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com --..-+-++-- 2:29:43 99.99% chaos remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu ######*****# 1:57 99.98% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com **+*#+*+**** 8:14 99.96% leri remail(a)leri.edu **+*#+****** 9:34 99.95% kaiwan ghio(a)kaiwan.com ++--*-+*.-+ 29:35 99.83% soda remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu +++..+++++++ 1:29:40 99.89% vox remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl --- ...--- 11:43:07 99.72% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *+ * **-**** 50:25 99.53% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com *+ #**-**** 56:07 99.31% desert remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl ..-- 26:50:26 99.03% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org +--- ----*- 6:41:53 98.76% usura usura(a)xs4all.nl +* -******* 9:57 96.99% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi __++******** 10:53:28 93.49% Suggested path: c2;bsu-cs;wien For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html Options and features cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. oldpgp Remailer does not like messages encoded with MIT PGP 2.6. Other versions of PGP, including 2.3a and 2.6ui, work fine. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). If you've got a Web page, please feel free to include a link to this page. If you think your Web page is relevant to the subject of remailers, let me know and I'll link it in. Comments and suggestions welcome! Note to remailer operators: this script generates hourly ping messages. If you don't want that, let me know and I will take your mailer off the list, or increase the interval between pings. Raph Levien

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Phil Zimmerman in Atlanta
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am authorized to announce... Phil Zimmerman is in Atlanta for Interop and will be a "commentator" at a separate panel discussion (Tuesday 13 September) on Clipper/DTI sponsored by EPIC. The subject of the panel is "Issues of Trust" -- "Can we trust the government?" All the usual suspects: Clinton Brooks (late of NSA) Jim Bidzos (RSA) John Droge (?) Dorthey Denning (Georgetown) Barbara Simons (ACM) David Sobel (EPIC)

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Re: Introduction- Telephone
by Ron Bardarson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reply to: RE>>Introduction: Telephone traffic analysis >> I stumbled upon this great explanation of telephone traffic analysis and >> thought I'd share it with the list: >It is to evade this sort of traffic analysis that complex routing, batching >and clustering of anon remailer traffic is being evolved. As long as 'someone else' controls the medium thru which the messages pass, traffic analysis will be possible. It may be a large problem, but it will still be doable with sufficient motivation. When you have an untappable wire between the sender and recipient, then traffic analysis is impossible (and crypto unnecessary). In order to get to the remailer chain you mention, I (for instance) can ONLY pass thru a couple a machines, which if properly monitored, reveal the traffic flow despite the remailers. You can still beat traffic analysis (and you still need crypto), but not in this medium.

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ACAPULCO H.E.A.T.
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, You won't believe what a chatterbox I'm going to be today. This is just the first of several posts I am planning. Of course, the most important must come first. This week's installment of Acapulco H.E.A.T. was the second part of a two-episode show called "Code Name: Stalemate." As you may recall, from last week, the story, set at a chess tournament in Venezuela, involved the attempted assassination of an ex-KGB spy named Andre by H.E.A.T.'s archenemy, Strake. I should mention that Andre was a dead ringer for Barry Goldwater (except with a bad Russian accent.) This week's episode hardly seemed connected to last week's. Strake is still holding Krissie hostage, but he seems more intent now on killing the entire H.E.A.T. The actor who plays Strake, a total megalomanic, completely chews the scenery in the worst case of over-acting I've seen in years. This, of course, leads to gratuitous gun play (God, women with guns make me so hot), a boat chase, an exploding boat and the inevitable climactic fist fight between the Good Guy and the Bad Guy. (The Good guy wins.) During the show we have Strake bugging H.E.A.T. HQ and shutting it down (again). Only this time Ashley breaks the "Kasporov algorithm" and breaks Stake's hold over the H.E.A.T. center AND infiltrates Strake's system. Strake also spoofs a phone call so that H.E.A.T. can't trace it. The Team uses small tracking devices to locate kidnapped members (they are discovered). I got some heat (pun intended) for not mentioning last week's bikini/Fabio ratio. When these episodes were make, Fabio was not part of the Team. They are all re-runs, so I don't know if he was part of the original cast and dropped later, or the other way around. Anyway, no Fabio. None of the principles were in bikinis, except for Krissie in the romantic flashback Marcos had while she was being held hostage by Strake. A number of beach background scenes were used, however, to pump up the bikini quotient. Finally, we did have a curious exchange between Tony and Cat in which he explained Zen. It had something to do with water and ice, but I guess I wasn't spiritual enough to grok it. IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT: My operatives are everywhere. Even as I write, one of them is on the trail of Alison Armitage .GIFs! If he is successful in bagging them, he will reveal his identity and make said .GIFs available to interested Cypherpunks. Stay tuned. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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CRYPTO ANARCHY/SOCIAL BODY
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Doug Cutrell offered some well thought out speculations on the social consequences of "crypto anarchy" in an essay he just posted to the list. I would like to respond to a few of his comments. Doug wrote: ... it is imperative that cypherpunks,... consider carefully what social impact these changes may have.... cypherpunks should examine ways to influence the deployment and patterns of use of strong crypto tools in society, and not merely consider the construction of the tools alone.... With all due respect, I think this has already been done by most Cypherpunks. We have looked at societal trends, seen problems, posited strong crypto as the solution to some of those problems and examined the consequences of strong crypto solutions. No one is writing code just to write code. The Cypherpunks list has always been ideologically driven. Though Cypherpunks cover the political spectrum, they have put aside sectarian differences to work towards the narrow ideology of personal privacy. At the same time, we have always thought about crypto "side effects." ... man is a social animal. We are evolved to survive through cooperative interactions with each other.... There are universal properties of interaction which create the social body in these species, and in all human societies throughout history. These properties depend fundamentally on the publicly visible nature of most social interactions.... Well, here I must disagree. While there is no disputing that man is a social animal, I find the last claim untenable. There are numerous historical forms of cooperative interaction that do not depend--"fundamentally" or otherwise--on a "publicly visible" interaction (e.g., postal mediated relationships, private clubs and other private relationships and most aspects of the market). Individual social animals exist in a relationship to the social body deriving from the visibility of their actions to others. This *defines* individuality.... While this is an interesting concept of individuality, it doesn't jive with any definition I've ever heard. If you were the only person on the planet, you would be just as much an "individual" (perhaps MORE so) than you are with 5.5 billion other folks blocking your view of the parade. ... Strong crypto -- the tools of crypto anarchy -- represents a break in these primal functions upon which the social body is based.... it is not only a first for human societies, but a first for all of biological evolution.... nodes -- "individuals" -- may appear and disappear over extremely short time periods, as anonymous identities come and go. All nodes may have any number of unknowable links, or links which are unknowable by arbitrarily large sections of the net. Links may have new properties, such as asymmetry of identity. Individual nodes may "unknowably" represent (equate with) entire collections of other nodes. The point is that the social structure is altered along dimensions that have been constant since the dawn of the evolution of social animals. Here is the crux of the matter. Doug obviously believes that crypto anarchy represents a paradigm shift or quantum leap in human interaction. I don't think so. every one of the "unique" properties Doug claimed existed for crypto anarchy already exists in the non-crypto society. I won't (unless asked) enumerate such analogs, but I will give two "clues" as an exercise for the student: John Paul Jones and Delaware corporations. [1] This picture implies the development of something radically different than what we now think of as a social body. [2] It is far more complex, with new types of basic components and operations. [3] There is no reason to expect it to resemble any society in the history of man, or to bear any resemblance to any social body which has evolved to date... [1] Only if the picture is correct, which has not been shown. [2] Granted, it is more complex, but really "new components" has yet to be demonstrated. [3] I most heartily disagree. Humans are conservative; when they make progress, it usually looks like an extension of what went before. (Ever notice how the first autos looked like buggies? Why do computer graphic interfaces use "desk" and "folder" metaphors?) There is *every* reason to expect crypto anarchy will resemble historical social models. ... For my purposes, desirable changes would include an increased standard of living for all humans, increased communications ... undesirable changes would include ... Crypto anarchy is coming whether we like it or not. With it, your hopes and fears are much more in your hands then they have ever been before. I hope we all use our super powers for good rather than evil. In any event, the cat is out of the bag. ... it seems that a reasonable approach would be to conduct computer simulations of the spontaneous forms of self organization that occur in populations participating under various game-theoretic and economic models, when these populations have access to strong crypto.... In my opinion (offered without a shred of proof), (1) it ain't gonna happen, (2) wouldn't work even if it did happen. In closing, I want to thank Doug for refocusing discussion of social implications in such organized and thoughtful way. I want to reiterate, this is not something that Cypherpunks have not thought about and discussed before. Nevertheless, it is always good to go over old ground if it can be done in a reasoned and comprehensive manner. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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PRIVACY REGULATIONS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Thanks to Chris Hibbert for the clarification of his (her?) police stop scenario. The first impression would have constituted very bad advice for dealing with your friend, the policeman. In his second message, Chris wrote: ... you do have to give a name (and probably an address) when the police ask. Of course, it might be added that you have to give a *correct* name, address and whatever. In common law countries, such as the US and UK, this requirement might not be as unequivocal as one might think. What name would "John Wayne" (or "Bill Clinton" for that matter) have to give? Neither was born with those names. What if Paul Stubens(?) hadn't volunteered that he was "Pee Wee Herman" when he got busted for lewd conduct? Maybe he'd still be on TV in his Playhouse. ... When they do have probable cause, they can insist that you cooperate or allow a search. And if you don't cooperate, they can arrest you. "Probably cause" is not required for a police officers to make what is called a "field stop." The criterion for a field stop is "reasonable suspicion." During a field stop, an officer can hold on to you only as long as it takes to determine if there is probable cause to believe you have committed a crime (this could include checking to see if you have any wants or warrants). Incidental to the field stop, the officer is allowed to do a gross pat-down search of you and anything you are wearing or carrying. The purpose of this pat-down is solely to determine if you have weapons that would endanger the officer. They can't, for example, look inside an envelope (which might contain drugs), because it could not reasonably be expected to conceal a weapon such as a knife or gun. ... If you assume they always have the right to insist, you will spend more time talking to cops than you have to, and will let them dig deeper than they have a right to. The longer they poke around the better the chances they'll find something you thought of as innocent that they think is suspicious.... Amen, to that. When a cop asks if he can look in the trunk of your car, or take a look around your apartment, you can say "I'd rather not," and ask if you're free to go. **Remember that they have a gun** and the right to use it in some situations. Be polite. They'll let you know if they're insisting on your cooperation. Physical resistance is a very bad idea. But there's no need to let them look if they don't insist, and they are prohibiting from insisting if they don't have a legally justifiable reason. Dittos. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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CONTROL FREAKS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Samuel Kaplin responded to Duncan's assertion that markets have ways of dealing with uncertainty, by writing: The main assumption here is that the populous and the markets realize that they are in a totalitarian state. We in the U.S. are evolving closer and closer to this and most seem not to see it, and if they do, not to care about it. I think this misses Duncan's point. Neither the populace nor the market (the economic interactions of the populace) need to realize they are in a totalitarian state, to take appropriate action. What the market does "know" is how to shift capital from lesser to more remunerative investments. This is a homeostatic flow just like water seeking its own level. The senario that I see, is [1] the borders being closed.... [2] All of the firearms and weapons being removed from private hands.... [3] The U.S. economy being isolated from the rest of the world.... Once your economy is isolated from the rest of the worlds who cares what a dollar is worth.... [1] If they stopped foreign businesspeople and tourists, the economy suffers. Without Mexican "guest workers" the price of agricultural products go through the ceiling. The US can afford to close its boarders. [2] I'm a gun nut; I know gun nuts. If you want to see a civil war, just try to remove the *200 million* guns from private hands. Gun ownership is *growing* not declining. These folks are *serious* about keeping their weapons. Contrary to popular belief, most cops strongly support the rights of civilians to keep and bear arms. Who are you going to get to grab the guns? [3] The US economy is broad, but not that broad. Without world trade (especially for petroleum) we would grind to a halt. In the meantime, the billions of people who depend on food grown in America would not quietly lay down and starve. The government can, of course, call a dollar whatever it wants. The more unrealistic the assessment, however, the faster black markets will bloom in the "alternative economy." S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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"Packet Sniffers"
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this is probably the wrong forum, but I also know that the quality of hte people here is ample to get my question answered. I am an undergraduate student at a state university in Minnesota. This summer as part of a long-term independent study I set up a Linux machine on the campus ethernet, get it assigned an IP, and then proceeded to do a practicum on system administration and information management. (This is also the same machine that briefly rand the digested version of the Cypherpunks mailing list). Following some departmental conflicts and (IMHO) illegal sanctions, the machine was shut down for some unspecified "security concerns". Essentially, it turns out, the computer science department didn't was this kind of independent project around. So I trundled across campus to another college, got the proper faculty behind me and submitted for the continuance of the project. After three weeks of jumping through the correct hoops and over the correct hurdles, there appears to be only one "concern" remaining. Some junior computer administrator has raised the concept of "packet sniffers" as being a suitable bar for my project (the machine is a 486/66 Linux machine). Unfortunately, I haven't a clue what exactly a "packet sniffer" is and am really not in a position to answer the arguments in even a semi-informed manner. Thus, I am posting here in the hope that one or more of you can take a moment to give me the lowdown on what these things are. Common sense seems to indicate that it is a piece of software or firmware that will display the contents of any packets that pass through the machine on its way to the correct destination. The specific setup would have the machine on a thinnet link in a lab with about 20 other PCs which are used primarily as word processors and terminals to the campus VAX or UNIX machines. The specific upstream setup is unknown, but I assume there is some kind of a line to a router upstream, eventually winding its way into the real world. It seems to me that a packet sniffer on the lowest link of the network wouldn't be able to look at those packets passing upstream because the router would never pass them down, but I could be just plain wrong and thats why I'm asking for some clarification. Thanks for your help. Sorry if this seems confusing. ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> I do not necessarily speak for the \/ Finger for PGP Public Key <=> City of Mankato or anyone else -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 2.1) GJ/CM d- H-- s-:++>s-:+ g+ p? au+ a- w++ v* C++(++++) UL++++$ P+>++ L++$ 3- E---- N+++ K+++ W M+ V-- -po+(---)>$ Y++ t+ 5+++ j R+++$ G- tv+ b+ D+ B--- e+>++(*) u** h* f r-->+++ !n y++**

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How to Handle Corrections/Additions to Cyphernomicon
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks all for the responses to the Cyhernomicon. Some people have begun to send corrections, clarifications, elaborations, etc., and others have asked me what _form_ such points shold be made in, e.g., should they list the "16.3.1" section numbers, etc.? So here are some points: 1. By all means send corrections, etc., as I said in the docs (the Release Note). 2. Include a *fragment of text* you are responding to. This will allow me to grep for the fragment or keyword and thus make the changes. 3. The section numbers ("13.9.1") are *NOT* useful, as they change automatically everytime I rearrange material. (By the way, I only chose to number the stuff out to 3 levels..."MORE" will do it to any number of levels, or mix in bullets, stars, Roman numbers, etc.) 4. If you think some points ought to be publically discussed, use your judgement and, then, go ahead and do so. Obviously I didn't intend the FAQ as a static, undiscussable document. (There are themes in it that don't get enough discussion, and that need discussion.) --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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